

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN SPAIN

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INTRODUCTION

On July 17th, 1937, the reactionary forces which had been defeated in the elections of the preceding February by the Popular Front, rose in armed rebellion against the Spanish Government. The plot had been under preparation for a very long time. The generals who started the rebellion in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco were simply repeating the tactics of General Sanjurjo who also attempted a subversive movement against the Republic, in the name of Spanish feudalism, on August 10th, 1932. So that there was really nothing new in what occurred. For the Spanish Right had adopted an attitude of permanent rebellion against the Republican State ever since the new régime had come into being.

Sanjurjo's attempt at insurrection having proved a failure, the Right began to look towards General Franco. And for two years they were busy preparing the aggression which finally came to a head in July 1936. Aware of their internal weakness the political parties and the conspirator Generals sought outside Spain the help which they considered indispensable to ensure the success of their revolt. They could count on the recruitment of Moors, which began on the first day of the rising, if not earlier, and on Italian and German war-material. They also had the firm and enthusiastic support of the Portuguese dictatorship, which had allowed the lengthy preparations for the revolt to take place on Portuguese soil.

All the strength, therefore, of these coup d'état generals and of the feudal classes who detested the Republic—because of its social laws, its liberty, its parliamentary system—existed outside Spain. Without the promise of help from Mussolini, Hitler and Oliveira Salazar,

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Franco would never have started his rebellion. But already before July 17th, 1936, there existed pacts and agreements between the three powers mentioned and the intending rebels which guaranteed to the Spanish generals the certainty of foreign intervention against the Republican democracy of their country.

"Pertinax", the well-informed Diplomatic correspondent of the Catholic Conservative "Écho de Paris", who is hardly a person to be suspected of sympathy towards the Left popular movements of Spain, wrote the following in the August number of the London "Fortnightly" :—

"It is too easily forgotten that on the 28th of July, 1936, four Caproni aeroplanes staffed with officers and non-commissioned officers of the Italian army had the bad luck to land or to be wrecked on the wrong side of the border between Algeria and Spanish Morocco. Mr. Peyrouton, the high commissioner in Rabat, personally cross-examined those men whose names and military ranks were indicated in papers found on board. They all declared that they had been recruited from various units of the Italian air forces at the beginning of July and had received their final instructions on the 15th, that is three days before the outbreak of the counter-revolution. As early as March or April in the same year, the French Ambassador in Berlin had informed his government that General Sanjurjo, who would have been the leader of the rebellion but for the accident which cost him his life, had reported himself there and had been welcomed in official quarters."

Only fools or knaves, or foolish knaves,—for even these exist—could deny all the evidence. And the evidence shows that the Spanish rebellion, even before it was finally

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declared, was an act of aggression not only of the Spanish Generals against their legitimate Government but of Italy, Germany and Portugal against Spain.

The present volume deals with the foreign intervention in Spain. It will be followed by others, in chronological order. It is therefore not necessary to give in the introduction the proofs which are duly offered in the text.

It is nevertheless highly interesting to see the effects which Italo-German-Portuguese intervention has had on the course of the war, particularly at the beginning.

Until the end of October, when Russia began to send war-material to the Spanish Government, the Spanish people were fighting their foes under conditions of terrible material inferiority. In these months—from July until the early days of November—the Spanish Government was completely abandoned by the rest of the world. True, in democratic countries there were collections among the working class for the Spanish Popular Front. And clothes and money were sent to Spain. But these pious activities lacked efficacy in comparison with the work of Italy, Germany, and Portugal who sent tanks, planes, rifles and machine-guns. The Spanish people had none of these things—the rebel generals had them in abundance. “I shall win, because I have better material than the ‘Reds’”, Franco declared to an “Evening Standard” correspondent.

On August 19th, 1936, the “Manchester Guardian” reported the following from Gibraltar :

“Madrid’s Government militia are some of the bravest men I have ever seen, but their position is made difficult by the fact that hardly any of them are armed with anything approaching efficient guns. The militia in many cases are armed with nothing better than fowling pieces, and some of them have even been issued with old weapons taken out of

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museums. Many of these guns have not been fired for well over 100 years."

On August 13th, 1936, "The Times" correspondent in Hendaye wrote :

"The insurgents are preparing to counter from the air. Burgos headquarters announces that 19 new aeroplanes have reached the Guadarrama zone to-day."

On August 14th, "The Times" correspondent on the Franco-Spanish frontier wrote :

"The anti-Government forces now have more aircraft, and increased activity in the air has been a feature of the last 24 hours."

On September 2nd the same correspondent wrote :

"There is, however, a general impression that the insurgents are still receiving strong support in the shape of munitions, aircraft and war material of all kinds from abroad, and that their attacks are becoming increasingly formidable for this reason."

On September 21st, 1936, the Minister of Marine and Air, Don Indalecio Prieto, said to an English press correspondent :

"In the first months of the struggle we had more (aeroplanes) than the rebels. But to-day, after two months of 'neutrality'—and of continuous deliveries of German and Italian—Heinkel, Fiat and Savoia—machines to the rebels, this superiority has changed. Now it is 12 to one in favour of the Fascists."

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On October 9th, 1936, the "Daily Telegraph" correspondent in Madrid wrote :

" Navalperal, one of the Government's strongholds in the Sierra de Gredos, about 40 miles north-west of Madrid, fell to-day to the insurgents after tremendous fighting lasting three days. All last night the insurgents shelled and bombed the town, which finally had to be evacuated by the Government troops, who retired to Las Navas.

As in the case of the fall of Toledo, this loss was due chiefly to the insurgents' superiority in the air. They used three-engined bombers, armoured underneath as protection against anti-aircraft fire."

On October 10th, 1936, the Foreign Minister, Sr. Alvarez del Vayo, declared to the "Daily Telegraph" correspondent :

" The insurgents have obtained constant aid, while the Government has met with all kinds of obstacles. The insurgents are thus able to allow themselves the luxury of squandering their war materials because they are sure of regular supplies.

The rebellion would have been already practically suppressed, with the exception, perhaps, of Navarre, which is the only region where the insurgents have the support of large sectors of the civil population, but for the foreign aid given to the insurgents.

This foreign aid is particularly noticeable in aviation. In the note I sent to the signatories of the non-intervention agreement I detailed the strength of the insurgents' air force at the moment when the rebellion began.

One week before the present Cabinet was formed, I visited the Madrid aerodromes with Señor Caballero. We had four 'planes for each insurgent 'plane.

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To-day, according to figures supplied by the Air Ministry, the proportion is probably 20 insurgent planes for each Government machine.

More insurgent 'planes have been brought down than Government machines, and if they had not received foreign aircraft in such quantities the enemy air force would not exist now.

This figure of 20 to one is alone a mortal blow for non-intervention accord. Nor is there any sign of reduction in foreign aid for the insurgents. It continues cynically and is encouraged by the indifference with which up to the present, the Spanish Government's exposure of the infractions of the non-intervention agreement have been received in official circles abroad."

On October 19th, 1936, "The Times" correspondent in Madrid wrote, with reference to the insurgents' advance along the Tagus valley :

"The crushing superiority of the insurgents in the air of course helped."

James Abbe, the "Morning Post" correspondent in Burgos wrote as follows on October 21st, 1936 :

"This lull and relaxation of tension is due, I think, to the fact that the greatest bulk of General Franco's forces is now in advance, and three columns are converging on Navalcarnero, south-west of Madrid, in order to deliver a joint attack on the capital. The Junta forces appear to have secured the complete mastery of the air. Government planes were conspicuous by their absence at all the forces of the front which I visited."

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Describing the war methods of the insurgents in their march on Madrid, "The Times" correspondent there wrote, on October 23rd, 1936 :

"In general, attack is heralded by air bombardment that scares the villagers and swells the pitiful convoys of refugees with their donkeys, mules, and carts hastening towards Madrid. Insurgent artillery engages prearranged objectives, and battle begins in earnest when the large Caproni aeroplanes, sometimes three or four at a time, appear with their escorts of Fiats. The Government positions are strewn with bombs.

Tanks then advance half a dozen at a time, moving with great rapidity and circling with ease, vomiting fire on the open lines of the Militia, crossing right up to and over the trenches, where these exist. This display might well shake the morale of seasoned troops unable to oppose equality of armaments. The Militia are mostly raw levies poorly armed."

Frank L. Kluckholm, correspondent of the "New York Times" in rebel territory, sent the following message from London on his return from Spain (October 31st, 1936):

"Whatever the rights or wrongs of the Spanish situation may be and whether the Leftists indeed represent communism—which is doubtful—an impartial observer is forced to the conclusion that General Franco's movement is extremely unpopular with the bulk of the people, who regard it as an attempt of the privileged class to turn the clock back. Only foreign aid has made the Rebel success to date possible."

On August 18th, 1936, the Diplomatic Correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian" wrote :

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“ The loyalist levies who are not in the militia are manufacturing grenades of their own. They are very short of ammunition for their small arms and artillery. Their equipment is often wretched. According to one eye-witness many of them are mere boys and girls with nothing but a rifle, a shirt, a pair of trousers, and sandals. They have very little to eat. Nevertheless, they stand up with astonishing hardihood to the vastly superior weapons of their opponents.

The loyalists appear to have received some passenger 'planes from France, but these are manned not by French but by Spanish crews, and are quite unequal to the battle 'planes manned, at least in part, by trained Italian and German crews. No British war material appears to have reached Spain, but the rebels have received considerable sums from the City, where these sums are described as “insurance against Communism”.

There can be little doubt that even the presence of 18,000 Moroccan troops in Spain would not have been enough to ensure the military success of the rebels if help had not come, and was not still coming, from Italy and Germany. German 'planes continue to arrive for service with the rebels. The German Junker 'planes now stationed in Seville are battle 'planes. Their German crews are staying in the Hotel Christine.”

On September 30th, 1936, President of the Spanish Republic, Don Manuel Azaña, gave an interview to Vernon Bartlett, “News Chronicle” special correspondent :

“ ‘ Enthusiasm is good, but there are occasions when heavy bombers are even better,’ he said, emphasising the growing disparity between the Loyal and rebel air forces owing to the policy of non-intervention which he condemned very bluntly.”

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The policy of "Non-Intervention", which becomes in practice active and constant intervention of Italy, Germany and Portugal in favour of Franco, and passive complicity on the part of other countries against the legitimate Spanish Government, is without precedent in history. The fact is that the Spanish war has brought the final collapse of international law. To this collapse England and France have contributed in no small measure. If these two great Powers had maintained an attitude of simple legality the Spanish war would not have gone on for two years. Because had it not been for the help given to Franco by international Fascism the war would have lasted only a few months, and would unquestionably have ended with a victory for the Government.

According to the "Institute of International Law"

"Every Power at peace with an independent nation is bound not to interfere with the measures which that nation takes for the re-establishment of internal peace. It is bound not to furnish to the insurgents either arms, munitions, military goods or financial aid."

From the first moment the Governments of the democratic nations declared themselves neutral. Such neutrality was in contradiction to the law. But Mussolini, Hitler and Oliveira Salazar on the other hand, affirmed their interest in an insurgent victory. Franco's cause is our cause—said the dictators. The answer of the democratic countries to this open and declared intention to intervene against the legitimate Government was the policy of "Non-Intervention". They refused to sell war-material to the Republic. The consequence of this is well known to the Spanish people, who in the beginning were forced to fight without any proper weapons, and throughout have suffered under material conditions of marked inferiority to those of the rebels. The testimony which we reproduce

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here explains the easy advance of the insurgents from Andalusia to Madrid.

There has been much talk of a Soviet plot to implant Communism in Spain. That is pure reactionary propaganda. Russia only decided to send war-material to Spain when she saw only too plainly that "Non-Intervention" was an unjust farce. The first Russian war-material reached Spain at the end of October, after M. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in London, had declared in the Non-Intervention Committee that the Soviet Union only considered itself bound by the Non-Intervention agreement in the same measure as the other Powers concerned.

On the subject of Russian intervention we may once more quote "Pertinax" :

" It is absurd to assign to Soviet Russia a decisive part in the sequence of events. During the whole month of August, last year, Stalin remained indifferent to the fate of the Spanish Communists, outnumbered by Anarchists, Trotzkyists, Socialists and Syndicalists of all descriptions. When he was stirred out of his passivity and forwarded the airplanes and tanks which probably saved Madrid last November, his motive was not so much to help in the creation of a Soviet in Spain—he is intelligent enough not to have dreamed of it—as to maintain the Third International, the weapon he wants to have in hand against Germany. . . . We have played to the end with cheaters the game of non-intervention. We have complacently witnessed the arrival in the peninsula of an expeditionary force of some 70,000 Italians and about 13,000 Germans (later reduced to 7,000 or 8,000), and we have found whatever justification of our conduct we could in the presence, on the side of Valencia, of an international brigade of 25,000 or 30,000 which has now shrunk to 6,000 or 7,000."

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"The same writer," wrote *Lawrence H. Fernsworth*, "*The Times*" correspondent in Spain, "finds the entire Russian man power in Spain to consist of about 2,000 engineers, mechanics and airmen. This corresponds with my own observation. I have never seen a Russian common soldier or infantry officer in Spain."

There is no need to insist on the lack of wisdom shown in the policy which the democratic countries have chosen. In the following work will be found abundant material on every aspect of foreign intervention in Spain. We believe that the collection of such material is of service to History. It is important that the documents should not be lost, and here, after an intense work of selection, we offer them in a more or less ordered form.

This first volume deals with the active intervention of Italy, Germany and Portugal and gives detailed information on the work carried out by the League of Nations during the first six months of the war. The second volume will deal with the attitude of France, England and Russia, and other countries, and the policy of "Non-Intervention" with the work done by the Committee of that name.

Both the first and second volumes contain the events which occurred between the beginning of the war, in July 1936, and the month of January 1937. Other volumes, in chronological order, will deal with subsequent events.

Our intention in undertaking the present work has merely been to prepare a work of consultation for those persons who need such reference for making or writing History. In our opinion we are doing a service to truth in collecting and ordering, day by day, important material which probably (certainly to some extent) would have been lost, had we not undertaken a difficult but necessary task.

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CHAPTER ONE

GERMAN INTERVENTION

ACTIVITIES OF GERMAN NATIONAL- SOCIALISM IN SPAIN BEFORE JULY 18TH

Contents of the Documents Found by the Police in the Nazi Centres of Barcelona

Since the spring of 1933, that is to say shortly after Hitler came into power, the German Fascists resident in Spain organized themselves politically into sections of National-Socialism, and began a work of espionage and disturbance which is easily seen from the documents recently found by the Barcelona police. Spain, with her characteristic hospitality to foreigners, took no steps to arrest this danger of Nazi espionage. The Nazis held their political meetings in complete freedom, and often started conflicts by their provocative manifestations. At the outbreak of the war on July 18th, 1936, there fled from Spain some 3,000 Germans whose consciences cannot have been very easy. But according to declarations made by the Nazi chiefs outside our country, the National-Socialist movement included some 10,000 Germans resident in Spain. Little by little they have left the territory loyal to the Government, and gone to the rebel camp to fight against the Spaniards, or else they have returned to Germany.

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Two English newspapers, the Manchester Guardian and the News Chronicle published extracts from the documents found by the Barcelona police in the general headquarters of the National-Socialists.

We reproduce here the articles from the two great English dailies.

On July 29th, 1936, a special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian sent to his paper an interesting report on the general situation in Barcelona. This article appeared on August 5th, and among other matters alluded to the documents which we have mentioned.

SCHOOLS AND SPORTS CLUBS TO UNDERMINE THE SPANISH STATE

The special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes :

The only foreign property that has not been immune is that of three known German centres of Fascist activities. Two of these are suspiciously near points in which the Spanish Fascists were most strongly fortified at the beginning of the struggle on Sunday, July 19th. The parties attacking these three centres included numerous anti-Nazi German exiles, and the attacking parties were proved to have been entirely justified by the finding of numerous compromising documents. A "Brown-book" is being prepared from these, which will show, it is alleged, that the German Consulate has consistently violated Spanish law by promoting systematic Nazi propaganda radiating from twenty-seven centres in various parts of Spain. Over two thousand members of these centres (under the names of sporting and social clubs, schools,

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etc.), especially those engaged in industrial pursuits, have been fomenting a network of rumour and denunciation throughout the country, and have been in continual communication with Nazi offices in Hamburg and Berlin, from whence they have been largely financed.

A number of Spanish papers with reactionary tendencies have willingly lent themselves to the spreading of propaganda, notably in Barcelona, Madrid, and Málaga, in all of which there are large semi-permanent foreign colonies.

Broadcasting stations have also played a part in this subversive campaign, and many of the recent false rumours of Fascist successes have been traced to them. A number of Germans are said to have taken part in the active fighting, in the Fascist ranks, and to have admitted the fact openly before the loyalist victory became definitely known.

A formal protest is being presented to the anti-Fascist authorities of Catalonia, urging the complete suppression of these Nazi organizations, the arrest and expulsion from the country of their members, with confiscation of all their documents and papers, and an official protest against consular abuse of the hospitality of Spain.

Later the writer alludes to the documents in these words :

FOR THE UPKEEP OF THE SCHOOLS

Among the many significant documents with reference to German Nazi interference in the internal affairs of Spain are the following:

1. Letter headed "Headquarters of Spanish Division, Reich Foreign Organization, Harbour

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path of their not very subtle predecessors. The mass of the disgusting Lisbon and Madrid bourgeoisie will show itself very friendly to Hitler as soon as a Nazi Ambassador or Minister is on the spot. . . .

The letter ends by emphasizing the special importance of the radio as a conveyer of Nazi propaganda, for it will make the Nazis "interpreters of the will of the press which we can neither bribe nor conquer because we have not sufficient money."

SECRET COURIER SERVICE

The Spanish branch was in Madrid at first, but was then transferred to Barcelona (its address is Calle Aribau 124). The leader of the Spanish branch is H——, who is a salaried official of the Nazi Party. He often travelled to and fro between Barcelona and Berlin as official courier of the German Foreign Office. His pass as German official courier was issued by the German Embassy in Spain on April 24th (the original has been seen by your correspondent).

Communication between Barcelona and Berlin was kept up not only by official couriers but also by the special secret courier service of the Nazi Party. Messages of special secrecy and urgency were telegraphed in code (known as the "telegram key AO"). One of the letters seen by your correspondent (dated October 1st, 1935) suggests that this code be placed at the disposal of all the more important branches.

Special branches ("Stellen") were established in all the Spanish ports. All these branches were linked up in a close network with the German Embassy, the Consulates, and the Chambers of

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Commerce. The German "Labour Front" also had a hand in Spain. Its special duty was to supervise the Spanish ports and harbours. One of the tasks of its "Harbour Service" was to secure the deportation to Germany of all Germans who were opponents of the Hitlerite régime. According to a letter dated March 5th, 1934, all branches in Spanish ports and harbours were instructed to appoint "a suitable member of the Party" to establish relations with every incoming German ship.

SMUGGLING PROPAGANDA

The Nazis had an extensive organization for smuggling propaganda into Spain. The officials of the Party as well as the German Consuls in Spain received instructions how to elude the Spanish Customs officials. All were under orders to take a part in these smuggling activities. Further extracts from letters, of which copies are in the possession of your correspondent, will illustrate these activities.

On September 6th, 1934, the head of the Nazi branch at Málaga wrote that he had succeeded in securing the arrest of a German, B——. "We shall," he concludes, "try to send the man to Germany on the 10th in the (steamship) *Spezia*. Heil Hitler!"

A letter dated January 17th, 1936, gives precise instructions as to how packets of propaganda can be smuggled through the Spanish Customs (it says, amongst other things, that the packets must not be too big).

A letter dated December 30th, 1935, states that a certain amount of smuggling can be done in motor-boats.

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INFLUENCING THE PRESS

The Nazis regard a favourable public opinion in foreign countries as a commercial, political, and military asset to the Third Realm. Their propaganda throughout the world is unequalled for its quantity and its systematic and multifarious character. Amongst the documents seized by the Spanish police in Barcelona is a confidential memorandum drawn up by the Nazi "Landesleitung" (the name given to the head organization of the Nazis in every country) on methods of creating a public opinion in favour of Germany, with special reference to the establishment of a new German agency that would place articles of a suitably tendentious kind in the Spanish press.

This memorandum is of great interest because it demonstrates the methods and principles followed by the Nazis in all countries and reveals, above all, the importance they attach to military considerations. The "Landesleitung" in every country receives directives from Berlin. For example, on May 22nd, 1935, the "press department" of the "Overseas Organization" (Auslandsorganisation) in Berlin gave instructions that articles should be placed in the Spanish journal *Sintesis* because that journal had "discussed German affairs in a friendly fashion or not at all."

SPAIN'S STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

The memorandum itself, which was drawn up in 1935, begins by indicating the main objects of Nazi propaganda in Spain.

"A glance at the map," so it opens, "will show the strategic significance of Spain in a war between Germany and France." It is not the Spanish Army.

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that matters so much as the raw materials, the cattle, the foodstuffs, and the labour with which Spain could supply the French front. Beyond this there is the possibility which France would have "of transporting African troops to France by land and of securing cover on Spanish soil (whether on the mainland or on the islands) for her flanks—that is to say, for her overseas communications or for her naval activities."

But even in peace time Spain may be useful to Germany, so the memorandum continues. She might for example support her in the League of Nations by not voting against her, "nor should it be forgotten that Spain was once almost on the point of resigning from the League and that this inclination is not extinct even now." Besides, "Spain is of considerable importance to German export trade."

What makes German propaganda easier in Spain than in France is that "Germany does not want to drag Spain into a war or any other risky adventure." And, in spite of "racial antitheses," Spaniards "harmonize with the Germans as with no other people."

The memorandum then deals with the practical tasks confronting German propagandists in Spain, and begins by mentioning the "considerable success" achieved in so far as the "untenable condition" that gave "the French Havas Agency a practical news monopoly with regard to German affairs in Spain" has been eliminated. This was achieved by establishing a German telegraphic agency (the D.N.B.-Fabra).

SUPPLEMENTARY NEWS SERVICES

The supply of German news to Spanish papers is described as unsatisfactory for several reasons. One of them is that Spanish correspondents in

Germany "are not free from the lack of education which is peculiar to the Spanish journalist, and are therefore not even half able to report correctly." As for the smaller Spanish papers which cannot afford to keep correspondents abroad, they are dependent on agencies, "amongst which the United Press plays a most inglorious part."

The work of the D.N.B.-Fabra can be supplemented, so the memorandum continues, in various ways—for example, by the "Press Attaché" (Pressebeirat) of the German Embassy in Madrid, who "works with financial means and through intermediaries" but "suffers from the weakness of all bureaucratic work, such as slowness, lack of initiative," and so on. Then there is the Spanish branch (Landesgruppe) of the Nazi Party. The branch began its work without any means at its disposal, "but is now in touch with the Embassy and has partial control over the Embassy's funds."

A supplementary activity is that of the travel agency of the German State Railways (Reichsbahn-zentrale für den Deutschen Reiseverkehr), which has "sent its press service to Spanish newspapers" and has opened a branch in Madrid. There is also the German "Academic Exchange" (of German and foreign students), "which to some extent works directly, but also through the Embassy and the press."

The memorandum then goes on to explain what ought to be done to make the German press agency serve its purpose more effectively.

Comment on important events relating to German home or foreign policy ought to be available at a moment's notice. Explanatory articles adapted to the Spanish mentality and dealing with German conditions should be placed in the Spanish Press, as well as articles which "will indirectly advertise German trade."

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INFLUENCING THE NEWS AGENCIES

The agency will have to cultivate relations with Spanish newspapers, journalists, and authors. It is better, so the memorandum continues, to try to influence the smaller rather than the bigger Spanish news agencies. The bigger agencies would "demand more money" and would nevertheless "show their independence." Besides, they would publish articles by persons critical of the Third Realm—"We cannot, for example, collaborate with a firm that has undertaken to place articles by Georg Bernhard or Emil Ludwig." But "a small firm will be entirely dependent on us and therefore altogether in our hands. The man in charge must be a Spanish journalist who has an interest in placing as many articles as possible and will therefore constantly go the round of the newspaper offices."

The memorandum suggests that a "small news agency" would cost about 500 pesetas a month and that the salary of the journalist in charge would come to another 500 pesetas. Further details with regard to payment for articles are given. Any sums beyond those paid by the Reich could be used for various extra purposes—for example, "as occasional bonuses to journalists who will see that the articles published by the agency are reproduced as often as possible." Additional sums could be obtained from firms for articles on, say, "The Progress of the Diesel engine," or "A new malaria cure," or "The aspect of the modern motor-car," which would advertise certain firms (the names of the firms being mentioned).

The memorandum concludes by stating that nothing is more effective in influencing public opinion than a good telegraphic agency. Such an agency is, "so

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to speak, the skeleton, while comment and reporting are the flesh. Only the two together make a live body capable of doing good work."

BERLIN'S CONSULS AND DIPLOMATS

A further series of the documents seized by the Spanish police in Barcelona is concerned with the systematic "Nazification" of the German Diplomatic and Consular Service. The documents are, by the way, no longer in Barcelona. They were transferred from there to Paris about a month ago. The originals have been seen by your correspondent and copies are in his possession here.

The documents show that the party has achieved an even greater influence on the appointment of German representatives abroad than of German officials in Germany. In a letter dated June 17th, 1936, the head organization (Landesleitung) of the Nazi Party in Spain wrote to the German Consul at San Sebastian that the director of the Spanish branch of the party (Landesgruppenleiter) has "a recognized right to sanction or to disallow the appointment or dismissal of persons in Consular posts." The letter requests the Consul to submit copies of all correspondence relating to such posts to the "Landesgruppenleiter," for "only then is it possible to co-operate in a manner promising success for the party in the delicate question of pervading [with Nazis] the Consular body of the [German] Foreign Office. . . . Heil Hitler!"

CONTROL OF DIPLOMATS AND CONSULS

The members of the German diplomatic and Consular Corps are ultimately controlled not by the

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Nazis in the country to which they are accredited but by the central organization in Berlin of all the Nazi organizations abroad (Reichsleitung der Auslands-organization). The authority exercised by this central body was established in an agreement between the Nazi Party and the German Foreign Office on February 7th, 1934. German representatives abroad represent not merely the Government but the Nazi Party. A letter, referring to the agreement of February 7th, and dated May 30th, 1934, is amongst the documents. It is addressed to the Spanish Consul in Granada, and informs him that he "is delegated to the 'Landesgruppe' in Spain and is subordinated in a disciplinary and organizational sense to the superior authorities in that Landesgruppe. Heil Hitler!" An immediate control over the German diplomatic and Consular Corps abroad is therefore exercised by the "Landesgruppen" which now exist in all countries of the world where there are Germans.

SMUGGLING

German diplomatic or consular officials sometimes receive orders from their Party superiors which, as many of the documents show, are incompatible with the laws of the country to which they are accredited. Many of the documents relate to smuggling activities. There is, for example, a letter dated December 28th, 1935, marked "Strictly confidential" and signed by the German Consul in Cartagena, which says: "Parcels (propaganda), etc., which are not too big can be received here without difficulty if they are handed over cost free to Inspector S. of the D.G. Neptune, Bremen, Freihafen 1, Neptune Warehouse." In a similar letter, also marked "Strictly confidential," the German Consul in Malaga (his name is given)

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says that he has spoken to the son of the manager of a certain shipping line (name given) who states that "one or two parcels per steamer can be taken ashore if they are not too big and if they are handed over by the Party branch in Hamburg to the dockyards office."

On January 5, 1935, the chief of the Party branch at Tetuan wrote that "to go on working in a manner that is truly in the national interest it is necessary to dispatch an energetic and seasoned member of the Party" as Consul. The letter shows that the whole German Consular Corps in Morocco is being brought under Nazi control and that a special effort is being made to extend that control to the French zone.

The pressure of the Party on persons suspected of not being convinced Nazis is reflected in dozens of letters. All such persons must in time capitulate before the hints, the menaces, and the defamatory methods used against themselves.

On December 3rd, 1936, another special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian alludes to the famous documents, and amplifies the information already given by his paper, in the following terms :

INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT'S AIR STRENGTH

Shortly before the outbreak of the Spanish civil war the German espionage service was on the point of receiving detailed information about Spanish aerodromes. The information consisted of notes and sketches showing the precise character of each aerodrome, the numbers and types of the machines, and so on.

It was drawn up in reply to detailed questionnaires that show the intense interest taken by the Germans

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in the aerial forces and the anti-aircraft defences of the Spanish Government on the eve of the rebellion.

On August 31st a German subject, Wilhelm Henckels, was arrested at Barcelona on suspicion of being a German agent. He was found to be in possession of the address of another German subject, Bernhard Funk, who had left Barcelona (it was known afterwards that he had been arrested in Madrid on July 15th). When the police searched his rooms they found the documents, some of which were ready for the post and bore Berlin addresses. Two of the packets had covering letters addressed "Care of" persons with women's names. One covering letter reads:

DEAR GRETHEL,—To show you that you enjoy my confidence unalterably now as before, I would like to send you the enclosed envelope, which contains notes in the French language on the state of our business.

The second covering letter bears the same date. It is addressed to "Dear Dorle," in whom Herr Funk also expresses his "great confidence," adding that there is no one else in whom he feels "so much confidence." He begs her to keep "the envelope with some notes" until he asks for them again.

One of the sketches Herr Funk made of a Spanish aerodrome indicates twenty-nine numbered items, the tabulated list of these items being given on a separate sheet.

INFORMATION ASKED FOR

In one of the questionnaires the following information is asked for:

Precise details about the aerial armament of the Getafe aerodrome are desired. These details

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should relate specially to the type, weight, and actual load of the bombs and to the depots where they are stored. It is also very interesting to know the number of aerial machine-guns and the calibre and number of the cartridges allotted to them, as well as all kinds of information about the material used in recent construction.

Another questionnaire contains inquiries about four aerodromes in Morocco, two in Barcelona, and two in a locality with a name that is illegible in the document. Among the inquiries are the following:

(3) Number of officers and men on duty at the aerodrome, specifying the number of pilots, observers, wireless operators, and others.

(4) Anti-aircraft defences, giving details of the artillery, machine-guns, etc., as well as the personnel employed in defence. Also indicate possible existence of defence in case of attack.

(5) Number of aeroplanes. Speed, radius, armament position of each aeroplane, condition, age, bomb-carrying capacity.

(10) Illumination available for night flights.

Photographs of the questionnaires, the replies, and the sketches are in the possession of your correspondent.

STRUGGLE FOR THE MONOPOLY OF SPANISH TRADE

Nazi activities in Spain since the outbreak of the military rebellion clearly reveal that the interest of Berlin in our territory was not only spiritual and military, but very especially economic. In reality, the German "crusade" aims at markets for the products of the Ruhr and Essen, and at raw materials for these industries. Before July

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18th, 1936, Germany was already fighting to exclude from Spain all but Nazi trade. On August 25th, 1936, the Manchester Guardian discusses this aspect of Hitlerian espionage while revealing the following :

Business advisers are attached to the foreign branches of the Nazi Party. These advisers are under the control of the Nazi head organizations for trade in Berlin and Hamburg. The head organizations receive reports not only about German firms, but also about firms where Germans are employed and about foreign firms that handle German goods. Nazi business organizations abroad also serve the cultural and political as well as the commercial interests of the Reich as a whole. Behind all these organizations are the wealth and power of the German State.

The following extracts are from a report, dated March 31st, 1934, drawn up by the German Consulate at Cartagena:

To promote German trade, German industry, and German shipping the Consulate has indefatigably continued its intense propaganda on behalf of Germany's aims. The German school established here for this purpose has fulfilled all expectations. Through a large number of Spanish children from industrial, business, naval, and military quarters, these quarters are not only exposed to German cultural influence but orders that were hitherto traditionally placed in England or France are now placed in Germany. This reacts on shipping, and the German flag has again taken first place in the harbour of Cartagena.

The report goes on to say that work on behalf of Germany is made difficult by "an artificially created

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spy-mania (‘ Spionagepsychose ’),” which “ is probably connected with the international Mediterranean policy of the Balearic Islands, for which islands Cartagena is the war-harbour.”

We cannot, (so the report continues) understand why the German Navy allows its cruisers in foreign waters to pass Cartagena by, despite many requests and detailed arguments to the contrary. Germans in this region need to be fortified by the visit of a warship so as to counteract the hostile propaganda of certain circles. . . . The German school is our bulwark against the hostile propaganda directed against everything German. Its cultural influence is constantly expanding. . . . German schools abroad are the most important factor in strengthening German life abroad, and are also the pace-makers for German trade, industry, and shipping.

ANTI-SEMITISM

German anti-Semitism outside Germany is revealed in a circular of the Foreign Trade Department of the Nazi party in Berlin. It is dated December 23rd, 1935, and puts a number of questions about firms in Spain.

For example, a certain firm (the name is given) was reported to the department by local Nazis as employing seven Spaniards. This specification was evidently regarded as insufficiently precise, for the circular states: “ We are not clear whether these seven Spanish employees are seven Spaniards or seven Spanish Jews. We desire further enlightenment.” In the same circular there is a reference to a report that “ the Jew X (name given) has a sleeping partner Y (name given), but it is not stated whether Y is also a Jew or not.”

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A Spanish business man Z (name given), who is also German Consul, is referred to as employing four Spaniards. "We do not assume," so the circular states, "that Mr. Z, being a German Consul, employs only Jews, . . . but we request an answer to the question whether the four employees are Spaniards or Spanish Jews."

A circular (undated) drawn up by the branch of the Nazi Party in Granada gives a list of local firms characterizing them in accordance with racial and political standards. For example: "Siemens have a branch of their own, 'Siemens Industria Electrica,' five Germans, about six Spaniards, no Jews amongst them," and "All Germans of the Siemens and A.E.G. (Geathon) Filiamen are patriotically disposed (national-gesinnt). Some of the employees are members of the N.S.D.A.P. (Nazi Party). The others are sympathetic in their attitude to the Party. All are good Germans who are constant in their endeavour to sell German goods."

The reports in the News Chronicle naturally have points of similarity with those of the Manchester Guardian, since they refer to the same documents found in Barcelona. But they are not necessarily identical. We think that the two reports would give a better idea of the contents of the papers in question, and therefore we reproduce here the statements which appeared in the News Chronicle.

A correspondent of the News Chronicle writes as follows, on August 18th, 1936 :

I have been allowed to-day to pay a visit to the closely-guarded house in a quiet suburb of Barcelona where now repose thousands of documents bearing

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on German Nazi activities in Spain which recently came into the possession of local Socialists.

For some hours I inspected these documents, the authenticity of which is beyond all challenge, and long before I had completed this task feelings of dismay, indignation and even of horror overcame me.

The documents must certainly discredit the Nazi movement beyond recovery in the eyes of respectable people whatever their politics.

As it worked in Spain in recent years they show the Nazi system to have been based beyond expectation upon terrorism and intrigue, with spies and secret police everywhere, with secret tribunals administering "justice" on Nazi lines against a dark and sinister background.

By this system residence in Spain was made almost impossible for the non-Nazi German, and if the victim ventured to return home to Germany steps were taken to ensure that the work of vengeance was continued by the Nazi authorities there.

These documents, numbering about 10,000 typewritten sheets were found in the apartment of Herr Hans Hellermann, leader of the Nazi Party in Spain, with headquarters at Barcelona.

A MYSTERY FOR EVER

Herr Hellermann fled (presumably to Berlin) when the position here became too hot for Fascists.

But why, ignoring warnings, he omitted to destroy or make safe the incriminating Party papers may always remain a mystery.

He and inferior Nazi leaders had several times been reminded of the danger of correspondence falling into the hands of enemies.

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Indeed, one of the first documents my eye caught this afternoon turned out to be a letter without address and merely signed "Adjutant," which had been written just after the February elections in Spain revealed the doom of Fascism in that country.

This letter reads:

Feb. 18th, 1936.

All correspondence with Party organizations *inside and outside* Spain is to cease at once and to remain suspended until further notice. All party files and party notepaper are to be transferred to the official representative organizations of the Reich, packed and left sealed. Where this is not possible, documents must be taken to a safe place. This letter is to be burnt immediately on reception.

In addition to Herr Hellermann, other figures in the Nazi Party hierarchy in Spain were Herr Erich Schnaus, Herr Carl Cords and Herr Alfred Engling.

Anonymous judges of the secret judicial organization appear from time to time in the documents.

Herr Schnaus seems to have been sent to Spain from Berlin to reorganize the Nazi Party, which had grown somewhat lax under the administration of a Herr Zuchristian, Herr Hellermann's predecessor. On completing this task, he appointed Herr Hellermann permanent leader in Spain.

Herr Cords was the head of the Secret Police (Gestapo), an organization to which in Spain the innocent-sounding title "Harbour Service" was given. The activities of practically every German living in Spain would appear to come under his supervision, reports of all Germans of every type being discovered in the files.

He kept a close eye upon the German diplomatic

body and on German industrialists in Spain, and he would even insist on knowing everything about the career—and political outlook—of any maid-servant who, losing her job, applied for relief at the nearest German Consulate.

Herr Alfred Engling was the chief of the Nazi secret police in Barcelona, and was apparently the subordinate, without independent powers, of Herr Cords. Many of the documents found in the premises of the Nazi chief who vanished have to do with the affairs of the "Uschla."

The "Uschla" was the dread secret judicial system of the Nazi Party in Spain—and presumably in Germany and elsewhere—and the judges of its tribunals were Nazi visionaries of extreme ruthlessness.

Those documents relating to this body which I went through to-day showed vividly how Germans in Spain upon whom the Party ban fell were relentlessly broken.

Some, details of whose cases appear in the files, fought manfully against the judgments of expulsion of the Uschla, judgments that might mean their economic ruin in Spain, and the concentration camp should they venture to return to Germany.

Others, realizing the futility of resistance against the Nazi Black Hand, accepted the decrees of the court in a spirit of fatalism.

Some files were evidently moved to a safe place before the fighting in Barcelona, and it is surmised they had to do with Nazi activities directly endangering the security of Spain.

Reports on the situation in Morocco and Tangier, evidently incomplete, disclose how deep is the interest taken by the Nazi Party in these strategically important territories.

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Two or three stray documents, which may well have belonged to the archives that have escaped seizure, are particularly sinister. Thus only military considerations could account for the eagerness of the Nazi leaders to get Nazis into the cable stations at Vigo and Horta where a part of the staff is German.

HOLD ON CABLE STATIONS

A "strictly confidential" letter on this subject runs:

Cable stations at Vigo and Horta. As already explained, our movement attaches very great importance to having one or more reliable Party comrades in the cable stations of Vigo and Horta. I therefore request you most urgently to persuade the officials that are most suitable to join the National Socialist Party.

Another significant letter, this time from the trade section of the foreign organization of the National Socialist Party, Berlin, runs:

Concerning purchase of lead for French account in Spain, we have received your letter of June 29th and thank you for your information, which we will, of course, treat as strictly confidential.

The documents establish beyond question the blatant smuggling of propaganda literature and other papers to Spain in German steamers—evidently with the consent of the owners—and by airmen. It deserves, however, to be recorded that the Lufthansa, the great German air company, at one time at least—and perhaps always—set its face against this practice.

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The German diplomatic bag was evidently used on various occasions—and perhaps regularly—for purely Nazi purposes, but the documents I have had in my hands do not lend support to the theory, widely held here, that arms were smuggled into Spain in this fashion.

The letter in the files arousing suspicions on this point is headed "Strictly confidential" and was written by the head of the Nazi Secret Police, Cords.

In it a question of using the diplomatic couriers for the carriage of "propaganda material" was raised. Cords asked whether there was a possibility of propaganda material being got through the "courier post" without difficulty.

He added: "Also I want to know how many parcels can be got through without discovery."

Contrasted with the actual spy system operated by the Nazi Party in Spain, the accounts of Nazi espionage in general which have appeared in the columns of the *News Chronicle* and elsewhere pale to insignificance.

Spies or agents reported to their chiefs at Barcelona or Madrid, and these reported to headquarters at Berlin or Hamburg. Spanish affairs and the doings and opinions of Germans in Spain were reported on indiscriminately.

The Nazi agents were not fastidious in their methods. The party representative at Malaga, in forwarding to his chief in Barcelona a report by an alleged Belgian spy, mentions that a German named Mehling, who was acquainted with the Belgian, purloined the document "in an unguarded moment" from the latter's home.

Of the thousands of documents I examined to-day, this one surely has had the strangest story. Written by a Belgian, stolen by a German Nazi, it is now in

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the possession of Barcelona Socialists. But the files reveal that organized espionage represented only one aspect of a system of control and denunciation that was an inherent part of Nazi methods. Everyone seemed to be reporting on one another and suspicions were constantly fastened on men high in the party ranks.

WATCH EVEN ON AMBASSADOR

An astonishing episode in this orgy of spying was the watch put upon the German Ambassador himself, Count von Welczeck, who is now Ambassador in Paris, an aristocratic and fastidious diplomat, and upon the Embassy staff and the German Consular body.

This supervision was the result of action taken by reason of a secret circular sent in behalf of Chancellor Hitler's deputy in Berlin, Herr Hess.

The circular, prompted by the scurry of German diplomats to enrol in the Party a year or so ago, reads:

Strictly confidential, only for the official use of the political leader mentioned below.

The agreement between the Foreign Office and the foreign section of the N.S.D.A.P. (Nazi Party) regarding the admission of members of the diplomatic service to the Party, given as an appendix to my circular No. 50/32, has led to many applications for membership in the meantime. As I have declared in my earlier circular letter, it is obvious that the political leader must be asked for his point of view when these applications come up for consideration.

In order to relieve the burden of needless inquiries for the Party administration, I herewith rule summarily.

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The political leaders abroad must investigate within their own sphere the career and political outlook of every single official, employee and worker in the diplomatic service and must send to headquarters a full report on each, a separate sheet being used in each case.

Only trusted Party comrades are to be commissioned to compile these reports, Party comrades who are absolutely reliable from the standpoint of the movement, besides having the necessary qualifications for the task.

I must stress the great responsibility this inquiry represents for every single political leader. Opinions should be expressed without respect of personal considerations and in order to serve the cause alone. Through being entrusted with this task each political leader ought to recognize that a great measure of confidence has been put in him.

THINGS TO BEAR IN MIND

In these reports the following should be borne in mind:

- Career;
- Eventual membership of a lodge;
- Racial origin and stock of family;
- Earlier political activity and political outlook;
- Attitude to the former system;
- General suitability from the standpoint of the movement.

To these details should be joined an expression of opinion as to whether the person concerned is worthy of admission to the ranks of our Party.

Heil Hitler!

(Signed) E. W. BOHLE.

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It would appear as though Herr Zuchristian, then leader in Spain, regarded the task of reporting on the Madrid Ambassador as a somewhat embarrassing one.

In his first report, dispatched to Berlin in reply to a circular letter, he merely mentioned that he heard the Ambassador was already a member of the Party.

This report, dated May 2nd, 1934, marked "Strictly confidential" and addressed to the Foreign Department of the N.S.D.A.P., Hamburg 13, is as follows:

Concerning the German Embassy, Madrid.

Count Von Welczeck, Ambassador: I hear he has already been admitted to the Party.

Dr. Voelkers, Counsellor of Embassy: In Madrid since November, 1933, married to a Dutchwoman of Malay stock. Previous activity and political disposition unknown here.

Dr. Mey, Counsellor of Legation: Hitherto not been prominent in a political sense. Bachelor. Before admitted to the Party must be ascertained whether he conforms to the Aryan paragraph and what he did in the war.

Dr. Korth, Secretary of Legation: Has a national outlook. Took part in war. Bachelor. Always leaned towards the Right. In view of his disposition worthy of admission to the Party.

Dr. Fischer, Secretary of Legation: Only here a short time. Bachelor. Devout Catholic. May perhaps have been connected with the Centre (Roman Catholic) Party formerly. In agreement with the new régime.

R. Enze, commercial councillor: Already joined the Party in Barcelona. Does not take any interest in movement.

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E. Larsen, Head of the Embassy Chancery: Married to a South American, once champion of democratic ideas, now 150 per cent Nazi. No fighter. Acceptance cannot be advocated.

F. Kolbe, Consulate Secretary: Formerly zealous Marxist. Goes with Jews and other dubious elements here. There can be no question of his admission to Party.

Kaethe Linder, typist-secretary: National outlook. Unmarried. Nothing in way of her admission to the Party.

Hildegard Zipplies, typist-secretary: Formerly hostile.

C. Zwick, clerk: Already a Party member. Very active.

R. Ebert, porter: Political nonentity. Formerly a National-Socialist. Owing to lack of intellectual capacity, not admissible.

E. Stein, gardener: Takes no part in the movement.

Heil Hitler!

W.2.

Leader of the Party Group in Spain and Deputy Foreign Commissar.

The second report, also marked "Strictly confidential," related to the Ambassador alone and ran:

From Walter Zuchristian to the Foreign Department of the N.S.D.A.P., Hamburg.

June 4th, 1934.

Regarding Count von Welczeck, Ambassador in Madrid.

Replying to your inquiry of the 17th ultimo, and in reply to your circular 53/34, with reference to the questions put, I have to communicate the following:

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(1) Attitude towards the N.S.D.A.P. since the taking over of power to be defined as absolutely loyal. Co-operation wholehearted. Every help conceded.

(2) Since 1926 in Madrid, previously Minister in Budapest. Faultless man of the world and clever diplomat.

(3) As far as I am aware, has never been a member of a lodge.

(4) According to his own statement is a pure Aryan. His wife, a Chilian, also a pure Aryan.

(5) Has never been a member of a political party, holding formerly, I believe, the Conservative-Catholic point of view.

(6) According to his own statement, interrupted his diplomatic career for some years as he was out of sympathy with the policy adopted after the war.

(7) In my opinion there is nothing against his admission to the Party.

In later documents the Ambassador is referred to as "Party Comrade Welczeck" and it may be assumed that he attained membership of the Nazi Party, so vital to the German diplomat who hopes to have a successful career.

Less fortunate must have been Dr. Mey, the Counsellor of Legation, for a second report on him reads:

His appearance does not suggest a fighter, although nothing is settled by that. On the ground of my information his admission cannot be refused, but if there is a possibility of it being postponed for six months, it would be better.

On the other hand, Dr. Voelckers, Counsellor of Embassy, fared well in the second report sent by Herr Zuchristian to headquarters:

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I regard him (wrote the then Nazi boss in Spain) as politically reliable and I perceive he tries to accommodate himself to the trend of the hour. In my judgment nothing stands in the way of his admission to the Party and therefore I favour it.

The German Consular body was entirely under the thumb of the local Nazi bosses. The conflict between the Nazis and Herr Draege, German Consul in Seville, is symptomatic of this condition.

CONSULS UNDER NAZI BOSSES

Local Nazis report to headquarters that Consul Draege is the head of the firm of Baquera Kusche & Martin and employs various Jews in his business.

The acting-Consul is married to a Jewess.

It is exact that Consul Draege goes regularly with Jews.

To form an opinion in the case of Consul Draege, the following facts may usefully be considered:

Before Hitler took office, he was not sympathetic to our movement, being instead loyal to the régime that gave him his job.

Moreover, he is a Rotarian. He admits these charges and promises to enrol himself in our fight in the future. He pledges himself (1) to resign from the Rotary Club; (2) to cease intercourse with Jews; (3) to try to cleanse his business of Jews.

Party comrade Draege has begged for time to review the whole issue and then inform the Party of his political conversion.

The iron hand of the régime came down mercilessly upon Germans whose conduct or political outlook was

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at variance with Nazi ideals. Firms and business houses were required to dismiss non-Nazis or anti-Nazis and replace them by party comrades.

A ban was sometimes placed upon the return to Spain of Germans in disfavour with the Party who had gone home on leave.

Herr Schenck, an engineer employed at the Opel works near Mainz, fought hard against the intriguers who prevented his return to Barcelona and even begged to be allowed to face his hitherto anonymous judges, but the documents referring to his case show he was defeated.

Biesinger, a young student whose main offence was an anti-Hitler outlook with occasional abuse of the Chancellor, was closely watched in different parts of Spain and eventually, with the connivance of the reactionary Spanish police, was taken on board a German steamer and shipped home.

He has an immense dossier in the Nazi files.

In the first full account of his behaviour—in a letter from Herr E. Arnold, of the German Clerks' Association in Granada—he is represented as abusing the Führer, and it is stated that he appears three times in the "black list" of the local German Consulate.

The factory in Berlin where his father is employed is mentioned. The Nazi chief adds:

It should be possible in some way to lay hold of such people and ship them back to Germany, for the cost would be slight compared with the harm they do Germany.

This is precisely what happened to the offending student, a later report stating that by means of a trick and with the help of the Spanish police, he

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was taken on board a boat bound for Hamburg and handed over to the captain.

Business men, maidservants, waiters and well-to-do women whose social conduct is in opposition to Nazi ideals, are watched by the agents of the Secret Police or are required—if they wish to escape expulsion from the Party—to appear before the secret tribunals.

The “Harbour Service” (Secret Police) office of Berlin write to the Nazi leader in Barcelona concerning Horst Mueller, reputed to be living in that city.

This person (it is stated) who was reported as a returning emigrant, has gone back to Barcelona to his foster-parents. I regard it as advisable for local comrades to be informed of his return so as to find out whether he expresses himself favourably or the reverse about our present-day Germany.

The “Harbour Service” of Berlin, in a letter dated May 6th, state:

According to a communication of the German Labour Front, Rudolf Hahn, who is employed at the Banco Aleman Transatlantico, Barcelona, probably associates with the Black Front (an anti-Hitler organization), I request a watch be set on this person and that I be kept informed as to the result of your steps.

“SMALL FRY IN GERMANY”

Krupps, the great Essen firm, are told they must not send a mechanic named Hans Gruenewald out of Germany again.

In a letter to the Gestapo in Berlin, Carl Cords, the head of the Secret Police in Spain, says:

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Personally, as I have already explained, I am against Gruenewald coming to Spain again, because we do not want here Germans who infect the air. Moreover it might be quite useful if this man were to make the acquaintance of a concentration camp. People of his brand are small fry in Germany, but they put on airs abroad.

The mechanic was an anti-Nazi.

Herr Peter Faull is expelled from the Party for putting up during his stay in Madrid at a boarding house run by Fraulein Blumenfeld and Fraulein Chaim, "emigrants." Herr Faull's case is the subject of a long correspondence between the Nazi officials in Spain.

The local head of the party reports that, "as conduct was not to be reconciled with National Socialist principles and that the renegade took no notice of his expostulations."

He is expelled from the Party for "supporting with his money the international band of Jews, criminals and emigrants who were formerly parasites upon the German people."

Hedwig Maria Schiedzer, formerly a teacher in a German school near Madrid, "at present living near Munich," is recommended for expulsion from the Party on the ground of unreliability.

The head of the Secret Police in Madrid calls upon his colleagues in Germany in their attitude towards this teacher not to display "false sentimentality." "Considerations which lead to the watering down of the Führer's great idea are against the spirit of the movement," he adds.

Cords, head of the Secret Police, writes from Madrid to a district colleague instructing him to set a watch on the Jew Max Julius Barth. Cords adds:

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The above-named would appear to be staying a long time in your district, where he has a newspaper stand in Plaza Roberto Ray.

Because Barth would appear to be wanted in Berlin for high treason and is apparently active at present as a Communist journalist, please keep the man under observation and let me have detailed information about him.

On August 19th the News Chronicle published another dispatch, no less interesting, on the subject of the afore-mentioned papers :

Chief among the Nazi spy documents I have seen to-day in my continued investigation are twenty revealing an extraordinary dispute between the former German Ambassador in Madrid and an odd-jobs man on the Embassy staff.

The documents are remarkable for their expression of Nazi mentality.

The odd-jobs man, Zwick, refused to wait on table at official Embassy dinners.

The Ambassador, Count von Welczeck, proposed to dismiss him.

“ SOCIAL SABOTAGE ”

But Zwick was an ardent Nazi, and the local Nazi Party “ bosses ” intervened on his behalf.

In a report covering many type-written pages the Ambassador accused Zwick of “ sabotaging his social activities.”

The Ambassador stated:

Only those in the know can judge what endless trouble and expenditure of time, money and nervous

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energy are needed by an ambassador to make his Embassy a social centre.

Zwick, supported by the rank and file Nazis in Madrid, as well as the leaders, stood his ground, declaring that he was an Embassy official and not a mere waiter.

But eventually the Party chiefs decided the dispute in the Ambassador's favour.

Persistent Nazi interest in America is revealed in a document addressed to the headquarters of the National Socialist Party Bureau Ribbentrop (the organisation whose chief is Herr von Ribbentrop, the new Ambassador in London).

This document mentions that reports, among other matters, on "the French zone" and "the arrival of German tourist steamers in American waters" are appended.

A long hand-written report from the Nazi Press Chief in Madrid gives details of extensive bribery of Spanish newspapers.

A "confidential" letter addressed to the Nazi group in Spain deals with the financial field of the party there.

In view of Germany's reputed money shortage (preventing the payment of her interest on her foreign loans) this sentence in this letter is interesting:

You are doubtless aware that a place in Hamburg, on my instructions, forwards a sum of money regularly to Party Comrade Zuchristian (former Nazi leader in Spain).

CONTROL OF JOURNALISTS

Another document found here is headed: "Bureau No. 2 in Berlin, which is in control of the movement

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—that is, in France, England, Spain and several other countries.

Another document discloses how tight is the control exercised by Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, over German journalists abroad.

This comes out in a letter from the German Foreign Office addressed to German Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.

The letter, dated December 24th, 1935, runs:

Because of a case that cropped up recently the Reich Ministry for Propaganda begs that without referring the matter to it no German journalist abroad shall be received or given a recommendation of any kind whatever, not to mention financial help.

In the event of a German journalist turning up who has not been announced by the Ministry or who cannot produce such recommendations of the Ministry, the fact should be reported at once to the Ministry's Press Adviser, Government Counsellor Bade.

Berlin headquarters asks the Nazi Party organization in Spain to supply information about the career and activities of Herr Enge, the representative of the Eildinst (apparently a commercial news service) in Madrid.

The letter continues:

In addition to general information, I beg you to bear in mind the following when you answer: "How does he stand towards National-Socialism? Is there any contact between him and the official representatives of the Reich in Madrid?"

Nazis spied in Spain on one another cheerfully. Thus Herr Zuchristian sends the Foreign Department of the Nazi Party in Hamburg a secret report

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on the former Masonic connections of some of his leading colleagues.

He mentions that Party Comrade Messner was converted from Freemasonry by reading Ludendorf's book on the subject, and that Party Comrade Friedrich Standfuss protests that he never attended a lodge meeting when he was a Mason.

In another letter the allegation is made that the D.K.W. (a German motor firm) is partly represented in Seville by a director who is a Mason.

Obedying orders from headquarters, Nazi spies in Madrid sent a long report on the directors of Productos Quinicos Schering, Limited, a German business house.

The spies reported that one of the directors was a member of the German Labour Front, and explained that he had been given the choice of resigning from the organization or abandoning Freemasonry.

The director asked for a postponement of the decision until the summer when, "on his staying in Berlin, he would be able to resign from his lodge."

The head of the German (Nazi) Clerk's Association in Madrid reports he hears that two German women clerks, one of them married to a Jew and the other said to have Jewish acquaintances, are employed in a Madrid Government office.

"There is a strong suspicion that these women are spying against Germany."

From Valencia a Nazi agent sends a report on the local branch of the A.E.G. (the great Berlin electric concern) in which he says one of the directors is married to a Spaniard and takes no part in politics.

"Nevertheless he is not unfavourable towards the present Nationalists' side," it is added.

The trade department of the Nazi Party in Berlin (foreign section) instructs Nazi agents to find out

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all about a German business man named Kadner, representing a German pharmacist house in Madrid.

The letter continues:

It would interest us in particular to know whether the suspicions entertained here that he is a Jew are justified. We are looking forward to a prompt reply—if possible by air mail.

Finally, on August 20th, this correspondent writes as follows:

A letter written by Herr Hitler has been discovered among the amazing Nazi papers.

It is addressed to two German girls living in Barcelona.

Herr Hitler, through one of his private secretaries, congratulates the girls on their "courage and pluck," but explains to them that the jobs they hold (the nature of which is not revealed, as the girls' original letter has not been found) are in conflict with Nazi principles.

"The vocation of women," Herr Hitler added, "is merely to concern herself with the household and the family."

He therefore hopes that the two girls will become "real German housewives."

The papers prove the extent of Nazi military espionage in Spain and the intimate relations existing between Nazi leaders and the men behind the present revolt.

An unsigned statement on the political situation in Spain early this year says:

The strong and growing tendencies of the Right must put an end in the next few months to the present intolerable and incredible conditions.

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It is argued that the agents should act cautiously until the Nazi movement is "no longer in conflict with Spanish legal conceptions."

"WASTE OF TIME"

The fact that the Nazis instead of spying on anti-Nazis only spend a great deal of their time spying on each other is deplored in a report sent by Herr Cords, head of the Secret Police in Spain, to headquarters in Berlin.

A long report divides the Spanish Press into three categories—anti-Nazi, pro-Nazi, and "mutual"—and discusses the political standpoint of every daily newspaper.

The "unfortunate" effect of the conflict between the Nazi régime and Roman Catholics in Germany on the attitude of clerical papers in Spain which might otherwise be sympathetic to Germany is deplored.

In addition to bribing poor newspapers, Nazi agents are advised to use the more subtle means of "dining and wining" editors to make the Spanish Press friendly towards the new Germany.

Other reports show that a sharp eye was kept on the messages of Spanish correspondents in Berlin.

Party headquarters in Berlin on one occasion was advised to expel the correspondent of a Madrid newspaper whose anti-Nazi stories were found objectionable by the Nazi leaders in Spain.

Correspondence between Cords and his masters in Germany showed that many German women living in Spain were closely supervised.

Women friendly with Spaniards were denounced to the Berlin authorities, the "coquetry" of a Berlin ballet-dancer in Madrid in particular giving much offence to Cords.

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Nazi spies in Spain send reports on the activities of Communist spies in Germany which they pick up, one describing the meeting-place near the Friedrich-strasse railway station, Berlin, of agents.

German shipping companies which failed either to employ Nazis in key positions or to give all the information demanded are branded as "traitors" in letters sent to Berlin headquarters.

GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE GRATITUDE OF THE SPANISH REBELS

From the beginning of the war, National-Socialist Germany started a shameless intervention, both by speeches and writings, against the Spanish Government.

On July 30th The Times correspondent in Berlin wrote :

Events in Spain have been followed with the closest attention in this country, and with an undisguised sympathy towards the anti-Government forces. The well-drilled press tends to lump the Spanish Government's supporters together as Communists, Marxists, or Bolshevists under the orders or influence of Moscow, and calls their opponents "Nationalists" or "forces of the national uprising." This latter term (nationale Erhebung) was that given to the Nazi revolution in its earlier stages, before the Nationalists and other Conservative allies of National-Socialism had been relegated to their second-rank status.

The prospect of the establishment of yet another "anti-Socialist" dictatorship on some kind of Fascist

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model in Europe—especially on the Mediterranean—can hardly be a matter of indifference to Nazi Germany in the present indeterminate stage of European grouping, and beyond doubt the importance attached to the struggle has been fully explained to those responsible for the instruction of public opinion. Headlines, broadcast selections of news, and comments generally could hardly tell a plainer tale of the hopes in the background.

This active sympathy, expressed by the radio, the press and the Ministry of Propaganda in Germany, had its equivalent in another aspect of the relations of the Nazis with Franco.

A German Admiral Lunches with Franco

For example, on August 4th, Reuter's correspondent in Gibraltar telegraphs :

The Ceuta (insurgent) wireless station announced to-day that the officers and crew of the German battleship *Deutschland* were landing there this afternoon.

The former notice was amplified on August 5th, by The Times correspondent in Tangiers, who writes as follows :

Yesterday a German destroyer cruised off Ceuta under the eyes of the Spanish Government fleet, while the battleship *Deutschland* put into Ceuta. The German Admiral was received by the insurgent troops and proceeded to Tetuan, where he was entertained at luncheon by General Franco.

The next day, August 6th, The Times correspondent in Casablanca, adds this brief commentary to the facts before mentioned :

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The insurgents are exultant over the visit of the German battleship *Deutschland*, which they take as a sign of German sympathy and support.

The Commander of the "Leopard" Compliments Queipo de Llano

This form of German intervention appears more strikingly in the report given in the Manchester Guardian on August 6th, which we reproduce here :

Messages from the Mediterranean continue to report the activities of the German warships which are visiting the Spanish ports held by the rebels. It is now known that in addition to the visits to General Franco at Ceuta and the rebel leaders at Algeciras and Melilla, the German destroyer *Leopard* paid a visit to Seville, where (according to Reuter's Gibraltar correspondent) its commander complimented General Llano, one of the chief rebel leaders. A French report says that German bluejackets landed and marched to the city hall singing German songs and shouting "Heil Hitler!"

Hitler Expresses his Sympathy with the Spanish Rebels

Meanwhile Hitler himself declared his desire to interfere wholeheartedly in favour of General Franco. On September 14th, the News Chronicle published the following item :

Herr Hitler to-day expressed Germany's view of the Spanish civil war, following the third of his series of speeches to the Nazi Party Congress.

His remarks, made in a private, informal conversation with foreign journalists, form the first explanation why this year's Congress has been so largely devoted to attacks on Bolshevism.

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"I believe that we 'wild nationalists' are the best Europeans after all," Herr Hitler declared.

"Naturally, we and Italy sympathize with nationalists in other countries, because we can deal only with countries which are organized on a nationalist basis.

"A Europe led by one cultural régime could be understood. But that Moscow, of all places, should seek to dominate Europe—that is something we Germans could never accept.

"Other Governments tolerate demonstrations and collections for arms and munitions for the Bolsheviks in Spain. Foreigners call this Congress a Nazi mobilization."

He laughed scornfully and went on:

"What are the trifling 200,000 men here? If we were to follow our inclinations and authorize demonstrations of sympathy for the Nationalists in Spain, I would only have to give the words (he snapped his fingers loudly) and ten or fifteen million Germans would jump to my call.

"They would stage a demonstration that would give the world and even Moscow something unpleasant to think about."

The Rebels are Grateful for Nazi Help

The rebel generals, realizing that their only hope of victory is from outside help, begin to express gratitude to Hitler.

On September 15th General Cabanellas declared to the official German news agency:

"Tell Germany," he said, "that General Cabanellas gives his word to the German people that, come what

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may, Spain will never forget the friendly sympathy and moral support which Germany has given my native land."

The Nazis Congratulate the Insurgent Forces

The Nazis miss no opportunity of giving moral support, and that loudly, to the rebels. Reuter reports from Berlin, on September 28th :

A telegram of good wishes has been sent to the Alcázar defenders by Herr Hess, Chancellor Hitler's deputy. The message sent, says the German News Agency, "in the name of the National Socialist Party" read as follows:

The German National Socialist Party sends its best wishes to the heroes of the Alcázar and their liberators.

Franco sends a Grateful Reply

As is to be expected among gentlemen, General Franco replied—on October 2nd—to Herr Hess, in the following message :

In the name of the defenders of the Toledo Alcázar and the forces under my command, I send heartfelt thanks to the Nazi Party for its congratulations, which went straight to our hearts.

Joined with the friendliest greetings are my wishes for the future and greatness of the German people.

Fondness for Franco Makes the Nazis Lose their Heads

German intervention approaches the picturesque. For example, the following report from the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in Berlin, November 11th :

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The name "Alcázar" is no longer to be permitted in Germany for cabarets or night amusement establishments as a sign of German respect for the brave defence offered by the rebels to the Government troops at the Alcázar during the Spanish civil war.

A Ministerial instruction was previously given out that the name was considered unsuitable, and Herr Himmler, the head of the German police force, has issued a warning to-day to those resorts which have not yet changed the name that its continued use "threatens public order," and the police will take measures of force to see that a change is made.

An internationally known establishment with the now-forbidden name recently started a prize competition for a suitably attractive alternative.

The Failure of Franco Disturbs Berlin

In spite of the help of all kinds given by Fascist countries, and above all by Germany, the rebel generals do not succeed in defeating the Government forces. This failure causes disquiet in Berlin and in Rome. The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in Berlin writes on December 2nd:

The unexpected failure of General Franco to capture Madrid is clearly arousing much disquiet here, as German prestige is involved following the recognition of the Burgos administration.

Hitler Considers Franco the Representative of the Spanish People

Since the war began both Germany and Italy publicly announced their intention not to tolerate a victory for the Spanish Government. For Hitlerism the victory of

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Franco was indispensable. The Times correspondent in Berlin sends the following report to his paper (December 14th) :

In spite of their approval in broad principle of the stricter non-intervention and mediation proposals of the French and British Governments, the German and Italian replies—the two texts differ only in unimportant details—are regarded in the shrewdest political circles as confirming the determination of Germany and Italy to see the Spanish war through in the spirit of their agreement reached during Count Ciano's German visit.

There can be no doubt of the extreme importance attached here to the success of the Government of General Franco, which the German Government have recognized and with which they have thereby bound their prestige. It is evident that the Germans could only contemplate falling in with a state of affairs involving the elimination of all outside influences—notably the Russian—and also the control of Spain by the "National" Government, which they have already claimed to be the only factor that can now be regarded as representing the Spanish people.

Although all sorts of pretences have to be kept up the Spanish war is evidently coming to be regarded, in Germany as elsewhere, as the first campaign in the German-led anti-Bolshevist crusade, or, in cruder words, in a Russo-German struggle which may not become a direct conflict until many stages have been passed, and perhaps never. From the very beginning the Spanish outbreak has also been carefully considered here from the general political-military point of view. It is some months since the prospect of its keeping several French Army Corps permanently detached in the south-west was noted as an advantage in the event

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of critical developments in Central or Eastern Europe. Nor was the hampering effect overlooked of a Spain closely bound to Italy and Germany on Mediterranean communications with the French colonial armies and, indeed, on British communications. In addition, the conviction is still predominant in leading German quarters that France is doomed to disintegration through becoming "Red" or through a struggle to prevent it. The proclamation of a Soviet Republic in Catalonia would be anything but unwelcome, according to these theories, for it might be expected further to embarrass a French Government, which was not yet fully Communist, if confronted with the question of intervention. At the same time careful thought has been given to the avoidance of embroilments at sea which might involve Great Britain.

The Nazis can only Agree to the Defeat of the Legitimate Government

So determined is Germany not to allow the victory of any other policy but that of General Franco in Spain, that when the subject of mediation is broached, Hitlerism, in short a totalitarian State, opposes everything except the defeat of the Spanish people.

The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes, December 19th :

"No change" would appear to sum up German foreign policy since the recent speeches of the British and French Foreign Ministers and the Anglo-French proposal for mediation in Spain. Mr. Eden's Bradford speech was published in the German press at fair length, parts only being suppressed. His earlier speech at Leamington was almost completely suppressed here. The reaction of the officially inspired

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press to the Bradford speech has been fragmentary and scattered.

Upon Spain the German attitude appears to be that mediation is impossible and the civil war must be fought to a finish. Germany and Italy are deeply involved in the Spanish issue, and they believe that the party to whom they give their support must win in the long run. Labelling the Madrid Government as Bolshevist and declaring that the continuation of its existence is entirely due to Soviet Russia, as is its very existence, the two Governments stand by their refusal to tolerate "Bolshevism" and a "Bolshevist base" in Spain.

The *West Deutscher Beobachter* openly wrote recently:

The Soviet Government has created a situation which makes definitely an armistice with it no longer possible. Italy is of the same view.

The Berlin Government Admits the Failure of Franco

German intervention, like that of Italy, increases in proportion to the resistance of the Spanish people. Finally, on December 19th, the press begins to admit that the soldiers and war-material which Germany has sent to Franco are not proving sufficient. Reuter telegraphs from Berlin on that date :

The first admission to appear in a German newspaper that General Franco's forces are having unexpected difficulties in capturing Madrid is made in the *Lokal Anzeiger* to-day. This paper's correspondent at Cadiz writes that "The Reds are showing in Madrid a resistance with which nobody had reckoned."

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The Rebels Ask for More German Troops, and Thank Hitler

Both Germany and the Spanish insurgents now see clearly that without much more war-material, and, what is still more important, foreign troops, the cause of the military oligarchy which rose in rebellion on July 17th is doomed to failure. This is the moment when Franco asks Germany for men.

There was bound to be, therefore, a new manifestation of gratitude on the part of the rebels towards German Fascism.

Here it is, according to The Times correspondent in Berlin (December 23rd) :

In a *communiqué* to the German press the Spanish Embassy in Berlin recalls that the newly appointed Chargé d'Affaires of the Franco Government in Germany, Don Luis Alvarez de Estrada (who presented his Letters of Credence to Herr Hitler last Friday), was attached at the Spanish Embassy in Berlin from 1914 to 1919.

Señor de Estrada, the *communiqué* continues, returns to Germany at a time of tragedy and fateful ordeal which showed Spain at a very early stage where her true friends were. "General Franco and, with him, the Spanish people have frequently remembered with gratitude the sympathy and support accorded to them from the German side in their struggle for the liberation and national rebirth of Spain."

THE TREATMENT OFFERED IN BERLIN TO THE DIPLOMATS WHO REMAINED LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT

The behaviour of the German Government towards the diplomatic representatives of the Spanish Government is worthy of attention. The cowardice with which defenceless men in a foreign and hostile country were humiliated and attacked will go down to history as one of the greatest blots on the honour of Fascism.

The Spanish Monarchist Flag is Solemnly Run Up

Here are some of the incidents.

The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian telephones to his paper on November 9th :

The red-gold-red flag of the Spanish rebel generals was solemnly run up over the Spanish Embassy here to-day in the presence of the former Ambassador, Señor Agramonte y Cortijo, who was removed by the Madrid Government earlier in the civil war. Señor Cortijo declares that he has taken over affairs on behalf of General Franco.

The Madrid Government's Ambassador, Señor Rovira, is stated to have left Berlin, having given the keys of the Embassy on Saturday, without any instructions, to his chauffeur, who took them to the former Ambassador. A number of members of the Spanish colony and German sympathisers with the Spanish rebels watched the ceremony, while Señor Cortijo made a short speech calling for cheers for General

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Franco. The gathering responded with cheers for General Franco, for Spain, and for Germany.

The members of the Spanish Embassy staff here have been divided in their allegiances. When the new representative of the Madrid Government, Señor Rovira, took office, the dismissed Ambassador refused to leave the Embassy, because, he said, of difficulties in finding suitable alternative accommodation. Until recently, therefore, he has been staying in the residential part of the Embassy. The official business rooms of the Embassy, however, were denied to him, and it is apparently the keys to these rooms that the chauffeur delivered to the former Ambassador.

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Only last week a curious episode occurred in connection with the Embassy, into which official inquiries are being made. A member of the staff of Señor Rovira, the Government's Ambassador, was set upon in the streets. Those guilty are believed to have been Spaniards who were in sympathy with the rebels.

Nazis Attack and Rob the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires

The statements made by Don José Rovira to the correspondent of the News Chronicle in Paris, on November 10th, reveal the terrorist régime under which the Spanish diplomats in Germany who were loyal to the Government suffered.

The News Chronicle correspondent states :

Attacked and robbed by Nazis, who made his life in Berlin impossible, forced to abandon the Spanish Embassy to Fascists—Señor José Rovira Armangol, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Germany, arrived to-day in Paris on his way to Spain.

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Señor Agramonte, the former Ambassador who resigned in June, had again taken over the Berlin Embassy in the name of the rebel "Franco Government."

In an exclusive interview to-day Señor Armangol gave a dramatic account of his treatment in Germany:

Last Tuesday as I stepped out of my car I was assaulted by four men, who snatched my despatch case. From the appearance and looks of the men they were not Spaniards but Germans.

Police at the Wilhelmstrasse detailed two policemen to protect me. Three days later, four men called at my office. One of them was the former Chief Secretary of the Spanish Embassy.

They asked me to leave the Embassy. I went to the Wilhelmstrasse to ask for an explanation. The following day I was notified that the Spanish Embassy was now occupied by Spanish Fascists.

As I went back to the Wilhelmstrasse to ask for a safe conduct I was accosted by four persons—one of whom I recognized as one of my aggressors last Tuesday. They told the policeman who accompanied me that he should no longer look after me.

At the Wilhelmstrasse I was told that there had been a misunderstanding and that the policeman should continue to protect me. But I soon discovered that I was no longer under police protection.

Now I am in a free country I feel it my duty to reveal that since Oct. 20 the Spanish Vice-Consul at Hamburg has been in prison—no one knows where. Before his final arrest he was twice detained by the Gestapo.

GERMANY STARTS SENDING WAR-MATERIAL TO THE REBELS

A Junkers Tri-motor 'Plane Loses its Way

The first incident between the Spanish Government and German Fascism arose on August 9th, 1936. Here is the motive, as explained by Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister, in a letter to the Reich Government, on September 15th, 1936 :

On August 9th a German tri-motor 'plane " Junkers 52 " landed in the aerodrome of Barajas (Madrid). One of the crew got out to speak for a moment to the wireless operator of one of the " Junkers 52 " machines which were then running a passenger service Madrid-Berlin, with many more machines than at the times of the ordinary service, as a result of the special facilities given by the Spanish Government to the German Government so that the German subjects resident in Madrid might leave Spain by air. After the member of the crew had spoken to the wireless operator, he re-entered his own machine, and the 'plane, to the amazement of the employees and staff of the airport, took off again, and it was clearly seen to be fitted with machine-gun turrets above and below.

In the afternoon of the same day it landed, through lack of petrol, in the aerodrome of Azuaga, where it was seized by a Spanish military aeroplane together with its crew, which consisted of four Germans.

The machine had on board empty petrol-cans which showed that it had made a longer flight than was

normally undertaken, and therefore had been forced to refill its tanks while in flight. The 'plane, a "Junkers 52" of military pattern, was entirely without any installation for passengers and is now in the possession of the Spanish Government, exactly as it arrived, and is not being used for any purpose.

On August 14th the Berlin Government presented to the Spanish Government an imperative demand, in which they asked for the immediate release of the five members of the crew of the "Junkers" and the return of the machine.

The Spanish Government replied that they would release the crew, but they would in no case return the machine. This proceeding was made verbally to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid by the Spanish Minister, Señor Barcia.

With regard to the machine the Spanish Government offered to the German Government to retain the machine in their power, but without making use of it. In case that decision should not satisfy the Reich Government, the Spanish Government was prepared to submit the matter to arbitration, or to have a seal put on the machine by the German Embassy in Madrid and the machine deposited in the name of that Embassy in the aerodrome of Barajas.

On his side the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on the 13th announced to the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires there that he would not be received until the Spanish Government gave satisfaction to the demands of the German Government as stated earlier.

The "Junkers 52" in question appears photographed in the White Paper which the Spanish Government

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distributed at Geneva. I myself saw the machine in the aerodrome at Barajas in the first days of September, 1936. It is indeed a formidable warplane.

At that time Germany was delaying her reply to the French Government on the subject of "Non-Intervention," and one of the arguments of the German Government was that the 'plane taken by the Spanish Government had not been returned: according to the Nazis Germany was only using the 'plane for the transport of German refugees.

Hitler Still Wants Satisfaction

The Times correspondent in Berlin commented on the German delay in replying to the French note, and said, among other things (August 13th):

The initiative, it is made clear in well-informed circles to-night, lies with Madrid. Germany has received no satisfaction from the Madrid Government for the murder of her nationals in Catalonia, or for the seizure of the Lufthansa aeroplanes that were being used to transport refugees from Madrid to Alicante. Until the Madrid Government meet Germany on these points the German Government do not feel inclined to do Madrid a favour by agreeing to proposals of non-intervention. In these circumstances Herr Hitler's annoyance at the mistreatment of German nationals and property in Spain appears for the time being to be making it less easy for him to follow the counsels of those advisers who share the French view that the Spanish civil war should not be permitted to develop into an international crisis.

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That is to say, Germany was still posing as the victim of aggression and injury.

Nazi Cynicism

In the Note which contained the German reply to France on August 18th, the first condition laid down by Germany for her participation in "Non-Intervention" was this :

"(1) That the Spanish Government release the German transport aeroplane still held in Madrid."

It will be seen that the Berlin Government supported its adhesion to the farce of "Non-Intervention" on the basis of a lie : the transport aeroplane.

The Spanish Government were not inclined to give way to the German demands, but the British Government earnestly requested the Foreign Office in Madrid to return the machine in order to close the incident. The Spanish Government complied with the friendly request of the British Foreign Office . . . and the rebels had one more 'plane from which to attack the women and children of Madrid !

THE TROUBLED VOYAGE OF THE GERMAN STEAMER KAMERUN

On August 19th, 1936, off Cadiz, the German steamer Kamerun was stopped by the Spanish cruiser Libertad. The warship which is loyal to the legal Government of Spain stopped the Kamerun in Spanish territorial waters, and when the steamer was preparing to enter the harbour

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of Cadiz. The Reich Government gave enormous importance to the incident, in spite of the fact that the crew of the *Libertad* only stopped the *Kamerun* without searching it.

What happened next, the reader will see from the following reports, in which the dictatorial Government of Germany appears as champion of the law.

We copy this from the News Chronicle of August 20th :

The Spanish Government cruiser *Libertad* (7,850 tons) is reported in Berlin to have stopped and searched the German steamer *Kamerun* (2,449 tons) when she was on her way to Genoa with refugees from Spain.

Three shots were fired across the *Kamerun's* bows to warn her commander that he must heave-to.

The Spanish Government submarine B 6 was also on the spot and took part in the affair. Officers from the Government warships searched the steamer.

When the search was completed, the Berlin report continues, the *Kamerun* was allowed to proceed, but was compelled to alter her course—which would have taken her into Cadiz to pick up more refugees—and make for the Mediterranean.

It is stated that the scene of the incident between the warships and the steamer was seven and a half miles out at sea from Cadiz.

“INDIGNANT OUTBURST”

Great indignation was expressed in Berlin last night at the warship's action.

The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* declared:

As international law states that no ship must be stopped outside the three-mile zone, the

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stopping of the German merchant ship *Kamerun* is a striking breach of international law.

All German merchant ships in Spanish waters just now have received orders to run into Spanish harbours to evacuate Germans. The German Reich cannot allow such attacks and least of all from Bolshevik ships' crews.

The freedom of the seas and the securing of international trade transportation must not be infringed by Red pirates and the anarchy which has broken out in many Spanish towns must not be allowed to pass into Spanish waters and take effect on German ships.

We are certain that the German Reich, if necessary, will co-operate with other States in taking the proper measures to make such attacks by the Red pirates impossible.

In this particular case not only was international naval etiquette broken, but also a breach of law, a repetition of which must be prevented with all means.

The Spanish cruiser which took part is, as was reported, that warship upon which at the beginning of the civil war all the officers were murdered and thrown overboard by the mutinous crew.

(This report was strongly denied by the crew when they reached port.)

Thus it is a mutiny and pirate ship, and the incident reveals the complete impotence of the Popular Front Government.

Further reports which we publish reveal clearly the interference of the Soviet Authorities in the Spanish civil war.

We on our side cling firmly to non-interference, but incidents of this kind and the interference of Moscow are inclined to make the efforts of the European States illusory and to create a very serious situation.

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A spokesman of the German propaganda Ministry last night declared that so far no official steps have been taken in connection with the incident.

A full report of the matter, stated this official, has been forwarded to Chancellor Hitler, who is staying in Berchtesgaden, in Bavaria.

No step is expected to be taken, therefore, until to-day at least, because Hitler must first consider the whole matter and its implications.

As the German press has been ordered to describe the Spanish Government's ships as "pirate ships," it is not quite clear what official steps the German Government can take, unless this incident is used as a pretext for German warships in Spanish waters to attack the ships of the Spanish Government with the excuse that they were hindering German ships in their lawful work of evacuating Germans.

The Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy Visits Hitler

With the haughtiness of the strong who will not permit the weak to invoke the law, the German Government adopted a series of attitudes which were totally unjustified and out of all proportion.

Here is the report as given in the Manchester Guardian, August 20th :

It is possible that Germany may take further action over the incident, and Herr Hitler, who is at present at Berchtesgaden, is being consulted by important German officials who have flown from Berlin.

Admiral-General Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, left by special 'plane, it is understood, for Berchtesgaden yesterday. He will in

particular discuss with Herr Hitler the instructions to be given to the German warships now in Spanish waters.

Herr Meissner, the State Secretary of the Presidency, and Herr Lammers, State Secretary of the Chancellery, have also left for Berchtesgaden.

The Lack of Courage on the Part of the German Commandants

In the same number the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Berlin published an extensive report on repercussions of the incident which was provoked by the Kamerun itself, and not by the Government fleet, in spite of the Nazi assertions.

The German Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid has been instructed to protest immediately and in the sharpest form against the stopping and searching of the German steamer *Kamerun* by the Spanish Government cruiser *Libertad* and a submarine, and to declare that the German Government will make the Spanish Government responsible for all consequences if there are further similar incidents.

The German Chargé d'Affaires was also instructed to inform the Spanish Government that German warships have received orders to protect German ships outside the zone by every means from similar breaches of international law.

The Commander of the German naval forces in the Mediterranean to-day sent a telegram to the Commander of the Spanish Government fleet referring to the search of the *Kamerun* and recalling a previous incident, and declaring that these actions constituted a crime against the right of free navigation on the high seas.

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"I am not disposed to tolerate such acts of violence," the Commander declares, "and have given instructions to my ships to reply by force to any act of unjustified violence committed by your vessels."

PRESS INDIGNATION

The editorial columns of the press to-day are filled with expressions of indignation. Rear Admiral Bruninghaus, in a special article in the *Berliner Tageblatt* to-night, deals with the question of maritime and international law raised by the *Kamerun* incident. He writes:

At the end of July the Madrid Government declared Spanish Morocco and the two parts of Spain in which the "Whites" had the upper hand to be war areas. Cadiz, before whose gates the incident took place, is within the region, but it is necessary and important to observe that the incident took place well outside the three-mile limit and consequently was a severe infringement of international law.

The Spanish civil war provides a hard nut for the jurists of mercantile and international law to crack. The Madrid Government has recognized the "Whites" as a warring force through its proclamations of a war zone. The Madrid declaration that the "White" Franco warships are to be regarded as pirates is, however, not in any unison with the war zone declaration.

Further, the Admiral points out, the rebel warships are sailing without officers, being commanded by petty officers and ratings. This raised a question of

international law, since ships may not be commanded by men who have not passed officers' navigation examinations.

The Admiral also states that the incident shows that the men now in charge of the ships of the Madrid Government have not an elementary knowledge of maritime law.

The news that outside the harbours held by the Spanish Government (called by the Admiral "Red"), such as Málaga, Almeria, Cartagena, Valencia, Barcelona, minefields are being laid may also, he declares, lead to further difficulties in the political and military situation. Mine-laying, the Admiral points out, requires practice, skill, and a high degree of navigational knowledge. "If the 'Red' warships lay mines," he writes, "their position must be clearly defined for navigators, otherwise entering and leaving harbours in safety will be impossible."

"The 'Kamerun' did not Carry Arms"

On August 20th Reuter's correspondent in Berlin reported on the measures taken by the German authorities, as follows :

The following *communiqué* was issued by the German News Agency this afternoon:

Immediately after (alsbald) the news had arrived about the incident of the steamer *Kamerun* the German Government telegraphically instructed its Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid to protest in the most energetic terms against the attitude of the Spanish warships, which is in conflict with international law, and at the same time to state that the German Government will hold the Spanish

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Government responsible for all consequences which might arise from the recurrence of similar incidents.

The German Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed at the same time to notify the Spanish Government that the German warships have received orders to protect by every possible means German vessels against similar encroachments, which are in conflict with international law, outside Spanish territorial waters.

The Agency also stated to-day that no war material was on board the *Kamerun*. Moreover, the ship's papers were all in perfect order.

In addition to the Government's protest a stern threat to oppose by force any interference with German shipping similar to the searching of the *Kamerun* has been telegraphed to the Commander of the Spanish Government fleet by Rear Admiral Carls, commanding German warships in Spanish waters. The telegram says:

After the settlement of the breach of law in regard to Seville by the *Almirante Valdez* the cruiser *Libertad* yesterday afternoon fired at the steamship *Kamerun* outside Spanish territorial waters on the high seas and obliged it to come alongside and submit to a search by armed soldiers.

This treatment of a German steamer is a crime against the rights of free shipping on the open sea. I am not willing to tolerate such acts of violence. I have instructed my fighting ships to reply with force to every unjustified act of force of your ships.

The affair of the *Almirante Valdez* took place about eight days ago, when a German commercial

ship was held up in the harbour of Seville. To implement this warning German warships have been instructed to protect German vessels against incidents "by every possible means."

The "Kamerun" Re-appears in Lisbon

The intention of the Kamerun, according to the Nazis, was to collect German refugees in Cadiz. But the truth is that she intended to land 800 tons of armaments for the rebels. Unable to do so in Cadiz, she went to another rebel port, Lisbon. On August 25th The Times correspondent on the Franco-Spanish frontier sent the following dispatch to his paper :

A report from Lisbon, transmitted via Rabat, states that the German steamer *Kamerun*, which was recently stopped and searched on the high seas by Spanish Government warships, is now unloading 800 tons of war material in Lisbon. The Swedish steamer *Wisborg* is also unloading arms there. The cargoes are alleged to include light tanks, aeroplane bombs, and hand grenades, all consigned to the Spanish insurgents.

The Spanish Government also received from Lisbon, on August 23rd, the information which follows :

I am informed that at this moment a German steamer is unloading a great quantity of war-material at the terminus station of the line for Spain. Various boats have been requisitioned for the purpose of transporting this. The police allow no one to approach the landing-place. Among other material, the German ship contained 800 air torpedoes, tanks and gas-bombs.

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A special correspondent of the News Chronicle who was in Lisbon escaped to Rabat to avoid the censorship of the Salazar Government. From Rabat he sent to the News Chronicle the following article, which appeared on August 25th, from which we make some extracts :

The German steamer *Kamerun*, whose search at sea off Cadiz by a Spanish loyal warship raised a strong protest to Madrid from Germany, is rapidly unloading her cargo of 800 tons alongside the Santa Polonia Quay, in the very heart of Lisbon.

Another cargo is being unloaded at Lisbon from the German steamer *Wisberg* (Wigbert?). One cargo consists of arms, the other of oil.

The arms include light tanks, dismounted 'planes, bombs and hand grenades.

No Customs Officers are watching the unloading of the *Kamerun*. Portuguese artillerymen are in charge. Cargo is being placed aboard box-cars on the quayside. Twenty-three left on Saturday for Badajoz and Salamanca, and thirty were dispatched to-day.

The other German steamer which came up the River Tagus in the night with the *Kamerun* is lying at Montijo Port, across the river.

This, then, is the explanation of the troubled voyage of the German steamer Kamerun, which was going to Cadiz to pick up German Refugees, and ended by unloading war-material in Lisbon!

AN AIR ACCIDENT WHICH REVEALS CERTAIN FACTS

On December 4th, 1936, a German 'plane crashed on the Franco-Swiss frontier. The following reports deal with the incident.

The British United Press correspondent in Geneva sent this account to the London press :

A German air-liner, stated to be flying from Lisbon to Stuttgart, was discovered badly smashed at Petit Bornand, on the French side of the Franco-Swiss frontier, to-day. It is believed to have been returning from a mysterious mission in Spain.

The pilot, mechanic and wireless officers were killed, and it is not known whether any other people were on board. The 'plane had been missing since yesterday.

The French police state that pamphlets apparently intended to be dropped over Spain were found near the wreckage.

The German airways concern, Lufthansa, owners of the machine, have refused to give the Geneva airport authorities any information regarding the machine, but it is reported that it had visited Spanish insurgent territory.

In the Service of Franco

The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Paris telegraphed to his paper, December 6th :

Five of the six bodies found among the wreckage of the German Lufthansa aeroplane, which crashed in the Savoy Mountains on Friday night on its way to

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Spain, have been identified. They are Herr Lorenzen the wireless operator, Herr Metzroth, Captain Winterfeld, the son of the former German military attaché in Paris, and two Spaniards, Ricardo Garido and Rogelio Castello.

The aeroplane contained large quantities of Spanish propaganda literature, Nationalist songs, portraits of General Franco, and a supply of Phalangist (Fascist) berets—presumably to be worn by the German "volunteers" in Spain. Dr. von König, a director of the Lufthansa, who flew from Berlin to Geneva, arrived from there by air on the scene of the accident.

The suggestion that the German 'plane merely "transported passengers in a normal way" would be extremely hard to prove. Everything shows, on the contrary, that it formed part of the consignment of German aeroplanes that are being "smuggled" regularly into Spain across French territory. It is expected that diplomatic representations will be made, and the question has also arisen of keeping a closer watch and of forcing down any such 'planes crossing French territory.

FRANCO SELLS SPAIN TO THE NAZIS

History always leaves " patriots " the sad task of handing over their own country to foreign invaders. The Spanish rebels must have known well that both the German and the Italian help which they recieved had its price. A great deal has been written as to the hidden intentions behind the German support for Franco. We quote here a commentary from the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Gurdian which appeared on October 2nd :

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Germany is following the Spanish civil war with intense interest. Her partisanship on behalf of the rebels is fervent and she genuinely believes that their victory will promote the victory of the National Socialist idea in the world.

But her partisanship is not only of an ideal nature. She reckons with a modification of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean as the result of a rebel victory. She is, of course, realistic enough to know that whatever promises the rebel leaders may have made, these promises cannot be completely fulfilled. She knows that they cannot, however, complete their victory, simply cede Ceuta to Germany (or to Italy) and lease harbours in the Balearic or the Canary Islands. But she does believe that she is gaining a foothold in Spain—and therefore in the Eastern Mediterranean—even now, and that she will not lose this foothold. She counts in the Mediterranean for the first time since the Great War, and she is determined to go on counting.

In the days when a rebel victory was doubtful the attitude of those responsible for the conduct of German foreign policy—and of the German military leaders—was that a rebel defeat “could not be tolerated.” Germany is now confident in a rebel victory, and Italy, no doubt, shares this confidence.

The rebels as a whole cannot, strictly speaking, be called “Fascists,” or “National Socialists,” though some of them have Fascist or National Socialist ideas. But Germany is hopeful that National Socialism will gain ground amongst them. She believes that she has created both an “ideological” and a material foundation for a German Mediterranean policy, and that in course of time she will be able to acquire a very strong position in the Mediterranean with the help of a “National Socialist Spain.” She is as

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fully aware as anyone that there is no gratitude in politics (except perhaps amongst some of the more primitive Balkan Powers), but the help she has given to the rebels is, so she confidently believes, the beginning of a political, commercial and naval influence that will grow and become far more than a mere influence, not because of any gratitude the rebels may feel on account of help given in the civil war but because they will know that in Germany they have an interested friend who has not only given practical proof of her interest but is worth keeping as a friend because she is wealthy and powerful.

Whatever happens (now that a victory of the Spanish rebels is, according to the German view, certain) Germany is confident that she will not only play a big part in Mediterranean politics—bigger, she believes, than the part she played before the Great War—but that she will, through the “gate” of the Mediterranean, have secured access to “world politics.” She has regarded herself as a European Power ever since her rearmament was well on the way. The victory of the Spanish rebels—in which she takes great pride as being partly her own victory—is making her conscious of becoming a “world Power.”

Franco's Compromise with German Capitalism

Certainly the rebels were not unaware of the designs pursued by Germany on Spanish soil, and especially in Morocco: they knew only too clearly. The following article, published in Reynolds' News on January 10th, 1937, may throw some light on this:

The capitalists of Germany and Italy stand unmasked. *Reynolds* is able to reveal that the Spanish military revolt was inspired by a group of Fascist

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industrialists, bent on obtaining from General Franco mineral and mining concessions which the advent of a People's Government had effectively prevented.

Gradually, the mystery of Hitler's resolve to undertake an "ideologic crusade" against Communism in Spain is being dissolved.

Apart from his deep-laid plan to encircle France on the south in the Pyrenees and to cut her maritime routes to North Africa and the Orient, the Führer's participation in the Spanish insurrection is directed by motives far removed from the purely political.

Let the cold hard facts speak for themselves.

In April, 1935, a group of German financiers at Frankfort-on-Main evolved a plan to obtain concessions for working mineral mines in Spain by means of German labour.

In order to facilitate the scheme, the group created a vast financial trust, known as the Banking and Industrial Consortium, composed of the Rheinmetall munitions trust at Dusseldorf; the Siemens and Halske concerns; Krupps, the I. G. Farben chemical trust, and other well-known companies on whom Hitler relies for his maintenance in office.

Powerful as it was, this new German machine was anxious to cover up its tracks, so that its intervention at any time might not be laid to Germany alone.

It proceeded, therefore, to get into touch with Commander A. Serra who was then the Italian representative of the Rockefeller group, and transmitted to him at Rome the outlines of the plan.

A report was made to the Italian Confederation of Industrial Employers, and another was presented to the Fascist Party by Signor Giuriati. Both were received with approval.

The big Italian industrialists, having obtained the necessary capital for the adventure from various

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insurance companies, suggested to the German Consortium the creation of a special autonomous organization to exploit the Spanish mines.

The Germans, who had already made complete technical studies, reports, soundings, and analyses, agreed, and all the Fascist capitalists had to do was obtain concessions from the Lerroux or the Gil Robles Governments.

They were confident that this would not be difficult.

But at the moment when the German-Italian magnates were on the point of beginning operations came the Spanish elections of February, 1936.

Instead of a victory for the Fascist "Action Populaire," the electoral struggle resulted in an overwhelming triumph for the "Frente Populaire."

The People's Party had been returned with a programme which foreshadowed the early nationalization of those very mines on which the industrialists had set their covetous eyes.

There was consternation within the industrialists' ranks. They had poured out money like water in preparation for their plan; now all seemed lost.

There was, however, another way in which they could achieve their end. If they could not apply for concessions they might be able to take them.

Five months later the Spanish military revolt burst on an astonished world.

That was the first act of the drama: the curtain soon rang up on the second. Germany and Italy rushed in, eager to snatch the spoils of Franco's "victory."

For years past the Spanish mines have been worked by Spanish, French and British companies. But that fact in no way deterred Franco. Fondly imagining that his insurrection was going to succeed in forty-eight hours, he had made no provision for a permanent

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war-chest out of which his troops could be maintained, and by means of which he could make his purchases of arms, munitions and equipment from abroad.

Then he realized his error. A massive importation of weapons of warfare was his one chance of success, and there remained but one method of paying for them. He would hand over to his allies the iron-ore and other raw materials from the mines. And the Fascist industrialists smiled.

On August 27th Colonel Sanchez Gonzalez, chief of Franco's "Civil Service," commandeered the mines in Spanish Morocco—an act of sheer piracy. At the same time he ordered the owning companies to get into touch with foreign buyers of ore and effect the liquidation of accounts by a 60 per cent cheque drawn on London.

Hitler refused these conditions of payment for his war help, for he, too, was in need of ready cash. Thereupon ensued an arrangement between the German capitalists and Franco which put the rebel leader completely in Hitler's power.

There were rapid developments. A company called Hisma Limitado Carranza y Bernhardt, with headquarters at Seville, was endowed with the monopoly of the Moroccan mines, including those of the Compañia Española de Minas del Rif, whose capital was of British, Spanish and French origin.

All the deposits of iron-ore and manganese in the districts occupied by the insurgents were placed under the Carranza Company's control.

Curiously enough, the Carranza firm has for years been the special representative of the German iron trade in Spain, and to-day it represents the German organization which under Hitler has centralized the metallurgical industry of the Reich and its purchases

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abroad. In reality, it is a German organization with a Spanish name and with an absolute control of Spanish industry.

Thus Hitler has put into force a scheme of German colonization under the guise of resisting Communism. His real object is the subjugation of the Spanish people to the will of German and Italian armament manufacturers and war lords.

Already thousands of tons of ore have been dispatched to Germany to be used for munitions. Franco, to pay for the help he so urgently needed when he was checked in front of Madrid, authorized the sale to Germany of a further 800,000 tons of minerals to be delivered within twelve months.

Finally, it should be noted that the exchange of minerals and their payment are to be subjected to a strict international "clearing." The war-mongers are afraid of each other. Without this watch the metal market would be upset and huge profits would not be possible.

British and French capital invested in the Spanish mines has been confiscated, and yet no protest has arisen from its owners. Is a new capitalist "understanding" in the offing?

Activities of German Business-men in Rebel Territory

Thus, the Germans began to gain control of all commerce and industry in the rebel zones.

The following appeared in the Daily Telegraph on December 21st, 1936, from Sir Percival Phillips in Gibraltar :

German business activity in Spanish territory in the hands of the Nationalists is beginning to arouse alarm and resentment in the minds of many Spaniards.

They fear the increasing German domination, in commercial as well as military operations, which it is impossible to check so long as the Nationalists are dependent on German aid in fighting the Madrid Government.

Coastal shipping trade has already passed out of Spanish into German control. This trade was formerly largely in the hands of three companies—the Trans-mediterranea, of Madrid, the Solanazar, of Málaga, and Ybarra and Co., of Seville. Recently, however, on the ground that Spanish ships were endangered by the blockade, traffic between Vigo, Seville, Huelva, Cadiz, and the Balearics has been diverted to German ships, operated by the Neptun, Woermann, Hansa and Oldenburg Portugiesische lines.

“Himsa,” a German organization originally formed as a distributing company handling traffic between Ceuta and Seville, has broadened its activities to include all kinds of import and export business which, before the revolution, was shared by the European markets.

The buyer, whether he pays in pesetas or arranges a commodity exchange, has merely to give his order to “Himsa.” It then carries out the transaction without further formality and ensures prompt delivery from German ports.

German firms have already profited by orders for 120,000 steel drums for olive oil, of which half have been landed, at prices higher than those quoted in past years by Dutch and French manufacturers.

The paper shortage is being met by large shipments of wood pulp from Germany which, instead of coming direct from Sweden or Finland, now passes through “Himsa” at no advantage to Spanish purchasers.

Other materials needed in Nationalist territory are

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similarly supplied by German agents. Commodities of which Germany is in great need are leaving Spain under the same arrangement.

German agents have been buying large stocks of wool and cork, and they are, I understand, drawing heavily on the output of iron ore from the Spanish mines in Morocco, as compensation for the materials supplied to General Franco's Government.

Unless Britain is able to conclude a satisfactory clearing arrangement with the Nationalists, it is believed that the season's output of oranges, which is estimated at between 250,000 and 300,000 cases, will go to Germany, there to be resold to other markets.

In addition, the Germans are said to have been trying to purchase or to secure an option on 30,000 tons of olive oil from Seville. If this is permitted by the Government it will prove a profitable investment for Germany, in view of the curtailed production.

These are but a few instances of the way in which Germany is tightening her hold on Spanish markets.

The Nazis Declare Spain a German Colony

After four months of war the Nazis begin to seriously believe that Spain may take a place in the politics and economics of the Reich similar to that held by the German colonies before 1914. The following article which appeared in the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, signed by Gunter Woltersdorf, November 1st, 1936, is especially significant. They had not even the grace to publish it in any other paper: it appears in the place which they consider the most suitable for it—in the official German colonial gazette! Let us glance at Herr Woltersdorf's ideas:

The Spanish civil war which is shaking the country deeply and has such disastrous consequences for the State and the economic system, has directed our attention to a country with which we Germans feel particularly united. German character and German creative power have given to parts of the Iberian Peninsula a clearly recognizable face. Since the days of the Gothic migration and the establishment on Spanish soil of the *West-Gothic Empire*—a State which by the still existing name of “Andalusia,” from “Vandalusia,” the Empire of the *Vandals*, has been preserved up to our own time as a living remembrance of early German history—Spanish soil has seen many Germans. Here by their knowledge and ability they have created works of culture which have eternal value. The palaces and churches of Spain tell of German artistic creation. Spanish history in its heyday tells us of commercial houses from *Schwaben* and the *Rhineland*, which had an important influence during the time of the discoveries; it tells us of German *scientists*, who accompanied the *explorers* and *conquistadores*, and who alone made it possible for them to achieve their ends; of German miners, who were to open up the wealth of the soil of Spain and its new territories beyond the sea; of mercenaries and soldiers who fought for the greatness and power of Spain. But also German peasants—and this episode is probably one of the least known of German fate throughout the world—followed the call of Spanish agents, to cultivate the land there and to convert deserts into flourishing gardens and fields. And they followed willingly, because their country, even in the beginning and middle of the eighteenth century, had already become too small and no longer provided sufficient space for its sons. Some other reasons may also have helped to bring this about.

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Here follows a detailed description of the German peasant settlement in the Sierra Morena. The article closes with the words :

German work and German blood have not been introduced in vain into Spain. An honest friendship, which was preserved throughout the Great War, connects us with Spain; many German merchants, artisans and technicians have found a field for their activities in Spain up to the present day. Although their work has now been destroyed and lost—places of German culture, municipal houses, churches and schools—we hope that the fate of emigrants will soon assume a better aspect again.

What Franco Owes Hitler

A certain amount has been written about the cost of the material help which Hitler has given Franco : we wish to quote some of this information in these pages.

On December 21st, 1936, the Madrid newspaper, Juventud published the following article on the financial aspect of German intervention in Spain :

General Franco owes Germany £19,000,000 for munitions sent to him. This does not include payment for the 237 aeroplanes which Germany is also alleged to have sent.

As General Franco has no foreign exchange to pay these debts in gold the intention of German industry is that this sum should be paid in minerals. Iron ore from the mines of Spanish Morocco was formerly sent principally to England, France and Holland. Now, by a dictatorial order of the Burgos Government, it is all being sent to Germany. ♣

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In October four German ships, which had arrived at Cadiz with war material, returned home carrying 12,000 tons of iron. Next January ships will leave Germany to carry away 600,000 tons.

The Riff mines alone hope to hand over to Germany 800,000 tons of iron ore in eight months.

What the Nazis have Spent to Save Franco from Defeat

On December 27th, 1936, the Deutsche Volkszeitung of Prague, published the following note, which we reproduce as sent from its special correspondent in Berlin :

I have obtained from a quarter in close touch with the German Foreign Ministry a reliable estimate of the cost up to now of German intervention in Spain. "By February at latest," I was told by a man who holds a high official position, "we shall have sunk half a milliard marks (£40,000,000)." (He feels sure, too, that the adventure will turn out badly for Germany.) General Franco's "purchases" amount to some 280,000,000 marks for army stores of the most varied sorts, all provided on credit by Germany, since Franco has nothing to pay with but blank cheques in the form of promises to meet German colonial demands.

The direct expenditure on the equipment and maintenance of German troops is estimated to amount by now to 75,000,000 marks. A soldier with rifle and full equipment has cost by the time he sets out for Spain some 850 to 1,000 marks, according to a calculation made for the Ministry of Finance.

The operations of German warships in Spanish waters also represent a heavy burden on the taxpayer. Extra expenditure already incurred on maintenance

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and cruising exceeds 30,000,000 marks. To this have to be added appalling sums for staff expenditure, for "propaganda," and for "other expenses" of undisclosed nature.

In the aggregate all this belligerent expenditure amounts already, according to the correspondent's informant, to more than 400,000,000 marks. Part of it has had to be paid for with foreign exchange. This was obtained on the strength of the assets abroad of big German firms.

WAR-MATERIAL SENT BY THE NAZIS TO THE REBELS

In the following pages we shall quote all the information which we possess on the subject of help given in war-material to General Franco by Nazi Germany, from the outbreak of the war until the end of 1936.

Several Three-engined German 'Planes in Tetuan

The Times writes, August 5th, 1936 :

Our Casablanca correspondent telegraphs:

It is reported on good authority from Spanish Morocco that several three-engined German aeroplanes arrived at Tetuan on Monday.

What the Rebels Receive from Germany—and What they Expect

The following is an extract from a message by the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, published on August 5th, 1936 :

With regard to German intervention the facts are as follows:

Five German aeroplanes (including three heavy bombers) have arrived at Ceuta. More are expected—the rebel leaders count on receiving ten German heavy bombers.

Twenty-five German 'Planes, with German Pilots, in Seville

The Manchester Guardian published the following dispatch sent from New York, on August 13th, 1936 :

Notwithstanding official German assurances that no German 'planes or war-material have been supplied to the Spanish insurgents, a message from the special correspondent of the *New York Times* in Seville, which has been smuggled out by way of Gibraltar, declares that twenty heavy German Junker bombers and five fast German pursuit 'planes have arrived in Seville. They were manned by German military pilots in mufti.

The correspondent states that "officials of the German Consulate here admit privately that the German airmen are military pilots," but claim that they will not fly the 'planes in action against the Government forces, but will instruct Spanish airmen in their use. The correspondent adds that he inspected some of the German 'planes in person.

The Same Notice Appears in "The Times"

Here is a paragraph from an account by The Times correspondent in Berlin, which appeared on August 14th, 1936 :

The suggestion mooted in well-informed circles to-day that a German acceptance of the French proposals

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would be to the advantage of Madrid invites the inference that Germany is already assisting the insurgents in deed as well as word. It may at least be said that no express denial is obtainable of reports that twenty-five German military aircraft were landed at Cadiz two days ago and sent to Seville for the use of the insurgents, and that a number of Lufthansa aeroplanes, which were originally in Barcelona for rescue purposes, have found their way—through a commercial transaction in Lisbon—to the insurgents at Tetuan.

German Pilots in Tetuan

Reuter's correspondent in Paris telegraphs, August 12th, 1936 :

The special correspondent of the *Intransigent* at Tetuan states that an intense action on the part of the whole of the rebel air force is about to begin. He further states that a score of German airmen in white flying suits arrived in Tetuan yesterday, all of them under twenty-five.

More German Pilots in Seville

The Press Association correspondent in Lisbon sent the following message to the London press on August 18th, 1936 :

A British pilot who was in Seville—the rebel headquarters in the south—a few days ago, says that he saw a large number of fighting 'planes which had arrived there, and were still arriving, from Italy and Germany. He actually spoke, he said, to German airmen, who wore white uniforms and carried revolvers

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and, he understood, were taking an active part in bombing operations.

It was understood that these men had, with a view to legalising their position, joined the Spanish Foreign Legion.

Two German Ships with Aeroplanes for the Spanish Rebels

On August 20th, 1936, the Spanish Government received the following information :

The German steamer *Monte Sarmiento* was to set out on a pleasure cruise, from Hamburg, on August 6th. But the embarkment of the tourists was suspended, and on the 7th the steamer sailed for Lisbon, fitted out as a ship to take off the German refugees who had come from Spain. She loaded fourteen military 'planes, and some two hundred and fifty men who were pilots and military instructors.

In the same way the steamer *Usaramo*, which was to weigh anchor on July 18th for another pleasure cruise, left Hamburg on the 31st of that month with eighteen or twenty bombing machines, war-material of other kinds, and a fair number of men recruited from the Nazis.

The organizers of these expeditions are the leaders of the National-Socialists in Hamburg, and, naturally, in agreement with the Reich government.

Eighteen German Bombing 'Planes

In a report from Valencia a special correspondent of The Times wrote, referring to the rebels (August 26th, 1936) :

They are known to have received recently some fifteen Italian aeroplanes, and are now reported to have

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obtained another seventeen bombers of German make.

What Arthur Koestler Saw in Seville

Arthur Koestler, special correspondent of the News Chronicle obtained an interview with General Queipo de Llano in Seville; the report of the interview was sent from Gibraltar and appeared in the News Chronicle on September 1st, 1936. We give here the most interesting sections of the report:

As to the military dictatorship's foreign policy, he said it would be particularly friendly towards Germany, Portugal and Italy, "who supported our cause, and whose corporative status Spain will imitate."

Question: And what will your relations be with countries which are strictly observing non-interference?"

Answer: Less friendly.

Questioned about the origin of the German Junker 'planes which are now fighting for the rebels, the General declared that he bought about ten in Tetuan—the rebel headquarters in Morocco—from a private agent who owns a whole stock of Junker and Caproni (Italian) 'planes.

He refused, however, to disclose the name of this singular private personality who is able to stock dozens of the latest model fighting 'planes produced by foreign countries.

I am informed that three more Junker 'planes arrived at the Seville airport on August 28th.

I am further informed that German 'planes are brought to Spain by civilian pilots who immediately

return home, while German war pilots arrive by land or sea to take charge.

Wherever German war pilots pass through rebel territory they register themselves under Spanish names at the hotels they stay at.

A British subject, Kaid Belton, aged 51, who arrived in Seville on August 23rd or 24th from Gibraltar, was arrested at three o'clock the following morning and has since been kept in prison, no reason for his arrest being given.

"Kaid" is the name for a general in the Moroccan Army.

Although no fighting has yet occurred in Seville, life in the city is a nightmare.

Streets are crowded with soldiers, red-capped Carlists, Foreign Legionaries and white-dressed German pilots, but the obviously dominant element is the Fascist phalanx which daily increases—an avalanche only to be compared with the Nazi spring-tide three years ago in Germany.

The same types of mercenaries, hot-headed youths and desperadoes abound as in the famous Sturm Abteilung (S.A.) of the Roehm period.

Last Thursday I saw a lorry bringing about twenty prisoners captured during the conquest of Rio Tinto.

They were not brought to the barracks or the prison but to the Phalanx headquarters, just as in the first days of the German terror prisoners were taken not to the police but to S.A. headquarters.

A big crowd watching the passing of the prisoners in a frightened, hostile silence was immediately dispersed by police.

In every café there is a placard prohibiting discussion of politics besides an invitation to join the rebel army for 1s. 9d. a day—in Portugal recruits are promised 9s. a day.

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The recruiting commissions have been instructed to reject workers unemployed or any other person who might be suspect. As Andalusia is a particularly poor district, almost everyone is under suspicion and this is the main reason for the rebels' shortage of men.

The rebels have plenty of arms but lack men. Madrid has plenty of men but lacks arms.

The rebel leaders in Seville are feeling the hostility of the workers and trying to win them over by promising agrarian reforms and proclaiming the advantages of the Fascist system.

The people of Seville practise a kind of passive resistance. Nobody dares to act or even to speak in public, knowing that of the three people sitting at the next table in the café at least one will be an informer.

The following personal experience gives an idea of the typical atmosphere in Seville and of the relations of German airmen with the rebels.

On Friday at about 2 p.m. I entered the hall of the Hotel Cristina and passed a table where four gentlemen sat wearing uniforms of the Spanish Air Force, reading the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and talking the purest Prussian dialect.

A fifth man at the table was Herr Strindberg, actually the German Ullstein Press Agency correspondent in Spain, who knows that I resigned in 1932 from the editorial staff of Ullstein's *Vossische Zeitung* when that paper adopted a Nazi policy.

I did not recognize Herr Strindberg until he strolled along to my table pretending to be looking at the ceiling, and then rejoined his party.

Some whispering between the five men was followed by a strategic move, two of the airmen strolling to the hotel entrance and posting themselves there, while

a third sauntered to the telephone box to denounce me to the police.

Frankly, I admit to feeling rather frightened, knowing that the attitude of the Seville police towards suspects is first to shoot and then to inquire.

I approached Strindberg and after a short and rather stormy discussion one of the airmen, introducing himself with Prussian correctness as "Herr Bernhard," asked for my identity papers.

As I refused these, protesting that he was not an official authority, my interrogator called the hotel manager, who witnessed that Herr Bernhard, in his capacity as an officer of the Spanish Air Force, was authorised to demand the papers of any civilian.

When I informed him that I am a *News Chronicle* correspondent, Herr Bernhard sounded a retreat.

When I asked him how a German happened to be an officer in the Spanish Air Force he declared that he and his four companions were all resident in Spain—which statement was untrue, as I learned that they arrived in Seville only a few days ago.

Back at my hotel I found that the rumour that I had been arrested had already spread, and although the incident seemed to be closed even people friendly to the rebels advised me to leave for Gibraltar as soon as possible.

Twenty-eight German Bombers in Cadiz

The diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Herald wrote on September 2nd, 1936 :

I am told on good authority that a German steamer arrived at Cadiz yesterday with twenty-eight bombing aeroplanes for the rebels.

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The Activities of the German Soldiers in Seville

The following report was sent by a correspondent of the News Chronicle in Tangiers, and published on September 4th, 1936 :

Almost at the same time as the radio announced Germany's adhesion "in principle" to the non-interference committee, I learned to-day, from a reliable source, the following particulars of deliberate intervention by Germany in the Spanish civil war.

On August 28th there arrived in the Seville airport twelve German chaser aeroplanes of the very latest pattern designed by Gerhart Fieseler, the well-known German air acrobat.

Gerhart Fieseler himself is in Seville and was seen on the afternoon of August 27th in the hall of the Hotel Inglaterra wearing a Spanish pilot's uniform.

The Fieseler chasers have been in production for the past eight months. They are the last word in fighting machines, attaining a speed of about 250 miles an hour.

It is quite possible that the entry of these machines into the war may have a decisive effect or at least turn the balance in favour of the rebel air force.

I do not know how the 'planes were transported from Germany to Portugal and from Portugal to Seville. It is possible that they were delivered as spare parts by the German cargo boat *Wiberg*, which, as the *News Chronicle* exclusively revealed, unloaded war-material some ten days ago at Lisbon—material which did not pass through the Portuguese Customs, but was directly taken over by Portuguese officers.

The 'planes may have been assembled in Lisbon or in Vigo. This, of course, is only an assumption—the fact is that they arrived in Seville on August 28th.

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According to the same source of information, which is in close touch with the headquarters of the 2nd Division in Seville, the air strength of that Division, operating on the Andalusian front, is as follows:

Six Dornier Wal (German) aeroplanes (older pattern, belonging to the division before the civil war started).

Seven Italian Savoia-Marchettis.

Five three-engined Junkers (German) 'planes.

Three large Lufthansa (German) transport 'planes converted for carrying bombs.

The above-mentioned 'planes do not bear any of the usual markings on their wings.

It is significant that the German war pilots operating with General Franco's army do not belong to the Tercio—the Spanish Foreign Legion—like the Italian pilots, who are all in the Tercio to protect themselves against possible international complications.

The German pilots in Seville are virtually masters of the Seville airport. They are attached neither to the Tercio nor to the 2nd Division, but form what amounts to an independent air buccaneer corps.

When in service they, of course, wear Spanish pilots' uniforms.

After a stay of several days in Seville, I was impressed by the absolute self-assurance and cynicism with which Germany is carrying on her intervention in Spain, she being well aware of the merely platonic character of round-table diplomatic conferences.

It is an exact repetition of the Abyssinia affair: while the Liberal Powers talk and negotiate fruitlessly, the Fascist Powers act and create the *fait accompli* of a new world as they like it.

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A German Destroyer Lands Artillery in Algeciras

On October 28th, 1936, the Spanish Government received the following information :

On the 17th of last month a German destroyer called at Algeciras. It landed anti-aircraft guns.

The Ironclad "Deutschland" in the Service of the Rebels

The following report was given to the press, on October 23rd, 1936, by the Spanish Embassy in London :

According to trustworthy information from Tangiers, at dawn on the 20th of October the armoured ship *Deutschland* sailed for Málaga and Valencia, receiving *en route* orders and mail for a German sea-plane in the service of the insurgents. On the night of the 19th fifteen German submarines crossed the Straits. On the 8th 160 German youths arrived at Seville in a German boat, apparently specialized troops, with twelve anti-aircraft guns, leaving immediately by train for the rebel fronts.

German Merchant Ships with War-material for the Rebels

On October 28th, 1936, the following report came into the possession of the Spanish Government :

The German steamer *Orotava*, on the 17th instant, landed munitions and rifles in Las Palmas (Canary Islands). The German steamer *Sierra Ventana*, also of the Norddeutscher Line, landed a cargo of war-material some fifteen days ago. The German steamer *Arriolso* and the banana transport ships of the Fratridolson Company are *en route* for Lisbon, where

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they will land Spanish and German officers who will then proceed to Spain.

More Details on Nazi Intervention

On October 30th, 1936, the Spanish Embassy in London issued the following information :

At half-past nine in the forenoon of October 28th a German boat of considerable tonnage entered the port of Ceuta. She was stowed with munitions for the rebels.

On Sunday, the 25th instant, a Norwegian ship loaded with munitions also reached Ceuta. According to the rebels they had seized her in territorial waters. But the truth is that the ship was manned by an Italian crew.

A person proceeding from Cadiz asserts that some twenty days ago he saw on the quay of the port there six cases of munitions with the following label in Italian: "For the Colonial Army; bombs for active warfare."

About a fortnight ago this same person saw on the wharf of the "Torre de Oro" in Seville, an immense case full of German munitions.

Rebel Messages Picked up by the Spanish Government

Among the messages picked up from the rebels by the Government's wireless service, on October 29th, were the following :

Salamanca from Leon, October 17th. Commander aerodrome to general commanding air forces. Received four Bredas, six Junkers, two Fokkers, one Dragon, thirty-six Heinkels.

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Ammunition, D, 16955; 379 A bombs; 230 B bombs. Hundred kilograms of 15. Fuel, A 36939; B 4532.

The second message is:

Salamanca from Seville, October 17th. To General commanding air forces from Commander Second Squadron. Received three transport Junkers, two Savoy. Dispatched one with three Heinkel reconnaissance 'planes to contact relay 'plane.

The third message (apparently relating to bombs) says:

Received and in stock 295 incendiary 12397 Italian high explosive. German weight: Ten kilos—172; Fifty kilos—107; 250 kilos—139; 500 kilos—9.

The Voyage of the "Emden" is not in Vain

On November 2nd, 1936, the Spanish Government received a dispatch from Berlin which stated:

On the pretext of an educational tour the German cruiser *Emden* is now in Spanish waters. She carries a cargo of flame-throwers, and is escorting two ships loaded with ammunitions and with three times the usual crew.

Six weeks ago two hundred German tank-drivers left Neuruppin for Spain. They were commanded by a lieutenant who knows some Spanish. It appears that four of these Germans have already been killed at the front.

How Germany Sends War-material for Franco

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian wrote, on November 20th, 1936:

According to information received here big shipments of war-material are leaving, or are about to leave, Hamburg. All German war-material is sent to Spain by sea (chiefly from Hamburg), except the German aeroplanes, which start off from Böblingen, near Stuttgart, and fly either directly to Spain (passing over France by night) or by way of Austria to Italy, and then to Spain from there.

Great precautions are taken in Germany to impose secrecy. Some time ago a non-German radio station announced that aeroplane engines had been delivered to the Spanish rebels by a certain German firm (the name of which is in the possession of your correspondent). The firm was thereupon occupied by agents of the Gestapo, who made numerous arrests. Amongst the arrested persons are several Nazis. The prisoners are still being detained.

German aeroplane motors destined for the Spanish rebels are first sent to Döberitz (the great military training-ground and arms depot near Berlin) and then to Hamburg.

During the last few weeks Germany has been sending more and more men to Spain as well as material. Volunteers are asked for. Two squadrons in a German tank regiment volunteered for service in Spain on request the other day. The service is popular, for, quite apart from the adventure it promises, volunteers are very well paid. A German private soldier who is accepted for service in Spain

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gets 500 marks a month and an N.C.O. gets 700 marks.

For German airmen, Spain at war is regarded as an excellent training-ground.

German Intervention Disguised with Portuguese Aid

The intervention of all the Fascist countries against the Spanish Government has made necessary the tightening of the bonds between two régimes so compatible with each other as that of Hitler and that of Oliveira Salazar. Therefore a trade air-service was necessary, plying between Stuttgart and Lisbon, and calling at Burgos! Such an innovation was also translated into help for Franco. On December 20th, 1936, The Times correspondent in Lisbon comments on the progress of the relationship between the two countries in the following terms :

A new Lufthansa air service between Lisbon and Stuttgart, connecting with Berlin and London, was inaugurated yesterday by the German Minister, who in a speech extolled the common interests and the friendship of Germany and Portugal.

The route is by way of Burgos, Marseilles, and Geneva. Three-engined Junkers machines will be used, and the departures from Lisbon and from Stuttgart will be on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

Hitherto it has been possible to fly from Portugal to other parts of Europe only once a week, using the Portuguese service to Tangier and thence the Air France service to Marseilles.

THE SENDING OF GERMAN TROOPS

More than Two Thousand Germans Land in Cadiz

Extract from the News Chronicle of December 1st, 1936:

A report has reached the British Government that German troops have been landed in Cadiz. More than 2,000 of them are on their way to Madrid to help General Franco batter down the capital.

There is good reason to believe that a confirmatory message is now in the hands of the French Government.

According to information received by the *News Chronicle* the German trained soldiers were all wearing Spanish rebel uniforms when they landed.

Beaten back by the determination and heroism of the Spanish people, Franco has taken the last desperate gamble; and has imported these troops to be his new mercenaries.

Although the report that Hitler has now intervened with troops is known in Downing Street, it is pointed out that so far the information is uncorroborated from sources other than the original.

There is, however, no reason to suppose that the British Government is wrongly informed. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that the report has been in London long enough for it to have been corrected were it not accurate.

Five Thousand Germans in Seville

From Gibraltar, Sir Percival Phillips sent the following dispatch to the Daily Telegraph which

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appeared on December 1st, 1936; we shall quote some paragraphs :

Fantastic reports are being circulated of the number of Germans already landed in Nationalist territory. I am able to state, on the authority of reliable eye-witnesses who have arrived here from Seville, that a number of German merchant vessels last week disembarked volunteers both there and at Cadiz.

It is estimated that 5,000 Germans are now housed in the Seville exhibition buildings, commandeered hotels and warehouses.

They have no uniforms but are supplied with modern equipment, described as the latest products of the German factories. Military supplies landed at the same time, it is stated, included aircraft, tanks, shells, six-wheel tractor lorries and machine-guns.

Picked Officers and Men of the Reichswehr

With reference to the German troops in Spain, a diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Herald writes, December 3rd, 1936:

Startling evidence has reached London to show that the majority, if not all, of the German "volunteers" now fighting for General Franco in Spain, are carefully selected officers and men of the Reichswehr, Germany's highly-trained conscript army.

It is clear that a steady flow of such "volunteers" is being poured into Spain with the connivance of the Reich Government.

Here is concrete evidence which has been brought to my notice. The facts, revealed by a relative of one of the Reichswehr men, speak for themselves and show how the German Government is aiding the rebel

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forces in flagrant violation of the Non-Intervention Agreement to which it is a party.

On November 21st, cavalry, machine-gun, and tank corps units at Cassel, in the State of Hessen, were paraded in their barrack squares after they had been asked about their knowledge of languages.

They were invited by their officers to volunteer for an important mission abroad, which they were told "would not be a soft job." Volunteers were promised immediate promotion. Out of 1,700 men, only fourteen offered their services.

The following day the men were paraded again. After a medical inspection, thirty-five soldiers from the tank corps, between seventy and eighty cavalrymen and forty machine-gunners were selected. They were then told that they were to go to Spain.

Those who came from South Germany were given short leave, and later assembled at Munich in civilian clothes. From there, with officers and engineers, they went via Austria to Genoa. At Genoa they were put on board an Italian steamer for Spain.

The others, in civilian clothes, but armed with rifles and machine-guns, left on German merchant ships from the German ports of Wilhelmshaven, Bremerhaven and Cuchaven. At these ports they were joined by other units similarly recruited.

Another centre from which these "volunteers" were drawn was Gottingen, forty miles north of Cassel, where twenty men were selected from 800 cavalrymen and members of the anti-aircraft unit stationed there. In both cases the procedure was the same.

All the selected men have had between a year and eighteen months' intensive training. The proportion of officers among them is, I am informed, exceedingly high.

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There are known to be roughly 6,000 Germans in Franco's ranks at the moment. These two cases refer to only two small military centres in Germany. It is fair to assume that the greater part of the German "volunteers" now swelling Franco's forces were recruited in the same way.

Twenty Thousand Germans are Expected in Seville

Of the greatest interest, in view of the political tendencies of the writer, are the following paragraphs extracted from an article sent from Gibraltar by Sir Percival Phillips, and published in the Daily Telegraph on December 3rd, 1936:

The influx of Germans to join General Franco's army is said to be continuing at Cadiz and Seville. One well-informed foreigner, who was lately in Seville, told me to-day that the people there made no secret of their belief that fully 20,000 Germans would shortly be concentrated in barracks and depots for absorption, nominally under Spanish command, into the Nationalist forces.

It is also asserted that the Germans will preserve their own military formations which existed on their departure from Germany, but no proof of this is yet forthcoming.

The Germans already in Seville have been carefully instructed about their attitude to the civil population; and respond with evident pleasure to the Nazi salutes with which they are greeted on all sides. But they are discreet in conversation, keep much to themselves, and go about in small groups.

It is significant that all those seen so far bear the distinct impress of military discipline. Sentries on duty outside the Cristina Hotel, Seville, one of the

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German headquarters, although wearing Spanish uniforms, are alleged to be Germans, and the changing of the quarter-guard is an elaborate ceremony, introducing the goose-step.

Parties have been seen busy with field kitchens, said to be of German manufacture, and the presence of much mechanized transport cannot be denied.

German experts are also said to be aiding in the construction of new defences for Seville against attacks by land troops and from the air. The Nationalists are doing everything possible to make their new allies welcome. Their flags are displayed in shops and on public buildings, alongside Italy's Fascist emblem.

Radio broadcasts at morning and midnight invariably end with the Horst Wessel anthem, sung in its entirety by a soldier's chorus, punctuated by sounds of marching feet and German words of command—evidently imported gramophone records.

After the anthems of Italy and Spain have been played transmissions end with "Deutschland Uber Alles."

Representatives of the new German recruitment, who like all the men in Seville are thinly disguised in civilian clothes, have arrived at Salamanca, but, unlike those in Seville, give the impression of belonging to the officer class.

The Nationalists' new defensive preparations which were begun three weeks ago are being pushed forward in various areas behind the Madrid front as an obvious precautionary measure against surprise raids by the Government.

Picked Soldiers

Nor must we omit to notice the following paragraphs from the article by the Morning Post correspondent in

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Paris, which appeared in that Conservative paper on December 3rd, 1936:

There is no doubt at all in official quarters here that the 5,000 Germans reported to have reached Seville are not only trained, but picked, soldiers sent by the Government of the Reich. In a totalitarian State, a "volunteer" cannot exist, and Herr Hitler would not send any but first-rate materials to the support of General Franco.

The grim meaning of the arrival of these troops is thought here to be that Herr Hitler considers that the failure of General Franco would be too severe a blow to his own prestige to be tolerated.

Letters from the German Soldiers Serving Under Franco

Extract from an account by the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, published December 3rd, 1936:

Skilled mechanics are being enlisted in Berlin for work on tank production in the factories in the regions under the control of the Spanish rebels. Big wages and future employment are promised, and the strictest secrecy is enjoined. These mechanics are not even allowed to tell their wives where they are going. Special boxes are allotted to them in the post offices nearest their homes. If their wives wish to write to them the letters are put into these boxes and are then forwarded through a special department of the German War Office. The wives also find the letters from their husbands in these boxes.

The Confession of Mr. Eden

On the other hand, on December 7th, 1936, Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary:

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stated in reply to questions in the House of Commons that information had been received from Cadiz that the number of Germans recently landed there was about 5,000.

Information from a Passenger on the "Koenigstein"

On December 10th, 1936, a passenger from the German steamer Koenigstein explains the voyage of ship from Stettin to Seville (taken from the "Information Service," Valencia):

From Bremen the boat sailed to Stettin. There she loaded 100 pieces of anti-airguns (Fleks), more than 100 searchlights, and many tons of shells and munitions. Moreover there came on board 400 men of the Reichswehr in civilian dress. It was not a question of so-called volunteers, but of an army group sent, under the command of their own officers, to do "anti-aircraft manœuvres."

The troops came on board in civilian dress, but they brought with them their luggage (knapsack, blanket, eating utensils, hoe, rifle, bayonet, steel helmet, straps and belt), in special boxes. The officers carried swords and pistols.

Once on the high seas the men were told that they were going to Spain. They were all ordered to observe the strictest silence, and were made to swear to observe this on pain of death.

In each of the four cargo compartments there were two officers of the Reichswehr on guard, day and night, armed with pistols, and in the radio-operator's cabin there was another officer keeping watch. These officers were relieved every four hours.

To prevent acts of sabotage on the part of the crew, special agents of the Gestapo were employed,

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who spied on the crew. A fireman who one night casually threw a cigarette end into the sea, was denounced and imprisoned for three days on the suspicion that the act was a signal.

In Brunsbuettel, near the Nord-Ostsee-Kanal, the vessel loaded with Bunker coal. The crew were strictly forbidden to go on shore. A fireman who broke this order was immediately detained, and his fate is unknown. The loading of the coal was not done, as is customary, by workmen from the place itself, but by the crew who received for this task 1.40 marks an hour.

From Brunsbuettel the ship was escorted by a cruiser as far as Quassant. During the voyage the seamark on the funnel A.B. (Arnold Berustoin) was changed to K.G. (Karl Gruemersdorf) a company in Haltenau, and which does a great trade in the supply of war-material.

From Quassant the voyage continued, escorted by the cruisers *Koeln* and *Nuernberg* and some submarines, as far as Seville. In Seville the "Muss-soldaten" (forced soldiers), who had been forced, so unexpectedly, to go to the front, were paid an advance of 1,000 pesetas. The crew were severely forbidden to write to their families, and the letters which, in spite of this prohibition, reached land, were returned to the ship by the postal service.

On the return journey the funnel was re-painted with its former seamark and the sailors were ordered to tell any inquirers that the *Koenigstein* was returning from Emden, without making any mention of Seville.

With the Rebels at Seville and Salamanca

The following article published by the Manchester Guardian on December 14th, 1936, was written by

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"a correspondent lately in Spain" and dated in Lisbon the 4th of that month. The character of German intervention in Spain is exposed in this article, as the reader will plainly see.

Seville, the future capital of Spain according to the rebel authorities, is full of life. The factories are working day and night. General Queipo de Llano, who spends half an hour before the microphone every night passing judgment on international politics and advising Great Britain and France to follow the example of Italy and Germany, is one of the principal diversions of the people of Seville, educated and uneducated alike. I sought in vain for a room in any of the splendid modern hotels of Seville. They are all full of Germans and Italians—diplomats, aviators, press agents, and, above all, future soldiers in Franco's army. Hitler and Mussolini have sent to Seville and Salamanca their best technicians in the field of propaganda. The Fascist emissaries from Rome are giving instructions to the Spanish "Falangistas" on the organization of syndicates and on the technique of the conquest of power. They say that neither Hitler nor Mussolini was satisfied with the Spanish Fascist movement, which is too revolutionary, too violent, too much inclined to the elimination of political enemies by death.

I made the journey from Seville to Salamanca by motor-car with the war correspondent of a Seville newspaper. This paper, like all the papers published in the territory controlled by Franco, is militarist. My journalist companion was a talkative man; we talked of the avalanche of Germans who have come to Seville—rigid and rubicund, robots who salute with the raised palm of the hand and a dutiful "Heil Hitler!"

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"The more Germans, the merrier," said the journalist. "Germans and Spaniards have always been good friends. During the Great War the true feelings of the ordinary Spaniard were pro-German; only a clique of intellectuals and aged politicians stood up for the Allies, and to-day there are no intellectuals of that type in Spain. They do not dare to come here, and any who do pay for their sins of the past. They have been the enemies of Spain."

When we reached Salamanca the journalist invited me to lunch in the leading hotel in the venerable Castilian town. The dining-room was full of Germans and Spanish soldiers. General Millan Astray, who had just been appointed head of the Press and Propaganda Department, a physical ruin with only one arm and one eye, went to and fro, greeting the Germans in the hall and the dining-room. He is scarred all over with shot wounds received in the Moroccan war, when he commanded the Foreign Legion. After an hour's waiting the Spanish journalist lost patience and sent for the manager. "Can we not have anything yet?" he asked.

"I am sorry, sir. We have to serve these German gentlemen; they are very particular and object if they do not get quick service." We got nothing to eat until, at about 3 p.m., the dining-room had become empty of Germans, and the poor Spaniards who had been waiting began to enter.

"Deutschland über Alles," "Giovinezza," and the Spanish Falangist "hymn" are given on the wireless. The children whistle the first two in the streets. The Plaza Mayor, the principal square of Salamanca, is full of blond young men who have come to fight. I was told that Madrid is being defended by a Russian army of 30,000 men. "What do we care?" said a young Falangist. "Germany

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is ready to send 60,000 if necessary. The Germans will never allow the Russians to be masters of Spain."

All the press and propaganda machinery is in the hands of German experts. French and American journalists are being expelled, for no apparent reason except that they are objected to by the Germans. The press agency which sends news to the French papers is German, with German editors and staff. General Mola's chief adviser is a German; they call him Don Walter. A general staff is at work at Salamanca in collaboration with the Spanish military authorities; it is said to be the real author of the new plan for the conquest of Madrid.

Thus we are now witnessing the Germanization of Spain. It was reported that five thousand Germans had arrived; the truth is that German "volunteers" have been arriving at Cadiz and Vigo from Germany every week for a month past. It is impossible to give the actual number. Many of them are already fighting on the outskirts of Madrid as legionaries, with their own officers, forming independent units. An approximate calculation made by a Spanish "Nationalist" put the number of the Germans at 20,000. The Italians are much fewer. Italy is contenting herself with sending her best war-material, mobile tanks, and her technicians.

For more than a month past there has been incarcerated in Valladolid a journalist, Aznar, who is accused of having been the author of a violent anti-German campaign during the World War. There is talk of a "Tcheka" directed by agents of Hitler. A Spaniard, who complained in my presence in the Restaurant Fraile of the excessive number of persons who have been executed in the "Nationalist" cities, was hotly criticized by a German who was also present. The German gave vent to this opinion: "Com-

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munism needs to be nipped in the bud, and all Spaniards who protest ought to be shot."

Almost every day groups of Germans march through the Plaza Mayor in Salamanca and down the broad avenues of Seville singing their national anthem and the "hymn" of the Spanish Foreign Legion. Some of them wear the uniform of the Foreign Legion, but most wear the blue shirt of the Falangists, though without the insignia of that Spanish Fascist group—five arrows and a yoke. Two months ago Moors were to be seen strolling through the streets of Seville. They are disappearing, and their place has been taken by the blond men of the North. In order to conquer Madrid General Franco has been obliged to Germanize his cities, relegating to the background the many Fascist and traditionalist Spanish volunteers who have shown so much enthusiasm until lately. The colonial war which Franco has been carrying on victoriously since July 19th has given place to a modern war, with modern soldiers and a different tactic. Madrid is not to be conquered by columns of infantry nor by light cavalry. Franco's volunteers have disappeared, because neither Franco nor the German and Italian experts consider them sufficiently hardened to fight the powerful army which we are told is defending Madrid.

The Spaniard is an individualist, and rebels against any foreign interference. He has always rejected the rule of foreign races. He has shaken off the yoke of superior forces. What is the explanation, then, of the presence of Germans and Italians in Seville and Salamanca as specially privileged inhabitants? The Spaniard feels humiliated by their presence. The Spanish soldiers are being thrust aside and are obeying the orders of foreigners. To explain this fact, they tell you in Seville that the Germans are the natural

allies of Spain, and that they are only fighting as legionaries. The original Foreign Legion has disappeared. New recruits rallied to it. But the legionaries of to-day are not so efficient or so daring as those who captured Badajoz and Toledo. It is precisely for this reason that the Germans are there, to infuse new vitality into the exhausted Legion.

Germany's support, the Spaniards tell you, is going to grow considerably. But what sort of sacrifices will Germany demand of Franco if, thanks to Germany, Franco wins the war? General Franco continually denies that there has been any mortgaging of national territory; but is it not possible that Germany's excess population may come in the future to fill the Spanish cities and countryside? Will not Spain be converted into a country of fields and factories worked by Germans, into a sort of German industrial colony, from which Germany may draw the raw materials she needs?

Until Franco's disaster at the gates of Madrid foreign intervention was limited to the material of war with which the Germans and Italians were ready to experiment on Spanish soil. But since Franco's failure in his attempt to conquer Madrid he has found himself obliged to accept Italy and Germany as advisers and to admit soldiers from those countries. Now no military move is made without the prior approval of Germany and Italy. The destruction of Madrid is the result of the advice of the Germans and Italians, who considered it to be a military necessity to destroy a capital in the power of Communism—a capital, moreover, for which they, unlike the Spaniards, have no love. It is said that Franco had always refused to destroy Madrid, and that is it only in face of German and Italian insistence that he has found himself obliged to take that painful course.

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Germany and Italy had arranged to recognize Franco's Government when Madrid had been conquered; but in face of the failure at Madrid and in their eagerness for direct political and military intervention in Spain's internal affairs they precipitated the recognition. This is the explanation that is heard to-day all over Spain. I heard the same explanation in Portugal. The rebels are delighted now with the intervention of Germany and Italy—as saviours, they think: and they make no secret from anyone, not even from a foreigner like myself, of the fact that they “will win the war, because Germany, Spain's natural ally, will fight to the end against Spanish Communism.”

The newspapers are concealing the fact of the dispatch of German soldiers, but every day they have articles extolling Hitler and Mussolini. In the shops, alongside portraits of Franco, Mola, and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera are those of Hitler and Mussolini. The Nazi and Fascist “hymns” are being sold in a Spanish translation alongside those of the Falange Española (Spanish Fascist group) and the Foreign Legion. Many people are wearing the swastika and the fasces on the lapels of their coats. In almost all the shops badges are for sale with the Italian, German, and Spanish colours—the Spanish colours of the time of the monarchy. The Nazi salute is the same as that of the Falangists, and is used when passing a group of Germans. The Germans, who know only their own tongue, address the waiters in it, assuming that everyone in Spain speaks German.

The only journalists permitted to see Franco's generals are the Portuguese, the Italian, and the German ones. For them the censorship is less severe, and for them there is no risk of expulsion or imprisonment. Every journalist who is neither Spanish nor

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Portuguese nor Italian nor German is regarded as an enemy and a possible spy. If one wants to know what is happening in Spain one must go there as a tourist, and on no account should one admit having anything to do with foreign newspapers or news agencies.

Only Fourteen Thousand Germans

The Times correspondent in Paris wrote on December 15th, 1936:

An independent observer just returned from the insurgent lines before Madrid reports the existence of an independent German expeditionary force, anything from 10,000 to 14,000 strong, complete with their own officers, staff, and supply train. They wear khaki uniforms with berets and have with them tanks and anti-aircraft guns; they are highly trained and are respected by the Spaniards as excellent soldiers. There is also a strong detachment of military aeroplanes and pilots.

The Germans Constitute an Independent Military Force

The correspondent of the Morning Post in Paris wrote to his paper, on December 15th, 1936:

A well-informed non-Spanish observer who has just returned from Spain states that for the last two months a fully organized independent German expeditionary force, wearing a uniform almost identical with that of the British Tank Corps, has been fighting alongside the Junta forces.

This force is stated to have its own auxiliary services and its own supply trains, so that it is not dependent on the military organization of the Junta. They are already in the front line, and are not to be confused

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with the 6,000 Germans recently reported as having landed at Seville.

The total German force, including the air units which have been in Spain since the war started, may now amount to about 12,000 men, it is added. A reliable estimate, is however, difficult.

The Six Thousand were Reinforcements

In relation with the former dispatch this information from the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Paris is interesting (December 15th, 1936):

An observer who has been with the rebel troops in Spain for several weeks, and whose sympathies are, if anything, pro-rebel, has returned here and has given me some remarkable facts which confirm some of the information published in the *Manchester Guardian* to-day from a correspondent recently in Spain.

My correspondent declares that the 6,000 German troops landed recently in Spain are by no means a "first instalment." They have, on the contrary, been sent to Spain to reinforce the German troops that have been active in the Madrid region for at least eight weeks.

Throughout his account my informant used the word "troops" and not "volunteers," and said that these German troops are not only highly organized, complete with a tank corps of their own, but also that they wear a special kind of uniform (very similar in colour and cut to the British army uniform), and, what is more significant still, that their supply services are completely independent of the Spanish rebel armies.

In short, they have all the characteristics of a regular expeditionary force, and are not, as is widely supposed, simply "volunteers" scattered among the rebel

troops. My informant estimated their numbers at between 6,000 and 8,000 which together with the newly arrived 6,000 represents a total force of 12,000 to 14,000. The purpose of these troops, he said, was to take the place of the Legionaries, most of whom had been killed or wounded.

There are also some Italian troops with the rebels, but according to my informant they are not held in the same high esteem by the rebels as are the Germans. They are not keen on fighting.

The "Volunteers" of the 9th Infantry Regiment in Potsdam

The Daily Telegraph correspondent in Berlin wrote, on December 16th, 1936 :

I learn that the method of raising army "volunteers" for Spain in Germany varies greatly from regiment to regiment. In some it is left entirely to the individual to come forward or not as he desires.

In others—as in the 9th Infantry Regiment stationed near Potsdam—it has been made clear to the unmarried officers and men that it is their duty to volunteer.

The Spanish war is providing an opportunity for trying out Germany's new war-materials. The view held in military circles, on the basis of reports from Spain, is that the anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns have proved extremely effective.

The tanks, however, have been found too slow, and, as a result of this experience of real warfare, it is likely that new types will be introduced here.

German Contingents on the Madrid Front

In view of the preceding information, the following communiqué from the Defence Junta of Madrid, given on the 15th of December, 1936, has considerable interest :

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Simultaneous attacks were launched by the rebels in the sectors Fresnedilla (Guadarrama front), Boadilla Del Monte to the south-west of Madrid, and Val de Norillo.

The enemy was everywhere driven back with heavy losses.

The attack was particularly violent in the Boadilla sector, where Moroccan troops and German contingents who recently arrived on the central front charged, supported by aviation and a number of tanks.

The battle lasted for more than five hours, and ended in a total rout of the enemy, who left over 200 dead and many wounded in our lines.

The Correspondence of the Germans who are Fighting Against the Spanish People

There must be some truth in that communiqué. Compare the report from the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, December 16th, 1936:

Relatives of men who have been dispatched to Spain from Germany have been instructed to send their letters unopened to the Berlin post offices C 2, W 10, and N.O. 55, whence the letters are forwarded.

The relatives have not been told that these men have gone overseas. The men are instructed to inform their relatives that they have been drafted to a secret destination for a course of training which is to last sixteen weeks. The letters to the men serving with the German Flying Corps in Spain are forwarded via post office W 10. Letters to men in the tank and anti-aircraft corps go via C 2 and N.O. 55.

Meanwhile parents of Germans serving in Spain have begun to receive official notification that their sons have been "fatally injured during manœuvres" ("bei einer Uebung").

Recruiting in Bavaria

The following report from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Munich speaks highly of German tenacity in support of Franco. This information was published on December 16th, 1936:

From reliable but unofficial sources I learn that fresh contingents of Nazi volunteers, totalling about 2,000 men, will leave for Spain shortly. They have been recruited from the various Bavarian Nazi organizations, and include members of the S.S. black uniformed guards, machine-gun and technical specialists, and members of the N.S.K.K., the Nazi motorized corps.

Most of these men are unmarried and some have received military training.

The news that Germans are now serving in Spain is beginning to filter through to the population. Parents are gradually discovering that their sons, whom they thought to be on "distant manœuvres," are fighting in Spain.

Rumours are circulating of stormy scenes in the Brown House, the Nazi Party headquarters in Munich, with irate parents who come to demand the whereabouts of their sons. It is reported that one mother asked why, when Herr Hitler had promised that no drop of German blood would ever be spilt except in defence of the Fatherland, her son had been sent to fight in Spain.

The Sending of Germans to Spain is Continuous

The Daily Telegraph correspondent in Berlin also sends his information—December 19th, 1936:

According to information which I believe to be reliable, General Franco has informed the German

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Government that he requires 60,000 more men if he is to win the war in Spain.

Since German prestige has been involved by Herr Hitler's recognition of General Franco's Administration, there is an obvious danger that "volunteers" from Germany may be forthcoming, even in such large numbers, unless effective measures are taken to prohibit the despatch of volunteers to Spain from all countries.

At present "volunteers" are leaving Germany for Spain in a continual stream. Most are members of the Air Force and of Tank Regiments.

I learn, for example, that fifty officers and men of the 6th Tank Regiment, stationed at Neuruppin, fifty miles north-west of Berlin, left recently. They were given special leave.

A number of young Air Force officers who left recently were given printed forms to post to parents or relatives stating that they were going on "special manœuvres," and asking for Christmas mail to be addressed to them at the Air Ministry in Berlin. In several cases, however, the men have disobeyed these orders and revealed their real destination.

The Sending of Germans is a Secret

On December 21st the same correspondent amplifies his report :

It seems certain that the leaders of Germany cannot continue much longer to be satisfied with the present German force in Spain. It is damaging German prestige by not making its strength adequately felt.

There is no doubt that, were full intervention decided upon, Germany could win the war for General Franco without much difficulty. Were the present

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contingents to be multiplied by five a wide margin of safety would be left and some sort of permanent control in Spain would be secured, however inadvisable it might be. The prospect is a tempting one and suggests many possibilities.

There are, however, several arguments against such a policy. The first is the financial factor and the impossibility of recouping more than a fraction of the expenditure. The second is the military risk which might result from the disclosure in Spain of the secrets of the German Army.

At present a position seems to have been reached here resembling that which preceded Herr Hitler's decision to create the new German Army. Then, although signs of rearmament were evident to every careful observer, it was officially kept a secret, just as is the despatch of soldiers and airmen to Spain now.

How many Germans are Fighting with Franco ?

M. de Kerillis, on his return from rebel territory in Spain, published a series of articles in the Echo de Paris. In the third of these articles, which appeared on December 21st, 1936, he declares from information obtained in Salamanca (headquarters of the rebels) that the number of Germans in the service of Franco is as follows :

5,000 with special weapons (that is, aeroplanes, tanks, etc.) and approximately two other Regular Army divisions—that is, about 20,000 to 25,000 men. The total number of German soldiers may thus be estimated at between 26,000 and 31,000.

In our opinion this calculation of M. de Kerillis is worth attention, for two reasons : firstly, that M. de

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Kerillis is a Fascist, and secondly, because he declares that he received the information in Salamanca.

Germans Everywhere

A special correspondent of The Times bears new witness to the activities of the German troops in Spain, in a report sent from Gibraltar, and published on December 23rd, 1936:

German influence is playing a considerable part in the plans of General Franco. Germans are to be seen everywhere at the bases of the Madrid front, Avila, San Martin de Valdeiglesias, and Toledo, and all along the roads which lead to the capital from those towns. They are serving in anti-aircraft units, with heavy artillery, and with the air arm.

In addition to Junkers aeroplanes and anti-aircraft guns, five "divisions" of German infantry, amounting in all to 10,000 men, have been landed at Cadiz and transferred via Seville to the more important centres, thence to Salamanca and the Madrid front. In the ruined city of Toledo there are almost as many German soldiers as Spanish, and in Salamanca one hears more German spoken than Spanish. Some of the Germans wear Spanish uniforms, others wear the uniform of their own nationality, but it is to be noticed that they all travel in lorries of German make, with the skull and cross-bones painted in white on a khaki background in bold lettering on the front. There are several German anti-aircraft camps to the south of Madrid. A German General is in Seville under the direct orders of General Franco.

It must be understood that foreign aid is essential to the completion of General Franco's plans. At present an army of 15,000 men besieges the western

front of Madrid, extending from the University City to the Toledo bridge. More forces are necessary to complete the circle of the capital, assuming that General Mola's army descends from the north-west via Avila, and that the Sigüenza column descends through Guadalajara, on the north-eastern side of the capital.

It is believed that the German infantry will be entrusted with the difficult task of blocking the means of escape on the south-east. Without this aid it is almost certain that General Franco would be unable to counteract the vast quantities of Russian and other foreign material and men which have been constantly received by the Government forces during the past three months.

The Public Knows Hitler's Cunning

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes, on December 24th, 1936:

During the last few weeks Wilhelmshaven and Stettin have been used as ports of embarkation for the German troops detailed for service in Spain. The reason is that greater secrecy can be observed in these two ports than in the great international port of Hamburg, where anti-Nazi feeling exists amongst the dockers and transport workers. In Hamburg almost everything about the dispatch of men and war-material to Spain seems to have become widely known almost at once.

German industrial labour is taking an intense interest in the civil war. Although all German newspapers without a single exception are highly tendencious in their reports about the war, and although German correspondents seem to be sent to the front chiefly to write up atrocities and attribute them to the "Reds," the facts are beginning to leak out even in Germany.

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A good deal of information is being obtained from foreign broadcasting stations and newspapers—although to listen-in to news from abroad or to read it in a non-German paper is often very dangerous in Germany. Scepticism with regard to German official news about the war has deepened because for weeks the German press and wireless described the greater part of Madrid as being in the hands of the rebels—the fall of the city was often stated as being a matter of hours.

What has immensely increased pro-loyalist partisanship among the German working class is the knowledge (now widespread) that German Socialists and Communists are taking part in the defence of Madrid. The German Ministry of Propaganda is aware of all this—it is extraordinarily well informed about even the undercurrents of German public opinion—and is rather disturbed.

The German Expeditionary Force

On December 22nd, 1936, the diplomatic correspondent of the Morning Post writes as follows :

The international character which the war has now assumed is particularly marked in the air, where German aviators do battle daily with French and Russian pilots.

Germans in great numbers can now be seen in all the principal towns occupied by the Junta, where their distinctive uniforms and habit of breaking into the Horst Wessel Song easily identifies them. The aviators are also employed to train Junta pilots and accompany them on their flights over Government territory.

The majority of the German volunteers, however, will be used as infantrymen on the Madrid and other fronts.

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These men wear uniforms which could only have been supplied in Germany, and it is quite obvious that their recruitment has been an organized business sanctioned by the Nazi authorities. Moreover, they have their own tanks, machine-guns, staff and supply train, just like any independent expeditionary force.

When she has sent sufficient men to balance the Russian and French volunteers and ensure the victory of General Franco, Germany will probably agree to the ban on foreign recruits, which has been proposed by the French and British Governments.

When it was reported on January 2nd, 1937, that a strong detachment of German troops had landed in Cadiz there followed the natural sensation throughout the world. There were many reports and commentaries, of course, on such an important event. We think it a matter of great interest to reproduce the news as given in two famous English newspapers.

They Cannot be Volunteers

The diplomatic correspondent of the Morning Post wrote, on January 2nd, 1937:

A report which has reached the British Government that 5,000 Germans had landed at Cadiz, and were on their way to join General Franco's army in front of Madrid, caused anxiety yesterday. There is no reason to doubt its accuracy.

While admitting it to be correct, however, official circles pointed out that there was no evidence that the Germans either wore uniform, or were troops, or showed any military formation.

The question is whether 5,000 men leaving Germany, obviously with the approval of the authorities,

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and landing in Spain as a body, can rightly be considered as volunteers.

Five Thousand or Six Thousand

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian wrote on the same date (January 2nd, 1937):

The report that large numbers of Germans have landed in Spain is true. There is some doubt as to the exact number, but 5,000 or 6,000 does not seem to be an overestimate, and the total may be much higher. It was stated in the *Manchester Guardian* on November 20th that the German military authorities were calling for volunteers from the German Tank Corps for service in Spain, that the response was considerable, and that the pay was high. These men have now been arriving in Spain. Officers and men from other German units are also arriving.

The Germans do not arrive in military formations, but in groups or batches. Most of them are arriving at Cadiz. They do not wear uniforms or bear arms. They are supplied with Spanish uniforms later on. Arms are being dispatched separately from Germany, who is supplying the rebels not only with aeroplanes, tanks, officers, and men but also with small arms and ammunition.

All kinds of devices are used to ensure secrecy. For example, the other day a Spanish steamer with a cargo of oranges arrived at Hamburg. The cargo was unloaded, the oranges were removed from their cases, the cases were filled with ammunition, and were then reloaded on the ship after being labelled as returns on the pretence that the oranges had been found in a rotten state and had to be sent back to the

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Spanish exporters. The work of loading and unloading was done by Brownshirts, upon whom the need for absolute secrecy was impressed—the German authorities fear that if ordinary workmen are employed on such tasks those with Socialist or Communist sympathies (and they are not few) will give the secret away. The German authorities do not appear to realize how many Socialists and Communists there are amongst the Brownshirts.

The Germans in Spain are being drafted to the rebel front. Most of them are to take part in a renewed attack on Madrid. One reason why this assault is being suspended is that General Franco does not wish to expose his Moors and his Spanish Legion to annihilation in the streets of the capital and is waiting for German reinforcements.

Franco's chief difficulty is not the shortage of arms and ammunition, of which he receives more than enough from Germany and Italy, but the shortage of men. This shortage is now being remedied, and a renewal of serious fighting may be expected. Franco will be able to rely on the Germans and Italians as he cannot rely on the Spaniards whom he has recruited behind his own lines, for notwithstanding his threats and the persuasive efforts of the clergy the population of the regions occupied by him shows very little enthusiasm for his cause (though the same is no doubt true about the attitude of the population behind the loyalist lines to the loyalist cause, except perhaps in parts of Catalonia).

The Italians are principally engaged on the eastern section of the rebel front (in so far as the series of scattered positions and strongholds can be called a front), including the Balearic Islands. The Germans are chiefly engaged on the western sectors, including the Madrid region and the Balearic Islands.

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The German volunteers who are now arriving are not in the same category as those who are fighting in the "International Brigade" on the loyalist side (though they are possibly in no different category from the Russians who volunteered in Russia for service in Spain). The "International Brigade" is made up of men of various nationalities (including many Germans) who have joined in defiance of their own Governments. The Germans on the rebel side have, there is reason to fear, been summoned by the German authorities. The volunteers on the loyalists side (except those that have arrived from Russia) are idealists or adventurers acting entirely on their own. The Germans on the rebel side are instruments of German foreign policy.

As pointed out repeatedly in the *Manchester Guardian*, the German dictatorship is resolved not to allow a loyalist victory in Spain. The dispatch of men is renewed evidence of this resolve. The renewed help now being given to the rebels by Germany means not only a revival of heavy fighting and a further increase in the general European tension. It means that the efforts now in progress here in London to prepare the way for mediation are gravely prejudiced.

FAUPEL, GENERALISSIMO OF THE GERMAN TROOPS IN SPAIN

One of the first steps which German Fascism took towards intervention on a large scale was the sending of General Faupel as German Chargé d'Affaires at rebel headquarters. The presence of General Faupel in Spain must have been humiliating for the Spanish patriots,

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whose generals needed the advice of a German soldier after fighting for four and a half months without any success against the Spanish people. Nevertheless the welcome given by Franco to Faupel was most cordial . . . and picturesque.

The following, from The Times correspondent in Berlin, describes how the Nazi general presented his letters of credence :

General Faupel, the newly appointed German Chargé d'Affaires at General Franco's headquarters, yesterday presented his letters of credence to Señor Serrat, General Franco's Foreign Minister, at Salamanca.

He regarded it as a special honour, General Faupel said, to enter upon this office at a time when it was continually becoming clearer that Communism represented the greatest danger and a permanent menace to peace, and that it was the common opponent of all civilized peoples.

Afterwards General Faupel and his staff were presented to General Franco, who with his colleagues engaged them in long conversations. On his arrival and departure from General Franco's headquarters General Faupel was saluted by a guard of honour of Moorish troops and Civil Guards, and was conducted to and from his hotel by the Chief of the Protocol of the Franco Government.

The adhesion of the Spanish people to Franco's movement is symbolised in the Moorish guard of honour which saluted General Faupel. It seems that the rebels had not even national troops for so exceptional a case as this of paying tribute to a foreign general.

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Who is General Faupel? On November 22nd, 1936, the National Socialist organ Der Angriff introduced him in the following terms:

“General a. D. Faupel has been appointed to deal with the affairs of the Government of the Reich in connection with the newly-recognized Government of General Franco in Salamanca.”

Personal details of General Faupel follow.

“In recent years General Faupel as Director of the Iberian-American Institute in Berlin has rendered great services in drawing the Spanish-speaking world nearer to Germany.”

“General Faupel, now Germany’s representative of the Spanish National Government made the acquaintance of many foreign countries soon after he joined the army. He was in China and Mongolia. He took part in the struggle of the Hottentots in South West Africa. . . . During the World War he was for years an officer on Hindenburg’s General Staff. He was awarded *Pour le Merite*. After the ‘November Revolt’ of 1918 he took part in the struggles against *Spartakus* in Dresden, Munich and the Ruhr. He fought also in Upper Silesia.”

“From 1921 to 1930 General Faupel was adviser to President Uriburi in the Argentine.”

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian wrote on December 3rd, 1936:

General Faupel, the principal officer with the German forces now serving with the Spanish rebels, was received by Herr Hitler before his departure. Hitler impressed upon him the necessity of ensuring a rebel victory.

General Faupel took part in the Boxer campaign. He is one of the “extremists” in the National Socialist

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Party. His function in the Party is that of colonial expert. His view is that Germany must attempt to secure a colonial empire in Northern Africa. There is a widespread belief that Germany's colonial claims are limited to the return of her former colonies. This belief is entirely mistaken. Germany's former colonies were a liability and not an asset, and the aspirations of the "new Germany" are far bigger. General Faupel is one of the chief exponents of Germany's real colonial policy, which is already being translated into action, as the activities of German agents and propagandists in Northern Africa show.

We think that the above information is enough. It speaks for itself.

THE FAILURE OF FRANCO BEFORE MADRID AND THE INTERNAL CRISIS IN GERMANY

After the sending of German troops en masse, non-intervention naturally suffered a new crisis. The world's press was occupied with the division which appeared to exist in the German Government on the subject of the extension of German intervention in Spain. When the rebels had failed before Madrid, and most of the Moors and legionaries whom Franco had brought over from Africa were out of the fighting, then Germany was faced with the problem of sending an army to the Peninsula if she really desired a victory for the rebel generals.

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This crisis is referred to in the reports which we now quote.

On December 21st, 1936, Vernon Bartlett wrote in the News Chronicle:

The Franco-British hopes that a mere expression of disapproval will lead Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to stop their supplies to Spain are built on the thinnest foundations.

From an extremely well-informed source I learn that Herr Hitler is still determined to go his own way regardless of advice or appeal.

There is no doubt that Germans in Spain have only contempt for General Mola and are very disappointed by General Franco, but they claim quite openly that their Government proposes, if necessary, to send as many as five divisions to help in the Spanish war.

[In the German Army a division consists of 12,500 men. Five full divisions would constitute an army of 62,500 men.]

I understand that some three weeks ago a German diplomatic mission to the Spanish rebels unanimously reported to Berlin that General Franco was too unpopular in Spain to win without further heavy reinforcements of foreign troops.

They also pointed out that even in the event of victory these troops would have to remain on in Spain, since the Franco Government would not be able to exist without them.

The German General Staff and in particular Marshal von Blomberg consequently urged that the adventure should be abandoned and emphasized the dangers

of trouble with the Western Powers at a time when Germany was still not ready for war.

To this I believe Herr Hitler replied by pointing out how successful he had been in his previous breaches of international agreements, on which occasions he had acted against the advice of the General Staff, and he proposed to do so once more.

From an unimpeachable source on the rebel side in Spain I learn that German and Italian reinforcements to General Franco have in each case arrived as trained units. The first German expeditionary force is believed to have consisted mainly of S.S. men—the *élite* of the National Socialists.

There is some idea that the second expeditionary force, whose arrival in Cadiz three weeks ago brought the question of volunteers to a head in the Non-Intervention Committee, is recruited from the labour service in Germany.

The technical services are all carried out by regular soldiers who are thus obtaining experience which the German Government believes will be invaluable later on.

The Italians are almost unrepresented on the fronts in Central Spain, except by units of rather ineffective small tanks.

They are concentrating on the task of making life difficult on land, sea, and in the air for the Spanish Government along the Mediterranean coast.

It may be pointed out that the British Government has for several weeks realized the difference between "volunteers" enlisted on German and Italian parade grounds and individuals who enlist in the International Column to fight Fascism against the will of their Governments.

The fact that the Foreign Secretary has placed these two types of volunteers on the same footing

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in his declarations in the House of Commons and elsewhere inevitably encourages Rome and Berlin to believe that they can continue to treat the Non-Intervention Agreement with contempt.

Russia has undoubtedly sent arms and a few men to help the Spanish Government, while Great Britain and France remained so strictly non-interventionist. That she should have been able to do so without incurring anything worse than abuse suggests strongly that the danger of war, if a firm line were taken to check further Italian and German supplies, would be slight.

Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini would obviously be more ready to take action against Russia while she stands alone than they would be if she were backed up by Great Britain and France in a general attempt to put an end to all intervention in Spain.

Information gathered from a variety of sources agrees on two points. Germany and Italy will not resist the temptation to support General Franco until it is made perfectly clear to them that their support will involve them in a most serious dispute with Great Britain and France.

Secondly, should the choice be put bluntly before them, they will abandon an adventure which even in the best circumstances must cost them further large contributions in the form of men and money.

It would not be wise to see no connection at all between German intervention in Spain and the internal situation of the Reich. Although the reference in the following article to the German attitude on the Spanish war is not important, the report of The Times correspondent in Berlin (December 22nd, 1936) throws enough light on the question. He writes :

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Many in Germany are carrying with them into the Christmas holidays grave preoccupations about the future of German foreign policy; and they are deprived for the moment of the relief of public expression. The leading article in *The Times* of to-day is recognized in influential circles as being of great importance, but it is mentioned only in a single newspaper, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which publishes a brief summary from London, including a critical comment about the "naïve request that the Soviets should dissolve the Comintern in their own interests."

The article is apparently regarded as a reply to various questions which, if they have not been put directly, are felt to have been conveyed indirectly of late in print and spoken word, such as: What would be Great Britain's attitude towards the German colonial claims? Does she stand in the Spanish clash on the side of what are here described as the "forces of order"? And what is her attitude towards Communism in Europe generally and Soviet Russia in particular? It is evidently looked upon as an unsatisfactory answer, and has, if anything, deepened the prevailing depression, because it is felt to indicate that the German policy of neutralizing the Western countries, at any rate by means of propaganda, is not making headway.

German policy seems to have reached a deadlock. For it is becoming clear that Great Britain and France, which have recently drawn closer together, are prepared to support a settlement which might meet the chief of Germany's demands only in exchange for a complete return to economic and political collaboration and the abandonment of adventures. The terms seem to mean the giving up of the policy of self-sufficiency, of independence of international finance,

and of the systematic preparation for the mobilization of the entire nation for war conditions.

Not only would such terms be bitterly hard for a régime like that of the new Germany to swallow, but it almost looks as though some parts of the policies in question have been prosecuted beyond the point at which a withdrawal seems practicable.

On the other hand, without relief of some sort, no one can see how Germany is to get through another winter, if she gets through this one. Desperate measures may enable the critical spring months, during which the grain shortage will make itself felt, to be surmounted, but only at the cost, indirectly, of next winter's supplies of various vital foods. The policy of "Guns rather than butter," deliberately chosen in Germany's present circumstances, has brought this about.

It is not astonishing, therefore, that in those influential quarters which set much store by a pursuit of the independent policies at all costs, the idea of the "explosion" threatened by Dr. Schacht as a psychological and material outlet should have gained ground.

In speculations of this sort the strategical value of a success in Spain is urged, on the ground that it would keep part of the French Army immobilized and altogether embarrass France and Great Britain. Against this argument is the fact that the support of General Franco to victory has met with serious delays, and the view is understood to have been conveyed through General Faupel, the German Chargé d'Affaires with the insurgents, who has just been in Berlin, that very considerable additional support will be necessary for success. That this requirement coincides with signs of an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations and with a feeling that Italy's

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interest in Spain is, perhaps, slackening a little adds to the gloom of the outlook.

There is little doubt that military advice would go against further commitments. But it cannot be taken for granted that the Army's advice would necessarily turn the scale or that it would necessarily coincide with that of General Göring's Air Force and associated services, which have taken the keener interest in the Spanish affair. The advice of both, its merits duly weighed, would have to be conveyed finally through the War Minister, whose deep attachment to the Führer and sympathy with other party leaders is well known.

Meanwhile the "moderates," among whom may be included not only the Foreign Office and Dr. Schacht and the industrialists but also responsible military chiefs, are clearly playing for at least a "little" concession in the colonial field for the sake of prestige and as a desperate means of tiding over the food crisis psychologically and of reinforcing their own waning power and appeasing the hot-heads. Even a "little colony," it is pleaded, would soon be expanded into a big one in the popular mind by skilful propaganda, and would make a big impression.

The difficulty about this solution is that it could only be a makeshift—perhaps a very brief one—and would offer Europe little, if any, prospect of relief from anxiety, for it would admittedly have slight chance of leading to the abandonment of intensive rearmament, the Four-Year Plan, and the policy of self-sufficiency for military purposes.

In effect, Hitler's adventure in Spain encountered opposition from eminent personages in the army and the navy.

On December 23rd, 1936, the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph wrote :

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Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador in London, who returned here on Saturday for the Christmas holidays, has, I learn, already informed Herr Hitler of Mr. Eden's strong desire that the sending of volunteers to Spain should cease with a view to avoiding still further complications.

Herr Hitler left Berlin this afternoon for Berchtesgaden, his Bavarian country retreat, without having announced his decision on this point. I understand that he will consider it during the Christmas holidays in the light of the somewhat conflicting advice which has been tendered to him during his stay here.

It is strongly rumoured that the recent supersession of Admiral Foerster as chief of the German High Seas Fleet reflects the opposition of certain of the higher ranks of the German fighting forces to recent developments.

With regard to the German crisis, the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph in Berlin wrote the following report on December 23rd, 1936:

The German press, as was to be expected, makes no reference to the reported German casualties in the fighting in Spain.

Officially no German participation is admitted beyond that of isolated Germans living in Spain, and it is likely that this policy of silence will be maintained, unless it is decided to despatch reinforcements on a large scale.

The German army leaders, I learn, are at present not in favour of maintaining in Spain more than a "token" force sufficiently large to earn the gratitude of General Franco and to give an opportunity for testing the efficiency of German war-material,

but not large enough, to represent a military commitment which, once entered upon, could not easily be abandoned.

Views differ here as to the way in which the German air units in Spain compare with those of other countries, but there seems some measure of agreement that the men are better than the material. A German who recently returned from Spain was surprised, he told me, to find that the Russian aeroplanes were so efficient.

The point of view of the German Army seems to be that to send anything in the nature of a real expeditionary force would interfere with the military efforts being made at home. These, it must be remembered, are still concerned with overcoming various difficulties, the chief being that of providing officers in sufficient numbers for building up a trained reserve.

On the other hand, the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian comments on the conflict of ideals in National Socialism as follows, December 24th, 1936:

Victory in Spain is becoming a matter of internal as well as international prestige for Hitler. But German military opinion is opposed to open intervention in the Spanish civil war—to the dispatch, for example of an expeditionary force or to anything that would make the war look like an attempt at a German conquest of Spain. It is probable that the German Government will await the results of the coming offensive against Madrid, in which German troops will take part, before deciding for or against further intervention.

On the whole it would seem that the risks of further and open intervention would be too great,

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to make it seem worth Hitler's while. It would, amongst other things, mean the end of "non-intervention" on the part of France.

It is evident that the Spanish war became closely linked to German internal politics from the moment when Hitler committed himself with men, war-material and reputation to the victory of the military oligarchy over the Spanish people. But the following article by the correspondent of the Sunday Times published on December 27th, 1936, underlines this aspect of Hitler's intervention. It is important to notice that Hitler by presenting the Spanish war to the German people as being a battle between the forces of order and Communism—this presentation of course is not the truth—gives an unsuspected character to the relationship between the events in Spain and the internal politics of Germany, and increases, through the fault of the German Government itself, the responsibilities of the Wilhelmstrasse.

The correspondent of the Sunday Times writes :

The Spanish war and Germany's part in it have been Herr Hitler's chief preoccupations over Christmas. Although he is spending the holiday at his country home near Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, he is keeping in close touch with the situation.

It is probable that he will confer, some time next week, with Herr von Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador in London, and with General Faupel, the Chargé d'Affaires accredited to General Franco's administration, both of whom returned to Germany a few days ago. Before receiving the Anglo-French appeal Herr Hitler had learned from the former that the British Government urgently desired the despatch of volunteers to Spain to cease.

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The view of the army leaders, that Germany should avoid committing herself too deeply in Spain while her war machine is still far from ready, has apparently been strengthened during the last few days. It is probable that, if further elucidation of their opinion is required, General von Reichenau, the army commander in the Munich district, and formerly Chief of Staff to Field Marshal von Blomberg will be summoned to Berchtesgaden.

It is by no means certain, however, that Herr Hitler, who has taken an independent line on several occasions in the past, will follow the army's advice. He may feel that a striking success in Spain is worth the risks involved in the substantial reinforcement of the troops already sent to assist General Franco.

In any case his final decision is likely to be reached before he returns to Berlin early in the New Year.

Internal considerations will have a great influence on that decision. To the German people the war in Spain has been represented as a simple struggle between Bolshevism and the forces of law and order. Can Nazi Germany afford, Herr Hitler, may well ask himself, to allow "Bolshevism" to triumph?

It is probably no exaggeration to say that a few million Germans are still Communists at heart. Their faith is fed by the Moscow broadcasts, to which they still listen.

To these elements, who are likely to be reinforced as discontent is increased by a hungry winter, the defeat of General Franco would be a great encouragement.

It is significant that the "menace of Bolshevism" was one of the main themes of a broadcast to Germans at home and abroad, made on Christmas Eve by Herr Rudolf Hess, deputy leader of the Nazi party.

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The German people, he said, were convinced that there could be no finer aim for humanity than the maintenance of peace.

"We desire peace all the more deeply," he went on, "because Bolshevism's threat to the peace of the world has increased during the year which is now ending.

"We Germans thank the Führer for the fact that he has helped to secure Germany and the world from Bolshevism by strengthening our good relations with Fascist Italy and by concluding the anti-Communist agreement with Japan."

The German internal crisis was studied by the diplomatic correspondent of the Morning Post, the famous paper of the English aristocracy. The general admission that Franco could not win without the strong support of German troops, also appeared in the columns of that paper.

Here is what the Morning Post wrote on December 28th, 1936:

No reply has yet been received from Herr Hitler to the latest appeal of France and Britain to Germany and the other Powers to keep out of Spain.

The decision to make this further and more urgent appeal was taken on Thursday after consultations between Paris and London. It reflects the anxiety which has been aroused by reports that Herr Hitler may shortly send a much larger force to Spain.

Several thousand so-called German volunteers are already fighting in the ranks of General Franco's army, but the check which the General has suffered in front of Madrid suggests that he is still deficient in soldiers.

General Faupel, head of the German mission to the Junta headquarters, who recently returned to

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Germany, is reported to have advised Herr Hitler that between 60,000 and 70,000 men would be required to ensure the victory of General Franco.

It is understood that Herr Hitler is now considering whether to provide the necessary reinforcements or limit himself to existing commitments. While the German General Staff are believed to be opposed to more active intervention, the Nazi Party evidently take the view that German prestige is at stake, and that no pains must be spared to bring about defeat of the Spanish Left.

Should Herr Hitler opt for the latter policy, it would presumably be the end of non-intervention, since Russia certainly would not remain passive while several divisions of the German Army were poured into Spain. On the other hand, internal pressure on the French Government to intervene on the side of Madrid might become irresistible.

The following article from the correspondent of the Morning Post in Berlin, December 28th, 1936, is worth noting :

The British and the French Ambassadors called separately at the German Foreign Office this morning and it is understood that their visits concerned the question of intervention in Spain.

Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, is spending the Christmas holidays in the country, and the Ambassadors were received by Dr. Gaus, the head of the Legal Department of the Foreign Office.

Herr Hitler is still at his mountain home at Berchtesgaden. He is giving a Christmas party to friends, including his publisher, but there is no evidence that he has been holding political conferences.

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In reply to the repeated statements issued from Moscow that 20,000 to 25,000 Germans are fighting on the side of the Junta, the German authorities will only admit that there are certainly German volunteers in Spain.

It is noteworthy that Admiral Foerster ceased to be the head of the German Navy on the 21st of this month. There is no ordinary reason why the Admiral should retire now, and it is currently rumoured that his removal was due to the fact that he was not in agreement with at least some of Germany's rulers.

It is suggested that the fear was entertained that Admiral Foerster might not act with sufficient vigour if this was suddenly required, and that Rear Admiral Carls, the new head of the navy, will fully appreciate political exigencies.

The *Völkischer Beobachter* maintains that a common step by England and France in the volunteer question would be grotesque, for a whole book could be filled with quotations from French newspapers alone on French breaches of neutrality.

The Nazi newspaper adds that, although it has more than once declared that it can understand the Anglo-French friendship, it is of the opinion that Mr. Eden would do his policy the worst possible service if just on the volunteer question he should lean on the guilt-laden shoulders of his Paris friends.

The Evening Standard alludes to the internal crisis of National Socialism with relation to Spain (December 29th, 1936). The following paragraph appeared in A Londoner's Diary.

Germany has not yet replied to the recent Anglo-French *démarche* regarding the cessation of "volunteering" in Spain.

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She has given no indication when her answer is likely to be received.

In Berlin there is a conflict of opinion. The army chiefs, guided by reports received from General Faupel, the German military Chargé d'Affaires with General Franco, are inclined to believe that Germany has backed the wrong horse.

But the Nazi Party holds other views and is unwilling to beat even a semblance of retreat. The probability is that the German answer will be delayed as long as possible and that, while nothing spectacular will be attempted, Germany will continue to pour "volunteers" and supplies into Spain.

We will close this information on the disagreements between the National Socialist Party and the leaders of the armed forces in Germany with the following report from the Agence Havas correspondent in Berlin, published in Le Temps, Paris, January 11th, 1937:

To-morrow evening, Sunday, the Führer-Chancellor will return from Berchtesgaden. On Monday morning he will receive the Diplomatic Corps for the traditional New Year congratulation ceremony, which the Third Reich has fixed for the 11th of January.

The "diplomatic truce" which according to official informations was to coincide with the Führer's absence, has not been strictly observed, as everyone knows. In fact, rarely has a "diplomatic truce" been marked by so many events and important negotiations.

During this time, in his retreat at Berchtesgaden, the Führer was determining his policy in the Spanish question. As early as December 21st a report published by the agency D.N.B. announced the retirement of Admiral Richard Foerster, Chief of the

German Fleet in the Baltic. The report was premature, for the official news of the Admiral's retirement was again published on December 31st. It was at that time rumoured in Berlin that Admiral Foerster had refused to engage the German Fleet in an action off the shores of Spain which might have had the most serious consequences. Admiral Carls, who from the start when German ships were first sent to Spain had drawn attention to himself by his energetic actions, succeeded Admiral Foerster.

Shortly after Christmas, General Faupel, representative of the Reich at Franco's headquarters, arrived at Berchtesgaden and presented the Führer with an urgent appeal from General Franco. Franco, to gain a victory over Madrid, asked that an expeditionary corps of 60,000 men should be sent. The Führer, who had entrusted General Faupel with a mission of victory at any price, immediately placed this request before his military advisers.

General von Fritsch, Commander of the land army, reminded him that neither the Reich nor the German Army could take at the present moment any action which might result in an early war. It is said that he even went so far as to threaten to resign his command, if his authoritative advice were not listened to. At the same time a high German military official was asserting openly in Berlin society: "A war begun with food-cards is a war already lost."

Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister, supported the advice of General von Fritsch with all his authority and all the confidence which he enjoys with Hitler. The rumour of all these stormy discussions, it is said, reached Berlin. In military circles, even, towards the end of December there was expectation of the retirement of General von Fritsch, and his replace-

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ment by General von Reichenau, Commander of the fortress of Munich, *persona grata* to the Führer and to the National Socialist Party.

Rumours of a new "30th of June" were current. The black militia (S.S.) were to be disarmed by the regular army. Nothing of the sort happened. The Führer was not willing to undertake to despise the advice given by his military advisers.

At this moment, the Reich has not yet sent the expeditionary corps which General Franco asked. In Munich and in other parts of the Reich there has been recruiting of black militiamen who have been sent to Spain. Moreover, the sending of special arms and technicians continues. The subsequent attitude of the Reich in the matter of intervention in Spain will depend, on the one hand, on the reaction of the powers to the German reply of January 7th, and on the other hand, on the more or less rapid success of the operations which General Franco has begun before Madrid, and whose total success Berlin is anxious to assure at any cost.

THE GERMAN INTERVENTION IN THE NORTH OF SPAIN

On Friday, September 25th, the rebels sent over Bilbao for the first time "their mercenary air-fleet," to use the term employed by the newspaper Euzkadi:

Men, women and innocent children were victims of the Fascist rage. For neither the pilots, nor those responsible for sending them over Bilbao sought any military objective. Bilbao is not a besieged town.

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The battle front is many miles away. And therefore the bombardment was not directed to the surrender of a place which was not besieged but aimed at spreading panic . . . and shedding the blood of non-combatants, the blood of those who had taken no part in the struggle.

There were two bombardments on the first day : one in the morning, one in the afternoon.

In the morning raid seven aeroplanes rained death on the city, for the space of an hour and a half. In the afternoon bombardment, which lasted hardly an hour, there were four aeroplanes taking part.

The next day, Saturday, September 26th, the civil population of the "unconquered city of Bilbao" was again bombed by the Fascist insurgents. "They were not satisfied with the vandalistic raid of the previous day directed deliberately on the un-armed inhabitants," commented the afore-mentioned newspaper.

"The rebels," stated another Bilbao paper, "El Liberal," "have carried their war to stages of cruelty which were unknown before. Not even in international wars have there been deeds such as these enemies of Spain have committed."

The second day's bombardment was not so intense as that of the preceding day, although it lasted longer. The number of the 'planes engaged on this criminal action was six, and they flew in pairs, which relieved each other for the space of three hours on end.

The damage and the victims from these bombardments were terrible.

Euzkadi, reporting the second day's bombardment, wrote :

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The baseness of these actions is beyond description. On Friday, a high-powered explosive bomb fell near the Civil Hospital which contains many hundreds of sick people. This is no journalistic exaggeration. The deep hole of enormous width may still be seen. In the San Luis Hospital more than five bombs were heard; they actually penetrated the building.

These bombardments, and that of October 21st in the International Zone of Las Arenas, caused enormous damage to buildings, and claimed very many victims.

According to data supplied by the Municipal Court of Justice of Bilbao and Guecho, the Statistics Department of the Town Council of Bilbao, and the Department of Public Health of Euzkadi, the total numbers of the dead and wounded in Bilbao and the International Zone of Guecho as a result of the raids of September 25th and 26th and October 21st were as follows :

In Bilbao in the raids of September 25th and 26th there were killed :

<i>Men and boys</i>	<i>. . .</i>	<i>72</i>
<i>Women and girls</i>	<i>. . .</i>	<i>16</i>

The total number of the wounded in Bilbao through the raids according to report on cases attended to in First Aid posts, hospitals and private clinics—not counting those whose injuries were slight and were treated in pharmacies and doctors' houses—mounts up to 648.

In the International Zone of Las Arenas, according to information supplied by the Municipal Authority there,

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the total number of deaths caused by the German bombardment of October 21st is as follows :

<i>Men</i>	6
<i>Women</i>	1
<i>Children</i>	1

The number of the wounded in Las Arenas on October 21st was two.

The total of deaths caused by the raids in Bilbao and Las Arenas on the three dates in question was 96, and the number of the wounded, 650.

All the deaths of innocent persons, from aerial bombardments, were caused by the use of explosive and incendiary bombs of German manufacture, as the following statements will show. The statements are made by the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, Don Jesus de Luisa, and are accompanied by graphic proof.

Señor Luisa made the following declaration to the press, which appeared on November 8th in all the Bilbao papers :

In order to determine the origin of the raids, technicians have examined the fuse of one of the bombs which failed to explode, and it has been proved that the manufacture of these bombs is German. The photographs are decisive, and they leave no doubt as to the German make of the explosives, which proves that the insurgents receive aid in the shape of war-material originating from that State.

(The photographs are reproduced.)

A German Aviator Killed in an Air Accident in Vitoria

The happening which we are about to relate was immediately known in Bilbao : we were informed of the accident and of its consequences, which, on account of their high significance, will be analysed on another occasion. Not to deviate from the aims of the present work, we will only dwell on the first part : that is, a complete account of the flying accident which cost a German airman his life, with necessary details to prove the statement contained in the title of this section.

We have our version and the facts preceding it from witnesses who were actually on the spot.

In the Fronton Hotel in Vitoria were staying eighteen German airmen who arrived in mid-September, accompanied by a Spaniard, in their machines which they brought from Germany. Of the eighteen Germans only one spoke Spanish : the Hotel staff had to converse with the others by signs. The Spaniard who came with the eighteen Germans, and the one of these who knew Spanish, warned the staff to tell no one their real identity, and asked them to say, in response to all enquiries about their nationality, that they were French.

These German aviators were, on the same evidence, the ones who carried out the bombardment of Bilbao on September 25th and 26th. Nobody in Vitoria hesitated to publish the information.

The accident with which we are concerned happened in the following way :

On Sunday, October 4th, they celebrated in Vitoria the relief of the Alcázar of Toledo. The whole day was given to festivities which culminated in a demonstration :

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how spontaneous this was may be judged from the fact that many people were roused from their beds in order to arrange it and give it support. The festivities continued throughout the night, and contrary to the usual custom, the lights were not put out.

In the Fronton Hotel the German airmen banqueted well, and a dance followed which went on until the morning. The ladies staying at the Hotel joined in the ball. When the entertainment was over some of the airmen went to bed, but most of them remained drinking whisky until the time came for them to set off for Avila where they had been ordered. It had been announced that before the 'planes left for Avila the Germans would bid farewell to the town of Vitoria in an exhibition of flying, during which as an apotheosis of the former day's festivities one of the 'planes would drop a red and yellow flag, the ensign of the Monarchists and the insurgents, on the Town Hall of Vitoria. And, early on the Monday, the townspeople were wakened by the roar from several 'planes flying over the town. They looked up at the evolutions of the machines, and were particularly impressed by the daring pirouettes of one of them. And, perhaps because the flight was only a short distance above the roof-tops, or perhaps because the pilot who was to throw down the flag was one of those who had not slept and had drunk too much, the machine in question caught the chimney of a house in Plaza Nueva and, losing its direction, crashed against one of the houses in a corner of the square.

As the 'plane fell it struck two milkmen who were killed instantly, as was the pilot: the machine burst into flames, which caught the blinds of the building into which it had dived.

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The day after the accident the funeral of the three victims took place. The two milkmen, who lived in the plain of Vitoria, were buried, and the German pilot was taken in a tri-motor 'plane to Cadiz to be embarked for Germany.

We possess other proofs and testimonies which we do not judge it opportune to bring forward now, but which coincide exactly with the description of this event as we have heard it from witnesses who were actually present.

In the Castle of Izuzkiza two German Prisoners fall into the hands of the Loyalist Forces.

In the attack made by the loyalist force on the Castle of Izuzkiza, on October 5th, eleven prisoners were taken and among them two Germans.

Serious as this statement is, we make it in the certainty of being able to prove it to complete satisfaction. And the best way of doing so is to follow the proceedings of the Judge in the case against the prisoners at their trial. The summary of the case was made by the special Court of Justice of Bilbao (Number Three) and bears the number One.

The Contents are as follows :

FOLIO I—In yesterday's movements by this column against the Castle of Izuzkiza eleven Requetés and Fascists were taken prisoner. I have the honour to inform you of this, and also that the prisoners were taken to the prison of Bilbao, and that it would be most useful to question them, to find out their point of procedure and if possible their antecedents, since in the cells of the place held by them there were found insignia

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which show that some of the prisoners held high commands in the rebel camp.

Ochandiano,

October 6th, 1936.

JOAQUIN VIDAL.

Lieutenant-Colonel in Command.

Signed with a special mark—War Commissariat in the Province of Biscay—Bilbao—there is a stamp in violet ink which reads "First Expeditionary Column for Ochandiano." This notice is accompanied by documents of great interest taken from the prisoners and letters in German which should be translated for war information. The suggestion is made that one of the foreigners among the prisoners may be the same one mentioned on the visiting card and letters which are sent herewith.

Who the Prisoners Are

Here is the register of the eleven prisoners :

1. Wolfgang L. V. Eynatten, born in the town of his surname, in the district of Euppen, formerly German, now Belgium. Born on May 16th, 1901, a doctor calling himself "Baron," bachelor.

2. Lothar Gudde Reudel, born on October 9th, 1917, in Barman, Rhine, bachelor, teacher of languages.

3. Herman Manurer Lehmann, born in Zurich, Switzerland, January 6th, 1919, bachelor, hair-dresser.

4. Teófilo Doronda Estebañez, born October 12th, 1917, in Sesma, Navarre, son of Gregorio and Angeles, bachelor, farmer.

5. Emilio Meneses García, 19 years old, of Madrid, living in Joaquin Costa Street, No. 59, son of Leoncio and Josefina, bachelor, student.

Eynatten the Informant of a German Newspaper

In folio 15 appears the proof that Eynatten while in the rebel camp had the duty of sending to a German newspaper articles and commentaries on the progress of the civil war in our country. There is a letter addressed to the Editor of a German newspaper which reads :

To the Editor.

DEAR SIR,

Enclosed is an article for the Ilz (*unintelligible contraction for the name of the publication*). I am at the headquarters of the Spanish Phalanx of the Fascist movement in Pamplona. I should be very willing to send you twice a week articles from here, Toledo, Burgos and San Sebastian, as well as special articles on opinion with regard to France and other themes. Especially interesting news I will send to you separately.

Statement by Eynatten

We give here a literal copy of the statement made by Eynatten on October 31st which appears in folio 2 of the case, and runs as follows :

He was born in Eynatten, in the district of Euppen (Formerly German, now in Belgium, and he is a naturalized Belgian considered to be a German, on May 16th, 1901. A doctor domiciled in Eynatten, a bachelor, with no criminal record. That since last January he had been in the Nuns' Hospital at Ingrillez, called Nuemberg: that on 24th or 25th of September, 1936, to the best of his belief, he entered Spanish territory to work as a doctor, because since 1929 he

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had not been able to practise in Germany owing to having been present at an abortion: in view of that he had joined the French Foreign Legion, where he had been, returning to France in January last: at which time he went to the afore-mentioned hospital where he worked as a dresser: that in order to enter Spanish territory he took steps at the Spanish Consulate in Bordeaux, where he was directed to the street Esprit des Lois in which was the defence Junta of Spanish refugees, and there a certain person arranged for him to go to Hendaye in a lorry, but as he had no documents he returned to Bayonne: that there he told the German Consul he wished to return to Germany; but was told he could not do so because of the affair of the abortion: that a certain person who came into the Consulate told him that he could easily get into Spain, and must arrange it with a gentleman called De Han or De Hirat, who lived at S. Jean de Luz in a street opposite the post office: and with this person in a lorry or car accompanied by another person they crossed into Spain by a frontier which they did not know, about thirty or forty kilometres from Irun, going by a pass in which there were few houses: one of his companions spoke in Spanish to the guards who allowed them to pass, and so they came to Pamplona.

When they reached Pamplona he was first presented to the Military Commandant, and asked for medical work, choosing this in face of the alternative of not being given such work and not wishing to go to the front: nevertheless after having spent three days in a barracks, in a convent situated in the modern part of Pamplona where there were members of the Spanish Phalanx, and some monks, they were obliged to take up rifles and other war-materials which were given them, and sent in a lorry to the Escoriaza sector, and from there in another lorry to the sector of Ochandiano.

Statement by Lothar Gudde

We reproduce here the statement made by Lothar Gudde, on October 31st, faithfully copied from folio 24 (verso); which reads:

That he had been living for the past eighteen months in Pamplona, 26 St. Augustin Street, first floor, engaged in teaching German and Dutch. That he had no work when the movement began, and looked for work in the offices of the Spanish Phalanx, in the Plaza del Castillo in Pamplona, but did not belong to the organization until he had worked there, and in the middle of August they pointed out that he should enrol himself. That he has no political idea, except to be a German. That his work consisted of writing permits for sick persons and for rises and falls in prices. That he left Germany to look for work, and lives with his mother who was a dressmaker in Pamplona: that he was paid three pesetas a day for his services in the office. That the office manager told him he was not needed any more: they could not go begging in the street, and faced with the alternative of joining the Legion or the Phalanx he preferred to join the latter and was garrisoned in the building of the Salesian Friars. He knows that some women thirty years of age who had spoken unwisely have had their hair shorn, and that the Phalanx chiefs used to make their partisans take castor-oil as a punishment for any offence. That he had neither seen anyone shot nor heard it spoken of, that he does not believe what he has not seen, nor does he believe that anyone was tortured or ill-treated. That he had scarcely entered the barracks when on the 2nd of the month he set off for the Escoriaza front in company with another German and a Swiss and the prisoners.

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That he did not know the other German or the Swiss, or the other prisoners, although he left with them for the front in buses. That they were commanded by a captain of revenue-guards whose name he does not know: he does not know or cannot remember the name of the Commanding Officer at the barracks. That he was made a corporal as were the other German and Swiss, and the rest of the prisoners. That they spent two days in the Escoriaza sector and then moved to the Ochandiano sector. That several of them spoke of deserting to the loyalist forces and as they saw that on the side opposed to the rebels there were Shock Troops they could take the opportunity to go over to them as ten or eleven managed to do: he did not specify who proposed the desertion.

Statement of Hermann Maurer

Lastly we give the statement made by Hermann Maurer, also on October 31st, taken like the preceding ones from the summary and folio 27:

He was born in Zurich on January 6th, 1919: a bachelor and a trained hairdresser. That he had come to Spain for the first time five weeks ago from Zurich, travelling directly from Paris to Hendaye without staying on the journey and with the intention of finding work as a hairdresser. That he came alone to Spain: he was three days in Paris; that he tried to cross the International Bridge, and the French guard offered to get him across for military service: he said he did not want that: he wanted to work as a hairdresser. That by night on a frontier place past Behobia he was taken across by a person and driven by car to Pamplona: asked for the name of the man who took him across the frontier he thought it was something like Laroi. The

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frontier place where he crossed was inland and some five kilometres beyond Behobia: that the man who introduced him handed him over to some Spanish sentinels, and they took him with two guards to Pamplona, where they arrived at about six in the morning: they stayed in a barracks where Lothar was and a day afterwards he saw Eynatten there. That he was taken before the Commanding Officer called Moreno, who told him that he must either join the Legion or the military forces; but they would not give him any work and he had therefore to join that military body: he asked for the Consulate of his country, but there was not one: he alleged his age and nationality but that did not prevent him from being forced to enlist. That two days after his arrival he was taken with the two German prisoners to the Escoriaza sector, and two days later to Ochandiano. That Eynatten proposed they should desert with some of their fellows to the loyalist side, and that eleven of them agreed to do so and did desert. That his ideas are democratic and anti-Fascist, and that he does not believe any of his companions are either Fascists or Communists. That he did not believe there was a civil war in Spain, only a strike or local revolutionary movement. That the frontier post where he crossed was Endarlaza.

Amplification of the Statements of Eynatten and Another of the Accused

In folio 30 (verso) is the statement of the first accused, Meneses, who in the course of his declaration says as follows :

That he remembers that in the town Eynatten did not do exactly as the soldiers ordered him: although all of them had a certain amount of liberty.

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Folio 35 contains the amplification of the statement made by Eynatten, as follows :

That he went to the Consulate in Bordeaux for no other reason but the personal one which he has already declared: That if he went to the Consulate it was because a commercial traveller from Strasbourg advised him that it was loyal to the legitimate Government, and that another Consul, whose name he was told but cannot remember, was not in sympathy with the Government. That he received monthly from his trustee or guardian, Von Papen, certain irregular sums of money which varied from month to month. When shown the card and the seven pieces of notepaper attached to folios 2 and 9 he examined them carefully and said that he recognized them as his with regard to the writing on the card, and the signature of one of the pages which were in his hand. As for the initials I.L.Z. he did not exactly know what newspaper they referred to, but he believed it was some illustrated periodical in Germany. He explained that the typed sheets of paper were handed him by a man in the Criminal Department in Pamplona, in the barracks or offices of the Spanish Phalanx, which offices were controlled by the Public Authorities, and that the man forced him to sign them and to write the card. Asked why he did not declare this in his earlier statement he said that he did not think of it: that the articles were written in bad German, therefore he had not done them, he could have done them much better. On September 30th a leader in the Spanish Phalanx, named Galo, introduced him to a religious, he could not say whether a priest or a monk, who was to accompany him to San Sebastian, Burgos and Toledo, but as he had not sent off the articles, for that reason he did not go with him, but was sent

to the front on October 2nd; another reason for this was that the accused had refused to write articles for the German papers which they showed him there—for if he had accepted he could have stayed in Pamplona in the offices of the Phalanx carrying out that task.

**Statement by the Sergeant in the Public Defence Forces
which Captured the Rebels**

Folio 37 contains the following statement made on November 3rd by the Sergeant don Mariano de Diego Garcia :

It was he who took prisoner the group of ten individuals referred to in the first folio of the proceedings: they were armed and with a Monarchist flag, and approached the position occupied by the loyalist forces in his command, doubtless supposing that the position was held by rebels. When they were challenged to surrender, they made as if to fire on the loyalists, but when these latter fired, they dropped their weapons at once and surrendered.

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He noticed that of the three Germans or foreigners, the youngest carried the flag and issued commands to the rest, giving them signals or orders to advance and later to abandon their weapons which consisted of muskets, knives and pistols (some of them) and munition.

The Verdict of the Tribunal

In the trial held in the Court of the City of Bilbao, on November 9th, the Popular Tribunal pronounced the

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suitable verdict, of which we shall transcribe the parts referring to the foreigners :

1. On October 5th of this year the accused Wolfgang L. Eynatten was taken prisoner on the Ochandiano front, being armed and with other persons moving to attack the loyalist forces?

Yes.

2. Is the accused Wolfgang L. Eynatten author of the Documents written in German and translated which appear in the investigation, which documents appear intended for a German periodical?

Yes.

3. Was the accused Lothar Gudde taken prisoner on October 5th of this year on the Ochandiano front being armed and with other persons moving to attack the loyalist forces?

Yes.

4. Was the accused Hermann Maurer taken prisoner on October 5th of this year on the Ochandiano front being armed and with other persons moving to attack the loyalist forces?

Yes.

13. Was the accused Lothar Gudde the leader of the group formed by the nine other accused?

Yes.

14. The party or group formed by the accused in this case was militarily organized and consisted of nine persons and a corporal?

Yes.

15. Was the accused Hermann Maurer more than eighteen years old when he was taken prisoner in Ochandiano?

Yes.

16. Was the accused Lothar Gudde carrying a

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Monarchist flag when he was taken prisoner by the loyalist forces?

Yes.

19. Did the accused Wolfgang L. Eynatten enroll himself freely and spontaneously in the ranks of the rebels?

Yes.

20. Did the accused Lothar Gudde enroll himself freely and spontaneously in the ranks of the rebels?

Yes.

21. Did the accused Hermann Maurer enroll himself freely and spontaneously in the ranks of the rebels?

Yes.

30. When the loyal forces challenged the accused Wolfgang L. Eynatten to surrender, did he do so without any gesture of defence?

No.

31. When the loyal forces challenged accused Lothar Gudde to surrender, did he do so without any gesture of defence?

No.

32. When the loyal forces challenged the accused Hermann Maurer to surrender, did he do so without any gesture of defence?

Yes.

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41. Did the accused form part of a company or superior unit commanded by a captain of revenue-guards?

Yes.

The Case for the Prosecution

The second part of the proceedings contains the case for the prosecution in the following terms :

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WHEREAS: When the trial opened the Public Prosecutor described acts as consequent on a crime of military rebellion on the part of all the accused (described in Article 237 of the Military Code and provided for in Article 238), and on another crime of treason (described and provided for in Article 222 of the same code) of which the accused Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten is guilty: there being in the case of Victoriano Saez the slightly attenuating circumstance that he is under 18 years of age: demanding for the crime of military rebellion the death penalty for the accused Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten, Lothar Gudde, Hermann Maurer, Teofilo Doronda Esteban, Emilio Meneses Garcia, Domingo Etayo Palacio, Tomas los Santos Lopez, Rosario Urena Resalo, Ramon Berano Mojon, Francisco Martin Perez and for Victoriano Saez the penalty of twelve years' military imprisonment, and for the accused Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten the death penalty for the crime of treason.

Petitions of the Defence

These are contained in the third part, and read :

WHEREAS: The Defence for the accused maintains that the exempting circumstances of Article 239 of the Military Code apply to all the accused, and if this is not accepted, according to Article 9 of the Penal Code and Clause 5 of Article 67 of the same legal body the circumstances of Clauses 9 and 10 of Article 8 of the Code should be considered as slightly attenuating, and the Defence asks for all the accused complete absolution, or alternatively as a penalty six years and a day of military imprisonment. With regard to the accused Victoriano Saez the Defence maintains that the circumstances of exemption as No 1 in Article

239 of the Military Code should be considered in his favour, and if not asks the penalty demanded by the Prosecution.

The Death Sentence of Lothar Gudde, and a Re-trial for Eynatten

In the fourth part of the proceedings :

WHEREAS: in the procedure of this trial the legal dispositions have been observed, and the voting referred to in Article 21 of the Decree which regulates proceedings having taken place at the fit moment in the trial in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Decree, the result of this was the sentence passed on the accused Lothar Gudde should not be commuted, and that the case should be re-tried before a new Tribunal with regard to some of the persons accused.

The Sentence

Here is the definite sentence of the Court of Justice :

WE FIND: that we must condemn and we do condemn the accused Lothar Gudde, as leader of a group of rebels, to the penalty of death: the accused Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten, Hermann Maurer, Teofilo Doranda Esteban, Emilio Meneses Garcia, Domingo Etayo Palacio, Tomas los Santos Lopez, Rosario Urena Resalo, Ramon Berano Mojon, Francisco Martin Perez, as authors of a crime of military rebellion, to imprisonment for life. Victoriano Saez Arana, for the same crime, is sentenced to twelve years of military prison, and Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten, for a crime of insulting the institutions and the armed

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forces, to six years in a correctional prison: all these with the accessories and costs equally distributed.

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The shooting of Lothar Gudde took place at six in the morning of November 11th, and his death was recorded in the municipal register of Zamudio, and the date of revision of the case by a new Jury with regard to the accused Wolfgang Ludwig Eynatten is still to be fixed.

**The proceedings on a charge of treason against the German
Chargé d'Affaires in Bilbao and a German subject**

Finally, we will prove that the supplementary organization of the German Consular Service, which had left the territory loyal to the Republic, acted in open hostility to the legitimate authorities of Euzkadi, being caught in flagrante delicto performing acts of espionage, and giving rise to proceedings before the Courts of Justice.

As in the former case, and believing this to offer strong and unequivocal proof, we shall use as testimony throughout the chapter the actual account of proceedings in the Courts of the Republic.

The special Court of Instruction Decano drew up a case which bears the number 5 to report on the crimes of treason and espionage which were charged against José Anglada España, Julián Munsuri Echevarria, Julio Hernandez Menderichaga, Federico Martínez Arias, Guillermo Wakonigg Hummer and Emilio Schaeidt Scheneider.

The folios of this summary are used throughout our account.

Copy of folios 1 and 1 verso :

The Plot of Espionage is Discovered

Appearance: In the Council House of the Ministry of the Interior of the Basque Country, Department of Public Surety, at nine o'clock on the 28th day of October, 1935, before the Director General, don Francisco de Arregui, assisted by Señorita Leonor Martin, acting as Secretary qualified to engage in these inquiries, there appear don Matías de Eguren don Pedro Herrán and don Antonio Pérez Aguirre, employees of the Department of the Interior in the Provisional Basque Government, who are charged with the examination of passports and authorizations to embark in the ports of Basque territory, who inform that the embarkations on the English warship *Exmouth* are fixed for this day at 7 a.m. That last night, about twelve o'clock, they were summoned by the legal Assessor of the Department of the Interior, Señor Garmendia, who in presence of the Counsellors of the Basque Government, Señores Monzón and de la Torre, ordered them at this embarkation to make the most careful examination of all the baggage and the persons of those embarking and that they should also examine the Consuls of the various countries who usually go down to see the subjects of their own countries go on board and to bid them farewell; very especially on this occasion when several of them were leaving on a diplomatic mission, and it was therefore important to thoroughly search their baggage and to ask them to show their consular bags. When the embarkation operations had started, several Consuls came to the department where the witnesses were engaged and after the rest of the passengers had gone on board, there came to the landing-stage the Consuls of Switzerland, Belgium, England, the Argentine Republic and

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Austria-Hungary. The first four, asked to show their bags, opened them, and the contents were examined, and appeared to the witnesses to be in perfect order. When it came to the turn of the Consul for Austria-Hungary, Señor Wakonigg, he refused to open his bag, and tried to take it from the department and return it to the Consulate, which the witnesses would not permit him to do, saying that once he had tried to take the bag on board it must be retained and it would be examined in the Department of the Interior of the Basque country. Whereupon Señor Wakonigg declared that if the bag was detained he would not go on the diplomatic mission with which he was charged, and would return to his Consulate, taking the bag with him. The witnesses told him that if he would not surrender the bag he must appear in person with it before the Department of the Interior. Whereupon he agreed to the bag being opened, and unfastened it personally, and when the contents were examined, there were found two plans of the estuary of Bilbao, numerous letters addressed to private persons, (supposedly, since the addresses give no official position) various of which were opened, and when the contents were read they were thought to be important because of the commentaries which they contained on the situation of the war. Other letters were seen to contain sums of money in notes of the Bank of Spain. There were also two small bags which Señor Wakonigg declared contained jewels. In view of this discovery they judged it necessary to bring Señor Wakonigg with the consular bag and his own luggage to the Department of the Interior, and having noticed that a man, who appeared to be a German, had been exchanging signs with Señor Wakonigg since the discussion arose, they judged it necessary to bring this man as

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well.—In view of Señor Wakonigg's position as Consul, and profiting by the chance that Señor de la Torre, the Counsellor of the Exchequer, was on the quay bidding farewell to some friends, they invited this gentleman to accompany Señor Wakonigg to the Council House of the Ministry of the Interior, which was done at about 8.30 in the morning. The witnesses brought the bag and the man who appeared to be a German, and the revenue-guards brought the luggage of Señor Wakonigg, which was now in the Council House. They assert that all they have said took place in the presence of the Lieutenant of the revenue-guards and of the men at his command, who were specially requisitioned last night for the careful examination which was made for the embarkations on the *Exmouth*. They have nothing further to state, all that they have said is true, and they ratify it, and reading through this statement they find it in agreement with their declarations;

Signed and witnessed by don Francisco de Arregui and with me the Secretary:

Francisco Arregui; Antonio Pérez; Leonor Martin; Pedro Harrán; Matías de Euren.

What the Bag Contained

In folios 2 and 3 is an account of what the bag belonging to the Consul of Austria-Hungary, Chargé d'Affaires for Germany in the Basque capital, contained:

In Bilbao, October 28th, 1936, appeared the Consul of Austria-Hungary, don Guillermo Wakonigg, and the Secretary General and the legal Assessor of the Department of the Interior of the Provisional Government of Euzkadi accompanied by the Director General of local administration for the said Depart-

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ment, and after a solemn protest by Señor Wakonigg, who claimed that the Consular bag was inviolable, they proceeded to the opening of the same, making a careful note of the documents which it contained, as well as of other sealed objects which Señor Wakonigg carried.

The documents in the bag were as follows:

Two plans of the estuary of Bilbao. And another envelope which contains two letters and a card: one envelope addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army, which contains a report in which the writer speaks of Balparda, of money, and ridicules the Basque Government, with a copy, and a card headed consular with official documents.

When this examination had been carried out, the bag was closed and sealed, the three envelopes with their corresponding documentation remaining outside one of them addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Northern Army, another to the Civil Governor of San Sebastian, and another to Colonel Solchage. The act is now terminated, and the persons mentioned above sign.

Statement by Wakonigg

In folio 10 and verso is the statement made on October 28th, the same day, by Guillermo Wakonigg, which reads :

Declaration by don Guillermo Wakonigg y Hummer, sixty-two years of age, married, native of Littai (Jugo Slavia) living in Bilbao, with address in Elcano Street, number 23, exercising the function of Consul of Austria-Hungary, and empowered by the Embassies of the Republics of Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary in Paris. Who declares that to-day he intended to embark on the English warship *Exmouth*,

in company with the Consuls of Belgium and Norway, who, with him, were forming a Commission of the Consular Corps in Bilbao to treat with the Ambassadors accredited to Spain, who are now residing in Saint Jean de Luz, on general matters connected with the International Zone in Guecho, and the bombardment to which that has recently been subjected, with other matters of that nature, about which they had previously informed his Excellency the President of the Provisional Government of the Basque Country. He wishes it to be noted that this is the first time he has left for abroad since the declaration of war. Going on board he took with his luggage the consular bag. That when he went to the quay, in the office where the passports were examined, he was asked to open the bag in order that the contents might be examined. Thereupon he wished to return the bag, and not take it on board, but he was told that having tried to embark the bag, he could not return it, without its contents being examined. He agreed and opened the bag, and when the employees engaged on examining the documents found among them some which they considered important, they told him that he must accompany the bag to the Council House of the Interior of the Basque Country and they invited the Counsellor of the Exchequer, who happened to be at the quay, to accompany him there. In the Council House they proceeded to make an inventory of the contents of the bag, in spite of the protest of Señor Wakonigg; this was done by the Secretary General and the Legal Assessor of the Department of the Interior, in the presence of the Director General of that Department, and as a consequence, they opened the proceedings herein related. That he understands by consular bag the documents referring to matters dealt with between Consulates and Embassies, including the

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Governments of their countries, and including objects privately belonging to the Consuls and their families; that he thought it was permissible to take letters for other persons, and that was the reason why various persons who had asked him if he was leaving, had given him letters for their friends, and that he had received them and included them in the bag. That he does not remember who gave him the letter addressed to the Military Governor of Guipuzcoa. That he is completely unaware of who gave him the envelope addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army. That he took the plans of the estuary of Bilbao from the memorandum which was sent him annually by the Junta of Works of the Port of Bilbao, and he was taking them in order to show them to his firm Dewismw and Pouillant, mineral traders, whom he was to meet in Saint Jean de Luz, and he took those plans because they were the only ones which showed the mineral freighters, and that would help to clear up certain doubts which had been raised at different times as to the place where the boats should load.

Amplification of the Statement

In folio 102; it was made on October 28th and ran as follows :

Amplification of the statement of don Guillermo Wakonigg.—He states that Señor Emilio Schaeidt, who came from the landing stage of Las Arenas, with the officers in charge of examination of passports and authorizations, is a German subject who assists him in the work of the Consulate, because his staff left Bilbao, and Señor Wakonigg's work has increased considerably, for when the German Consul left Bilbao he instructed the witness to protect the rights

of the German subjects there: that the said Señor Schaeidt had no work to do at the quay, and he supposes that he went there out of curiosity, as many people do when there is an embarkation. That he had instructed the said person in his absence, which he supposed would last four or five days, to note the telephone calls, and to attend to any commissions there might be at the Consulate.

The Contents of the Envelope Addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army

The envelope addressed to the ex-General in command of the rebel forces in the North sector contained the following document sent by the Captain of Engineers, don Pablo Murga—tried for treason and condemned to death—to the insurgents.

The envelope of a letter addressed as follows :

His Excellency the General Chief of Staff of the Northern Army.

The letter which this envelope contained reads :

Your Excellency: The Captain of Engineers who signs this, who is united heart and soul with the movement for the salvation of Spain, was surprised by the movement in his destination at the Commission of Mobilization of Industries of Bilbao, and prevented in the first moments from joining the army by the serious threat to his family: he has since made various attempts to do so, all in vain. On the 6th of the present month he received the order to join the second section of the Staff of the Department of Defence of Euzkadi, so that, in the position of Second in Command he should take charge of the fortification works in Bilbao, his appointment covering the zone between *Cerro Viejo* and *Colmenar*. When he

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received the order he thought at first to refuse to obey and to escape or hide himself: but considering that his absence would not make any obstacle to the completion of the work, while on the other hand his position would enable him to render a great service to the national cause, by giving detailed information on what was being done, he accepted the post. To date and with the countersign he has sent off three reports, by different means, which he trusts will already have reached you, and in order to legalize his situation and to standardize the sending of the information, he asks from your Excellency an approval of his actions or an order of incorporation, and in the event of this approval an indication of where he should send the reports, and, if any exists, a regular means of doing so. Bilbao, October 25th, 1936. Captain of Engineers, PABLO MURGA. Signed with special mark. To his Excellency the General Chief of Staff of the Northern Army.

LINE OF DEFENCE NEXT TO "TISINGAR"¹

With this title and with the countersign below I have sent earlier, and by different hands, two reports on the works being carried out to form a belt of fortifications embracing "Tisingar" and "Quereres." In case these have not arrived I repeat their contents. On the 2nd of this month, and through the suggestion of some of the political parties, supported by the Chief of Staff of the "Serrano" Front, Comte "Labarta," the War Department ordered that this chain of fortifications should be made, in order to make a strong resistance there and to delay the fall of "Tisingar" as long as possible. The chain was to

¹ There is no need to explain why we have altered the original place-names, etc., on this document!

be at the necessary distance to protect the "town" from the artillery fire, and to extend as little as possible in order to limit the number of troops who would have to hold it. . . . In the choice and determination of the type of works they left them their freedom, having adopted in the majority of cases. . . .

In order to complete the works the second section of the Staff was organized, and placed in the annexe of the "Invalidos de Tisafor," until the "Com-mandancia" buildings were prepared, in which they intended to concentrate all the "War Dependencies." The moving will take place one day soon, for they are certain to finish the quarters before the end of the month. At the head of the section they placed a captain of . . . , aided by another of the same body and occupation, and the administrative and auxiliary staff is completed by persons from the political groups. For the direction of the works they commandeered the assistance of architects, engineers of roads and mines, and for their execution they gave orders that all works which were not for the war should cease, and demanded the collaboration of all the building contractors, with their employees and their tools. They began the works on the 6th of this month, and later they incorporated all the staff and tools of the "public services" and the employees which these services found for them. . . . The wire entanglements start from "Benkarrik" to "Tugunz" . . . The line runs as follows (see the topographical plan): Sector of "Larreta"; First line: "Abaran" (Cota 1215) House "Ixillo-baita Frain," "Zeluan," Cota 93, cross roads on Km. 89. Cemetery, Piedras de San Julian "Playa," Cota 320, Cota 43, "Zinkunegui." Second Line: House "Arcila" Houses Ochango, "Camino Lador," House "Banarta," Cota 302. Third Line: "Monte Mastegui," Cota 31.

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Approach to the Bridge of the R.37, "Matzain," "Bereau." Sector of "Lukainka"; only line: "Dark-ebdani," Cota 43, Height "R.14," of the road at "Arratzubi" Cota 36, "Koskonta" (46), Cota 97, Cota 75 on the "Haciendas Erlaiz, Olazabal" (235, 375), Railway tunnel "La Ache" (75 and 36), "Alcazarkibir." Sector of "Melilla": only line: ridge which goes from the hill "Tzakain" to the hill "Txortxi," with important works only on the first and on the roads from "Potoka" to "Ximela."

And the report describes next and with great attention to detail the fortifications carried out in all the sectors. It continues :

From "Melilla" to the sea the line runs through. . . . State of the works: In the sector of "Baztan" the front line trenches are finished; the rest are still in the first stages of construction, and no machine-gun post has been finished or any wire put up. Only on the sector of "Yantsi" have they got about fifty metres of this wire entanglement. We think that the best means of delaying these works would be frequent air attacks, using machine-guns from time to time (37-12).

Various notes :

From conversations overheard in the headquarters of the "Larache" front, it appears that an attack is being prepared for the near future on "Cincinati" in the "Larreta" sector. The artillery of which we can dispose in the "Larache" sector consists of. . . . We are expecting an abundance of artillery coming from abroad, but I have not been able to find out its origin, nor the boat on which it is coming, although it is supposed that it comes from. . . .

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The manufacture of munitions for the artillery is now organized; they are making only. . . . The manufacture of fuses and priming-tubes takes place almost solely in . . . and that of gunpowder and (trilite) in. . . . The cartridges are filled with the gunpowder from . . ., and the rifles are made in the same place, i.e. . . . and in . . . the building next to this. We are expecting the arrival of . . . at any moment.

Letter from Schaeidt

In folio 21 is the translation of a letter written by Schaeidt and which was included in Wakonigg's bag.

We transcribe the following paragraphs :

DEAR WILLY,

I am certain that there will be no fighting in Bilbao. The Basques will surrender it as soon as the front advances, if not earlier: when Madrid has fallen, which will not be long now. Before that, I do not think there will be an offensive against Bilbao. Also the aeroplanes will leave us in peace, for the destruction which they caused in their two visits of September 25th and 26th was terrible (300 dead). The object of the raids was simply to show the Bilbao folk what the whites are capable of, and they succeeded. Here there is the same calm as when you left. We have now got the Basque Government here, which does things that make one's hair stand on end.

The Civil Government before was not worth much, but this is a hundred times worse. They gave them the Statute when they were on the point of foundering, and now they will defend their Basque country to the last drop of their blood; but you may believe me, this band . . . will quit the fronts as soon

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as the offensive begins, and you can expect nothing else from such cowards as these people are.

I am completely sick of the Basques. They have not even the courage to admit their defeats, and they go about with lies promising pleasant surprises and talking of victories.

The Commandant of the Koln has entrusted Señor Wakonigg with the protection of the Germans here. Señor Wakonigg has once more been made the Consul for Austria Hungary in the North of Spain, since August. He can be certain that they will put up a statue to him when this is over; he deserves one as large as the Sacred Heart in the Gran Via.

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Folio 25 contains the translation of another letter from Schaeidt, which reads :

DEAR OTTO,

Please send this letter to one of the figures in the Burgos Government. I hope that you have arranged that telegram. Thank you, etc.

Folio 31:

Where . . . you have left no address: consequently I went to your office, where I gave it to a young clerk (Joboso), I believe he is to be trusted.

Señor X had the following business: On the 20th of this month the Government of Euzkadi—may God punish them—published the following decree (extract from a newspaper). The danger of this Decree is that the Government wishes to dispose of foreign monies, either to buy war-material, or so that the gentleman in the Basque Government may have them, for they will soon be getting ready to leave,

and to live comfortably abroad in the long years which await them. This is what your friend G. is afraid of. It will be a pity if these cursed rascals, and chiefly José Antonio Aguirre, should manage to escape.

The thing is that if the conquest of Bilbao by the Whites is delayed even another three weeks the gang will get all the money, which amounts to some millions: this must be avoided. At the moment the banks can contravene the Decree, insisting on the repayment of the securities by the proprietors, who are mostly absent: but in the end that will not help them: your business now is to call the attention of the Burgos Government to this danger, so that they may speed up the offensive against Bilbao and save millions.

At the moment the Government will not give passports, even for women and children. Foreigners have to get a permit, otherwise they are not allowed to embark. This is the behaviour of the Government of Euzkadi which speaks so hypocritically about humanizing the war: but the good Basques have already realized the lamentable situation to which Aguirre's policy is leading them. I am, now as before, optimistic: I am convinced that we shall not come to fighting in Bilbao: but perhaps there will be fighting between the Reds and the Basques, for the Reds will oppose the surrender of Bilbao; but it will be useless.

Señor Wakonigg is very busy as usual. Señor Shanman and I are helping him. The Commandant of the Koln has entrusted Señor Wakonigg with the protection of German interests. He will certainly give these lines to you personally, for he is going to be absent some days on an important mission which will, please God, have a successful conclusion.

New Statement by Wakonigg

Folios 145, 151, 152 and 153 contain fresh statements, made on October 29th and 30th, by Señor Wakonigg, from which we transcribe the following :

Folio 145. Statement by don Guillermo Wakonigg Hummer, made at the Headquarters of Public Surety of the Basque Provisional Government, at twelve midnight on October 29th, 1936, before the Director of Public Surety: the witness after being questioned, stated:

That he does not know who gave him the envelope addressed to the General Chief of Staff of the Northern Army, nor does he know who gave him the letter signed by Captain Pablo Murga, although he affirms that it was not the Captain himself. That he does not know who gave him or sent him the five sheets of paper, typed and numbered, which begin "I take the advantage of the journey" and end "hatred of Spain," although he admits that on the copy of those sheets he wrote himself in pencil "for Pedro Alfaro, Burgos," doubtless because that was the address on the envelope in which the papers were. Nor does he know who gave him the typewritten page with a copy, entitled "Bank Information" which ends "six million pesetas": nor who gave him the typewritten paper entitled "Information on Bilbao" which ends with the words "this garrison."

That he knows Captain Pablo Murga, having been introduced to him about six or eight weeks previously, when Señor Murga reminded him of his father, who succeeded the witness in the Basconia factory.

That as to the envelope containing two letters and an envelope addressed to the General in Command of the Northern Army and the information which

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mentioned Balparda and banking sums, another which ridicules the Basque Government (with a copy) and the letter dealing with banking information, as well as the report with an official letter signed by Pablo Murga, he cannot exactly remember who gave them to him, but as the envelope bears the heading of the "Sociedad Iberica de Gomas y Amiantos" (Iberian Society of Rubber and Asbestos), on being asked again if it was not some employee or messenger of that firm, he answered that he does not think so. Asked if all or part of these documents were not given him by Commandant Anglada, he categorically denies it.

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Asked if he did not perhaps receive these Documents from Captain Pablo Murga, he categorically denies it. A point is made that he may have received them from some friend or acquaintance of Captain Murga who works in the firm S.I.G.A., and he says he seems to remember that the Manager of that firm gave him an envelope, but he does not remember how it was addressed.

New Statement by Señor Wakonigg

Asked once again to make a statement, Señor Wakonigg did so in the following terms :

That the envelope with the heading "S.I.G.A." and some letters, among them those addressed to Señor Larramendi and the Chief of Staff of the Northern Army, the documents entitled "Banking and political Information" and the "Report of considerations on Basque Nationalism," i.e., all the documents of that type, were in the envelope which

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was handed to him in the offices of the Consulate of Paraguay: that the envelope was handed to him with the communications with it when he had gone to the offices of the S.I.G.A. in response to a call "to discuss a product called di-oxide": that the envelope and the documents were given to him personally by don Federico Martínez, who is Consul of Paraguay and Manager of the firm S.I.G.A. and that they were handed to him in the presence of the lawyer don Julián Munsuri. That at the time they showed him the documents which were in the envelope, and with regard to one of them which consisted of five pages and begins with the sentence "I take advantage of the journey" they told him that it was to be given or sent to don Pedro Alfaro, of Burgos, for which reason he, the witness, noted it in presence of Señor Martínez and Señor Munsuri, writing in pencil on the first page of the copy the words "for Pedro Alfaro, Burgos". . . .

New Statement by Señor Martínez Arias

Señor Martinez Arias again made a statement, on November 1st, and 2nd, in the following terms :

That he had found himself in this business owing to his good nature and the great desire which he had to do a favour for a friend, who had always behaved as a gentleman to him, Señor Murga. Unfavourable circumstances brought it about that this favour which he thought to do for his friend became a concrete accusation against him: he did not shrink from the accusation, but nevertheless must declare himself absolutely innocent in the matter of espionage.

Señor Murga, a sincere man, who had always felt towards him and treated him as a friend, explained

to him his situation and his desire to find a way out: for he thought that when the Government of Burgos won, that he having made no gesture, would be considered disloyal to the rebel troops. He knew, as Consul, that Señor Wakonigg could take correspondence on any vessel, and therefore he handed the envelope which Señor Murga gave to him (without reading it, and therefore not knowing its contents) to Señor Wakonigg. . . . He declares that the letters were written in his office.

Questioned as to his relations with Señor Anglada, who is implicated as author of one of the writings, and in view of the result of the examination by experts on the already mentioned documents, he declares that Señor Anglada, wishing to express his sentiments, had dictated to him the documents in question, and that he had simply copied them on his typewriter, not putting any of his own ideas into them at all. That owing to their friendship and the professional relations which had existed between them, Señor Munsuri had also written his article of reference in his house. He made this declaration after being shown the result of the expert examination of the form and style of the letter of Señor Munsuri, and the form and style of his professional writings and other documents drawn up by him found in his office. He declared that as a gentleman, and faced with the overwhelming proof he cannot help but make these statements, for by denial he would not alter the facts. . . .

That the article entitled " Plaza de Bilbao " referred to in the article of Señor Anglada, was one that he gave himself to Señor Wakonigg on another occasion. . . . That the original was for Señor Alfaro of Burgos, and the copy for Señor Wakonigg, who gave it to a person completely unknown to the witness.

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With regard to Commandant Anglada, he declares, that in spite of that gentleman's denial, the truth is that he gave him a piece of information with an account of happenings in the Regiment of Garellano, of which he remembers that there was an account of Lieutenant Colonel Ortiz de Zárate waiting in a village, whose name he forgets, for the arrival of a batallion: for various reasons this batallion did not arrive. That Colonel Piñerúa lined up the officers in the Mess, and asked that all those who were prepared to defend the Government of the Republic should take a step forward, and not one of them did so. That later they deliberated as to whether they should join the revolt, and affirmed their attitude, asking what attitude the other forces would adopt in the event of a rising in Garellano. That the Lieutenant Colonel of the Civil Guard answered that he would be on the side of legality (regretting that he must differ from his companions in arms, and even shedding tears on one occasion). That his attitude was supported by the Commandant of the Shock Troops and by the Commandant of the Rural Guards. Finally the report said that they must clarify the different conducts, distinguishing between the officers who served the Government of the Republic with decision and enthusiasm, and those who served through compulsion, coldly and apathetically. It gave some ten names of the first. That when there was a possibility of sending papers to the other camp, Señor Wakonigg would come to his office, and tell him on what day it would be possible to send things, and that he was interested to have reports, principally from P.M. meaning by those initials Pablo Murga. . . .

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Statement by Don Julián Munsuri

Folio 188 contains the statement made on November 1st by don Julián Munsuri, which reads as follows :

That he admits that Señor Martínez asked him if he had anything for Burgos, since he would soon have an opportunity to send some letters there. Thereupon it occurred to him to give some news to his friend Pedro Alfaro in Burgos, and he drew up the writing which begins, "I take advantage of the journey," and ends with the words, "hatred of Spain." That he dictated the letter and Señor Martínez typed it out, with a copy, for whom he does not know.

Statement by Commandant Anglada

Here is the text of the statement made by Commandant José Anglada on November 1st :

That he knew Señor Wakonigg when he was in Bilbao before, in the years 1920 to 1924. That before the present outbreak he used to see Señor Wakonigg in the Café Boulevard on Sunday evenings. That about the 20th, going to intercede in an attempt to procure the liberty of don Pedro Eguileor, the conversation turning on how two flying officers and a Captain and Commandant of revenue-guards had escaped, details were furnished him by Señor Wakonigg, even to the extent of admitting that he had arranged with the Captain of a German ship to embark the aforementioned revenue officers, adding that it was very difficult to get away, because now the boats no longer stopped at Bilbao. . . . That it was don Federico Martínez Arias who suggested and instigated the idea of running an information service through

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the Consuls who could effect it in their journeys from Bilbao: stressing the fact that by such means their names would become known in the opposite camp, and their responsibilities would thus be lessened. In view of that he gave him some notes to type out, which are those that have been intercepted, and deal with the question of Basque Nationalism. That he did not dictate those writings to Señor Martínez, but left him a draft of some pages to be written out. That previous to that he had not given him any paper or writing, and therefore if anything exists or has existed in connection with events which took place in the barracks, or similar things, Señor Martínez is responsible for it, using to that end the conversations which took place at the "tertulias" held in his house at half-past two every day, and which the witness used to frequent, with don Federico Martínez and . . .

Statement by Hernandez Mendirichaga

Contained in folio 206 and made on November 3rd as follows :

. . . That he wrote a couple of sheets, those shown him in typescript with the title of "Banking Information." That his motive for writing those sheets was that he had a conversation with Martínez about the need to save the financial interests of Bilbao, in the event of the evacuation of the city, and to that end he put the data that he possessed into the pages mentioned, and gave them to Señor Martínez Arias to have them sent to the Burgos Government. . . .

New Statements, Inquiries and Confrontations

The previous and following folios of the summary, to the number of 269, contain the careful inquiries carried

out in the procedure, consisting of new statements, searches and confrontations which finally prove the facts, and stand out clearly in the verdict of the Popular Tribunal.

We have omitted from this narration all the details and circumstances which, although not lacking in interest, are not necessary to show the actions of the prisoners, their activities in open opposition to the legitimate authorities of Euzkadi, their interventions in this plot of espionage, in which such decisive and active participation was taken by the Chargé d'Affaires for Germany in Bilbao and a German subject.

The Sentence

Finally we transcribe the sentence given in this case in the oral and public trial held in Bilbao on November 18th :

In Bilbao, 18th of November, 1936.—Having seen in oral and public trial and before the Popular Tribunal of Biscay the proceedings in the case No. 5 begun by the Special Court of Justice for the crimes of espionage and treason against don José Anglada España, forty-four years of age, bachelor, commandant of Infantry, without previous criminal convictions or record: don Julián Munsuri Echevarría, forty-four years of age, lawyer, married and living in Bilbao, without previous criminal convictions or record: don Julio Hernández Mendirichaga, sixty-one years of age, bachelor and living in Bilbao, manufacturer, without previous criminal convictions or record: don Federico Martínez Arias, fifty years of age, bachelor, Consul of Paraguay in this City, without previous criminal convictions or records: don Guillermo Wakonigg Hummer, sixty-five years of age, married, Consul

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of Austria-Hungary in this City, without previous criminal convictions or record: and don Emilio Schaeidt Scheneider, fifty-one years of age, married, without any previous criminal convictions on record; the same being defended by the lawyers don José Maria Ruiz, don Juan Migoya, don Florencio Arostegui, don Agustin Herran and don Ignacio Areilza, the charges being brought by the Public Prosecutor, don José Miguel Gomendio, and the chairmen of the magistrates being don Dionisio Mazorra and Fernandez de los Rios.

WHEREAS: After the legal procedure the Jury dictated the following verdict:

Question 1.—Did the accused Guillermo Wakonigg, who was Consul for Austria and Hungary, on the 26th of October take in a bag, among other things which were discovered when that bag was examined, an envelope addressed to the General Chief of Staff of the rebel army, which envelope contained the writing by the ex-captain of Engineers Pablo Murga, another writing by the accused Hernández, besides a letter from the accused Schaeidt and a plan of the estuary of Bilbao, all of these seized when he was attempting to take them on board?

Yes.

Question 2.—Did the accused Anglada compose the writing in folios 62 and 63 of the summary?

Yes.

Question 3.—Did the accused Munsuri compose another writing which appears in folios 75-79 of the summary?

Yes.

Question 4.—Did the accused Hernández compose another writing which appears in folio 80?

Yes.

Question 5.—Did the accused Martínez Arias invite the accused Anglada to his house in order that he should give him the writing referred to in the second Question, and once he had obtained it did he give it to the other accused Wakonigg, in order that it should go to the address which was on the envelope containing it?

Yes.

Question 6.—Did the accused Munsuri meet the accused Martínez Arias in his house in order to give him the writing referred to in Question 3, and so that once he had obtained it he should give it to the other accused Wakonigg, in order that it should go to the address which was on the envelope containing it?

Yes.

Question 7.—On the other hand, was the writing of the accused Munsuri directed to his friend and companion in Burgos, don Pedro Alfaro, and to be given to him in due course?

No.

Question 8.—Did the accused Martínez Arias invite the accused Hernández to his house in order that he should give him the writing referred to in Question 4, and once he had obtained it did he give it to the other accused Wakonigg in order that it should go to the address which was on the envelope containing it?

Yes.

Question 9.—Did the accused Schaeidt Schneider write the letters which appear in folios 17, 20 and 29, or rather in folios 30, 31 and 32 and give them to the accused Wakonigg to be sent to their destination?

Yes.

Question 10.—Was the object of the accused Anglada the same as that of the other accused, namely

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to supply information to the rebel Government, letting them know whatever might injure the loyal forces?

Yes.

Question 12.—Was the object of the accused Hernández the same as that of the other accused, namely to supply information to the rebel Government, letting them know whatever might injure the loyal forces?

Yes.

Question 13.—Was the object of the accused Schaeidt Schneider the same as that of the other accused, namely to supply information to the rebel Government, letting them know whatever might injure the loyal forces?

Yes.

Question 14.—Was the object of the accused Wakonigg the same as that of the other accused, namely to supply information to the rebel Government, letting them know whatever might injure the loyal forces?

Yes.

Question 15.—Was the object of the accused Martínez Arias the same as that of the other accused, namely to supply information to the rebel Government, letting them know whatever might injure the loyal forces?

Yes.

Question 16.—Did the accused Guillermo Wakonigg, prior to committing the acts giving rise to these proceedings, send information of the same nature and to the same intent to the leaders of the insurgent army?

Yes.

Question 17.—Did the accused Julián Munsuri, through or by the mediation of Guillermo Wakonigg

and prior to these proceedings, send any other information of the same nature or to the same intent to the leaders of the insurgent army?

No.

Question 18.—Did the accused Julio Hernández Mendirichaga, through or by the mediation of Guillermo Wakonigg and prior to these proceedings, send any other information of the same nature and to the same intent to the rebel leaders of the army?

No.

Question 19.—Did the accused José Anglada, through or by the mediation of Guillermo Wakonigg, and prior to these proceedings, send any other information to the leaders of the insurgent army?

Yes.

Question 20.—On the other hand, did the accused, through or by mediation of Guillermo Wakonigg and prior to these proceedings, send any other document relating to the events in Garellano to the leaders of the insurgent army?

No.

Question 21.—Did the accused Schaeidt Schneider, through or by mediation of Guillermo Wakonigg and prior to these proceedings send any other information of the same nature and to the same intent to the leaders of the insurgent army?

No.

Question 22.—Did the accused Martínez Arias prior to these proceedings act as go-between for Wakonigg, supplying him with information from the other accused persons to be sent to the leaders of the insurgent army to the same intent?

Yes.

SECOND:

WHEREAS when these conclusions were rendered certain, both the Public Ministry and Counsel for the

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Defence took proceedings in pursuance thereof, and when the verdict of the Jury was known, the point of law was considered. During these proceedings, the Public Prosecutor gave it as his opinion that the accused were guilty of treason as provided for and penalized in Article 222 paragraph 7 of the Military Code, and demanded that sentence of death be pronounced against them. Counsel for the accused Federico Martínez Arias admitted the offence as defined in Article 240 of the Military Code and alternatively that defined in Article 125 paragraph 4 of the Penal Code. Counsel for the accused Guillermo Wakonigg maintained that the offence committed by his client was that referred to in Articles 125 paragraph 4 and 127 of the Penal Code, or alternatively in Article 230 of the Military Code, while the accused Emil Schaeidt claimed that Article 138 paragraph 2 of the Penal Code should be applied. Counsel for the accused Julián Munsuri Echevarría gave it as his opinion that his client was guilty of the offence referred to in Article 240 of the Military Code, i.e., his action had not been fully carried out. Counsel for Julio Hernández Mendirichaga stated that the offence committed was that provided for in Article 240 of the Penal Code, and, finally, counsel for Anglada pleaded that the offence committed by his client had not been fully carried out.

THIRD:

WHEREAS in pursuance of these proceedings and on learning the verdict the Court pronounced sentence and forthwith gave notice of the dispositions thereof, whereupon the ballots provided for in the Decree regulating procedure were both held, with negative results, all legal formalities being observed in these proceedings. WE therefore pronounce judgment:

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We must and we do condemn the accused Guillermo Wakonigg Hummer, Federico Martínez Arias and José Anglada España, after being deprived of his military rank, to death as having committed the crime of high treason, and we sentence the accused Julián Munsuri y Echevarría, Julio Hernández Mendirichaga and Emil Schaeidt Schneider to imprisonment for life as guilty of the same offence, but without effect, with all penalties pertaining thereto, and to payment of the legal costs in equal shares.

This our final sentence we pronounce, decree and subscribe.

The execution of Guillermo Wakonigg Hummer, Federico Martínez Arias and José Anglada España took place at a quarter past seven on the morning of the 19th November, their decease was entered at the Municipal Court of Zamudio, the first was buried in the cemetery in the annexed region of Begoña and the others in the cemetery at Derio.

APPENDIX

After this proof that the German Chargé d'Affaires in Bilbao, and the above-mentioned German subject Schaeidt, participated in this crime of espionage, there may be some distrustful or suspicious reader who claims to explain it by suspecting or giving credit to the story that the Germans resident in Basque territory suffered persecution or loss of their property. That nothing of the kind took place is proved by the evidence of one of the Germans involved, namely Schaeidt, from whom numerous letters were found in Wakonigg's bag, addressed to the rebel camp,

containing the coarsest abuse against the legitimate authorities of Euzkadi.

In one of them, contained in the summary, folio 23, he states that a certain building was protected by the authorities of Euzkadi, and confesses that it suffered the consequences of the bombardment which was carried out with German personnel and material on September 25th.

Here is the passage in the letter which deals with the point :

Dear Waeel and Willy, and dear little Ilanri and Manfield: I want to tell you about your house; at first the military wanted to quarter some of the refugees there, I was called on the telephone by the porter and asked for the key; I replied that I could not give it, as the house belonged to foreigners, and I rang up the police who told me that they would not permit it. At nine o'clock I was again rung up by the porter who asked me to go immediately, or they would break down the door: so I hastened there, and called the police, who arrived, and so these people were prevented from occupying the house. The following morning I found the Consul, and he gave me a consular seal, which said "Property of a German subject, etc." I fastened this on the door, and left instructions with the Urcolas. I went several times after that, and everything was in order until on the 29th I was called by Urcola, and they asked me to go, as two bombs had fallen in the courtyard and had done great damage. They had packed up their bags and were leaving: I went there (the Urcolas had gone), our things had not been damaged, thank God: but then I had to find a place for them and lorries to move them.

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In another letter from Schaeidt, dated October 26th, which is contained in folio 18 of the summary, there is evidence that the houses of the Germans suffered no damage. Schaeidt affirms that nothing happened to any of the houses belonging to Germans which he knew.

This letter contains, among other things, the statement :

I am sure that when I get there I shall meet only bored faces; so many German refugees pass through my hands (all the letters pass through my hands, as there has not been a German Consulate here for a month, and I have to collect the things for myself), and all the letters show a longing to return. But it will be a long time before we come to that, even if Bilbao is eventually occupied by the Whites. I could not have borne being so long without anything to do, and my conscience will be satisfied when I return to you.

“ Our house,” he says, “ is order: it seems that some refugees from San Sebastian are living below us.”

“ Jentschens’ house is also all right, and I believe they have respected the houses of all the Germans. . . . ”

And in contrast with the conduct of the authorities of Euzkadi towards the German subjects, we see the behaviour of Schaeidt himself !

CHAPTER TWO

ITALIAN INTERVENTION

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DECLARES ITSELF IN FAVOUR OF FRANCO, AND ANNOUNCES THAT IT WILL NOT PERMIT THE TRIUMPH OF THE REPUBLIC

The conduct of Italian Fascism with regard to the Spanish war proves beyond all doubt that the Rome Government has agreed not to allow the triumph of the popular Republican forces. For that end, not only does Italy supply as much war-material as they need to the Spanish rebels, but she declares every day, in the press, on the wireless and by every organ of propaganda, her open sympathy for the insurgent generals, and her determined hostility to the legitimate Government. We shall reproduce in the following pages some of these manifestations : they are an aspect of Italian intervention which is not to be despised. Under the pretext of not permitting Communism to be established in Spain, what Mussolini really aims at is the introduction of Fascism, a State subject to foreign Imperialist powers. Therefore, with military support goes moral support, the most obvious collaboration with the Spanish rebellion. Let us examine this.

An Italian Warship Visits the Rebels

Reuter's correspondent in Rabat telegraphs, August 16th, 1936:

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An Italian warship is reported to have arrived at San Lucar this morning and gone up the Guadalquivir River towards Seville, the rebel headquarters in Southern Spain.

**Fascism Takes an Interest in the Fate of the Workers
. . . Those who are not Living in Italy!**

Rash actions and angry threats against the Spanish authorities on the part of the Italian Government and the Italian fleet have become an ordinary occurrence. Knowing that Spain could not successfully resist the foreign fleets, and aware of the weakness of a Government which has to struggle against rebel forces at home, both Italy and Germany have used every kind of provocation against the Spanish people. Using as a pretext the supposed murder of an Italian plumber, Mussolini has metaphorically rent his garments. Italian Fascism which has murdered thousands of workers is shocked because in Barcelona one, so it seems, has perished. It is another excuse to intervene in favour of Franco.

Here are the consequences of the incident as explained by the Rome correspondent of the News Chronicle, on September 5th, 1936 :

Only the advice of the Italian Ambassadors in London and Berlin to-day persuaded Mussolini to "hold his hand" and to call off an ultimatum which he intended to send to Barcelona.

The Italian cruiser *Pola*, accompanied by two destroyers, is already on the way to stage a demonstration at Barcelona, following the murder there of an Italian plumber.

The Duce had informed both envoys of his proposed

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ultimatum and asked them to report on the probable reactions of Britain and Germany.

Both Signor Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in London and Baron Attolico, the Ambassador in Berlin, replied that such a step would have disastrous consequences and that it would be better to wait and see what reply the Catalonian authorities would send to the Italian protest.

It is believed that assurances have been forthcoming from Barcelona that all efforts would be concentrated to safeguard Italian nationals.

A state of alarm has been decreed in the Italian Navy and Air Force, and the fleet is mainly concentrated at the bases of Gaeta and La Spezia.

It was officially stated to-night, however, that no warship other than the "Pola" has been sent to Spanish waters, and that at present there is no intention to send more.

The Times correspondent in Rome also alludes to the Fascist reaction over the incident mentioned. He writes, on September 5th, 1936:

No reply to the strong Italian protest lodged with the Barcelona authorities after the murder of the Italian workman has so far been received from Spain. Indignation at the outrage is great, and an increasing sense of irritation is becoming apparent.

The dispatch of a second cruiser to Spanish waters, it is explained here, was intended to dissuade the Spanish Communist from attacking other Italians. The belief is expressed that Italians are an object of Communist wrath because besides being foreigners they are Fascists and Roman Catholics. Should the measures taken by the Italian Government to ensure the protection of Italian citizens in Spain prove to be

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ineffective, there is no doubt that Signor Mussolini will not hesitate to adopt harsher measures.

The Spanish Smuggler, March, in Italy

On the same day the News Chronicle correspondent reported that not only was Mussolini preoccupied with the life of Italian workers abroad, but also that he was glad to receive a visit from a famous Spanish capitalist. Here is his report:

Don Juan March, the Spanish multi-millionaire and the alleged financial backer of the Spanish rebels, has paid a flying visit to Rome.

He has been staying in the city's most prominent hotel and his visit is believed to be connected with aircraft orders.

Courtesy of the Fascist Diplomats

We take the following from the Daily Herald, September 16th, 1936:

Three officials of the Italian Embassy in Madrid, at present stationed in St. Jean de Luz, have paid a courtesy visit to the rebel authorities at San Sebastian.

More Diplomatic Courtesy

The scandalous conduct of the Fascist diplomats in Spain is underlined by the following action: reported by Reuter, September 29th, 1936:

Radio Seville yesterday announced that the Italian and German Consuls there had congratulated General Queipo de Llano on the "magnificent resistance" of the cadets in the Alcázar.

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An Italian Consul, Naturally quite Innocent, Rouses Suspicion

In view of such behaviour, is there anything astonishing in the incident which we now reproduce? Reuter's correspondent in Rome writes, September 22nd, 1936:

The Italian Consul General in Barcelona, Signor Carlo Bossi, was stopped while driving his car and searched by Spanish Government supporters, it is learned here. On his release he called on the authorities and lodged a strong protest. The incident happened two days ago.

It is not known what attitude the Italian Government will take towards this incident. The cruiser *Pola* was sent to Barcelona early this month following the murder of an Italian workman. It was then stated in Italian political quarters that protests were no longer sufficient and that if a similar incident occurred Italy would have to take stronger measures.

A country which is waging war on Spain cannot demand immunity for its functionaries, nor should it be disturbed when by mistake there occurs an incident such as we have related.

Mussolini Protests Against Communism in Order to be Able to Implant Fascism in Spain

Italian Fascism uses the excuse of the supposed Communist menace in Spain to justify its flagrant intervention in favour of Franco.

So, on November 20th, 1936, Signor Gayda, his master's voice, writes in the Giornale d'Italia:

It must be said very clearly, and without any useless turns of phrase, that Italy is not prepared to see

planted in the Mediterranean, on Spanish soil, a new centre of the Red revolution, a new base of Communist political and military operations. If some great Power has had it in mind to open at Montreux the doors of the Mediterranean to Soviet warships laden with arms and explosives for the use of the world revolution, Italy, a Mediterranean country, and other strong and decided nations of Europe are determined to set a close watch and to prevent that grave error becoming the starting point of the absolutely irreparable destruction of European order. In undertaking this task the anti-Communist defence of Italy and Germany in Europe, as also that of Japan in Asia, will not be merely passive but will assume such forms of reaction, though not offensive forms, as may be imposed by the aggressive initiative of the Soviets and of their Communist Committees.

Behind all this garrulous literature there lurks one plan : to convert Spain into a State which would be in the service of Mussolini and the Bank of Italy.

All the most costly apparatus of Italian propaganda—so necessary in a country which is dominated by the terror of a minority of financiers—has been mobilized during the Spanish war against the legitimate Government.

On November 22nd, 1936, the correspondent of the Morning Post writes from Rome :

Italian propaganda is preparing the public to expect a naval flare up between the Junta fleet and Soviet supply ships at Barcelona. The *Messaggero* comes out with three-column headlines to-day, "Ships carrying arms to Spain will be sunk," and "No neutral zone in the port of Barcelona."

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According to Italian news dated from Tangier, Russia has recently sent 200 'chaser' planes of the German Heinkel type, 10 bombers of an American type, over 100 armoured cars—all of these being accompanied by numbers of Soviet military experts. These are being disembarked, it is said, at Barcelona and Alicante.

Fascist Moral Support for Concrete Military Operations

Italian intervention admits no limits. The Spanish rebels talk of blockading the harbour of Barcelona, and the Italian Government offers its "moral" support without concealment or hesitation. We quote from the Daily Express of November 24th, 1936:

Italy announced moral support last night for the insurgent blockade of Spanish ports. This was intended merely as an "expression of sympathy."—Reuter message from Rome.

Gayda Speaks in the Name of the Spanish People

And when France and England broached the subject of mediation, Italian Fascism, in the name of the Spanish people (!) rejected the proposal. The following dispatch is from the Daily Express correspondent in Rome, published on December 11th, 1936:

Signor Gayda, Mussolini's spokesman, to-day warned that Italy is likely to reject the Franco-British proposal for mediation in Spain.

France and Britain yesterday asked Germany, U.S.S.R., Italy and Portugal to get together to secure an armistice in Spain while a referendum was held to

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give the Spanish people a chance "to express their will."

Signor Gayda says that mediation would be "undignified for the Spanish people."

The Hopes of the Italian Government

Italian Fascism does not wish for mediation because it believes that the victory of Franco is close at hand, and that by his victory Italy will be able to establish herself definitely in the Balearic Islands. This is not our statement, but it is made by the correspondent of the Observer—a paper which is the enemy of the Spanish people—in Paris, on December 13th, 1936:

According to news from the French delegation at Geneva, Italian circles are confident that in a very few days General Franco will have blockaded Barcelona, and will have become master of Madrid.

Thus he will make any question of further foreign intervention superfluous, while at the same time Italy will have become definitely established in the Balearic Islands.

THE SENDING OF ITALIAN WAR-MATERIAL TO THE SPANISH REBELS

From the very beginning Italy hastened to supply war-material to the rebels in Spain. It is said, moreover, that the 'planes which made a forced landing in French Morocco on July 30th, 1936, must have left Italy on the 15th of that month. On that point the Manchester

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Guardian published, on January 4th, 1937, an interesting letter which we reproduce here :

SIR,—It is sometimes argued by those who hope for the rebels' success in the Spanish civil war that Germany and Italy would not have sent material aid in arms and men to General Franco if Russia had not first assisted the other side. Yet no reliable evidence has ever been published that the Russian Government sent material help before October, whereas there is undoubted evidence that Italy at least helped the rebels from the very beginning of the civil war.

In this connection may I draw attention to two recent statements in newspapers? The first is in Saturday's *Daily Mail*. In an article "from an occasional correspondent who has just returned from Spain where he has had ample opportunities of studying the whole situation" the following observation is made:

At that moment [when the war started] the only foreign supplies to Franco were Italian bombing aeroplanes used for the transport of the Spanish colonial troops from Africa to Seville. But for this aid the movement would have collapsed.

Secondly, "Pertinax," the eminent French journalist, who is certainly no friend to the Left, states in the current number of *Europe Nouvelle* that when at the end of July three military 'planes landed in French Morocco, M. Peyrouton, then High Commissioner at Rabat, telegraphed that the Italian officers who composed the crew "had received their orders to leave on July 15th—that is, three days before the military *coup d'état* took place." Without this Italian aid there would have been no civil war. The military

rising would have been crushed by the Republican Government, and there would have been no need for Russia to furnish the help to the Spanish Government denied to it by the Anglo-French "non-intervention" agreement.—Yours, etc.,

A STUDENT OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR.

The First Help Sent by Italy to Franco : Military Aeroplanes

The first news of the sending of war-material by Italy to the rebel generals is in close connection with a tragic accident.

On July 30th, 1936, the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in Paris sent the following dispatch :

Five Italian military aeroplanes were seen flying over Algeria to-day towards Spanish Morocco, and later one of them crashed near Nemours and two others came down in French territory near the frontier of Spanish Morocco. Of the occupants of the wrecked plane three were killed and two injured. A number of machine-guns were found among the wreckage.

The incident confirms beyond doubt the complicity of Italy in the Spanish rebellion. It is rather amusing that this afternoon M. Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, should have spoken with much appreciation of the assurances of neutrality received from the Italian Government earlier in the day.

Reuter's correspondent in Orán reported as follows to the London press, on July 30th, 1936:

One of the Italian airmen who came down stated that they were on a mission to Nador, south of Melilla, in Spanish Morocco, which is held by the insurgents. The machine carried no mark or identification number.

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It is also stated that the Belgian commercial 'plane of the Sabena Line which left Orán for Marseilles this morning wirelessly back that she saw a disabled tri-engined Savoia machine (an Italian make) at 11.29 a.m. riding the waves fifty miles out of Orán. The machine carried three persons.

On August 1st, 1936, the Manchester Guardian wrote as follows concerning this scandalous incident :

Chief interest in the Spanish crisis centred yesterday in the evidence of Italian assistance of the rebel cause afforded by the crashing of two of a squadron of five Italian 'planes in French territory on their journey to Spanish Morocco and its repercussions on last night's debate in the French Chamber.

Late last night a Reuter telegram from French Morocco stated that it was learned from a reliable source that fourteen aeroplanes of the type of the machines that crashed on Thursday had reached Spanish Morocco.

One of the two Italian 'planes that crashed on Thursday in French territory fell at Saida, Algeria, with the loss of four lives; the other made a forced landing near Berkane, in French Morocco, near the Spanish zone. Investigation yesterday showed that in these two machines:

Italian colours on the wings and fuselage had been blocked out with fresh paint.

One of the engines bore the name Alfa Romeo and on a strip of torn canvas the word Savoia—the name of a leading Italian aircraft firm.

Each 'plane was fitted with four machine-guns, and carried cases of 20,000 machine-gun bullets in belts.

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The machines were manned by Italian officers and N.C.O.s in civilian clothes.

It was stated in authoritative quarters in Rome last night that the Government was making inquiries into the crashing of Italian seaplanes in North Africa. It was declared that the Italian Government was not supplying either 'planes or arms to the contending forces in Spain and that if any had been supplied, it was purely a private transaction.

It will be seen that Fascist cynicism was already beginning to show itself. Curious, this distinction made by the Government of a country subjected to the most formidable tyranny between private and public business!

The Times correspondent in Algiers amplifies the general information received with regard to these aeroplanes: he writes, on July 31st, 1936:

It is now confirmed that five Italian (Savoia-Marchetti) aeroplanes, some and probably all manned by Italian military pilots and carrying arms, flew over Algerian territory on their way to Spanish Morocco yesterday. Three of them made forced landings, two with the loss of all but one of their crew, while the six occupants of the third are now prisoners in French hands. They are Captain Trioesi and Sergeants Renato, Elio, Giliberti (second pilot), Terrio, and Boppestini.

General Denain, a former Air Minister, now holding a command in the Air Force, and members of his staff interrogated them closely for over five hours to-day. It is believed that these men admitted their rank and mission, which was to fly the machines non-stop from Sardinia to Melilla for delivery to the insurgents, and declared that they were merely taking the

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machine across for a private firm. Their machine contained four machine-guns and bomb-dropping gear.

The cause of the accidents in each case seems to have been lack of petrol. Shortly before midday yesterday one of the machines appeared over the watering place at Saida, near the frontier. After circling once or twice it tried to land, but stalled close to the ground and crashed. Bathers ran to the rescue and found the machine in pieces. Three of the occupants were dead, the fourth (now in hospital at Berkane) was badly injured. A few minutes later a second machine appeared and, after circling round the wreckage, flew on, but made a forced landing on the banks of the Moulouya river, which divides French and Spanish territory. Shortly afterwards some frontier guards came up and arrested the crew, whose names are given above. The third machine to meet with disaster was the one which was seen floating on the sea fifty miles off Orán by a Belgian aeroplane of the Sabena line. A fisheries sloop at once set out, but was forced back into port by heavy seas. Later the steamer *Masirak* searched the area, but found nothing, and it seems almost certain that machine and men have been lost.

We quote from the News Chronicle of August 1st, 1936:

Fourteen Italian warplanes were reported last night to have landed at Nador, near Melilla, the city in Spanish Morocco, where General Franco, chief of the Fascist revolutionaries, began his campaign against Madrid's Popular Front Government.

The arrival of this squadron follows the Reuter message of yesterday declaring that Italian fighting

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aeroplanes bound from Sardinia to Spanish Morocco had been forced down in French Algeria.

According to reports in Gibraltar (quoted by the British United Press) twenty Italian aeroplanes have reached Morocco to aid the rebels.

These are reported to have been purchased by Don Juan March, the Spanish multi-millionaire, who includes a seat on the board of Krupp's, the German armaments firm, among his many directorships.

The Times correspondent in Paris reported, August 1st, 1936:

Early to-day a report arrived in Paris from Rabat to the effect that trustworthy information had been received there announcing the arrival of fourteen more Italian aeroplanes (also Savoia-Marchettis) at Nador, in Spanish Morocco.

On August 1st, 1936, Reuter's correspondent in Rabat telegraphed :

General Denain, a former Air Minister, yesterday continued his investigation into the circumstances surrounding the forced landing of Italian aeroplanes in French Morocco.

General Denain had the Savoia-Marchetti which crashed moved from its present awkward position in order that mechanics might examine it. The Italian crew applied to the Italian Consul General to intervene and, according to the *Petit Marocain*, Captain Giliberti, the leader of the expedition, declared that he was convinced they were on Spanish territory.

Captain Giliberti added that the expedition was financed by a private Italian company to deliver material to the Spanish army in Spanish Morocco.

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It is clear that from the beginning of the movement General Franco depended on outside help. Without aid from abroad he could not even have brought his troops from Morocco to the Peninsula. The following report from Reuter, August 1st, 1936, is illuminating :

Troops of the Spanish Foreign Legion are arriving here from garrisons in the interior of Morocco in preparation for an air invasion of Spain. It is stated that the men will be transported to the Peninsula in aircraft which have arrived "from abroad."

But cynicism is not a quality which belongs exclusively to Hitler and Mussolini. The Spanish Fascists are good disciples, and masters of the art.

Franco Refuses to Receive Journalists

The following dispatch from Reuter's correspondent in Paris is representative of the general reports. It is dated August 2nd, 1936:

"Italian aeroplanes have been officially sent to repatriate Italian civilians in Spanish Morocco." Staff Major Armada, right-hand man of General Franco, made this statement in an interview with the Havas special correspondent at Tetuan. (General Franco is now refusing to receive journalists.)

Asked why so many machines, especially with machine-guns on board, were sent, Major Armada retorted, "I have nothing to add."

Twenty-one Aeroplanes for the Rebels

The Times correspondent in Algiers sent the following report to his paper on August 2nd, 1936:

Reports from Spanish Morocco state that eighteen Italian aeroplanes have now been delivered there, the total shipment to date thus being twenty-one, if the three which crashed are taken into account.

The six occupants of the machine which landed intact in French territory have been formally charged with infraction of the international agreements on air navigation by failing to carry registration marks, flying without permission over French territory, and carrying war-material. They were permitted to attend the funeral of their comrades who were killed in the machine which crashed at Saïda.

They were 'Planes from the Italian Air Force !

The following is an extract from the report of the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, published on August 5th, 1936:

With regard to Italian intervention the following facts have been established:

A formation of eighteen Italian military aeroplanes proceeded to General Franco's base. Fourteen reached their destination.

Four made emergency landing on French territory in Northern Africa. The marks of recognition on these four 'planes had been painted over. Nevertheless they could be identified as Italian military 'planes that had been part of the Italian Air Force a few days previously.

One of the pilots was identified as an active officer in the Italian Air Force.

The four 'planes had to land partly because they were short of fuel and partly because they were too heavily loaded with machine-guns and

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ammunition. Some of them had tried to throw their ammunition into the sea shortly before landing.

It is quite out of the question that these aeroplanes could have proceeded to rebel headquarters without the knowledge of the Italian Government.

Everything is Revealed !

We reproduce here the information sent by Reuter with regard to the inquiry which the French authorities made into the subject of the Italian aeroplanes which landed in Morocco :

The principal results of the inquiry conducted by the French authorities into the forced landing of two Italian 'planes in French Morocco last week are now known. It has been proved that these machines and the three others which accompanied them in the flight to Spanish Morocco were all regular Italian Air Force 'planes.

Documents seized aboard show that the five 'planes, four of which were Savoia-Marchetti machines and one a Savoia 'plane, had up to July 20th belonged to the 55th and 57th and 58th squadrons of the Italian Air Force. The two 'planes which were seized by the French authorities carried their war equipment with the exception of bombs, and were supplied with ammunition for machine-guns. The machines had no identification numbers, and the place where the national colours had been was freshly painted over with white paint.

The results of the inquiry indicated that the expedition was prepared in great haste both by the organisers and those commissioned to carry out the undertaking, and this explained the lack of precautions

taken to conceal the exact identity of the machines and their pilots. The crews were composed not only of civilian pilots, both commercial flyers and amateurs, but also of camouflaged Air Force men whose real identity was revealed by official papers found on the body of one of those who were killed as well as by his passport, driving licence, and military pay-book.

According to statements made by the members of the crew the expedition was formed in Bologna, whence the machines flew on July 29th to Elmas aerodrome at Cagliari, Sardinia. They left Cagliari at five o'clock in the morning on July 30th and flew to Melilla. Maps found in the machines were all of Italian origin, and indicated their destination as Melilla and Ceuta, both of which are in the hands of the insurgents.

A third aeroplane completely disappeared some forty miles north of Orán on the same day that the other two made forced landings. Consequently only two 'planes reached their destination.

The crew of the second 'plane, who were unhurt when their machine landed, are still being detained for having infringed the decree regulating flying over French Morocco. The French military authorities continue to guard the machines.

Hours after the accident a Spanish 'plane flew over the Italian machine, dropping a sack filled with uniforms of Spanish Legionnaires and with a message in Italian reading:

Put on these uniforms and tell the French authorities you belong to the Legion stationed at Nador. We will send you two barrels of petrol and mechanics to help you start again. Don't walk into the lions' den.

The End of the Farce

Finally we reproduce here a telegram from The Times correspondent in Casablanca, which describes the end of the farce. It is dated August 11th, 1936:

The six Italian airmen who recently made a forced landing in French territory while trying to deliver aeroplanes from Italy to the insurgents in Spanish Morocco were to-day sentenced at Oujda, French Morocco, to one month's imprisonment (to be suspended during good behaviour) and a fine of 200 francs.

Some of the prisoners said that they were recruited for their mission three days before the Spanish rising began.

Italian Help was Arranged Before the Rebellion Began

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes, August 18th, 1936:

Italian help was arranged some time before the rebellion began. The crews of the first Italian 'planes that joined the rebels were detailed before it started on the night of July 17th-18th. These 'planes belonged to a squadron of the Italian Air Force. On the 26th they completed the first stage of their journey from Milan to Sardinia, and were flown by officers and men of the Italian Air Force. In Sardinia the crews were changed on the 27th and the 'planes started off again on the same day. The pilots received instructions to follow a prescribed route by the compass to an area where two Italian ships were awaiting them. These ships gave them their final destination by wireless—namely, Spanish Morocco.

Caproni 'Planes Bomb Irún

In spite of the protests of the press, and the threat of the Spanish war becoming an international conflict, Italian Fascism continues sending war-material and men to Franco.

The Times correspondent in Hendaye begins his dispatch of August 25th, 1936, with the following sentences :

Three Caproni biplanes belonging to the Spanish insurgents bombed Irún and the villages along the San Sebastian road for an hour this morning. Other machines spent two hours attacking the Government front-line positions near Behobia.

Twenty-four Italian Aeroplanes in Vigo

We extract the following from The Times of September 5th, 1936:

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires called at the Foreign Office yesterday afternoon to draw the attention of the British Government to the landing of twenty-four Italian aeroplanes from an Italian ship at Vigo which is in the hands of insurgents, on August 28th. The Italian Government's prohibition of the export of arms to Spain was put into operation on August 28th. The ship must therefore have left Italy some days earlier.

The twenty-four Italian 'planes referred to in the preceding notice were landed in Vigo in the presence of an English warship. When Don Vicente Alvarez Buylla communicated this fact to the British Foreign Office, he found that it was already known there. In the note which we have cited "The Times" admits the importance of

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the information. Which is a disadvantage for Mussolini to whom the important thing is to work for the ends of Fascism without paying much attention to written agreements.

Italian Aeroplanes and Bombs in Melilla

We reproduce the following telegram from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Tangiers, which appeared on September 7th, 1936 :

I learn that the Italian cargo boat, *Genoa*, has landed at Melilla, on the Spanish Moroccan coast, two Caproni 'planes in parts, several aeroplane engines and bombs and grenades for the insurgent forces. A quantity of petrol was also landed.

The *Genoa* was escorted by an Italian destroyer to Melilla.

Italian Aeroplanes and Bombs in Río Martín

On September 19th, 1936, the Daily Herald published the following report :

An Italian ship unloaded bombs, gas bombs, and dismantled 'planes at Río Martín, the port for Tetuan, in rebel-held Morocco yesterday.

Authorities took strongest precautions to make the name of the ship illegible.

In a heavy easterly gale, when normally ships do not discharge at Río Martín, port lighters went alongside and, despite the risk to life involved, took off the cargo.

It is known that the shipment is part of a tremendous purchase effected during the recent visit to Rome of Señor Juan March, the multi-millionaire and chief financier of the Spanish revolt.

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The ship referred to in the preceding information is the Alicantino belonging to the company "Tricovich Servizi Marittimi del Mediterraneo." The Alicantino was previously in Casablanca. The landing of the material took place on September 11th. On the ship's funnel were the letters "S.A."

Revelations of the Italian Pilot, Vincenzo Patriarca

On September 15th, 1936, the Italian pilot Vincenzo Patriarca, who had been taken prisoner by the Government troops, made the following important declaration :

I lived three years in Italy, but I became a pilot in America. I enrolled for eighteen months in the Italian Air Force to serve in the war against Abyssinia.

When my period of service was over, I intended to return to America, but several officers who knew me when I was in Abyssinia suggested that I should come and work in Spain.

I answered that I would not accept alone but that I had no objection to doing this in the company of other Italian aviators.

These officers introduced me to the Fiat factory where the 'planes of the two chaser squadrons C.R.32. were being tested.

I left Genoa on August 14th to go to Melilla on a ship which did not bear a Spanish name and which, when it left the port, ran up the Republican colours.

The machines, which had been dismantled, were disembarked in Melilla, and sent to the aerodrome of Nador to be put together. Then they left for Tetuan aerodrome from where they went on to Seville.

All the men attached to the squadrons were Italians and they were commanded by Captain Simonetti.

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The chaser group was under the orders of Commandant Preti who was killed on the Talavera front.

My real name is Vincenzo Patriarca and the name Vincenzo Bocalari is a war name. During the Abyssinian war I had the rank of sergeant, and belonged to the Legion of Italians abroad for the service of the cause. Leaving Genoa I saw a boat loaded with petrol for the rebels. We also loaded cartridges of 7.7 calibre. I also saw spare parts for 'planes, petrol, bullets for rifles. The Italian Colonel in command promised me 1,000 pesetas per month, and the rank of subaltern. The officers received double that sum, and the specialists 300 pesetas. I was not made to sign any contract. When I left Italy I received 600 francs. The officers who knew me from the time when I was in Abyssinia and who suggested that I should go to Spain were Preti, Monico, Simonetti and Genni.

I landed in Portugal, not because of any accident but because I was mis-led by the harbour dock of Porto-Allegro, and I remained in that locality until the Commandant of Porto-Allegro had taken the necessary steps so that I could return to Spain: he knew that I was in the service of the rebels. A car which contained Spanish Fascists came to collect me in Portugal and two Portuguese *carabinieri* accompanied me to the frontier.

The military Commandant of the port of Porto-Allegro conversed in friendly fashion with the Spanish emissaries who were protecting me.

Immediately it was known that I was an Italian pilot in the service of the rebels I received every facility.

In Melilla a general and eight officers were shot and I was invited to be present at the execution. I was present at a dinner given in the Italian Consulate to all those who had come from Italy.

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I heard that Commandant Ferrari, Air Attaché at the Spanish Embassy, had been forced to flee because his life was in danger.

The method constantly employed is to send out two or three tri-motor bombers, preceded by chaser 'planes, except in the case of night flying and long distance bombing raids.

We flew generally for one hour or two hours. We carried twin machine-guns. The bombs which I saw were not of Italian manufacture. The largest weighed 100 kilograms and those of 50 to 70 kilograms are Spanish in origin. The incendiary bombs are not Italian.

The aerodrome is two kilometres to the east of Cáceres, and it can easily be seen from the sky. There is at the most only one bombardment patrol and all the eighteen chaser 'planes are not flown.

The landing ground is the same but it has been slightly enlarged.

I do not know where the bomb-stores are, but I expect that they are inside Cáceres.

In Cáceres

In the airport there are no anti-aircraft cannon, but all around the landing-stage there are anti-aircraft machine-guns.

The German chaser pilots are six in number.

The German bomber pilots are six in number.

The Italian chaser pilots are six in number.

The Italian mechanics are three in number.

The German mechanics are fifteen or more in number.

The *Heinkel* 'planes are six in number.

The *Junkers* 'planes (two pilots to each 'plane) are three or four in number.

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The *Fiat* 'planes (there were twelve of them) are now nine.

There is one *Douglas* (Spanish) 'plane.

The *Bréguet* 'planes are three in number.

The machines of the two squadrons are always ready at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning and they alternate with the 'planes of two other squadrons.

I only remained three days in Cáceres.

In Seville, I remained seven days.

In Córdoba there are permanently three *Heinkels* and the personnel is relieved every week. This relief is effected in lorries and at night.

The *Savoia* and *Junkers* machines leave from Seville for Córdoba at 4.30 or 4 o'clock.

They usually leave at dawn unaccompanied by chaser 'planes and at Córdoba they are protected by the machines there.

In Seville

The German chaser pilots are five or six in number.

I saw at least twelve *Junkers* 'planes, transport machines which could be transformed into bombers. These latter run a service twice a week to Morocco.

The German pilots of the *Junkers* 'planes are eight or nine in number.

The German post arrives twice a week. The machine lands in Seville, and after disembarking its post and passengers, leaves again for Germany.

I only saw this machine once, but I was told that it comes twice a week.

There is not a fixed day for its arrival.

The German mechanics are twenty-five in number.

The German *Heinkel* 'planes are five or six in number.

As in Seville there were many Spanish pilots, but

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there were no Spanish machines. Most of the machines were put together by Spaniards who had received the necessary training.

Fiat 'planes, six.

Eighteen machines (three squadrons) came from Italy.

Savoia 'planes, five.

Italian bomber pilots, five.

In Tetuan, I saw *Bréguet* machines.

In Seville, a *Nieuport*.

Signed : Pilot VINCENZO PATRIARCA.

Italian Tanks and Flame-throwers in Cadiz

On October 20th, 1936, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Señor Azcárate, communicated to the British Foreign Office the following information :

It is learnt from a reliable source that on the 15th of October two hundred caterpillar tanks and one hundred flame-throwers proceeding from Italy were landed at Cadiz for the rebels.

Italian Tanks with Italian Crews

We consider of the utmost importance the following dispatch sent from Saint Jean-de-Luz by Henry Gorrell, British United Press correspondent in Spain. It was published in the Daily Telegraph on October 29th, 1936 :

Whippet tanks which are leading the insurgents' advance on Madrid are manned by Italians.

Last Sunday I was taken prisoner by the insurgents on the Madrid-Aranjuez motor road while trying to obtain information regarding their progress on the railway at Aranjuez and towards Madrid.

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My arrest was a most unpleasant occurrence. I was nearly killed by a hail of machine-gun bullets from all sides as well as from the whippet tanks manned by Italians, which are heading the advance on Madrid from all directions.

One of these tanks roared towards me at full speed, its machine-gun blazing. It tried to run over me, but I was sprawled in a deep ditch, and it capsized.

I helped the driver of this tank out. He was an Italian. My action in helping him saved me from getting shot by a score of Moors as I held my hands high.

I talked to others driving and commanding these tanks. They were all Italians. These men and others of the Foreign Legion in the insurgent army, fighting on land and in the air, are winning the war for General Franco.

Although my experience was most unpleasant, it gave me an opportunity of comparing the opposing forces at a crucial moment of the war.

The insurgents appear to be a mere handful of men in comparison to the thousands already enrolled or being mustered to defend Madrid, but it is apparently their equipment that is carrying them to victory.

Declarations of the Italian Soldier Luigi Corsi

The following information was communicated to the British Foreign Office by the Spanish Ambassador in London, Señor Azcárate, on November 5th, 1936 :

The Italian soldier Luigi Corsi Siliberta, native of Villa Costelli in the province of Brindiso, was taken prisoner by Government forces on the 1st November near Parla on the Madrid front.

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This soldier belongs to the Tenth Artillery Corps in Rome. He joined his regiment on the 19th April last, and according to Italian law should remain in the ranks for eighteen months, that is to say until the 10th October, 1937. Luigi Corsi has stated that neither he nor his companions went to Spain voluntarily but were compelled to do so by orders from the Comendador Luigi who commands the Tenth Italian Artillery Corps. The Comendador, after haranguing them in Rome, picked out fifty men for the expedition to Spain, not one having volunteered. On the day of their departure, continues Corsi's statement, each man was given two hundred liras and on their arrival at Cáceres Lieutenant Ravello, their commanding officer gave them two hundred pesetas.

Luigi Corsi has stated that they embarked at Genoa in the last days of September, under the orders of the aforementioned Lieutenant Ravello and two other lieutenants. They disembarked at Vigo at the beginning of October. The vessel, adds Corsi, carried fifteen guns and fifty cases of ammunition each containing ten 65.17 shells. From Vigo they went to Toledo by way of Salamanca, Cáceres, Talavera and Torrijos; this has been verified from the notebook carried by the prisoner. Corsi states that in Cáceres he saw fifteen armoured cars, all Italian and driven by Italian soldiers. The prisoner declared that the six guns whose emplacements he was employed in constructing were in the Illescas line. Every gun, continues Luigi Corsi, was in charge of an Italian officer and the loaders, gunners and assistants were of the same nationality. The vessel which took them from Genoa to Vigo was Italian and the captain, officers and crew all belonged to the Italian Navy. Upon their arrival in Spain, Luigi Corsi was promoted by his superiors to the rank of subaltern.

Signor Tricolti and his Parachute

The war correspondent of the News Chronicle in Spain telephoned the following message to his paper on November 5th, 1936 :

I watched one of the bombers being separated from its fellows and pursued by two Government 'planes. Swooping down from above it, rising again, diving right over the bomber's nose and looping behind it, they kept up a ceaseless rattle of machine-gun fire.

The bomber made off towards the rebel lines, but over the Valencia road began a sudden dive.

A moment later I could see the white flicker of a parachute. The pilot was killed when the 'plane crashed, the parachutist, an Italian, came down on Government ground near the village of Moraleda and was immediately taken prisoner.

His name is Signor Tricolti. One of his legs was so seriously wounded it had to be amputated.

Catalonia Bombed by Planes from an Italian Base

Serious as is the fact that Italy has helped the rebels in every way since before the outbreak of the insurrection, her interference has not stopped there. Italy, like Germany, has gone so far as to bombard Spanish towns from her own ships and her own 'planes. This will be abundantly proved in the chapter on Intervention at Sea. We will only quote here one example of her aggression against Spanish territory :

On December 17th, 1936, 'planes which were thought at first to belong to the rebels, shelled the frontier towns of Culera and Port-bou in Catalonia. The Spanish

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Government thought that these 'planes came from Majorca where the Italians are strongly established. But this was not the case. The shelling was done by four trimotor bombers, Italians, commanded by Lieutenant Verdi, of the fourth squadron from an Italian base.

Voyage of Ramón Franco to Italy

On November 22nd, 1936, the Sunday Referee correspondent in Paris wrote :

News leaked out in Paris yesterday of an astonishing secret agreement between Mussolini and General Franco, which amounts almost to Italy joining the Spanish civil war on the side of the rebels.

The agreement is said to have been negotiated by Señor Ramón Franco, brother of the General.

In consequence, fifteen Italian submarines are now speeding to reinforce the Spanish rebel naval forces which are preparing to blockade Barcelona.

It is also reported that twelve Italian transports yesterday and to-day sailed from Leghorn, Genoa, and Naples loaded with tanks, armoured cars, ammunition, and large supplies of mustard gas.

The agreement, it is added, provides for the shipment from Italy of fifty Caproni fighting 'planes of the newest "Romeo 37" type, armed with three machine-guns each.

Forty Fiat 'Planes Sent

Sir Percival Phillips, Daily Telegraph correspondent in Gibraltar, wrote on December 5th, 1936 :

Three new Fiat fighters, said to be part of Italy's latest shipment of forty machines to reinforce the

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Nationalist Air Force, suddenly appeared above Algeciras this morning.

They performed various manœuvres to the bewilderment of the inhabitants, who at first feared that another raid from Málaga was imminent.

The 'planes then made off in the direction of the main base at Seville. There is great activity there, as the newly landed machines are being tuned and tested for service on the Madrid front to replace recent casualties and to strengthen the bombing offensive against the capital.

SOME INFORMATION ABOUT ITALIAN TROOPS IN SPAIN

The help which Mussolini has given Franco since the beginning of the war has not consisted of material only, but also of men, as we have seen in the preceding pages. Italy has given the Spanish rebel generals aeroplanes and pilots too ; she has provided tanks, and the crews to man them. Her help has been complete in itself, and freed the Spanish rebels from any difficulty with regard to the material sent by Italian Fascism. Mussolini believed, as Hitler believed, that if he provided 'planes and pilots, tanks and crew, flame-throwers and the trained men to use them, the Spanish Fascists were sure of victory. But the difficulties which arose in the capture of Madrid by the Moorish forces and the Foreign Legion already showed at the beginning of December that Franco had not sufficient men to conquer the capital of the Republic. Since Mussolini had decided on a rebel victory at all

costs he decided to increase the contingent of Italians in the Peninsula.

Recruiting Offices in Rome

The News Chronicle correspondent in Rome wrote the following report on December 5th, 1936 :

Though official circles deny reports that four recruiting offices have been opened in Rome for the enrolment of volunteers for the Spanish rebels, it is openly stated that 6,000 men have already signed for service.

A bonus, it is declared, is offered to these men, who are said to be paid 5s. a day.

It is also reported that Communists have been arrested in Northern Italy for trying to enlist men to fight with the Madrid Government forces.

Two thousand five hundred Italians landed in Algeciras

On December 6th, 1936, the correspondent of the British United Press in Gibraltar, sent the following message:

A force of 2,500 Italian Blackshirts landed at Algeciras, near Gibraltar, on Friday.

An eye-witness states that the Italians landed from a large new vessel, flying no flag. They immediately went by train and motor-car to Seville, the Nationalist headquarters, where German volunteers—estimated to number between 2,000 and 6,000—arrived recently.

The Blackshirts were not equipped for war, but it is understood that they will be equipped in Seville.

Reuter's version of this landing of 2,500 Italians is as follows : the note in brackets is from the Manchester Guardian.

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Two thousand five hundred Italian Blackshirts disembarked yesterday at Algeciras on their way to join the rebels, according to reliable information reaching here. They landed from a ship which flew no flag and which was escorted by a gunboat.

(Recently two small parties of anti-Fascists attempted to leave Italy to join the Spanish Government's side. They were arrested.)

Eight thousand five hundred Italians for Franco

One of the most important pieces of information on the sending of Italians to General Franco appeared in the Evening Standard, a paper whose political tendencies are not exactly Communist (December 9th, 1936). Apart from the political sympathies of the paper, the fact that the report comes from the Standard correspondent in Rome gives an added value to the information. It reads :

At least 8,500 Italian volunteers have been sent to reinforce the army of the rebel leader, General Franco, in Spain, it is disclosed in an authoritative Italian quarter.

Volunteers are being steadily mobilized.

Alarm is growing in Italy over the Spanish position. It is feared that the Soviet aid to the Spanish Government has reached such proportions that Franco may fail to subdue the Government forces.

I learn that volunteers are being enrolled at a recruiting station in Rome at the Palazzo Braschi, in the Piazza Navona in Milan, and at a concentration camp hidden away in the Abruzzi Mountains.

The volunteers present themselves at the recruiting station with their documents, passports and certificates of military service. The certificate is checked and sent

to the Italian Militia, which is the Fascist arm of the Italian Military Service.

After approving the volunteer's credentials, the Militia office notifies the recruit to report for service in Africa Orientale. When he presents himself at headquarters, officials make certain that the volunteer really desires to serve in Spain and that he is not a person of such importance in military or civil life that his death might embarrass the Italian Government. If he passes this inspection, he is sent to the Spanish recruiting headquarters.

Here he receives his equipment, which consists of the following: One khaki overseas cap on which is affixed a brass number tag corresponding to a number placed on the packet of his documents deposited with the Fascist Militia or with the Spanish Embassy; two dark khaki shirts, one khaki military tunic, two pairs of long khaki trousers, and a cape of very dark khaki lined with lighter material of the same colour.

Preparations for Sending Sixty thousand Volunteers

On the same day, December 9th, 1936, Reuter's correspondent reported from Paris :

Large scale preparations by Italy for intervention in Spain are alleged by Mme. Tabouis, writing in the *Œuvre* to-day. She declares that she can rely absolutely on the source of her information.

"It appears that Italy is making preparations on an astonishing scale to come to the aid of General Franco in the decisive coup in Catalonia on January 2nd, for which he is preparing," writes Mme. Tabouis.

"According to news from Turin, it appears that throughout Italy feverish preparations are being made

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for the dispatch of a contingent of 60,000 men to Nationalist Spain.

"Signor Mussolini is understood to have summoned six generals of the Fascist militia, including Generals Montana and Brandimarte, and to have ordered them to leave for Spain to take command of the Italian Fascists already on the spot.

"The first contingent of 2,700 men is to embark immediately at Spezia. Their arms will bear the stamp 'Micher,' although no armament works of that name exists."

More Details on the Eight thousand five hundred Italians who Went to Spain

With reference to the 8,500 Italians mentioned in the Evening Standard of December 9th, the Daily Express correspondent in Rome wrote on December 10th, 1936 :

Scores of men wearing the silver insignia of volunteers in General Franco's army are to be seen in the streets of Rome to-day.

At least 8,500 of them have already left to reinforce the insurgent divisions fighting in Spain.

Ordinary soldiers are offered £40 bonuses, plus a daily wage of from 10s. to £1. Airmen and officers are given a £150 bonus and £3 a day.

The volunteers present themselves at the recruiting station with their passports and certificates of military service. The certificates are checked by the Fascist arm of the Italian Military Service before the recruits sign on "for service in East Africa."

Virtually all volunteers are unemployed or discharged veterans of the Abyssinian war. Some are plain adventurers.

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Italians of high rank in civil or military life are discouraged from going to war. Prominent persons who do enroll for service change their names. None of the volunteers lose their Italian citizenship.

Arms are not supplied: otherwise the men are fully equipped for active duty.

Alarm is growing in Italy over the Spanish position. It is feared that Soviet aid to the Spanish Government has reached such proportions that Franco may fail to subdue Spain for Fascism.

More than Five thousand Italians landed in Cadiz

The Italian preparations referred to in the preceding information, were finally confirmed on January 4th, 1937, by the landing of great numbers of Italian troops in Cadiz. The Daily Telegraph correspondent in Gibraltar writes on that date :

More than 5,000 Italian soldiers, fully equipped and armed, have landed at Cadiz in the last few days, according to a traveller from that port who has arrived here.

It is stated that the men left by train for Seville, and on their journey were given a reception by insurgent leaders at Jerez.

Reuter's version, sent from Gibraltar on January 4th, 1937, is as follows :

According to an unconfirmed report received here, over 5,000 Italian troops have been landed in the past three days at Cadiz from Italian warships. The troops immediately entrained for Seville, the Junta General Headquarters in Southern Spain.

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The Daily Express correspondent in Gibraltar writes :

More than 5,500 Italian soldiers have been landed at Cadiz during the week-end according to passengers arriving here to-day from Seville.

They stated that one detachment of the Italian forces left Cadiz for Córdoba, while the remainder entrained for Seville. The soldiers disembarked from Italian warships.

A number of Italian staff officers have also arrived at Seville, the passengers declared.

The Daily Herald correspondent in Gibraltar amplifies the preceding notices as follows, on January 4th, 1937 :

More than 6,000 Italian troops, officered and fully equipped for war, have landed in Spain from Italian warships during the past few days.

Some 4,500 of these reinforcements for the rebels have been dispatched to the Madrid, Córdoba and Jaen fronts. About 1,500 are left in Seville, where they can be seen drilling each day and undergoing intensive military training.

This is the sensational news that reaches me from an entirely reliable source in Seville. It is the more surprising because there was general belief that Mussolini was withdrawing from the Spanish adventure.

My informant on the landing of the new Italian army says that Italian warships anchored off Cadiz harbour and that the 6,000 soldiers came ashore in steam launches.

The men have a General in command and staff officers with them. They came ashore fully equipped for fighting.

After forming up on the quay, the expeditionary

force entrained for Seville, where the officers conferred with rebel General Queipo de Llano.

One batch consists of "veterans" of the Abyssinian war, who can be heard boasting that their "victory in Spain will be a walk-over."

THE SCANDALOUS INTERVENTION OF ITALY IN THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

The intervention of Italian Fascism in the Balearic Islands constitutes one of the most alarming scandals which have occurred in the invasion of Spain by foreigners, in the course of the war. With regard to Italian activities in the archipelago there is plenty of material to hand. Italian intervention remains abundantly proved, and it is an open and cynical aggression against the Spanish people. Profiting, as usual, by the treason of the Spanish military, Mussolini has taken possession of the islands of Majorca and Ibiza, where the conduct of the Italians has revealed marked criminal characteristics. But we will leave our informants to tell something of the events which have occurred in those islands since the war which the "patriots" started first broke out. And we will trust that one day the Spanish people—and the Italian people—will take their revenge for such an outrage.

Three Italian 'Planes in Palma de Mallorca

On September 10th, 1936, the Morning Post published the following report from its Marseilles correspondent :

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The three Italian aeroplanes which landed at Palma, Majorca, on Sunday are of a very large and powerful type. They are monoplanes with three engines and can be used both as bombers or troop-carrying machines, being capable of carrying a load of 2,200 pounds of bombs as well as fourteen men. They are said to be capable of a speed of 200 miles per hour and have an operating range of 700 miles.

When the machines landed at Majorca they had their own crews with them, including a number of extra mechanics who appear to have formed a ground engineering staff.

The two ships which, although flying Italian flags, have been disembarking arms at Palma are the *Lanzerotto Malocello* and the *Nereide*. A large number of cases of new rifles and many thousands of rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition have been landed.

These ships also brought large cases which are believed to contain parts of aeroplanes. They had on board a far greater number of men than is usual for steamers of their size.

Later the same correspondent in Paris wrote as follows to his paper :

The French Authorities Know Details . . .

Revelations of new Italian deliveries of rifles, arms and aeroplanes to the Spanish insurgents at Majorca made by the *Morning Post* to-day caused a deep impression in official circles here. As a result investigations are being made by the French authorities.

It is understood that the authorities have been put in possession of further details of the shipment of rifles and ammunition believed to have been unloaded

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from the steamers *Nereide* and *Lanzerotto-Malocello* in the port of Palma.

The *Nereide* is a 1,598 ton ship owned by the S.A. di Navigazione Neptunia of Genoa. The other vessel does not appear in mercantile shipping registers here.

Enter Conte di Rossi

With the title "Italian arms pour into Majorca" the News Chronicle correspondent in Madrid sent the following report to his paper, September 29th, 1936 :

An amazing account has reached Barcelona of Italian activity in the rebel stronghold of Majorca, the largest of the Balearic Islands and once a Mediterranean tourists' paradise.

The most striking details are :

Participation by the Italian Blackshirt General, Conte di Rossi, in a triumphal procession of rebel forces in his honour ;

The continual arrival at Palma of Italian munition ships and war 'planes ; and

The presence at Palma of more than 100 Italian aviators and mechanics, wearing the uniform of the Spanish Foreign Legion and with silk handkerchiefs in Italian colours round their necks.

The astonishing details of Rossi's visit were given away by the rebel journal *La Ultima Hora*, published in Palma.

Relating the story of this "grandiosa fiesta of expansion and happiness," motivated by the triumph of our troops (over the Government column that was later evacuated from the island), the *Ultima Hora* tells how the Italian Blackshirt chief rode on horse-back at the head of the parade.

He wore "at his belt a revolver and poignard, and

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on his black Fascist shirt were the arrows of the Spanish Phalanx and a rosette of the bicolour flag (the rebel banner).

He was surrounded by a guard of honour of Phalanxists, "in view of the high consideration and esteem in which he is held."

The crowd cheered deliriously, the *Ultima Hora* reports, when Rossi dismounted and shook the hand of Lieutenant-Colonel Gracia Ruiz, the rebel commander. Later he went to Mass in the Cathedral, while 'planes circled overhead and church bells rang.

On August 27th at 8 p.m. a nameless ship with an Italian crew arrived at Palma, escorted by an Italian destroyer, and discharged 160 tons of war-material.

She left at dawn but returned at night-fall to finish unloading.

Two days later, convoyed by an Italian tri-motor 'plane, three tri-motor bombers arrived. Two days later came three more.

On September 7th, the steamer *Nereide*—out of Genoa with the Italian flag at the poop—met a British warship in the bay.

At night she discharged 360 tons of war-material, including bombs.

Italian material delivered at Palma includes six tri-motor bombers, three pursuit 'planes, three pursuit hydroplanes, three hydroplane bombers, eight anti-aircraft guns, equipment for one radio-telephone station, hand-grenades and spare parts for 'planes.

The intimate connection between Italians and the rebel command is indicated by the fact that Rossi, on his arrival, removed Colonel Ramos Unamuno from his post as commander at the Manacos front.

There seems to be international cordiality in the old Palma tradition.

The only foreign residents left are a few score

Germans and Italians, whose interest has always been more in the Island's possibilities as a naval base than as a resort.

On September 12th, the great Belmonte appeared in a benefit bull fight for the Fascist Militia.

Belmonte dedicated his bulls to Italian aviators, who presented to the toreadors silk handkerchiefs made from an Italian flag.

The White terror in Palma has been frightful, the number of victims being reported as more than 1,000. Their clothes are kept at the cemetery. In this way their families know what has happened to "missing" persons.

Facts which the Spanish People will not Forget

The activities of Italian Fascism in Palma de Mallorca are most clearly revealed in the following account which was published in the Republican paper Política, of Madrid, on October 1st, 1936 :

In the Spanish Consulate-General in Orán appeared Don Ramon Coll Balestroni, electrician on the motorship *Ciudad de Palma*, and Pascual Laustalet, wireless operator on the steamer *Ayala-Mendi*, who have escaped from Palma de Mallorca, and who in a declaration which they have signed make the following statements:

The motorship *Ciudad de Palma* works with the goniometer, finding the bearings of warships and merchant-ships, and on board are lodged the Italian aviators and mechanics who go in the chaser seaplanes.

On the 27th of August, at 8 p.m., a ship without name or number plate, but with an Italian crew, arrived at Palma, escorted by an Italian destroyer.

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Guided by the searchlight from another ship, also Italian, she entered the harbour, where she unloaded sixty tons of war-material, leaving the port at dawn and returning at nightfall to finish the unloading, and anchoring in the bay by the side of two Italian warships.

Two days later, and protected by an Italian tri-motor 'plane, with the initials "I.F.A.N.O.", there arrived three tri-motor bombers, and a week later three more tri-motors.

On September 7th there arrived the steamer *Nereide*, with a Genoan number plate, the Italian flag flying on the stern: there was an English warship in the bay. The *Nereide* arrived at one o'clock in the afternoon, but she did not begin to unload until nine o'clock at night. She carried three hundred and sixty tons of war-material, including high-powered bombs, all of which, with the exception of the aeroplanes, were placed in the tunnel of the railway which runs across Palma.

The war-material supplied by Italy to the rebels is the following: six tri-motor bombing 'planes: three chaser 'planes: three chaser seaplanes: three bomber seaplanes (only one of these now exists, and it was brought down by a 'plane from Barcelona, but is now repaired): eight anti-aircraft machine-guns: 250 tins of petrol for aeroplanes: anti-aircraft cannon: a radio-telephone station: exchange engines for 'planes, and hand-grenades. At present there are in Palma about a hundred Italian aviators and mechanics who wear the legionary uniform but have a silk handkerchief knotted about their neck in the Italian colours. The Italian airman who killed Captain Freire was called Coropi, and for that he was given the cross of Military Merit.

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In a military parade Count di Rossi rode at the head of the troops and was in command of the column. When Count di Rossi arrived in Palma he conducted the dismissal of Colonel Ramos Unamuno, who was commanding the Manacos front.

On September 12th there was a benefit bullfight for the Fascist Militia, which was attended by men from the English, French and Italian ships: there were cheers for the Italians, and the demonstrations of friendliness reached their height when Belmonte and Sánchez Mejías dedicated their bulls to the Italian airmen who replied by presenting the toreadors with silk handkerchiefs with the Italian flag on them: the toreadors tied these on their necks to shouts of "Arriba España."

Very many of the soldiers and Fascists wear bi-coloured and Italian flags crossed on their breasts, with a scapulary and medallions of the Sacred Heart.

The repressions have been terrible, and already more than a thousand persons have been murdered in the streets by the Spanish Phalanx. Lately, because one wounded man managed to escape, they have taken to bringing out the prisoners tied hand and foot, and shooting them in the back of the neck. Families discover the whereabouts of their relations because the clothes of the victims are kept in the cemetery. There are more than two thousand prisoners who are on the islets, Fort of San Carlos, Bellver Castle, Carcel, and a building next to the headquarters of the Phalanx (formerly the Casa del Pueblo). The Phalanx have killed the wounded, including five nurses who fell into their hands.

In confirmation of certain interesting points in the declarations of these witnesses, the Palma newspaper

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Ultima Hora in its issue of September 7th, published a report, under the title of "Yesterday's great parade of the armed forces," of which the first part reads :

Yesterday Palma celebrated a great fiesta of rejoicing, on account of the victory obtained by our troops in Portocristo, San Servera, and San Curri. An official reception of these took place.

As the sun rose everybody was astir, and many house-fronts were decorated. Especially the Rambla, the continuation of it and the avenue of the Marqués de la Cenia offered a surprising appearance.

Numbers of people came from the villages, and since from very early in the morning the troops were returning, by eight o'clock the city was a veritable human hive. Everywhere there was immense excitement and gaiety.

Just before eleven the Forces arrived at the spots which had been appointed for them, and in a few minutes they filled the broad avenues of the new part of the city.

By the statue of the Blessed Ramón Lull an altar was set up, with a canopy made of one of the rich damask stuffs reproducing scenes from the Conquest of Majorca.

At eleven the ground about the Instituto building, the avenue of the Marqués de la Cenia, the Rambla, and the continuation of it, were filling up with people, so that by twelve they were absolutely overflowing with patriots and enthusiasts.

When any member of the Forces or of the Military appeared he was greeted with cheers and applause and other acclamations, which never ceased from half-past eleven in the morning until half-past two in the afternoon, when the parade ceased. The enthusiasm was indescribable and never before seen in Palma.

The altar was set up close by the statue of the Blessed Ramón Lull, with its back to the buildings of the Instituto and the Escuela Normal, and facing the avenue of the Rambla.

The base of the monument was covered with a tapestry from the Town Hall representing the Blessed Ramón Lull, and in front of it had been placed one of the new portable altars used in campaigns. A little way from the altar was the tribune for the authorities and guests. Among these were the temporary military commandant, Señor Diaz de Feijóo, the civil governor, Señor Alvarez Ossorio: the mayor, Señor Zaforteza, with all the Town Council and mace bearers: the President of the Diputación, Señor Ramos, and the vice-president, Señor Obradors: the president of the Audiencia, with the Attorney-General and the magistrates Alou and Rosello: the delegate from the Treasury, Señor Casanovas: the administrator of Customs, Señor Marcote: representatives of the Red Cross, the director of the Bank of Spain, Señor Roca: the Italian vice-consul, Señor Facchi; the Chief of Aviation in Majorca, Señor Cirelli: representatives of Public Works and Posts and Telegraphs and many other bodies.

About twelve the Militia of the Spanish Phalanx arrived—the Balilla and the Women's sections had already come. In front of them the Cycle Corps, and the band of the Casa de Misericordia, in uniform, composed of Phalanxists. Then, on horseback, Count Rossi, chief of the Italian blackshirts, a revolver in his belt and in his hand, on his Italian Fascist's shirt the arrows of the Spanish Phalanx and a ribbon with the red and yellow colours of the Spanish flag: he wore a campaigning helmet. Around him, and forming a guard of honour, was a squadron of armed Phalanxists, in proof of the high consideration and esteem in which he is held by the Phalanx; they carried two

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bi-coloured flags, the Spanish one red and yellow, the Phalanx one, red and black. Behind the Count came the Phalanxists Militia of Palma and from the villages, very numerous, composed of thousands of men, whose most impressive march past lasted for several hours.

Immediately after that there arrived by car the Lieutenant Colonel of Engineers, Señor Garcia Ruiz, accompanied by his Staff. Señor Garcia Ruiz, wearing a campaigning helmet, got out of his car by the tribune of the authorities. When Count Rossi saw him he got down from his horse and went to meet him. They embraced each other effusively. Then Count Rossi embraced Commandant Esquivias, chief of the column operating in Portocristo during the whole campaign, and remounted his horse.

Italian Influence in the Balearics Increases

We reproduce the following report from the Diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, published on October 1st, 1936:

The influence of the Italians on the Balearic Islands is growing steadily. Not only have Italian officers taken part in the defence of the islands against the Spanish loyalists, but the Italians are now providing the islands (especially Majorca), which are cut off from the mainland, with all necessary supplies, with coffee, sugar, potatoes, and pharmaceutical products.

The leaders of the rebel forces on Majorca are considering a trade agreement with Italy. Whether such an agreement can have a permanent character naturally depends on the outcome of the Spanish civil war as a whole. It is not clear whether these local leaders are acting in collaboration with the

leaders on the mainland, so that even if the rebels win, it does not necessarily follow that such agreement will stand. But it is evident that the Italians count on getting a permanent foothold on the island in a political, an economic, and a military and naval sense.

There is a good deal of scepticism here whether any of the promises alleged to have been made by the rebel leaders to the Italians, Germans, and Portuguese will or can be kept. Some of the reported promises sound merely fantastic—for example, that Portugal is to have Galicia. But some uneasiness is certainly felt on this score, and more so, perhaps, in Paris than in London.

In any case, events in Spain have, if anything, increased the resolve to strengthen the British position in the Mediterranean.

The Conquest of Ibiza by Italy

In spite of all this, no action which the Italians have taken in the Balearics is nearly so grave as the capture of Ibiza by the Fascists under Count Rossi. We are faced with an act impossible to characterize. The following account is quoted from the Manchester Guardian of October 10th, 1936 :

The allegation that Italian soldiers in disguise from Majorca recently captured the island of Iviza (or Ibiza) is made in a message which, Reuter understands, was received by the Spanish Embassy yesterday from Madrid and subsequently communicated to the British Government. The message said:

The capture of the island of Iviza by the rebels took place with the assistance of 700 Italian soldiers and two three-engined 'planes, also Italian.

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The expedition was led by the Italian Count Rossi, Commander-in-Chief of the insurgents in Majorca.

The transport of these troops was made in the Spanish steamer *Ciudad de Palma* (3,959 tons). This ship was painted black, and the Italian flag was painted on its side. More Italian troops than Spanish insurgents took part in the capture of Iviza, only a few Spanish Fascists participating.

The island of Iviza is about fifty miles south-west of Majorca. Early in the civil war it was captured by the Government forces, but when these were repulsed from their attack on Majorca the rebels there sent an expedition to recapture Iviza. Together with Majorca it forms an important potential naval base in the Western Mediterranean.

A similar account of the criminal action of the Italians is contained in this letter sent by an eye-witness to the Manchester Guardian. The letter was written from Switzerland and appeared on October 12th:

SIR,—While in Iviza I had opportunities of observing Italian military activities there. The island was captured by the Spanish Government on August 6th, the rebel commandant fleeing; 2,500 militia-men were landed, but five days later passed on to Majorca, leaving some 200 Catalans on Iviza.

Some four weeks after this there appeared over the town a metal aeroplane, painted black and white and thus manifestly of Italian origin. This happened repeatedly during the succeeding fortnight. The plane would circle several times over the town and then disappear. About September 9th, 350 militia-men were sent to protect the island, the Catalans having been withdrawn.

At 2 p.m. on Sunday; September 13th, when the whole population of the town was promenading in the streets and on the mole, five three-motor 'planes, painted black and white, appeared from the direction of Majorca and dropped among the horrified crowd seven one-hundredweight bombs, destroying seven houses, sinking a ship, and killing about thirty people. The population fled from the town; the local committees of militia hoisted the white flag and at 3 a.m. left the island on board the steamer *Ciudad de Tarragona*. Some eighty out of 200 prisoners belonging to the Franco party were shot as reprisal for the bombardment.

The island was now entirely defenceless and the white flag flew from the fort. But next morning three more 'planes appeared and dropped several bombs. Food was running short, and on September 15th some forty-eight persons, foreigners and Catalan Fascists, decided to leave on board the German torpedo-boat *Falke*, which had happened to call at the port of Iviza. The Germans had had no news of the bombardment and were greatly astonished. The *Falke* took us to Alicante; there about twelve of us went on board the *Oceana*, which was collecting refugees. The *Oceana* went on to Barcelona, lying there in the roads.

On September 21st the Italian trooper *Sicilia* arrived and next day we were transferred to her; that evening she took us to Majorca, where we arrived at 10 a.m. on September 23rd. An Italian cruiser and two torpedo-boats were lying there, and a French torpedo-boat. After the usual port formalities the Majorca papers came on board the *Sicilia* and we learned from them that on the 19th Italians had landed at Iviza to restore order. The *Correo de Mallorca* and the other Majorca papers

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reported that Count Rossi, the "Lion" of Abyssinia, had directed the whole operation and had given instructions and assistance to the Franco troops.

Meanwhile there roared above the *Sicilia*, flying low in greeting, the familiar black-and-white bombing 'planes, acclaimed enthusiastically by all the Italians and Catalans. A man then appeared on the centre deck of the *Sicilia* and made a speech in praise of the great services performed by Italy. Then we saw a motor-boat circle round the *Sicilia*, with a full-bearded man sitting in it; he was frantically applauded. It was Count Rossi.

On our way to Naples we had the pleasure of learning at table from the Italian pilots who had bombarded Iviza of their heroic deeds and of the further intentions of the Italian authorities. They explained that the bombardment had been carried out because the Spaniards were not energetic enough. On landing on Iviza they shot some two hundred "Communists."—Yours, etc.

One hundred and fifty Italian 'Planes in Palma

With regard to the war-material accumulated by the Italians in Majorca the following dispatch from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Marseilles is of the utmost interest. It was published on October 22nd, 1936. Although the reporter does not say that the 'planes and men were Italian, it is plain that they could not be Spanish, because when the rebellion began on July 18th, the rebels only possessed four aeroplanes in the whole of Spain. Here is the report :

Palma, capital of Majorca, largest of the Balearic islands, from where I have just returned, is a great

armed camp. There are between 12,000 and 15,000 trained men there, and 150 aeroplanes, of which I counted 70 myself.

The Italian Fascists "have something to do"

On November 3rd, 1936, Gerald Grosvenor reported to the News Chronicle the following information on Majorca, which appears to us as of the utmost interest:

I have just returned from Majorca,—one of those spots where people used to lie in the sun, contemplate the most beautiful scenery, dream and think that life is grand.

To-day it is not much fun to be on the island; to-day the sun, which shines for months continuously, is clouded by artificial birds, called aeroplanes—of not only one nationality.

It was a Spanish pilot who told me the plain story:

"We are going to attack Barcelona from here, when General Franco attacks Madrid. This place has been made our air force centre. Barcelona, 110 miles away, will be easily reached in an hour.

"We have collected 150 'planes and I am sure they will be sufficient."

Although it was not possible to discover exactly how many of the 'planes were Italian, and how many of the pilots were Italian, one's own eyes told one that the proportion was considerable.

I asked the proprietor of a little inn, where visiting foreigners used to sit, "how things have changed."

"There is no more business for me," he said.

"All foreigners are gone, only some Italians come, but they all have 'something' to do." He seemed not to be free to explain this "something."

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I asked him whether any new restrictions had been imposed in the past three months, and he replied: "We all have to say that Fascism is better than Communism—and we do not know what it is all about. We are only interested in leading our old quiet life."

I tried to discuss "Italian interference" with one of the Spanish pilots, but he reacted with a sour face. I gathered that he was not "supposed" to discuss this matter.

My question "Do you like them?" (meaning the Italian airmen) he answered only with a certain look, which told me plainly that the two races are not particularly fond of one another.

The Ministry of Communications in Rome Directs Communications in Majorca

One more irrefutable proof of the shameless intervention by Italy in the Balearics is contained in this letter, which was published in the News Chronicle on November 11th, 1936 :

Further evidence of Italian interference in the Balearic Islands has come into the possession of the *News Chronicle*.

It consists of a letter from the head office of the Ministry of Communications in Rome to the Director of Posts and Telegraphs in Majorca. The letter—a facsimile of part of which is printed above—says:

I have the honour to inform you that from October 17th next (the letter is dated October 15th) my Genoa office is dispatching, every Saturday, mails for Palma, Majorca and Iviza. Only ordinary correspondence will be carried, and will be sent by the boats of the new line, Genoa-Palma-Iviza,

belonging to the Tripovich Company (Steamships: *Le Tre Marie* and *Guido Brunner*).

I should be grateful if you would inform the post offices of Palma and Iviza, and if you would let me know that these offices will be sending their mails by this line.

Such a letter is further confirmation of the hold which Italy now has on those Balearic Islands which are nominally controlled by the rebel Spanish forces.

Hitherto traffic between Italy and Palma has been so small that the Marseilles or Barcelona boats have been adequate to deal with it. The establishment of an Italian line would indicate that in the future Italy expects a far greater and more constant flow of traffic of all kinds.

Life in Majorca under Fascist Tyranny

On November 16th, 1936, the Manchester Guardian published an interesting article from one of its correspondents, which was dated in Palma, Majorca, November 9th. This article reads :

Entering the harbour of Palma to-day you find a very different place from the Mediterranean beauty spot which used to be such a favourite with English tourists. The only activity now is of a military nature. Hotels and pensions are closed, and the once gay water front, with its white-and-blue houses, terraces, and swimming-pools, lively with tourist merry-making, is sombre and lonely. British, French, and Italian war vessels are in the harbour, two of them Italian destroyers. Italian bombing aeroplanes zoom overhead, performing all sorts of evolutions to impress the Majorcans. Each day an Italian 'plane, mail-

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carrying, leaves for Rome, and that is almost the sole regular connection the Balearic Islands now have with Europe.

No sooner are you in the harbour, even before you step ashore, than you are aware how far the process of making Majorca safe for Fascism (Italian) has gone, and that is far indeed. As the steamer draws alongside the quay a khaki-clad individual strides importantly forward. Twenty or thirty Blueshirts, many of them lads of sixteen or even less, line up. They and such of the civil population as has been permitted to come upon the wharf give the Fascist salute and cheer loudly. No sooner has the cheer died away than another, even louder, arises. You seek the reason for this one, and promptly discover it in the manœuvres of several silver-hued Italian 'planes which execute startling "stunts" only a few hundred yards overhead.

You seek to go ashore, being bound for Algiers and stopping at Majorca but for a few hours. It is not permitted. Why not? A shrug. Being an American in this case, you seek the aid of a temporarily acting American official who in normal times is the head of an American business concern in Palma and who has remained throughout all the fighting and bombing of the town. He talks to the individual already mentioned, who appears to be commandant of the port. At last this one gives his consent to your landing. But a higher power intervenes on the wharf. He, it seems, is the head of the Secret Police. There is a long period of bowing, saluting, hand-shaking, and hat doffing, until at last permission is granted you to enter the town, but in the company of the aforesaid official, who undertakes to see to it that you approach nobody, attempt to converse with nobody, and otherwise comport yourself in properly subdued fashion.

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You therefore enter an automobile and proceed up the long pier and into Palma. Repeatedly you are stopped and a sentry, generally a lad of 15 or 16, entrusted with a rifle and the authority to use it at an age when in the United States or England a boy would be playing with a pop-gun, demands and receives the explanation of your presence. This happens again upon your return. Meanwhile you are driven through a city which at this time of the year was wont to be one of the gayest tourist centres in the Mediterranean. Now it suggests nothing so much as the naval base that everyone here takes for granted has been promised by Franco to Mussolini.

But to-day there is a terrific hubbub. News has just been received of the entry of the "Nationalists" into Madrid. There is wild rejoicing, and Palma is being hastily draped with the colours of the Spanish monarchy, which now replace the red, yellow and purple banner of the Republic, that Republic which, it seems, is no more. Improvised bands are making as much noise as possible, men and women and little children are shouting and singing, there is all the enthusiasm that might hail a great victory in a noble cause. Truckloads of young men in blue shirts and in khaki come tearing down the street and we narrowly avoid being crashed into more than once. "Life is cheap here to-day," says an English-speaking friend. "Those rifles in the hands of the kids could easily go off." We make a detour and pass a prison. Boys of 15 are doing sentry duty outside, loaded rifles held importantly on shoulders. "In there," says my acquaintance, "are some of the 2,500 'suspected' prisoners held on the island. None of them has more than a chance in a thousand of getting out alive. Daily executions number half a dozen, and some of the more rabid of the younger Fascists, dis-

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satisfied at the length of so-called trials are now in the habit of avoiding all that by taking 'suspects' directly to the cemeteries."

The truckloads of young men are singing and cheering wildly because they have been told that Madrid has fallen. "Viva España! Viva Franco!" Even the word "Duce" is beginning to be heard. Every time anyone of rank above a petty officer passes every arm is raised in the Fascist salute. All the time the Italian 'planes continue to zoom overhead. We pass what was once the Grand Hotel on Palma's principal, palm-shaded esplanade. "Thirty-nine Italian airmen are living there now," I am informed. "Some of them are those who aided the rebels to drive out the Government force which landed on the other side of the island at the start of the war."

Every foreigner here with whom I talk asserts that without this aid the Government would have taken and held the island, being better armed on the ground than the insurgents but without air equipment. Boatloads of men and officers from the Italian destroyers come and go. Messages are being exchanged with the offices of the temporary Majorcan Government where Italian "advisers" are "sitting." One of these, the principal one, is said to be a brother-in-law of Mussolini. Not the slightest doubt exists in the mind of anyone that the Majorcan Government is taking its orders from Rome, but it would be dangerous indeed for anyone to voice such a thought here in Palma.

Occasionally a boatload from the French destroyer in the harbour passes the French passenger-steamer at the wharf. The Communist salute is exchanged between the destroyer's men and some of the crew. One exuberant boatload, back from "liberty" in the town, even sings a snatch or two of the "Internationale" as it passes the anchored Italian

destroyers. The atmosphere is tense so far as concerns the foreigners present, but among the Majorcans the Fascist spirit already dominates. "We must wipe out our opponents," I am informed that many of Majorca's new-fledged Fascists declare. Once the mildest and most kindly of old-fashioned Spaniards, the blood-lust already grips the Majorcans. "Kill!" they demand. "Kill everybody of 'wrong thought'! The entire seed, even to the smallest infants, must be exterminated in order to 'purify' the land. The lives of ten thousand (an actual statement made to a friend of mine in Palma) will do no more than purge Majorca!"

Meanwhile an English cruiser lies at anchor in the outer harbour, in a position of watchful waiting. It is not a constructive position in the circumstances, and perhaps will not be a tenable one long.

The Spanish Government Calls the Attention of the World

On November 22nd the Spanish authorities thought it their duty to call the attention of world opinion to the Italian activities in Majorca. In a statement issued in Valencia it was declared:

The insurgents, have at present 10,000 men of the regular army on the island. They are organizing Fascist volunteer forces there as fast as they can.

They now have 25,000 recruits for these, whom they have enrolled under threats of imprisonment or execution. These 'volunteers' are armed and given military instruction by Italians. They are led by Italian officers and their chief is an Italian, Count Rossi.

The Majorcan troops are being fitted out with the most modern arms, all provided by Signor Mussolini. Italian ships come to the island twice a week to restock it with provisions and war-materials.

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There are fourteen Italian three-engined seaplanes and three Italian destroyers in the harbour. Italy has provided the insurgents with tanks, aeroplanes, officers and soldiers, in the hope of destroying Spain and thus converting her provisional possession of Majorca into a definite colony.

A Note from the Spanish Embassy in London

In view of a report which was published by the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, the Spanish Ambassador in London thought it necessary to send a statement on the situation in the Balearics to the British Foreign Office, on November 26th, 1936. Here is the statement:

The situation in the Balearic Isles constitutes, as Your Excellency is aware, a source of grave concern to the Spanish Government in the present circumstances. On several occasions I have had the honour to draw Your Excellency's attention to this problem, laying particular emphasis on the process by means of which Italy is progressively completing her political and military control of the Balearic Isles. Recent information published by the diplomatic correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* on the 25th November provides full and complete justification for the Spanish Government's concern in this respect.

In accordance with this information, Mr. Grandi, on returning from his official visit to Rome, was authorized once again to dispel the British Government's anxieties as regards the rumour according to which Italy was proposing to establish a permanent naval base in the Balearics. But what constitute a justifiable cause for alarm in respect to the maintenance of peace are the observations, which in any case the Spanish Government, in its capacity as sole legitimate

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titular of the rights of sovereignty over the Balearic Isles, could not let pass without interposing its strongest and most categorical protest, accompanying the Italian assurances in this information observations which constitute no more nor less than the plainest confession on the part of Italy of her political and military establishment in the Balearic Isles and of her intention not to leave them until certain conditions are fulfilled which depend solely and exclusively on her own will.

I am in effect giving as follows the statement which the diplomatic correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* considers himself authorized to make:

So long as there remains the possibility of a "Moscow outpost" being established on the Mediterranean coast in Spain, Italy *will guard* the approaches from points of vantage in the Balearic Islands.

When General Franco's forces have established effective control of this area, Italy, I am assured, *will withdraw* from the Balearics, holding that to remain there would be to create a source of constant friction between herself and Spain.

As has previously been said, whatever may in fact be the situation of the Balearic Isles, there is from the legal point of view no doubt that the territory composing these Islands forms part of the territory of the Spanish State and that consequently the latter is the sole legitimate titular of the rights of sovereignty over that territory. From the foregoing it must therefore be inferred, if the information in question is correct, that a situation has been created in the Balearic Isles which must necessarily be interpreted as a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of Spain.

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The Italians Control the Balearics, except Minorca

Another dispatch from Gerald Grosvenor, special correspondent of the News Chronicle, signed "in the Mediterranean," which appeared on November 30th, 1936, also deserves our attention :

Returning from my visit to Majorca, our yacht has just been sailing past the area where, I think it is safe to say, before many weeks are past the main battles of the Spanish war are likely to take place : in other words, just off the Catalonian coast.

Other interesting events are likely to happen first.

There is every reason to believe that the Italian controllers of the Balearic Islands, excluding Minorca, intend to launch an attack on that island—the only one remaining loyal to the Spanish Government—by sea and air before very long.

Only after having subdued Minorca will they turn their attention to the main attack on Catalonia. The reckoning is that the area will be attacked on land at the same time by Franco's forces.

Originally the plan is believed to have been to attack Barcelona simultaneously with the final assault on Madrid.

But this had left out of account the defenders of the capital. Madrid's resistance caused this programme to be reconsidered.

Italians in Majorca do not disguise the fact that they consider Catalonia will call for a tremendous effort to subdue; indeed, they talk of the campaign lasting, perhaps, for six months.

They are counting on their Italian 'planes having to meet in battle not only Russian, but French, 'planes helping the Loyalist forces.

On the Island of Majorca until several weeks ago

it was possible to approach San Juan, the main airport of Palma.

To-day, in view of the preparations for an offensive, it is absolutely impossible. Anyone stopping on the road even two miles away places himself under suspicion.

It is impossible to leave the city of Palma to go into surrounding country without special permission of the military authorities.

In the midst of this warlike atmosphere, it strikes one as extraordinary to find British, German, Spanish, Italian and French sailors fraternizing in the bars.

Photographs of Italian Intervention

On November 30th various photographs of Majorca under Fascist rule were published by the News Chronicle. We reproduce here the words with which the paper presented these photographs to its readers:

News Chronicle publishes exclusively on Back Page to-day first photographs to come out of Spanish Island of Majorca showing rebels in control. Majorca is island from which attacks on Catalonia with aid of Italian 'planes (?) and submarines) is planned.

Photograph shows Italian "dictator" of island, "Count Rossi," saluting on march of Spanish rebel troops through the capital.

"Count Rossi" is a false name. It is believed the "Count's" real name is Buonaccorsi and that he was a close friend of Dumini, one of the men most closely concerned in the murder of Matteotti.

His full assumed title is General Conde Aldo Rossi, "Conde" is a Spanish title (Italian is Conte) and Aldo is also Spanish. Thus he "proves" Spanish nationality!

The Balearics Occupied by the Italians

The following commentary from the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, published on December 1st, 1936, is sufficiently eloquent:

It is no overstatement to say that the Balearic Islands, as previously pointed out in the *Manchester Guardian*, are under Italian occupation. The occupation is naval, military, aerial, political, and economic. The commandant of Majorca, Rossi, is not, as is commonly supposed, a private adventurer. He is an instrument of Italian policy. The conquest of the islands and the defeat of the expeditionary force sent by the Spanish Government are mainly Italian achievements.

A Fascist militia is now being organized in Majorca by the Italians and on the Italian model. The economic life of the islands is under Italian and, to some extent, German control. Italian ships now have regular time-tables with the islands, and the whole of their trade is in Italian hands.

The Italian occupation appears to be intended to be permanent. Anglo-Italian and Franco-Italian relations have improved considerably, and the last thing desired here and in Paris is the renewal of tension in the Mediterranean. But it is clear that neither this country nor France could remain indifferent to any permanent change in the status of the Balearic Islands.

Italy has given repeated assurances that she does not mean to establish herself in the islands. There is a strong inclination here to believe these assurances, but Italian activities on the islands have gone so much farther than mere help to the Spanish rebels that the misgivings felt here and in Paris are understandable.

“Under Italian Auspices . . .”

Very important, given the writer's political tendencies, is the following article by Sir Percival Phillips, published on December 9th, 1936, and sent from Gibraltar to the Daily Telegraph :

The projected advance against General Franco's rear, however, does not take account of a Nationalist invasion of the east coast from the Balearic Islands, the possibility of which has already seriously disturbed the Government at Valencia.

It has good reason to believe that an expeditionary force is now being assembled at Palma under Italian auspices for landing on the mainland.

One estimate, which is not confirmed, places the strength of this army at 15,000, and others put it even higher. It includes both Spanish and foreign infantry, to which Italy is believed to be making a substantial contribution.

Such a force, if successfully disembarked under cover of Nationalist warships and aeroplanes, and having a fleet of fast fighting tanks superior to those used on the Madrid front, would be a grave menace to Valencia, as well as to coast towns in the south. The port selected for the landing of the bulk of the force is said to be Grao Gandia, forty-five miles south of Valencia.

There is no reason to believe that its arrival is imminent, as supplies are still being collected in the Balearic Islands; but the Government is already discussing arrangements for a sudden evacuation of Valencia in the event of a surprise. Additional militia arrived there this week.

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Rossi "Plays the Idiot"

On December 16th, 1936, the News Chronicle published the following article, signed by Frederic Basedow :

I am probably the only journalist who has been granted an interview with General Conde Aldo Rossi, Controller of the Island of Majorca.

It was at the headquarters of the Spanish Phalanx at Palma, a former theatre, that the interview took place.

Striding into his office ahead of me General Rossi seated himself at a plain desk.

I saw a well-built, energetic-looking man with a shock of dark hair, sharp eyes and a beard of the type made familiar by Marshal Balbo.

The General wore the black uniform of the Phalanx, with the Italian and Spanish symbols on his shirt.

Not waiting for my questions, the General addressed me thus:

I am a soldier. I am a rebel. I am a man who lives unto the day. I do not want to know what happened yesterday and what happens to-morrow. I live in the present. I live to fight Communism, my greatest enemy.

I have no other interests except fighting Communism.

I left Italy without the permission of the Italian Government.

Myself: What happens when you return to Italy?

Rossi: Oh, I don't know, but I might be put in gaol.

Myself: What are your plans if General Franco captures Madrid?

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Rossi: As I have already told you, I am a man who lives in the present, and not in the future.

Myself: What about the future of Ceuta and the Canary Islands?

Rossi: Oh, I don't know anything about that. I am a soldier who serves General Franco and no one else; and General Franco has not given me any instructions in connection with Ceuta. I am sent here to fight the world's and my greatest enemy, Bolshevism.

Myself: And what are your intentions towards the island of Minorca?

Rossi: None at all. We are not interested in Minorca.

We concentrate on fighting Catalonia, the centre of Communism. And we are going to drive the Reds out of there.

As soon as I mentioned Minorca, the General rose to indicate that the interview was at an end.

In this interview this Fascist á la Mussolini "plays the idiot" according to the Spanish popular saying. But he cannot shake our conviction that he is an envoy of Mussolini.

Italian Naval Experts

A correspondent of the Manchester Guardian sent the following dispatch to his paper (dated in Barcelona, December 1st.) We extract the following passages relating to the Balearics :

Considerable new activity has recently been noticed in Majorca, which is in rebel hands. Italian arrivals are remarkable not so much for numbers as for the fact that they are all trained seaplane and naval experts.

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Count Rossi has already "subdued" the island; and it is now known that Colonel Unamuno, whom he replaced on his arrival, has been shot. The number of bodies buried in Palma cemetery since the Italians' arrived until December 9th amounts to 1,843.

Amid considerable secrecy exercises in landing tactics are being carried out in Terreno under Italian instructors. A refugee recently escaped from Majorca states that the Italians express a certain dislike of the few remaining Germans and consider their activities as interference. Four Germans were expelled recently on a charge of espionage.

It is as yet uncertain whether the forces in the Balearic Islands are intended simply as a garrison, whether they will attack Catalonia in the early spring, as is rumoured, or whether they will operate against Minorca, at present highly organized under Government administration chiefly controlled by the Socialists of the loyal navy and arsenal.

The Cruelty of the Italian Fascists

The Information Service of Valencia published the following on December 23rd, 1936 :

New details on the subject of the tremendous cruelty of the rebels and the Italian forces who now control the life of Majorca, against the inhabitants of the Island, are continually being brought by persons who manage to escape from the "Fascist Paradise" which has been established there.

Several sailors who to-day reached Valencia, declared that the murders committed by the rebels and the Italians in whose service these rebels are, amount to more than five thousand among the civil population of Palma, and other cities such as Manacor, Soller, Inca, Felanitx and also in the villages.

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The rebels and above all the Italians have gone to extremes of cruelty and unheard of barbarism. In the refinement of their cruelty, there have even occurred cases when many of the victims, sacrificed solely because they were relatives of some citizen of Left opinions or of someone who has escaped, have been stripped prior to appearing before the firing-squad, and their eyes have been torn out before they were buried.

The number of inhabitants of the Island who have left because of the repugnance which they feel towards such a state of things is now very high: in the last month alone their numbers passed three hundred, and not a day goes by but some inhabitants of Majorca manage to elude the guards, and, using any kind of boat, reach Minorca.

To such extremes have the terror and the barbarism of the rebels driven the people of the island that they pursue all the men of Left opinions and search in the ranks of the loyalists for the tranquility which no longer exists in the fief of the smuggler March, now turned into a colony of Italian Fascism.

THE ROME REBELS, WITH THE COMPLICITY OF THE FASCIST GOVERN- MENT, HOLD UP A SPANISH DIPLOMAT

The case of the Spanish diplomats in Italy who have remained loyal to the Government scarcely differs from that of the diplomats in Germany. Franco's friends in Rome—we refer only to the Spaniards—encouraged by the hostile attitude of the Italian authorities towards the

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Spanish people, thought it their duty to commit outrages on the person of Señor Aguinaga, appointed Chargé d'Affaires by the Spanish Government. It is certain that if these friends of Franco had not been supported by the Fascist police and the Fascist Government they would not have "held up" Señor Aguinaga. The history of events in the Spanish Embassy in Rome is very characteristic of the plebeian proceedings of Fascism.

We will give three versions of the incident, as reported in various newspapers.

On August 12th, 1936, the Manchester Guardian published the following Exchange message from Rome :

The Spanish feud has spread to the Spanish Embassy in Rome, where an extraordinary situation has developed.

The Madrid Government was informed several days ago that its Ambassador to Rome, Señor de Carcer, had resigned. The Government then appointed Señor Aguinaga, Minister in Berne, as Chargé d'Affaires in Rome. When he arrived there he found the building occupied by the naval and military attachés, who had sworn allegiance to the rebel Government at Burgos.

He made various attempts to enter the Embassy, without success, but this morning, accompanied by two trusted bodyguards, he managed to break in through a side door and formally took possession of the premises. But the attachés were not so easily disposed of. They overpowered the Chargé d'Affaires and bodyguard and compelled Señor Aguinaga to sign a resignation form which they hastily typed out.

This resignation was at once delivered to the Italian Foreign Office and another copy, signed and witnessed, was dispatched to the Foreign Minister in

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Madrid with the following Note type-written and signed by Señor Aguinaga, "Hope this will reach you before you are forced to leave." To-night the Embassy was closed to all visitors.

The News Chronicle correspondent in Rome writes the same day :

When the new Ambassador sent by the Popular Front Government of Madrid, Señor Aguinaga, arrived at the Spanish Embassy here to-day to take over from the retiring Ambassador, Señor de Carcer, he was greeted by the staff who threatened him with revolvers.

Señor Aguinaga was bluntly told that the Burgos (rebel) Government was already represented at the Embassy and that he (Aguinaga) was a prisoner.

At pistol point, it is alleged, he was forced to write two letters, one to the Italian Foreign Office notifying his resignation, and a similar one to Madrid.

Thereupon he was allowed to leave the palace, and to-night he left for Paris.

Señor Aguinaga had been in Rome for several days, but as the ex-Ambassador had barricaded himself in the Embassy he had taken up his residence with the Spanish Consul. It was only to-day that, accompanied by two commercial attachés loyal to the Madrid Government, he made up his mind to enter the Embassy.

Finally we reproduce the dispatch from The Times correspondent in Rome : this also appeared on August 12th :

An extraordinary story is current here to-day on the arbitrary methods adopted by the Spanish Nationalists in Rome to prevent a representative of the

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Madrid Government from taking up his post. The story has already covered a period of about a fortnight and dates back to the appointment as Spanish Ambassador of Señor de Carcer.

It would appear that on the eve of the day upon which Señor de Carcer intended to present his credentials the military and naval attachés entered his room and, putting a revolver on the table, intimated to him that he would be prevented from assuming his duties. After the hurried departure of Señor de Carcer for Paris Señor Aguinaga was sent down to Rome from Berne to take charge of the Spanish Embassy.

This morning, apparently after some days of reflection, Señor Aguinaga decided to enter the Embassy, and made his entrance accompanied by two attachés said to be loyal to the Madrid Government. It was however, easier for Señor Aguinaga to enter the Embassy than to take charge of it, and, according to the story current this evening in Spanish circles, he was shut up in a room with his companions and informed that he would not be released until he had announced his resignation both to the Madrid Government and to the Italian Foreign Ministry.

Such was the treatment given in Rome, with the compliance of the Italian Government, to the diplomats who were loyal to the legal Government of Spain. The manner in which the rebel diplomats surprised Señor Aguinaga reveals a practice and a knowledge of their office which offer us a clue to the past history of these aggressors. As in bank hold-ups, some (the Spanish rebels) went in, pistol in hand, while others (the Italian Government) remained on guard in the street.

CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN SPANISH MOROCCO

From the international point of view, Morocco is the most dangerous centre of disturbance in the Spanish war. In this case, too, the unprotected state in which the democratic powers have left the Spanish Government amounts to a violation of international law, and involves the risk that, by their complacent attitude towards the rebels, the Spanish struggle may spread over the whole continent of Europe. Nothing of this would have happened if the world, and especially signatory Powers to the Treaty of Algeciras, had not allowed, or supported, the rebellion of the Spanish garrison forces in North Africa, and, which is even more serious, the recruiting of natives to fight on Spanish soil against the legitimate Government of Spain.

The President of the Spanish Republic on Morocco

The President of the Republic, Don Manuel Azaña, clearly defined this new crime committed by the European Powers in a speech which he made in Valencia on January 21st, 1937. In that part of the speech which referred to the Moroccan question he said as follows :

As I see it, there are two ways by which the military rebellion in Spain has come to be a grave international problem; on the one hand, because of its

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Moroccan origin, because the rebellion arose in the Spanish zone in Morocco, and the rebels have used that Zone as a base of operations; on the other hand, because of the help in war-material and armed men given by certain foreign powers to the rebel movement at its origin and at the present time.

As for the first aspect, I will confess that the Governments of the Republic, since the outbreak of the rebellion have given it their most careful attention, much more attention than public opinion in general has given it. The facts are very clear: in the Zone of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco the military entrusted with the task of protecting the Zone and of helping the Government of the Protectorate in its functions have rebelled against the legitimate Government of the protector nation, and not content with coming themselves to fight in the Peninsula have brought, besides the Peninsular troops who were stationed there, native forces: they have recruited soldiers among the Moors in that Zone, and converted what was an expansion of Spain's political activity, and the fulfilment of an international agreement, into a base of operations against the legitimate Government of the Republic.

These are the facts. Compare them with the rights of the situation. Morocco is a foreign state for us; the sovereignty of Morocco belongs to the Sultan; the Sultan has in our Zone a Caliph, who, as his name expresses, is his delegate or emanation in things political and religious; decrees are issued in his name, assisted by a high commission of Spain, and all the forces, which Spain pays for there, or subsidises through the Majzen, are troops which are under the orders of the Protectorate, for the ends of the Protectorate and for nothing else. The fact that the troops of the Protectorate, that Moroccan subjects who are

not Spaniards, and the Caliph, who is the representative of the Sultan, who has never placed in question the legitimacy of the Spanish Government, who knows that this Government is the Government of the Spanish Republic: the fact that the Caliph, in the hands of the rebels, either a prisoner or a traitor, consents to this, is not only contrary to Spanish laws, but also to the international pacts and treaties by reason of which Spain is in Morocco. Spain is in Morocco because of the Agreement of Algeciras and the pacts and treaties complementary to that. This is not the time to examine the reasons for her being there: but she is there because of that and to fulfil that mission, and the fact that, either by consent or permission or dissimulation, the Authorities of the Majzen silently approve the transport of Moroccan troops to Spain is an aggression against international treaties, a violation of the pacts which keep us in Morocco, besides being an attack on the Government of the Republic.

You know what sacrifices Spain has made to maintain the Protectorate in Morocco. We are not now discussing this policy: you know how scrupulously the Spanish Governments have tried to maintain the Protectorate in Morocco, and how the Republican Governments tried to transform Spain's action in Morocco, taking away from its spirit of conquest to make it more consonant with the aims of the Republic and the real ends of the Protectorate. Our country has undertaken for the Protectorate of Morocco immense sacrifices which would have been sufficient if directed to our country at home, to redeem a great part of our provinces; but from Morocco we have had nothing but troubles; at one moment a dictatorship, at another a military rebellion. Will not the day soon come when public opinion, turning to its

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Government, will ask, "Is it not time to put an end to an outrageous, harmful situation, one which ignores international treaties, and creates only difficulties for the powers which signed the agreement of Algeciras?"

This is all there is in the fact of the Spanish military rebellion guided and launched from Morocco. It is not for me to go more deeply into the problem, to seek a solution or to enunciate it; the problem exists. The Spanish Government knows it, and public opinion knows it, too.

We realize the difficulty of the problem, but it would be useless to suppose that the problem will remain for ever underlying, in the most violent upheavals of the rebellion, and that the Spanish Republic which has rights on Morocco, and can impose the rights of Spain on Morocco, will not take at last the decision which is according to the law.

Silence of the London and Paris Governments

Have the countries which signed the Act of Algeciras no objections to make against the recruiting of Moors, and their transport to the Peninsula? An energetic attitude on the part of France and England towards General Franco, a rebel general, when the Moors first began to leave for Spain to fight against the legitimate Government, would not have incurred any dangers. What has happened is that the London and Paris Governments have abandoned all their authority, to benefit the Spanish rebels. And so the world has seen the essential idea and the laws of the Protectorate violated, although to have carried out this legislation implied no danger to anyone, except to the insurgent generals.

The Sending of Moors to the Peninsula

How many Moors have been brought into the Peninsula ? Twenty thousand ? Thirty, forty thousand ? This crime was not likely to affect the Germany of Hitler, or the Italy of Mussolini, who with their 'planes and ships have co-operated in the Mussulman invasion. But neither liberal France nor Puritan England have raised a voice of protest. The Spanish insurgents have recruited as many Moors as they needed to act as executioners for Spain—in fact, many more than they can pay for. Two caids who appealed to the Sultan to stop this infamous traffic were shot by Franco's minions.

The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Paris writes on August 14th, 1936 :

It is believed that General Franco has not been able to recruit more than four or five thousand Moroccans for service in Spain, although he has offered the many promises and privileges, a premium of 250 pesetas and a wage of five pesetas a day. The attempt to recruit more has provoked a good deal of discontent, especially as General Franco had two caids who opposed the recruiting shot.

The Recruiting of Moors in the French Zone

It is not only in the Spanish Zone of the Protectorate that the rebels recruit Moors : they carry on recruiting in the French Zone as well. M. Delbos himself, the French Foreign Minister, denounced these activities at a Cabinet meeting on August 13th, 1936.

The Paris correspondent of the News Chronicle writes, August 14th, 1936 :

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That secret emissaries of General Franco have been busy in French Morocco recruiting Moroccan natives to reinforce the rebel army was revealed by M. Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, at to-day's Cabinet Council.

All necessary measures were taken by the French and Moroccan authorities, M. Delbos added, to stop the activities of General Franco's secret agents, many of whom have belonged to the French Foreign Legion.

I learn that several of them have been expelled from French Morocco during the past forty-eight hours.

Police reinforcements were sent to the frontier region to chase the "recruiting officers."

As will be appreciated, the French Government considers that its duty consists in only adopting police measures.

Meanwhile, communications between French and Spanish Morocco are not interrupted. And in fact the Spanish insurgent force in Morocco enjoys the privileges of the legal authorities.

What Germany Wants in Spanish Morocco

The passive attitude of England and France towards the Spanish rebellion in Morocco contrasts with the active aid given to General Franco by Germany and Italy. This help is given with the underhand idea of converting Spanish Morocco into an Italo-German colony. The Spanish patriots did not hesitate to abet this foreign invasion in return for aid in men and material, without which the rebellion would have been crushed in a very short time.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett, studied in its international aspect the question raised by Italo-German intervention and the

passivity of France and England. The following article by him appeared in the News Chronicle of December 31st, 1936 :

While each important Foreign Office in Europe is wondering how it can lessen the interference of its neighbours in the affairs of Spain, Germany is developing her influence over Spanish Morocco, an area of greater value to her than the whole Iberian Peninsula.

As General Franco's chances of a smashing victory in Spain grow fainter the call of Morocco will grow more and more insistent in the ears of the Germans, who had great ambitions, constantly thwarted by the British and the French, in North Africa before 1914.

Indeed, the arrival of the German gunboat *Panther* in the summer of 1911 off Agadir "to protect German interests" there brought Europe to the verge of war.

Articles 141-146 of the Versailles Treaty, whereby Germany renounced her ambitions in Morocco, are among the very few still remaining in force which impose upon her humiliating inequalities, and it will not be at all astonishing if Herr Hitler launches an attack against them before the civil war in Spain comes to an end.

There are four reasons, apart from Germany's very natural resentment against unequal treaties, which convince one that Spanish Morocco is going to play an important part in the politics of the near future.

One is its enormous strategic value. The European State which controls it also controls the Straits of Gibraltar.

The principal reason why this area was ever handed over to Spain was that Great Britain was opposed to

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French possession of a coast line from which British Communications with India through the Mediterranean could be menaced. That opposition would naturally apply still more strongly in the case of any other Great Power.

A second reason is that if the Protectorate were to pass to Germany, or German influence in it were to become very strong, French hopes of organizing a useful Moroccan army in her own territory next door would be destroyed.

The frontier between the French and Spanish Zones is an artificial one, which makes it very easy to encourage subversive activities in one Zone from the other. Germany worked hard and successfully in this sense during the World War.

A third reason is that Spanish Morocco is now in the hands of the Spanish rebels, and will remain so even in the event of a crushing defeat of General Franco in Spain.

I have the best reasons for declaring that in no circumstances would the Spanish Government send troops overseas to win back Spanish African possessions. Spaniards of the Left have never felt any pride in this empire which has cost the lives of so many of their compatriots and which was King Alfonso's best excuse for organizing a large army with a dangerous interest in politics.

If Great Britain and France want to dislodge Germany from Spanish Morocco, and even the Canary Islands, they will have to do so themselves. They will get no help from Spain.

A fourth reason is that the mountains of the Spanish Riff are rich in minerals which are essential to German heavy industry.

And there is no doubt that already German influence in Morocco is very great. General Franco is

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paying for the help he receives from Berlin with Moroccan manganese and iron ore.

A recent agreement whereby the *Compañía Española de Minas del Rif* pledged itself to deliver 800,000 tons of ore to Germany within the next eight months has already been reported. But this is only a small part of the trade developing between the German Government and that of the Spanish rebels.

Since last October a company known as *Hisma*, which has its headquarters in Seville, but is controlled by the German heavy industries, has been active in supplying ores to Germany. General Franco has granted it the monopoly for the export of all minerals from the Rif, although most of the mining companies are owned by British, French or Spanish shareholders.

According to M. Charles Reber, in the Paris weekly paper *Vendredi*, Germany pays for the ores she receives by making a corresponding reduction in the amount she is owed by General Franco for munitions.

Thus these British and other foreign companies supply Germany with the raw material for her armaments, but receive no money in return for this service.

This German penetration in Spanish Morocco will continue, if General Franco wins, with the consent of the new Spanish Government. It will continue, if General Franco loses, without the consent of the present Spanish Government, but also without its active opposition. It will continue if Herr Hitler chooses to make the abolition of Articles 141 to 146 of the Versailles Treaty the condition on which he will refrain from further intervention in Spain.

In any of these cases it is clear that Great Britain and France will lose their feeling of security in the

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Western Mediterranean as part of the price of their refusal at the outset of the Spanish civil war, to allow the legal Government of Spain to obtain munitions abroad in the legal and normal way.

Articles 141 to 146

By Articles 141 to 146 of Treaty of Versailles, Germany agreed :

To renounce all rights, titles and privileges conferred on her in Morocco by previous treaties.

To recognize the French Protectorate in Morocco.

To renounce the capitulations (right of German citizens in Morocco to be tried by German court).

To hand over to Morocco all property of the German Government in Morocco, without payment.

To transfer to France the German shares in the State Bank of Morocco. France was to pay for these shares, but the payment was to be reckoned as part of Reparations.

A "News Chronicle" Leader

On the same day the News Chronicle commented on Vernon Bartlett's article in a vigorous leader.

The news which Vernon Bartlett gives to-day of German aims in Morocco leaves little doubt that Europe will soon be faced with yet one more complicated problem, and a grave one.

The exact position in Morocco at present is involved and intricate. This is not the first time that German claims there have produced an international crisis. But two things are certain.

One is that vital British and French interests are affected by the position in Morocco. The other is

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that if these interests are now threatened by Germany, the Powers concerned have only themselves to thank for the new difficulties which confront them. They are of their own creation.

If they had allowed the Spanish Government to buy the arms which it needed at the beginning of the civil war, as it was lawfully entitled to do, that disastrous struggle would long ago have been ended. The refusal of the democratic Powers to allow this has alone enabled General Franco to pursue his adventure; and he has done this by granting to Germany, in return for munitions, concessions in Morocco which now give her a considerable stake in the country.

Democratic Spain, as Bartlett points out, has no interest in Morocco and will refuse in any event to concern herself with it. General Franco, if he wins, will be committed naturally to the honouring of his obligations to Germany. Britain and France, therefore, are left alone to deal with a problem which they cannot possibly ignore and to which it is not easy to see a satisfactory solution.

It must be a mortifying addition to their vexations to reflect that but for their own cowardly and vacillating policy this new and formidable problem would never have arisen at all.

The Italo-German Alliance in Morocco

The joint activities of Germany and Italy in Morocco were denounced by the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian on November 18th, 1936. He wrote as follows :

While they are intervening in Spain, Germany and Italy show a growing interest in Morocco and in the Pan-Arabic movement. No very great importance

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is attached to that movement here. Italian attempts to win support amongst the Arabic peoples have gone on for years and are still going on. They have a marked anti-British tendency, but show no discoverable promise of tangible results. German influence in Arabia and Northern Africa came to an end in 1918, but is now reviving; it is being promoted energetically by the Nazis.

At the moment Germany is paying special attention to Morocco, and her partisanship on behalf of the Spanish rebels is giving her renewed opportunities. It is uncertain whether she will be able to gain a lasting foothold in Morocco—it will depend on what kind of Spanish Government emerges from the civil war and on the attitude of the Western Powers. It will also depend on the attitude of Italy, and it is very doubtful whether Italy really wishes to see German influence grow in the Mediterranean; it is perhaps no accident that whereas the Italians have established themselves on the Balearic Islands the Germans are more interested in the Canaries.

Nevertheless the two Powers are acting together in Morocco at the moment. On October 21st a Pan-Arabic congress opened at Tetuan under the chairmanship of the local kalif. General Franco appointed a delegate in the person of Colonel Beigleder, who used to be Spanish military attaché in Berlin and has remained in contact with the Nazis ever since he left Germany. During the congress he was attended by a number of German officers who have been resident in Tetuan for some time and are said to have considerable influence.

An Italian delegate was also present in the person of Hadi Hassan Bou Ayad, an Italian subject, and known in Northern Africa for his anti-British and anti-French attitude. He has now started a Pan-Arabic

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propagandist campaign. Wherever Pan-Arabic agents are sent they establish close contact with the German and Italian Consulates.

It was stated at the Tetuan congress in the presence of Colonel Beigleder, the German officers, and the Italian delegate that the native Moroccans were fighting for "the Franco Government" because it had promised them freedom and independence. Comparisons were drawn with Egypt and Syria, and it was declared that Morocco would acquire a similar status as the result of a rebel victory in Spain. Spanish Morocco would then be the first of the free Arab States in Northern Africa.

Measures were discussed for preparing Arab "intellectuals" to take part in the future administration of the country.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ITALIAN DICTATORSHIP IN TANGIER

—And the Submission of England and France

An approximate idea of what facilities were given to the legitimate Government of Spain for the repression of the rebellion in Morocco may be gathered from the following report which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on July 23rd, 1936 :

According to information received here, the Spanish rebels are masters of all Spanish Morocco. Spanish Government warships have been in action off the Moroccan coast, and a difficult situation is developing in the international settlement of Tangier. Government warships have come to the port for fuel and provisions and have then gone off to bombard Ceuta and other rebel positions. Rebel forces threaten to bomb any such vessels that re-enter the port, and rebel detachments are preparing to occupy Tangier if such vessels are allowed in.

The French and British Governments are trying to prevail on the Spanish Government to keep its warships away from the port.

This pitiable retreat of the English and French Governments before the threats of the Spanish rebels deprived the Spanish Government of all aid on the coast of Africa to enable it to crush the rebellion.

The President of the Committee of Control Visits Franco

Faced with Franco's threats, the Committee of Control in Tangier does not ask who this rebel general is to threaten an invasion of the International Zone of Tangier, nor does it adopt an energetic attitude against the insurgent military. On the contrary, the President of the Committee, the Italian Consul, goes to Tetuan to bargain with General Franco, as The Times correspondent in Tangier reports, on July 23rd, 1936 :

General Franco, the insurgent leader in the Spanish Zone, last night sent a letter to the authorities here declaring if the ships of the Spanish Fleet which had revolted against their insurgent officers were not ordered to leave Tangier and no longer allowed to use the Bay as a base to refuel and provision, the refusal would be answered by bombing by aeroplanes and the dispatch of insurgent troops to Tangier. The Commission of Control met at midnight to consider the message and also the bombing of ships in the Bay by the insurgents yesterday afternoon.

No decision was reached, but the President is to go to meet General Franco at Tetuan.

A Grave Injustice

It is clear that the Statute of Tangier does not forbid the legal Spanish Government from using the harbour for the provisioning of its warships. The following article in the News Chronicle by the well-known journalist Vernon Bartlett discusses this point.

As it is increasingly clear that the success or failure of the rebellion will depend in great degree on the

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ability of the rebels to bring over Moorish reinforcements from Northern Africa, the legal status of Spanish ships in Tangier harbour may very shortly become a political problem of great importance.

The Tangier Zone is placed "under a régime of permanent neutrality," and "no installation which can be utilised for warlike purposes shall be either created or maintained in the Zone."

There are at present in the harbour several ships loyal to the Spanish Government, and General Franco, the rebel leader, has threatened action against the Zone if these ships are allowed to use it as a base for operations. In the words of the interview he gave to the *News Chronicle* last Tuesday, "this must not go on."

At the same time, according to the Statute, war vessels are able to make full use of the port in normal times.

The International Committee of Control, on which Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain are represented is therefore faced with the problem of deciding whether the Spanish vessels now in the port have a right to be there or whether their presence endangers the safety of the inhabitants of the Zone.

The Committee has set up a naval commission to take what measures it can for the security of the port and the town, but it seems probable that the directives for the wider decision will come from London, Paris, Rome and Madrid. In present circumstances it is not at all certain that these directives will agree.

There seem to be three possible courses of action. The Spanish ships, which are said to include a battleship, two cruisers and several destroyers, may be allowed to continue using the port as a base to which they may return after their engagements with the enemy.

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In that case General Franco, who is alleged to desire an international incident in the belief that it would be more damaging to the Spanish Government than to him, might take some desperate action against the Zone.

The ships might be allowed to remain on the condition that they refrained from further fighting. They would, in other words, be interned.

The ships might be ordered to leave Tangier altogether, in which case they might suffer severely from air attacks by the rebels.

It will be obvious to everyone that any of these three solutions would have an important effect on the civil war, and that solutions one and three might have international repercussions as well.

The risk of General Franco taking "some desperate action against the Zone" in Bartlett's words, does not justify the decision adopted by the Authorities of the Zone, who submitted to the rebel generals, and decided that the Government fleet must leave the harbour. The law exists, it would seem, in order to be obeyed. And the rebellion of the troops in Spanish Morocco against the legitimate Government, does not modify the condition in the Statute which lays down that warships may refuel in Tangier in normal times. It was not a question, at least until after the intervention of Germany and Italy, of a war, but only of a pronunciamiento or rising on a part of the Spanish Army.

The Complicity of the Committee of Control

The complicity of the International Committee of Control in Tangier with the rebels acquires scandalous dimen-

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sions, as seen from this article which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on August 10th, 1936, and was dated the day before in Tangier :

In view of the recent protests of General Franco against the use of Tangier harbour by Spanish Government warships, the International Committee of Control held two urgent meetings yesterday, at which it was decided to forbid the return to Tangier of all Spanish Government warships. General Franco's officers and officials of the Tangier Zone will be allowed in and out of Tangier, and all passports bearing the visa of the Tetuan authorities will be recognized as valid.

It is understood that the International Committee has decided that henceforth the entry of Spanish warships into the harbour will be considered contrary to the Tangier statute. The Committee is understood to have put on record the conciliatory attitude of the Madrid Government in temporarily ceasing to send warships to Tangier.

The Spanish destroyer *Lepanto* joined the *Alsedo* in the harbour this afternoon with the sole purpose, it was stated, of taking the latter in tow, owing to her engines not working. Both destroyers promised to leave in the afternoon, and a non-belligerent ship was appointed to see that this was done.

Commentary in the "Manchester Guardian"

On August 11th, 1936, the Manchester Guardian commented on the decision of the Committee of Control in the following leader :

The decision of the Committee of Control of the International Zone of Tangier to close the port to all Spanish warships on the ground that their presence

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would be contrary to the Tangier Statute of 1923 seems to go still farther along the road of "neutrality" which ends in unjust discrimination against the Republican Government. As the statute does not mention the possibility of civil wars and only rules that the port should not become the base of any Power engaged in international war, it is fairly clear that the decision must be for the sake either of expediency or of politics. It was adopted in answer to the protests of General Franco, the rebel commander, by a majority of the Committee, which consists of the consuls of France, Britain, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Portugal. The fact that the decision is criticized in M. Blum's paper *Le Populaire* suggests that it is no part of the French Government's policy of non-intervention, and it is at least ominous that at the same meeting the Committee should have decided to permit General Franco's officers to pass in and out of the Zone. It is not yet known, though one might guess, which consuls formed the majority. For the Spanish Government the closing of Tangier is serious, as it provided their only port in North Africa, while the rebels hold the strong harbour of Ceuta in Spanish Morocco. It has, however, acquiesced in the decision. It is possible, of course, that the consuls were moved primarily by the fear that any offence to General Franco might provoke him into an attack on Tangier, with all the grave consequences that would follow. But if their action was merely part of the general attempt to put the rebels on the same footing as the Spanish Government it would be a serious matter, and one would like to know on which side the British Consul cast his vote.

The Fascist Tendencies of the "Democratic" Consuls

The Spanish representative on the Committee of Control protested against the decision—certainly an unusual one—to recognize as valid the identification documents issued by the rebels. This first episode of the conduct of the Control Committee already indicates the policy of the democratic countries and the dictatorships with regard to the Spanish military rebellion. The consuls of Italy and Germany voted in favour of Franco. France voted against. But Holland, Belgium and Great Britain, all democratic countries, bowed to the policy of the President of the Committee, a faithful servant of Mussolini.

A Protest from the Spanish Government

The Spanish Government then communicated to the Governments of the countries concerned a Note, which the Spanish Ambassador handed to the British Foreign Office on August 12th, 1936. The Government of the Spanish Republic asserted that it could not accept in any form the agreement reached by the Committee of Control in Tangier to give validity for the entry into that city and Zone of identification documents issued by the rebel authorities. The Spanish Government insisted that if this agreement were allowed to stand it would constitute a dangerous precedent, equally fatal for all countries, which cannot agree to identification papers or documents issued by a rebel whose only authority is the purely material and ephemeral one of an act of force.

The Cynicism of the Committee of Control

So that in reality, before any Government had recognized General Franco, the consular representatives had

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done so in Tangier. This action caused a certain amount of surprise, and the Committee of Control felt obliged to cover its behaviour with a note, which we reproduce as reported in a Reuter message :

The International Committee of Control of Tangier, which consists of Britain, Spain and five other countries, published the following *communiqué* to-day:

In sittings held on August 7th, 8th, and 9th the Committee of Control undertook the task of defining the means of safeguarding—in the present circumstances—the special situation in Tangier as is laid down from the point of view of permanent neutrality by Article 3 of the Statute.

In this connection it has received official confirmation of the decision taken by the Spanish Government, while reserving the question of rights, to withdraw its fleet from the port, and notes with satisfaction that this decision has been fully carried into effect. As far as the movement of travellers and goods between the International Zone in Tangier and the Spanish Zone is concerned, it is recognized that in administrative practice application of the statutory regulations and legislation now in force should be strictly observed.

The ruling to facilitate travel between Tangier and Spanish Morocco by no means implies that the committee recognizes the authority of the rebels in Morocco, it is authoritatively stated.

“ Ignominious ”

The correspondent of the same agency in Paris reported, on August 10th, 1936, some of the criticism with

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which the French press of the Left greeted these decisions of the Committee of Control :

The decision of the International Committee of Control of Tangier to forbid the return to that port of Spanish Government warships is sharply criticized in the Left French press this morning. The Socialist *Populaire* writes:

The decision, reached by a majority vote, is ignominious. The right of the legal Spanish Government to utilize the port for its vessels is indisputably better than that of the Italian or German Governments. More reprehensible still is the permission given to partisans of General Franco to enter the Tangier Zone and the recognition of passports issued by the insurgent general.

Official Treatment for the Rebel Chief

The behaviour of the Committee of Control should not surprise us. The President, an Italian Fascist, from the first moment put himself at Franco's service.

Another fact which proves our assertions is the following: on August 15th, 1936, the President of the Committee of Control addressed himself to the rebel chief in Tetuan, calling him "High Commissary of Spain."

Servants of the Italian

In fact, the Committee of Control in Tangier does all that the representatives of Italy and Portugal suggest. The English Consul shows an excessive personal sympathy for the Spanish military rebellion. The representative of Belgium is not able, in his professional capacity, to cope with the present circumstances. Doubtless as a result

of the happenings of August 7th, 8th, and 9th, the English Consul in Tangier was transferred to Caracas. At that time there was a rumour that he was to be replaced by a man who had been married to an Italian woman (deceased) by whom he had a daughter.

The truth is that, as we have shown, the Consular Corps in Tangier was openly in favour of the Spanish Fascists.

More Details of the Italian Dictatorship in Tangier

Interesting details about the situation in Morocco, and especially in Tangier, are contained in the following report from a correspondent of the News Chronicle. This appeared on August 21st, 1936 :

That Morocco has again become the peculiarly exposed sort of European powder-barrel that it was in 1911 is all too obvious. But what is so interesting here is the amount of smoking that is going on in its vicinity.

Of the seven Powers sitting on the head of the barrel which is Tangier, one seems to be acting not only with carelessness but with a carelessness of a very special sort.

The President of the International Control Committee of Tangier this year happens to be Signor Rossi di Leon Nero, Fascist Italy's Minister.

After staying for several days in this colourful port which is seething with intrigue, I am able to record some of Signor Rossi's activities. His most recent enterprise was discussed last night at a secret meeting of the Committee of Control.

Rossi had undertaken consular duties for Spanish Morocco on behalf of the Spanish rebel leader, General Franco, who is using not a colony but a mere protec-

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torate held in trust, as a base of attack on his homeland.

The French took exception—very serious exception—to this exercise of a veritable act of sovereignty.

As President of the Control Committee, Rossi has been making certain changes in the international administration.

An Italian named Dei Gioia has been named chief of the port police, replacing a loyal Spanish official named Carleton. At Elbordj, on the frontier of the Spanish Zone, there have also been changes of the police at the expense of Spaniards of a Loyalist tendency.

Hardly a night passes without the Italian President of the International Committee receiving in his Legation some officer of General Franco's staff—either Major Armada or someone else in the rebel chieftain's confidence.

An acute observer remarked to me : " Italy intends to establish a Spanish Zone. Italian 'planes are operating from Tetuan. Italian officers are there. Without creating a serious incident by actually taking something, she is where she wants to be. Who will get her out? "

This question is being asked in another quarter. When it was discovered in Tangier that Moroccans wanting to enter the Zone—for which normally visas are not required—were being sent to the Italian Consulate there was a sensation.

Franco had attempted to establish his own Consulate, naming the Spanish aristocrat, Cabeza de Vaca, as his representative, but the Committee of Control could not recognize him to that extent even though daily visits of its President to Tetuan might be interpreted as recognition, and expelled Cabeza de Vaca.

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For days after that rebel frontier officials demanded Cabeza visas.

Before General Franco left for the mainland to lead the advance of the Moors and Spanish Legionaries through Estremadura, Rossi made daily trips to Tetuan, General Franco's headquarters.

After one of these he brought back the famous "ultimatum" from the rebel leader to the Committee that legally had no acquaintance with them to the effect that Spanish Government ships must leave Tangier harbour under pain of bombardment.

Few diplomats here doubt that he saw this document in the making.

Rossi also saw Franco's troops at the frontier of the International Zone and spared his colleagues no details of the danger threatening if the Republican's fleet remained.

Out of a welter of rumours it seems safe to present three reports, to which credence is given in several legations here. Proof, of course, could hardly be found.

First is that having secured a friendly port police, Italian warships lying in the harbour—there have been cruisers and one or two destroyers here for weeks—have landed quantities of machine-guns, arms of various sorts and hand grenades, some of which are now in the Italian Legation, some in the hands of Spaniards friendly to Franco.

Second is that on the night of August 8th-9th an Italian sailing vessel landed at Alhucemas Bay a cargo of machine-guns and grenades weighing about four tons, which that same night were conveyed in eight military trucks under command of Major Gauthier to Ceuta.

Further, that a look-out was being kept for the rest of the shipment, which supposedly was having diffi-

culty in evading Loyalist patrols of destroyers and armed trawlers.

Shipments by sea have nothing to do, of course, with the arrivals by 'plane.

Third report which is given credence here is that at a recent meeting in the Italian Legation, Franco's staff officers expressed the certainty that they would enter Madrid almost immediately, and asked what might be the chances of recognition of a military junta as the Government of Spain by at least two European Governments.

The chances, it seems, are not too bad, in the opinion of the Duce's representative here.

I am reliably informed there were seen at Tetuan yesterday in Italian uniform, two captains, three lieutenants and nine sergeants.

The Spanish Republican Minister, Señor Prieto del Rio, has been "sentenced to death" by Franco on several occasions. The Legation is practically honeycombed with spies, telephones are tapped, and servants bribed.

Fascist Justice in Tangier

In the matter of justice, it is clear how that is used in favour of the Italians. For example, the Terrorist campaign against the Spaniards who have remained loyal to the Government of the Republic has been responsible for intolerable incidents. On September 21st, 1936, a powerful bomb was exploded opposite the terrace of the Café Madrid, where people were listening to the radio news from the War Ministry. There were no victims of the explosion, which was however heavy enough to be heard throughout the whole city. In such cases the police are unable to find those responsible for the crime. And

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the magistrates of the so-called democratic countries do not hesitate to assist the Italian terrorists, who are well protected by the President of the Committee.

The Tribunal administers its justice in the most shameful way. Persecution of these Spaniards who are loyal to the Government is their rule of behaviour. A Spanish policeman named Fernandez is arbitrarily dismissed. The Director of the Postal Service is accused of unfairly censoring letters in Tangier, and of sending bags intended for Tangier into Spain. Legal proceedings are taken against the editor of the newspaper El Porvenir for having published articles in defence of the legal Government of Spain.

On the other hand, the rebels act with complete freedom. Sure of their impunity they commit crimes of every kind. They publicly announce that they will attack the Spanish Consulate, and they threaten death, even publicly, to persons whose loyalty to the Government is well-known.

On October 3rd, 1936, the Spanish Consul in Tangier addressed himself to the Committee of Control, protesting against the partiality of the Tribunal of Justice. The Committee declared that it lacked legal means to impose its will on the Tribunal, which is a marionette in the service of the Italian Consul, who can rely on the help of the consuls of Portugal, Holland and Belgium, and the indifference of the English Consul.

The Italian Fascists Attack the Loyal Newspaper "Democracia"

Certain that their acts will remain unpunished, Italian sailors, when they land in Tangier, set out to provoke the Spanish colony which stays loyal to the Government

of the Republic. Serious incidents occur with great frequency. On December 27th, 1936, a large group of Italian rioters attacked the offices of the Spanish newspaper Democracia : they caused much damage, and threatened to kill the editor. They destroyed the edition of that day, and also the files of the paper.

This crime went unpunished, thanks to the compliance which the Tangerine police, the Tribunal of Justice and the Committee of Control show with the wishes of the Fascist bandits.

The Incident as Narrated by a Friend of the Fascists

It is interesting to see how this attack on the Republican paper Democracia is recounted by Sir Percival Phillips in a dispatch from Gibraltar on December 28th, 1936. We only wish to note that Democracia is a Republican paper and not a Communist one as Sir Percival says. This mistake is easily explained when we remember that for a Fascist everything which is not Fascist is Communist.

Italian sailors again violated the neutrality of the Tangier International Zone by a surprise attack on the offices of the Spanish Communist newspaper *Democracia*. They came ashore early in the evening from the cruiser *Quarto* and the destroyers *Audace* and *Aquila*.

The parties converged, as though by arrangement, on the newspaper offices, situated in an obscure street. By the time the police arrived they had destroyed the current issue and the files.

The sailors damaged office equipment, but spared the printing machine. They threatened the proprietor with more severe punishment if he continued his anti-Fascist campaign.

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When they were eventually ordered back to their ships by the senior Italian naval officer they marched through the streets singing the Fascist song "Giovinezza."

By a curious coincidence the raid was planned at a time when all other foreign warships were away. The British battle cruiser *Hood* had gone to Gibraltar two days before to give her crew Christmas leave, the French cruiser *Simon* had gone to Casablanca for the same reason and the Portuguese destroyer had already arrived at Lisbon.

The nearest German vessel was the battleship *Deutschland* at Ceuta. Thus the harbour was left in possession of the three Italian warships and two tankers.

The first party of sailors to arrive at the *Democracia* offices spoke no Spanish. They made signs to the proprietor, Señor Solves, that they wanted to buy a copy of the paper.

A few minutes later others joined them under a petty officer in uniform. He demanded in bad French that Señor Solves should promise to cease his attacks on Fascism and publish an apology for articles to which they objected.

The premises became rapidly filled with Italians and it is estimated that finally there were at least 125, including other petty officers.

Señor Solves' family lives over the offices and his wife and children came down in a panic but were assured that no harm to them was intended. The bluejackets took the children into another room during the systematic destruction in the offices.

They declared that they came in the name of Italy and "Il Duce" to stamp out Communism. A large crowd collected and serious disorder was averted only by the arrival of a large force of police.

Later M. Lefur, the French administrator in the

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Zone, and the senior Italian naval officer arrived. Pickets were sent ashore to round up stragglers, and the sailors were ordered back to their ships.

On the way to the harbour further trouble was narrowly averted at a café, where copies of another Spanish Communist newspaper were made into a bonfire by a Tripoli Moor. There were many Communists among the spectators, but they did not retaliate and their unexpected restraint undoubtedly prevented the raid from developing into grave rioting.

It is believed that the Italians also intended storming the Spanish telegraph office which maintains communication by cable with territory under the Madrid Government. The employees, who were known to be well armed, barricaded themselves in the buildings and there was no attack.

Señor Solves, like other Spanish Communists here, has been responsible for many attacks on General Franco's Government, Hitlerism and Fascism. They led to his conviction under a law prohibiting the publication of articles insulting foreign Powers.

The Italian summary treatment of the offenders has caused strong resentment among the French and other nationalities. The incident is now being considered by the International Committee of Control.

The President of this Committee is an Italian, Count Rossi de Lion Nero, who will be succeeded on January 1st by M. Van Wijk, the Dutch representative.

Order is maintained in Tangier in the first instance by the police, reinforced by gendarmes, who, however, were not called on last night. In the event of disorders which they are unable to suppress the Administrator requests the senior naval officer to land bluejackets, who act under the orders of the Administrator. Normally the senior naval officer is the British Vice-Admiral.

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The German *Deutschland* and the French cruiser *Simon* arrived back here last night, and the British battle-cruiser *Repulse* is due to-morrow on the normal schedule of relief.

Recently the Italians here have appeared much less provocative, due to the disciplinary measures taken by the Italian naval command to prevent friction. Patrols here have been strengthened and liberty men have returned aboard earlier in the evening.

The international population of Tangier includes 9,000 Spaniards, of whom 90 per cent are said to be Communists.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS IN ITS RELATION TO SPANISH AFFAIRS

In this section we shall reproduce the documents which refer to the joint intervention, political and diplomatic, of Italy and Germany. From them it is possible to see the agreements—and accidental disagreements—existing between the two Fascist powers with regard to the Spanish problem. One of the most important facts in the course of the Spanish war, in the international sphere, has clearly been the recognition of the rebels by Italy and Germany; and this circumstance renders the withdrawal of the Fascist powers from their Peninsular adventure difficult if not impossible.

From time to time apparent differences have emerged between Italy and Germany on the participation of their dictatorships in the war against the Spanish Government. At first an excessive importance was given to the possibility of a rupture between Mussolini and Hitler. But responsibility finally made the link between them firm, and ended the illusion, which had been especially cherished in England, of breaking the Rome-Berlin axis in favour of non-intervention on the part of Fascism in our country.

Mutual Distrust?

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian wrote, on August 10th, 1936 :

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A further reason why Berlin is becoming more reasonable is that, although there may have been a certain collaboration between Berlin and Rome in the beginning, a good deal of mutual distrust has now arisen. Rome was disagreeably surprised by the extent of Nazi activities in Spain. The last thing Rome wants is that Germany should become a Mediterranean Power or should even impinge on the Mediterranean problem. Like Berlin, Rome wants the Spanish rebels to win, and the calculation was that German help would contribute towards their victory and at the same time diffuse and so lighten the odium that would fall on Italy if her intervention were found out, as it has been. The rebel victory would then be fully exploited by the Italians to the exclusion of the Germans, who, not being a Mediterranean Power yet, have not the same access to Spain that the Italians have.

The Italian attitude is known in Berlin, where it is felt that Germany has been "let down." Both Rome and Berlin are rather in a huff. The result is a considerable easing of the international tension.

Concern in Rome over German interference in Spain?

The same correspondent writes, on August 18th, 1936:

There can be no doubt that German help was also arranged before the rebellion began. Whether there was any collusion between Rome and Berlin is uncertain. According to recent information there is some concern in Rome over the extent of German interference in Spain.

What was promised to Italy and Germany in return for their help? According to information received here, the Italians are principally interested in Ceuta,

the Germans in Morocco and in the Balearic Islands. It seems that the rebels have not promised to cede Ceuta to Italy but to allow her to use the harbour as a base and to erect new fortifications. A similar arrangement is contemplated on behalf of Germany in the Balearic Islands, where she is to have the right to construct a naval base.

In Morocco both Germany and Italy are, if the rebels are victorious, to receive economic concessions. German and Italian interests in Morocco are almost identical, although again there appears to be no collusion between the two countries.

The Ciano-Hitler Plot

The journey which Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister and Mussolini's son-in-law, took to Berlin in October, 1936, was certainly of very great importance for the future of the Spanish war. It was during that visit that the recognition of General Franco (by Germany and Italy), was decided upon though for the moment the change was not made official. From the reports which we reproduce here it will be seen that Spain became from that time a subject of preoccupation for Italy and Germany of the colonial kind. In fact, in the policy of the two Fascist states, Spain seems to be confused with those peoples and zones of influences on which the Germans and Italians have set their ambitions.

Since, then, in Fascist diplomacy Spain is a problem similar to that of the Danube, Abyssinia or the Balkans, we must take into account the diplomatic activities of Foreign Minister Ciano in Berlin in order to appreciate the real character of Italo-German intentions with regard to the Spanish question.

Results of Count Ciano's visit to Germany

The following article is from The Times correspondent in Berlin, on October 25th, 1936 :

The outstanding results of Count Ciano's visit to Germany, as embodied in the various published statements, are the German recognition of the Italian Empire of Ethiopia and the formal description of the Spanish insurgent Government in terms that can be translated into full recognition at a chosen moment. Neither is in any way astonishing, in view of the known outlooks of the two countries; both have the character of tactical demonstrations rather than decisions fundamentally affecting European affairs. Nor is any attempt made on the German side to give them more importance.

A brief "*final communiqué*" issued in Berlin to-night says :

In the course of the visit of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, to Germany, the current political, economic, and social questions of major importance, especially those which affect both countries directly, were discussed in his conversation with the Führer and in his various talks with leading German personalities. The conversations took place in an atmosphere of friendly cordiality. To the satisfaction of both parties there has been established a concurrence of views and the intention of the two Governments to devote their joint activities to the promotion of general peace and reconstruction. The two Governments have decided to remain in touch for the accomplishment of these aims.

The recognition of Italian Abyssinia was recorded in a brief statement issued in Berlin yesterday. It was afterwards embodied in the longer *communiqué* read by Count Ciano at Munich after his visit to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. It is no more than a consummation of the German recognition of Italian suzerainty over Abyssinia already implicit in the announcement three months ago that Germany would substitute a Consulate-General for the Legation at Addis Ababa. If there is a price to be paid for this easy gesture it is presumably to be found in the privileged, commercial treatment to Germany in the new Italian Empire implied in longer statements.

According to German semi-official comment the step was a logical sequel to the common-sense attitude taken by Germany from the first with her policy of "correct neutrality" during the Abyssinian war. This attitude, based on the recognition of "hard facts," is contrasted with that of the League of Nations, which is said only to have prolonged the struggle by encouraging Abyssinian resistance and awakening fresh hopes in the Negus.

Care is taken to point out in Berlin that to-day's statement about Spain does not recognize General Franco's "National Government," but only the conviction of the two countries that his administration has found support in a large part of Spain and is accomplishing praiseworthy work.

Nothing in the reference to a Western Pact indicates any advance on the situation as left by the reception in London of the various replies to the British Memorandum.

There appears to have been some hope on the German side of extracting a Danubian Pact on new lines, to become visible some weeks hence, perhaps in connexion with the Rome Protocol meeting. The

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vagueness of the paragraph on Austria and the Danubian area in the *communiqué* may mean a not unexpected failure in this respect, or it may cloak more definite plans which require further preparation and cannot, perhaps, be exposed to the light until after the visit of the Austrian Foreign Minister to Berlin.

On all the evidence yet available, however, to-day's announcements seem only to confirm the theory that both countries—Italy, probably, more than a Germany which sees opinion and events in many parts of Europe developing rapidly in her favour—wanted a demonstration of friendliness and common outlook for diplomatic purposes, and that neither was prepared to commit herself deeply. Perhaps the most important aspect of the meetings has been the continuation of that consideration of what joint action might be taken in various eventualities which began in the first stages of the Italo-German *rapprochement* earlier this year.

Mussolini and Hitler agree to intervene in Spain

The same day the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Munich wrote as follows :

I understand that a German-Italian protocol initialled by Baron von Neurath and Count Ciano yesterday contains three important decisions. They are :

The formal recognition of Gen. Franco's Government in Spain will be made public immediately after the fall of Madrid;

A tentative arrangement is necessary concerning the division of German and Italian spheres of economic interest in the Balkans;

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Neither Germany nor Italy will enter into negotiations for a Western Pact with France unless she agrees to lessen her commitments towards Russia.

Count Ciano, to-day, gave an indication of German-Italian policy towards the Spanish Nationalists in a *communiqué* he read here before leaving for Rome.

Altogether the statement dealt with six outstanding questions on which, the Minister said, Germany and Italy had reached agreement. They are:

The League of Nations,
The Western Pact,
Austria,
The Spanish situation,
Bolshevism, and
Abyssinia.

Count Ciano opened his statement with a reference to the thorough exchange of views he had had with Herr Hitler and Baron von Neurath, German Foreign Minister. As to Spain, he declared :

“ We both recognise that the National Government of Gen. Franco will have the firm support of the Spanish people in the majority of the national provinces where it has succeeded in establishing order and civil discipline, in contrast to the anarchy existing previously.

“ At the same time we have reaffirmed our adherence to the principle of non-intervention in Spanish affairs, as well as our intention to abide by our international obligations in this sense.

“ It is superfluous to add that we agree in recognising that Italy and Germany have no other wish than to see Spain resume, as soon as possible, her former great place in the comity of nations with her national and colonial integrity unimpaired.”

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The last phrase does not appear in the German text, but Count Ciano added it in Italian when reading the statement, explaining: "I say this to put an end to the rumours which have been circulating recently."

From that moment Germany and Italy openly pledged themselves to contribute to a rebel victory by every possible means. It is now a matter of combined intervention, firmly agreed upon, with the aim of making Spain into a military base for the powers who were disappointed at Versailles.

"The Times" supports the Ciano-Hitler plot over Spain

Blind to the enemy manœuvre, the British governing classes still support the Ciano-Hitler plot, as can be seen in the following paragraph which we take from a leader in The Times of October 26th, 1936:

The reference to Spain in COUNT CIANO's statement, as is natural, is entirely favourable to the cause of GENERAL FRANCO, which "is supported by the firm will of the Spanish population in the larger part of Spanish territory." Few will quarrel with that estimate, or with the further observation that GENERAL FRANCO "has succeeded in re-establishing order and civil discipline in contrast with the anarchical conditions prevailing there hitherto." The expression of the wish of the two countries to see Spain recover "her due place in the community of nations with absolute national and colonial integrity" is no doubt calculated to dispel the rumours that the insurgent nationalists were bargaining away part of the Spanish oversea territories or islands. The principle of non-intervention is specifically upheld. The official attitude

of Italy and Germany towards Spain should thus not be incompatible with the views of this country, which will now consider with less hesitation the prospect of recognising the Government of GENERAL FRANCO inasmuch as the Madrid Government has brusquely rejected the British offer to help in the exchange of prisoners and hostages. The unfortunate captives are declared to be in fact not hostages at all but political prisoners, who have "intervened" against the Republic. It is known of course that the crime of many of the victims of the Reds has simply been to bear a noble name or to wear a crucifix; and the cynical refusal to entertain the proposal for their release must alienate the little that remains of British sympathy for the helpless and discredited Government of Madrid. On the other hand British public opinion will not derive much comfort from the thought that GENERAL FRANCO will inevitably have to rely upon the sword to maintain the peace at least for a considerable period—any more than it can from SIGNOR MUSSOLINI's offer to Europe of an olive branch sprouting from a "forest of eight million bayonets."

It will be seen that the consequence which The Times draws from the Ciano-Hitler plot could not be more disastrous: because Germany and Italy are preparing to recognise Franco, The Times would have him recognised by the British Government as well. And the main reason for such a measure of reprisal lies in the refusal of the Spanish Government to free the Fascists in the Madrid prisons, Fascists who for The Times are only innocent hostages! It is little short of astonishing to see a great newspaper embark on a policy of recognition for Franco on such a poor pretext.

Recognition for Franco as soon as he takes Madrid?

After Count Ciano's visit, Germany was of opinion that in the Italo-German negotiations an agreement had been reached to recognise Franco as soon as the rebels took Madrid.

The correspondent of the Sunday Times in Berlin sent the following wire on November 8th, 1936:

It is expected in authoritative quarters here that as soon as General Franco declares his Government established in Madrid the Fascist Powers—Germany, Italy, and Portugal—probably with Austria and Hungary, will formally recognise it. It is thought that other nations will then gradually follow suit.

Identical action by Germany and Italy was agreed upon during the recent visit to Berlin of Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.

Reuter also telegraphed on the same date from Rome :

Count Ciano saw Signor Mussolini to-day. It is thought that the situation in Spain was among the topics discussed.

Although no official statement has been made it is generally believed that Italy will recognise Gen. Franco's Government as soon as his forces are established in Madrid.

In the Vienna Conference the Fascist Powers, under the pretext of Anti-Bolshevism, also conspire against the Spanish Government

In the Vienna Conference between Italy, Austria and Hungary the Spanish problem was again discussed. The Paris correspondent of the Observer wrote, with reference to this meeting :

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With regard to the attitude towards Communism of the Powers who took part in the Vienna Conference and the attitude of Germany in co-operation with them, M. Jules Sauerwein expresses his belief that all four Governments have come to a decision that the creation of a Soviet republic in Spain would meet with their irreconcilable hostility. The word would also have to be taken in its complete and most active sense.

Italy and Germany recognise Franco without waiting for the fall of Madrid

On November 18th, 1936, Italy and Germany recognised the rebels as the legitimate Government of Spain. The text of both decisions with a brief comment was published in the Manchester Guardian, on November 19th, 1936 :

It was officially announced last night almost simultaneously in Berlin and Rome that Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler had recognised the Government of General Franco, the rebel leader in Spain. The German announcement was sent out by wireless and was picked up in Paris while the official statement was being made in Berlin.

The following semi-official *communiqué* was issued in Berlin:

Following the taking possession by General Franco of the greater part of Spanish territory and now that the developments of the past weeks have shown with increasing clarity that there can be no longer any talk of a responsible Government in the other portions of Spain, the Reich Government has decided to recognise the Government of General Franco and to appoint a Chargé d'Affaires for the opening of diplomatic relations.

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The new German Chargé d'Affaires will proceed in due course ("alsbald") to the seat of government of General Franco.

The German Chargé d'Affaires, who up to now has been in Alicante, has been recalled. The Chargé d'Affaires of the former Spanish Government left Berlin by his own decision at the beginning of November.

The official Rome *communiqué*, couched almost in the same words as the German statement, announces:

Now that the Government of General Franco has taken possession of the greater part of Spain and the development of the situation makes it continually more evident that in the remaining part of Spain it is impossible to speak of a responsible Government exercising power, the Fascist Government has decided to recognise the Government of General Franco and to send to him a Chargé d'Affaires to open diplomatic relations.

In Berlin the announcement came as a complete surprise, for officials of the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry, in reply to questions about the possibility of recognition for Franco, had been saying that no move was likely from Germany before Franco had formally installed himself in Madrid.

There is no doubt that the step has been taken by agreement between Germany and Italy. A week ago General Franco's brother, the airman Major Franco, arrived in Italy on a secret mission. Asked about his objects, Major Franco replied "That is an indiscreet question; we are at war and cannot always explain the reasons for our movements."

In Paris the announcement was said to have come "sooner than we thought," and it is thought that

Germany and Italy may now openly supply the rebels with war material.

In London it was declared that the British Government had not the slightest intention of departing from the policy of non-intervention. The German Ambassador, Herr von Ribbentrop, called at the Foreign Office last night to see Mr. Eden.

It is four months since the revolt began in Morocco. General Franco, who was given powers of a virtual dictator by the "Provisional Government" set up by the rebels at Burgos, has announced that he will organise a corporate state on the Italian model in Spain.

The English Press and the recognition of Franco by Italy and Germany. A leader in the "Manchester Guardian."

What was the reaction of English public opinion to this decision of the Fascist Powers? We will give the leading articles from various newspapers. First, from the Manchester Guardian, of November 19th, 1936:

Germany and Italy yesterday simultaneously recognised General Franco and his Junta of mutinous Spanish generals as the legitimate Government of Spain by withdrawing their Chargés d'Affaires from Señor Caballero's Government and attaching others to General Franco. Previously the Portuguese Government on October 23 severed diplomatic relations with the Madrid Government and recognised Franco in fact if not in form. Salvador and Guatemala have, one believes, already blazed this trail. There is nothing surprising in the action of the three Fascist Powers. Since they had already contributed materially to the Spanish rebels' success by supplying them with arms and munitions, the present move only shows

that where their treasure is, there must their hearts be also. With a Junta Government more or less working at Salamanca and the rebels holding down over half of Spain recognition may seem to be within their rights. It must always be somewhat in the nature of a gamble when to recognise a new State establishing itself by revolution. France, for example, promptly recognised the American Government which rebelled successfully against Great Britain in 1778, but Britain waited fifteen years before recognising the Spanish American republics. On the other hand, Hall lays it down that "recognition is not legitimate so long as a substantial struggle is being maintained by the formerly sovereign State for the recovery of its authority." President Wilson at one time went so far as to refuse recognition to new South American Governments established by unconstitutional means, but the present American view is that stable Governments must be recognised. Nothing, however, could be less stable than General Franco's Junta in Spain, and the wide crop of hatred which it is now sowing gives little enough promise of stability in the future.

Although General Franco may claim to be in control of more than one-half of Spain, there is no evidence outside the provinces of Navarre and, to a lesser extent, of Aragon that his power rests on anything other than the naked power of the sword. Whatever may have been the tortures and cruelties imposed by the Fascist regimes in Germany and Italy upon many of their subjects, both Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini may be said to have attained power by the will of the majority. In Germany the notorious "blood bath" of June 30, 1934, was actually of men who two years earlier had for the most part been Herr Hitler's enthusiastic supporters. General Franco, on the other hand, is deliberately advancing to power

through a blood bath. Why is Badajoz quiet to-day? Because hundreds of innocent men and women were killed by the Moors in the heat of battle. Why is all quiet in the Rio Tinto mines? Because 1,500 miners were "cleaned up" in cold blood. No one will claim that in Badajoz or Rio Tinto or even in Seville or Saragossa General Franco is popular. To-day the people of Madrid are fighting desperately with undying hatred in their hearts rather than tamely surrender the Spanish capital. General Franco has not dared to send forward Spanish white men as his advance guard to take Madrid, but has had to employ half-trained Moors for whose services he has bartered the autonomy of Spanish Morocco. If Madrid falls and Franco establishes his seat of government where hundreds of women and children have been slaughtered by the bombs from his German and Italian aeroplanes, who can doubt that his rule will be far more tyrannous than that of any other totalitarian dictator in Europe? Yet all the horrors of which we now read are only the logical consequence of General Franco's action in attempting a coup d'état against a Government freshly elected by free choice of the Spanish people. If General Franco's mercenaries are "patriots," as the Fascist press would have us believe, patriotism must be a mockery indeed.

It will, then, be a long time, if ever, before the rebel generals forcibly impose "stability" upon Spain, and, constitutional issues apart, the British Government would run the risk of violating the public conscience if it hastened to follow the German and Italian example of recognition. But one thing it is now the duty of the British Government to do; it must remind Germany and Italy of the principles that underlie the "non-intervention" agreement. If Britain and France withheld from the Spanish Govern-

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ment while it still controlled most of the territory of Spain the arms and munitions to which it was entitled, thereby handicapping its efforts to put down the insurrection, the Fascist Powers should also observe the embargo on the export of arms now that General Franco has achieved victories and obtained their recognition. It is true that it is already highly questionable whether Germany and Italy have kept to the letter of the agreement, but at least the London Non-Intervention Committee seems to have acquitted them of charges of breaking it. For that reason, and now more than ever, the British Government should press on with its proposals (whatever difficulties there may be) for a Commission of Control in Spain to guard against breaches of the arms embargo. That is the least it can do for the Spanish people.

A Leader from the "Daily Telegraph"

The following editorial comment is from the semi-official Daily Telegraph (November 19th, 1936):

At a moment when the ruthless bombardment of Madrid by Gen. FRANCO's forces is shocking his friends as well as his enemies, two of the signatories of the Non-Intervention Pact, Germany and Italy, have decided to recognise his administration officially as the Government of Spain. The stage of open recognition was doubtless timed originally to coincide with the completion of the capture of Madrid, but the tenacity of the defence has again and again postponed a Nationalist triumph, and the two Fascist States have tired of waiting for an opportunity of declaring themselves. A demonstration of this kind, made in concert from Rome and Berlin, without any specific occasion for the move, can scarcely be intended

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merely as a diplomatic gesture. It is to be feared that it presages a taking of sides in more than a sentimental sense, and it confirms the impression formed early in the Spanish Civil War that it was not from Communist quarters alone that foreign influences were at work in Spain determined to mould that State into a new political form agreeable to outside Powers, at whatever cost to Spain's unhappy citizens.

Berlin and Rome justify their recognition of Gen. FRANCO by the statements that he "has taken possession of the greater part of Spain"—which was almost equally true when the Non-Intervention Committee began to sit—and that in the areas outside his control there is no longer "a responsible Government exercising power"—which is rather less true now than a few weeks ago, before the desperate situation of Madrid had strengthened the discipline which the Government could command and inspired a greater unity of purpose among the rival groups under Señor LARGO CABALLERO. Gen. FRANCO has certainly subdued the territories through which he has fought his way; but the threat issued yesterday from Burgos that Barcelona would be blockaded does not mean the end of resistance in Catalonia. It would be premature to believe that he has fought his last battle, with Madrid still untaken, and the campaign which is making a shambles of a great city, raining thermite bombs upon its art-collections, is still only partially successful. There is in these facts insufficient ground for a decision which may have grave international complications.

Many morals might be drawn from the horrors of Spain's Civil War, in which the devastation prophesied for another international conflict is being inflicted within the boundaries of a single country.

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Those optimistic patriots in Britain who declare their willingness to fight, if necessary, but cannot stomach the idea of training and arming for defence, may ponder the difference between the war now being fought between more or less equally armed and trained forces in Spain and the monotonous victories of Gen. FRANCO against the undisciplined and ill-equipped Government troops of a month or two back. The gravity of the conflict is now increased by the recognition of Gen. FRANCO by two great Powers, who can hardly be prepared hereafter to see him lose. Further attempts will doubtless be made to draw our own country into an "Anti-Communist Bloc," but Britain will not be manoeuvred into any alliance in which the specious slogan of some political ideology conceals a grouping formed to further the participants' national aims. It is not fear of Communism which has brought Germany and Italy into an alliance with the greatest non-Aryan Power. In Spain itself a war supposedly waged in defence of the Christian religion is being carried on largely with Moslem troops. If other nations can so readily sacrifice their political theories to practical ends, Britain has no intention of attacking or defending one country or another simply for the sake of attacking or defending that country's latest authoritarian slogan.

Leader from the "News Chronicle"

The editorial comment in the News Chronicle was as follows (November 19th, 1936):

Germany and Italy have officially recognised General Franco as the lawful ruler of Spain—presumably in acknowledgment of his determined efforts to reduce the capital of his country to a smoking ruin.

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In a sense, this insolent proceeding clears the air. Fascist sympathy with the rebels, which was always obvious, is now open and avowed.

But yesterday's recognition is probably prompted by the desire of Franco's Fascist friends abroad to do all they can to give him moral support at once. They know that things are not going too well with him. They realise that his present exhibition of savagery at Madrid is itself prompted by the sense that time is against him, and that he must win quickly or never.

Their own new-born concern for the strict maintenance of the non-intervention principle is another sign of the way the wind is blowing.

Manifesto issued by the Spanish Government on the recognition of Franco by the two Fascist Powers

When it was learned that the rebel Junta had thus been recognized as the legitimate Government of Spain, the Spanish Government issued the following document (November 22nd, 1936):

Since the beginning of the military rebellion in Spain, assistance has been forthcoming to the mutinous generals from Fascist countries, assistance, thanks to which, the rebels have made up for their complete lack of popular support by quantities of imported war material and by that means alone have been enabled to continue the war with a cynical disregard for the non-Intervention Agreement which those countries signed.

Now they have dropped their masks. Franco the rebel has received the official blessing of Berlin and

Rome. Thus, for all the world to see, the forces that are spreading trouble and war in the international area have made one more insolent move towards the establishment of hegemony of the Fascist States in Western Europe. At the same time Spain's historic role as the bulwark of democracy assumes an ever greater importance and stands out in all its immensity. Recognition by the Governments of Berlin and Rome of this handful of traitors is, on the one hand, an attempt to bolster up the fighting spirit of Franco's forces to make up for their daily set-backs as they come up against the wall of steel of Madrid and, on the other hand, it signifies an act of perfidy on the part of those powers for whom the rights of peoples and international undertakings go for nothing.

Fascist Italy, that State which was condemned as an aggressor by the League of Nations and which employed in its Abyssinian campaign the same methods of destruction en masse of the civil population which we are witnessing to-day—without succeeding in weakening the morale of the population of Madrid—has found in Franco the puppet accomplice for her purpose of converting Spain into a disguised Italian colony by the addition to the Imperial Crown of Ethiopia, imperium in the Balearics.

Aider and abettor in this enterprise is Nazi Germany who has shown herself to be pre-eminent in the art of violating treaties and international undertakings, who remains outside the League of Nations because membership of the League would make it awkward for her to pursue her aggressive designs and who, with the connivance of the rebel generals, hopes to

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obtain in Spain those raw materials which she needs for her accomplishment of her war-like aims against those nations which refuse to submit to her domination. And in this attempt to reduce Spain to the status of a colony the insurgents have been using troops that belong to the Sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco while those nations which share with Spain responsibility for the Protectorate remain silent. The mere fact of using these colonial troops under the auspices of German-Italian assistance brings out very clearly the real nature of those lofty motives for the demand for colonies which those two countries are making. Not having received satisfaction elsewhere they thought evidently that they might obtain in Spain an immediate compensation. But to-day they find themselves up against a republican and proletarian Spain united in its determination to prevent any such thing. Our country has, after four months of fighting, emerged from the first phase of improvising its elements of resistance; every day the militia forces are being transformed into a regular army in the service of the Nation, its war-production is expanding all the time and continually revealing greater possibilities of expansion so that the war material available now includes tanks and aeroplanes. And thanks to the cohesion displayed by the various regional elements, the close collaboration of the Central Government, the Generalitat of Catalonia and the Provisional Government of the Basque Provinces, Spain to-day is one and indivisible, as is shown by the arrival of the Catalonian forces on the Madrid front. Thus Spain to-day feels that she is strong enough to achieve

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victory by her own efforts; she enjoys too the support of the People's Front elements throughout the world and specifically the support of Mexico, the U.S.S.R. and a majority of the democratic Nations; she knows that she has on her side all those who refuse to believe that world peace can ever be built up on those forces of aggression and war embodied in the Fascist states, those that are not prepared to see the international terrorism of two Fascist states imposing their will on Europe. It is not merely a solidarity of doctrines and ideas on an immense scale, it is support forthcoming from millions of free men who have taken up the cause of a Spain fighting and dying for liberty. This very fact means an obligation upon republican and democratic Spain to give adequate response to this display of universal confidence, to multiply a hundredfold its fighting capacity. It is necessary that our watch-word of steel-like discipline shall be a reality as hard and compact as steel itself, a single national will supporting the Government of the Nation.

In our present Government we have all the parties of the People's Front represented, all those elected by the majority will of the Nation on February 16th, which established the present Parliament. In this Government are the two powerful Trade Unions organisations, the U.G.T. and the C.N.T., to-day as always, in the forefront of the national efforts for the well-being of the Spanish workers, two forces which when working in collaboration are by themselves a sufficient guarantee of triumph. Thus let us see a general mobilisation from one end of the country to the other so that there is not a single corner of free

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Spain which does not have its share of responsibility in the war. Let everyone be prepared for whatever measures of rationing of supplies an extended campaign may require, let no one grudge hours of work or sacrifice, let each one of us feel a personal responsibility in his behaviour for the lives of those of our comrades who are fighting now on the Madrid front and on the other fronts of liberty; let every Spaniard take upon himself the huge daily responsibility of carrying out whatever task falls to his lot so that we may secure the future for all, our common future; one single will, one single discipline and thereby the assurance of Victory.

The Government of the Republic. (Signed.) Francisco Largo Caballero. Julio Alvarez del Vayo. Indalecio Prieto. Juan Garcia Oliver. Angel Galarza. Juan Negrin. Jesus Hernandez. Anatasio de Gracia. Julio Just. Vicente Uribe. Bernardo Giner de los Rios. Juan Peyro. Juan Lopez. Federica Montseny. Carlos Espla. José Giral. Manuel de Irujo. Jaime Ayguade.

Franco's joy at the recognition of his rebels

The feelings of the rebels when they heard the news of their recognition by Italy and Germany can be gathered from the following message, from a Daily Telegraph correspondent in Salamanca (November 19th, 1936):

When the recognition of the Nationalist Government by Italy and Germany became known at Salamanca, Gen. Franco's headquarters, last night, the inhabitants gathered in the main square, and, marshalled

by Fascist leaders, marched in procession to the headquarters, cheering Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

Gen. Franco appeared on the balcony and addressed the crowd as follows:

“Two nations, Germany and Italy, have recognised the Nationalist Government. They, with Portugal and Spain, form the bulwarks of culture, civilisation and Christianity in Europe.

“This moment marks the peak of the life of Spain no less than of the life of the world, and serves as a precedent for all those people animated by the common desire to carry on the work of disarming Russian Sovietism, the destroyer of all the Christian virtues and brotherly love of civilisation.”

An interesting commentary in the “Journal des Nations” on this recognition

The following commentary from the Journal des Nations was quoted in the Manchester Guardian in a message from its Geneva correspondent (November 21st, 1936):

In a leading article to-day the *Journal des Nations* says that there is no precedent for the recognition in such circumstances of a Government brought into being by a revolution. In all previous cases, the paper says, other countries have waited to recognise such a Government until it was firmly established and had in its hands the administration of the whole country. It cites the examples of the French Governments resulting from the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and from the coup d'état of 1851.

As for the Fascist regime in Italy and the Nazi regime in Germany, the question of their recognition,

the *Journal des Nations* says, did not arise, for both Hitler and Mussolini came into power by legal and constitutional means. The return of King George to Greece was also legal, for it was the result of a plebiscite.

The recognition by certain Governments of the White Russians, Koltchak, Denekin, and Wrangel, is no precedent, for they were recognised as successors to the former legal Government. Indeed, their recognition was exactly the contrary of the recognition of Franco, for it was a refusal to recognise a revolutionary Government set up by a civil war.

The *Journal des Nations* recalls the fact that the Russian Soviet regime was not recognised until a long time after it came into existence, and that some countries have not even yet recognised it although it has been in existence for nineteen years. It adds: "The American press is therefore right in saying that the recognition of Franco is the negation of all international law, and that if international law still exists it is a veritable provocation to war."

The *Journal des Nations* further says that it is the duty of the League of Nations to deal with the matter, and the duty of members of the League to bring it before the Council, whether the Spanish Government does so or not.

The Spanish Prime Minister alludes to the recognition in a speech made in the Parliament of the Republic

On December 1st, 1936, the Spanish Parliament met in Valencia. The Head of the Government made a speech in which he examined the situation at home and abroad. In the course of his remarks he said:

"From the international aspect, the recognition of the rebels by Germany and Italy and another smaller

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country stands out in the foreground. As all the world knows and as the Government has officially declared on several occasions, in actual fact, and in accordance with world opinion and the Institutions created for the maintenance of peace, the recognition already existed from the beginning of the revolt and even before. The two fascist powers have been the rebels' allies. At bottom, the real guilt for the provocation of the war rests with them. But for them, the military rebellion would have been crushed in a few weeks. The foreign armed assistance which these two powers have provided constitutes a policy of aggression which, carried on before the tolerance and passivity of the other nations, is the greatest peril to European peace.

Faithful, as always, to her international commitments and to the Pact of the League incorporated in her constitution, Spain has just applied to Geneva requesting that the Council be convened. Spain will go to Geneva as she went to the meeting in September, asking nothing of anyone and solely in the interests of world peace.

No other country has seen war, or is seeing war, at such close quarters as we are. War is here, European war. Or are people abroad not yet properly aware of the Note furnished days ago by the Minister of Marine and Air on the occasion of the attack on two of our vessels at Cartagena?

Because we perceive that a terrible world conflagration is about to break out, and because we take our obligations to the League of Nations seriously, we are going to Geneva in order to draw attention once

more to the danger that peace is in and to acquit ourselves of responsibility."

Intervention in Spain has united Hitler and Mussolini

At certain stages in the war there has been speculation, especially in the Press, of possible enmity between Italy and Germany on account of the intervention of both Powers in Spain.

The Berlin correspondent of the Daily Telegraph wrote, on December 16th, 1936:

It is rumoured here that the financial side of the Spanish war is creating difficulties between Germany and Italy.

It appears that Germany is being left to pay, out of her meagre reserves, the greater part of Gen. Franco's expenses, although it is felt that Italy would reap much greater advantages in the event of his victory.

But in spite of this and in spite of everything, the Italo-German alliance has been strengthened by the intervention of both countries in favour of Franco. Mussolini and Hitler, like two thieves, are tied together by their responsibility in crime . . . and by the advantages, in raw material and strategic positions, which a Spain dominated by them would offer to their respective countries.

One of the errors of English policy has been not to have realised that because thieves fall out, they do not abandon their prize or incline to bargain with the policeman.

CHAPTER SIX

PORTUGUESE INTERVENTION

*LISBON, HEADQUARTERS OF THE
SPANISH REBELS*

The behaviour of the Portuguese dictatorship towards the Spanish people will one day occupy a prominent place among the monstrous actions which history records. We have collected here enough proof of this behaviour, which is such that the conscience of every human being who is not deadened to the blows of injustice must feel itself wounded by the injustices committed. The people of Spain will never forget Oliveira Salazar, nor those who have collaborated with him.

We give the reports in chronological order, i.e., according to the dates on which they appeared. No other form of presentation was possible, because the articles which we shall quote have different themes. Therefore it was difficult to group them according to subject matter. In the course of these pages it becomes clear that not only has Portuguese intervention in favour of the Spanish rebels been as useful to them as the help given by Germany and Italy, but it is revealed as the most sinister of them all.

The Hostility of the Portuguese Dictatorship to the Spanish Government

In a dispatch sent to the Spanish Government from Lisbon, on August 12th, 1936, a well-informed personage denounces the policy of the Lisbon Government as entirely

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hostile to the people of Spain. The Portuguese dictatorship takes on a militant air in favour of Franco. The official press emphasizes that France is making a mistake if she thinks that Portugal will adhere to the policy of non-intervention, simply because England desires it. Portugal, says the press which Oliveira directs, is an independent country.

The Spanish Ambassador, Prisoner of Oliveira Salazar

On August 14th, 1936, the same informant sent another dispatch in which he reported to the Spanish Government in what state the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Sánchez Albornoz, was finding himself in Lisbon. The Portuguese Government were keeping him in a state of semi-confinement. He received no money. He was not in communication with Spain. In fact, he was a prisoner of the Portuguese dictatorship.

The Portuguese Press Publishes Appeals by the Rebels

On August 16th, 1936, the correspondent of the Press Association in Lisbon sent the following information to the London agency :

According to reports reaching here from across the Spanish border, a powerful column of rebel troops is expected at Badajoz shortly. It is said to be bringing fifteen anti-aircraft guns with it.

Colonel Juan Yagüe, the rebel commander of Badajoz, has asked the Portuguese press to insert an appeal for volunteers to enlist with the rebels. "After its heavy losses the legion needs experienced and gallant fighters to carry on the campaign," he says.

A Portuguese Loan for Franco

On August 18th, 1936, the Spanish Government received news from Lisbon relative to the activities of Señor Gil Robles, leader of the Catholic Party, in the Portuguese capital. Señor Robles opened an office in the Rua Arsenal, No. 76, from which he collaborated in directing rebel action against the Spanish Government. One of the measures of Gil Robles consisted in obtaining a loan of eighty thousand pounds sterling from the National Bank of Portugal, guaranteed by the Portuguese manufacturer, Señor Alfredo de Silva.

The Work of Gil Robles in Lisbon

We reproduce the following from the Manchester Guardian of August 19th, 1936:

The Portuguese press is almost entirely against the Spanish Government, and one of the Lisbon newspapers goes so far as to describe the War Minister as the "War Commissar." Señor Robles, the Spanish Conservative leader, is in Lisbon and is said to be in constant touch with the numerous rebel officers who are constantly visiting the city. Señor Robles is described by some as the brain behind the rebellion.

The 'Planes which Bombed Badajoz Came from a Portuguese Aerodrome

On August 21st the Spanish Government received from Lisbon a report which made the following revelations :

On an estate situated less than two kilometres to the south of the Portuguese village of Caia, on the

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eve of the fall of Badajoz there landed three aeroplanes piloted by rebel airmen. This estate was the property of the son-in-law of the Elvas industrialist, Señor Brazoa. On the following morning the three 'planes took off and bombed Badajoz. One of the 'planes appeared with a wing riddled with shots. One of its wheels which needed repair was replaced by a new one. All the inhabitants of Caia bear witness to these facts.

The Spanish rebels—*the report adds*—scour Portuguese territory in search of Spanish refugees whom they detain.

The Portuguese Police Hand Over the Spanish Refugees to the Rebels—to be Shot

Another message received by the Spanish Government on August 21st, from Lisbon, reads as follows :

The Portuguese authorities have handed over numerous refugees from Badajoz to the military insurgents, so that these may shoot them. Among those handed over and shot in such circumstances were the Mayor of Badajoz, Señor Madroñero and the Socialist Member, don Nicolás de Pablo. A Portuguese regiment refused to hand over a Spanish officer to the police, threatening to mutiny rather than do so.

The Portuguese Warship "Lima" Escorts the Rebel Steamer "Romeu"

The same day, August 21st, 1936, the Spanish Government received another report which contained the following information :

Yesterday the Spanish steamer *Romeu* coming from Teneriffe with groups of armed Fascists on board

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reached this (Lisbon) harbour. The *Romeu* landed ninety petrol tanks, which were immediately sent on to Badajoz. Then with the rebel troops still on board she set off in the direction of Vigo, followed by the Portuguese torpedo boat *Lima*, which acted as her escort.

The message adds :

It has been proved that the brothers Palha and the airman Bleck regularly supply oil and petrol to the rebels in Burgos.

Direction of a Press Campaign

Here is another dispatch received by the Spanish Government on August 21st, 1936:

The Portuguese wireless and part of the press, doubtless to test public opinion, manifest a desire for the Portuguese Government to recognize the rebel Government in Burgos.

The Rebels Shoot a Mayor and a Member of Parliament Handed Over to Them by the Portuguese Authorities

The same informant confirmed to the Spanish Government, on August 22nd, 1936, the news that the Mayor of Badajoz, Señor Madroñero, and the Socialist Member of Parliament, don Nicolás de Pablo, who had taken refuge in Portuguese territory, had been handed over to the Spanish rebels by the Portuguese police, and shot.

Portuguese Help for Franco Attacking Madrid

We reproduce a dispatch sent from the Press Association in Lisbon to the English Press, on August 23rd, 1936:

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Dr. Alberto Madureira, known as the only surgeon in Portugal qualified to perform Dr. Voronoff's operations, is organizing a Red Cross hospital, to be installed behind the rebel lines to aid them in their attack on Madrid. Dr. Madureira is now collecting medical supplies and organizing a medical corps. Many doctors are stated to have already joined as volunteers.

The Radio Club announces that three Communist leaders who had been seeking refuge in Portugal have been arrested.

This telegram is indeed expressive. The medical aid of the Portuguese Madureira for the rebels would be legitimate if it did not imply the intention to help the insurgents in their attack on Madrid. Apart from that, rarely have the heroism and the bravery of the people of Madrid appeared more nobly than when confronted with this news—the people of Madrid who have held out against Franco for three months, in spite of the help of the Portuguese Madureira.

As for the three Spanish Communist leaders who, according to the Radio Club, took refuge in Portugal, this news cannot be true because no Communist leader crossed the Spanish frontier. Of course for the Radio Club any Spaniard who is not with Franco is a Communist.

A Serious Allegation Against the Portuguese Dictatorship

One of the articles which most vividly illustrate the sinister conduct of the Portuguese dictatorship is the following, from a News Chronicle correspondent who visited Portugal, and went to Rabat (French Morocco) in order to write his report. It was published on August 25th, 1936:

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I went to Lisbon to find out exactly what Portugal's idea of neutrality in the Spanish tragedy might be.

I had heard rumours; now I know. Feeling that my findings might possibly not appeal to the censorship maintained by the Salazar Government, I have flown here to write them. Here they are:

(Here the journalist describes the war-material landed in Lisbon by the German steamer Kamerun. This part of the report we have quoted in the chapter on the war-material sent to Franco by Hitler.)

In Lisbon operates the real G.H.Q. of the military rebellion.

This G.H.Q. is in active relations with the Portuguese Government, while the Embassy of the Spanish Republic is kept in a virtual state of siege, cut off from Madrid.

Armed rebels drive in and out from the Spanish frontier flying the red and yellow flag of the "national movement."

I saw armed rebel officers in the Hotel Estremoz, a good fifty kilometres from the frontier. At Elvas I obtained all the proof I needed.

Portuguese police were handing over Spanish Republican refugees to be shot by the military at Badajoz and other towns along the frontier.

How can one define this kind of neutrality? What are the reasons behind it?

There is, of course, the natural sympathy of the Portuguese military-clerical quasi-Fascist dictatorship for a would-be dictatorship. And there is the fear of a "Red" Spain for a neighbour.

This is not surprising, for the Portuguese dictatorship has lived since 1931 in fear of a Liberal

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democratic Spain, to which the Liberals and Democrats of Portugal have looked longingly.

There is another reason: the Salazar dictatorship fears that a revolution is imminent in Portugal.

It dreads the fall of Oviedo or Saragossa, which might well be the signal for a rising.

How well-grounded are these fears I do not know, but I remember how widespread even the abortive rising in 1931 proved to be.

One hears that the Portuguese fleet, which has an embarrassing station in front of the capital in the wide muddy Tagus, is not altogether loyal. And one knows that refugee republicans from Spain are regarded as so dangerous that as "Reds" they are sent back across the frontier to face the firing squads.

I flew to Lisbon from Tangier in the weekly Portuguese mailplane over Spain, over which there hung a blue haze.

From a thousand metres who would have suspected the blood and horror below?

Off Cadiz lie the cruiser *Libertad*, a destroyer and a submarine.

The Spanish Republic's "blockade." What good is it now?

At the Spanish Embassy in the Borque Palace of Palhava here—interestingly enough it is the place where the plans for Portugal's independence of Spain were hatched—I ran into the most astonishing situation.

The Spanish monarchy had a genius for finding vast, gloomy palaces for its embassies. The great door of this typical palace at Palhava was shut.

I rang the bell. The door opened. An old man stood hesitating, then disappeared across the tremendous hall.

I wandered about examining the walls.

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The door then opened and somebody peered at me. It was shut again.

The old man came back and led me down a narrow corridor littered with plaster.

He stopped and opened a little door.

I stepped in and the door closed behind me.

Before me I saw a massive gilt bed. In it was a figure:

Don Claudio Sanchez Albornoz, the greatest Spanish authority on the Middle Ages, rector of the University of Madrid, an ex-Foreign Minister, now the Ambassador of the Spanish Republic to their sister republic of Portugal.

He sat up, pale, unshaven.

"I have been ill," he said apologetically, and added, "I am all alone. I am practically cut off from the world.

"And I am alone save for a military attaché, one consul, and a policeman."

His staff deserted him. His secretary is a young Spanish professor who has come to his assistance.

I learned there that the Embassy is practically beleaguered.

Telephone wires are tapped. Telegrams arrive mutilated after impossible delays.

For some reason code messages arrive garbled and cannot be read.

They have no way of knowing whether their own telegrams are ever sent off.

The Embassy police, even on official missions, are always shadowed and hampered.

"I do not know what is going on outside," said the Ambassador, raising himself on one elbow, "but I know that I shall go on representing my Republic—whatever the obstacles."

I noticed on the wall above his head a crucifix.

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Eagerly he asked for news of what is going on in the world.

To-day, when I left him, he was up, though feeling very weak and was on his way to the Portuguese Foreign Office to file a new protest.

"What do they say at the Foreign Office," I asked the secretary.

"They deny the facts," he answered.

These are the facts:

The real Spanish Embassy in Portugal, the "Black Embassy," another diplomat called it, is composed of the former staff of the Republic's Embassy, headed by the Counsellor, Señor Amsedo and the secretaries, Señores Villa-Urrutia and Canals.

They represent Burgos, the general headquarters of the rebellion, which is charged with diplomatic *démarches* and the purchase of supplies. It is composed of Marquis de Quintanar, Marquis de Foronda, Conde de las Torres and Conde de las Cortes.

In the background is the clerical Fascist leader, Señor Gil Robles, and at the side of him the "angel" of the movement, Señor Juan March, the Spanish multi-millionaire.

The gossips of Lisbon talk of a book of blank cheques signed by Señor March, which Señor Gil Robles handles. The Clerical leader lives in the seclusion of the Hotel Avis, with a heavy police guard.

He is loathed by many monarchists who consider him responsible for the failure of the Right to consolidate the "Republic" after 1934.

But there are fears lest some Portuguese sympathiser with Spain should dash into the hotel.

Active on the purchasing Committee is Marquesa de Rubio Arguelles, who the Republicans of Malaga say contributed about £1,430.

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The whole movement is prepared at Estoril, a smart resort a few miles out.

There the Generals Sanjurjo, Cavalcanti, Fernandez Perez held meetings during the spring. In May and June the hotel was thronged by Spanish officers, many of them on active service.

On July 17th, the day before the rebellion broke out, two Spanish hydroplanes from Africa, Savoias, No. 23 and No. 35, landed at the naval airport of Bonsuceso.

Enquiries by the military attaché at the Embassy were answered evasively by the pilots, and they took off. Since then they have returned with two others, Nos. 33 and 34, and taken on supplies.

I am informed that in the last few days Portuguese officers at Bonsuceso have objected to fuelling the machines.

The Gil Robles Committee seems to have unlimited funds at its disposal.

Three rebel officers arrived by 'plane from Seville a few days ago with fifteen million gold pesetas, which were immediately converted into open drafts for the banks.

I am reliably informed that loans have been raised through the Banco de Portugal and the Banco Espiritu Santo.

I heard that General Sanjurjo, one of the rebel leaders who was killed when his 'plane crashed as he was on his way from Lisbon to Spain, had four million pesetas on him.

The rebels have at their disposal practically the entire Portuguese Press. The Liberal organ, *Republica*, prints no Spanish news at all because it is unable to print what it chooses.

The rebels also have the radio under their control. So violent is the reaction among the Liberal listeners

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that a military guard has been placed round the broadcasting station.

Vast quantities of gasoline are pouring into Spain from Portugal. At Elvas I counted nine trucks heavily laden with drums.

I am informed that the State-controlled arms factory called Barcarena has sold machine-guns and grenades to the rebels to the amount of £3,000. An arms factory at Bemfica is understood to be making hand grenades for the rebels.

Here are other facts I have gathered:

The Spanish steamer *Romeu*, on its way from Teneriffe with a contingent of military rebels aboard, called at Lisbon, and then left for the North, escorted by the Portuguese destroyer *Lima*.

Before the last fierce bombing of Badajoz, which resulted in its capture, three rebel Junker 'planes landed in a field at Caia, within Portuguese territory. There wheels were replaced and the 'planes were loaded with bombs. They then took off to bomb Badajoz.

In a Lisbon café a retired Portuguese officer said: "Our police are sending refugees back to the firing squads."

Determining to find out the truth, I drove to Elvas, a Portuguese city and fortress on the frontier, twelve miles from Badajoz.

At Montemor Novo, a Portuguese flying the rebel flag. At Extremoz town, I passed a carload of rebels; there were rebel officers and men in an hotel.

On arrival at Elvas I learned that an hour before three armed rebels in uniform, accompanied by a Portuguese lieutenant, had driven into the city and, with revolvers drawn, had rushed into the hospital.

They were seeking Señor Granado, the Republican Civil Governor of Badajoz, who had sought asylum

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in Portugal two days before the town fell to the rebels.

As they approached Señor Granado's room they were stopped by the hospital director and told to clear out. This they did.

On Thursday Señor Madronero, a Badajoz Republican, and Señor Nicolas de Pablo, Socialist deputy for Badajoz, who fled to Campo Maior, the nearest Portuguese town, were handed over to General Franco's troops by Portuguese police.

Señor Narciso Vasquez, another Socialist deputy for Badajoz, who also sought refuge in Campo Maior, is still there, thanks to the efforts of a Portuguese relative.

I was told at Elvas that forty Marxist militiamen who had escaped the massacre at Badajoz by crossing the frontier had been sent back and had been shot.

Two days after the fall of Badajoz 400 refugees—men, women and children—were escorted back to Spain by Portuguese cavalry. Their fate is unknown.

When the police attempted to remove five Spanish loyal officers who had been interned at the barracks at Elvas with the intention of turning them over to the rebels, the Portuguese troops threatened them with violence. The police withdrew.

It is worth noting how the News Chronicle correspondent confirms several of the facts which were previously known to the Spanish Government.

New Confirmation of Some Monstrous Facts

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian writes, on August 26th, 1936:

There is a serious hitch in carrying out non-intervention because of the attitude of Portugal.

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From the beginning both the British and French Governments have used all their influence in Lisbon to prevail upon Portugal to co-operate practically as well as theoretically in carrying out non-intervention, but the Portuguese Government is entirely "pro-rebel," partly because it has natural "Fascist" sympathies but chiefly because it fears an extension of the Spanish Popular Front to Portugal.

The rebels have considerable influence in Portugal and in their propaganda, which has had some effect, they suggest that a Government victory in Spain would be followed by a Portuguese-Spanish war.

The rebels have been able to transport arms and ammunition across the Portuguese frontier into Spain. Several hundreds of Spaniards who fled from the rebels and took refuge on Portuguese soil have been handed over to the rebels by the Portuguese authorities and have been shot. It does not seem that Portugal herself has supplied the rebels with arms in any great quantities but arms have been landed from foreign ships in Portuguese harbours and have been transported across Portugal to the rebels in Spain. This apparently is still happening.

Portugal is, in fact, the chief "gap" in the "non-interventionist front." Until this gap is closed—which is only possible with the full co-operation of the Portuguese authorities—"non-intervention" must remain illusory.

The Rebels Organize Meetings in Lisbon

We reproduce the following from the Manchester Guardian of August 27th, 1936:

The rebel generals are clearly trying to gain support from Italy and France. An invitation to Fascists of those two countries to attend a monster

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meeting which has been arranged at Lisbon to "protest against Marxist atrocities" was broadcast yesterday by the Seville radio station. The invitation would seem to be an attempt to frustrate non-intervention and to play off the Fascists against the non-Fascist Powers.

Interesting and Scandalous Aspects of Portuguese Intervention

A News Chronicle correspondent writes from Tangiers, September 1st, 1936:

I have just returned here from Lisbon, where I was able to confirm that, in spite of repeated strong representations by the British and French Ambassadors, Portugal up to last Saturday, at any rate, was the military and political base of the Spanish rebels.

The Hotel Aviz in Lisbon is actually the central headquarters of the rebels. In charge is a mystery man, Hernández Dagila, alias Miguel Franco, a brother of General Franco, the rebel Commander-in-Chief.

Until recently he was assisted by Señor Gil Robles, the clerical Fascist leader, the Marquis de Quintanar and the Marquis de la Vega de Anzo, leaders of the "Fascist Phalanx," and Mariano de Amoedo y Galar-mendi, formerly First Secretary of the Spanish Embassy at Lisbon and now "Ambassador of the Burgos Provisional Government."

These rebels, who call themselves the "Lisbon Representation of the Junta of Burgos," act as if they are the legal representatives of Spain, and are semi-officially recognized and openly supported by the Portuguese Government.

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They raise funds and recruit volunteers for General Franco's army, promising a daily pay of 9s.

Permits to enter Spanish territory are signed by Gil Robles or Hernández Dagila.

These are recognized by the Portuguese frontier officials as official passports.

Meanwhile, the legal Ambassador of Madrid, Señor Sanchez Albornoz, is alone in his deserted Embassy, boycotted by the Portuguese Government and surrounded by spies.

The Hotel Aviz is even in direct telephonic communication with General Franco's headquarters at Seville.

As the junction between General Franco and General Mola is still unsafe Lisbon is the connecting link.

Portuguese newspapers are compelled by Government order to print 70 per cent of rebel news and 30 per cent of Madrid dispatches.

Writers who express sympathy for Madrid are immediately arrested. Even cables to British papers are stopped if they are hostile to the rebels.

Everybody in Lisbon knows that arms and mercenaries continue to pour over the Portuguese frontier.

The general impression is that Portugal's promise to adhere to the non-intervention agreement is pure farce. Portugal automatically considers herself in a state of war with the legal Spanish Government.

Herr Grote, Madrid agent for Junkers, the German aviation firm, removed to Lisbon a month before the beginning of the Spanish revolt.

Since his arrival in the Portuguese capital he has sold seven three-motored Junker 'planes to the "Portuguese Government."

This deal is curious, for in the last four years the Portuguese Government bought only two Junker 'planes for civil aviation purposes, preferring British 'planes.

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Portuguese civil aviation has been practically at a standstill since the Spanish civil war started. This purchase of Junker 'planes, therefore, can only be construed as having been made on behalf of the Spanish rebels.

In the first days of August and about August 15th, Herr Grote was seen in the company of German pilots in the Casino Esturil, near Lisbon. They arrived by boat and disappeared the next day.

As German pilots are not employed by the Portuguese civil aviation authorities, not even for the two Junker 'planes, the destination of Herr Grote's friends was no secret to anyone in Lisbon.

Grote's first assistant, a man called Hadedank, is a member of the staff of Austria's Honorary Consul, Herr Winner, who himself is a German and head of a big German export firm.

This close connection between Junkers' agents, the German export trade and the Austrian Consulate is typical of the ramifications of international Fascism. Yet they call it "a Holy Crusade against Moscow."

People terrified of the pretended menace of Communism do not perceive that in point of fact the Iberian Peninsula is actually the scene of an international political gang's plot to destroy democracy.

My investigations confirm the fact, exclusively revealed by another *News Chronicle* correspondent a week ago, that the German ships *Kamerun* and *Wiberg* brought oil and arms to Lisbon and that these were sent to Spain direct without examination by the Customs and with only Portuguese artillerymen supervising the unloading.

In spite of furious denials by the Portuguese Government these facts are known to-day by everyone in Lisbon.

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More Information Regarding the Sinister Activities of the Portugal of Salazar

The following despatch from the News Chronicle correspondent in Rabat amplifies the information which we already possessed on the conduct of the Portuguese dictatorship. It was published on September 3rd, 1936:

I am able to throw still more light on the peculiar conception of neutrality in the Spanish conflict which is prevalent in Portugal.

Without any fear of more than official contradiction, I can state that, fearful of "Red" and even of Liberal ferment, the uneasy Portuguese officials of Salazar's dictatorship are still engaged in sending back Spanish Republicans who have sought asylum within the frontier.

The most recent case, however, involves another Power. In the Spanish town of Alden Del Obispo a travelling circus with twenty-seven French-Swiss artists was caught by the rebellion.

The members of the circus staff soon found that the French subjects were unpopular with the rebels, and so they managed to cross into the Portuguese town of Almendra, in the district of Fozcoa.

On the following day they were informed they were to be expelled. Despite their pleas, they were taken back to the Spanish frontier and turned over to the rebel military authorities. They were escorted to the frontier by a captain and a lieutenant of the Sixth Company of Customs Guards stationed at Barco de Alva.

One man in the escort was arrested for remonstrating against what he considered to be a violation of international usage.

The French Minister in Lisbon made the most

energetic protest against the expulsion of his fellow countrymen.

From the Republican Alcalde of Puente Areas, in the Spanish province of Pontevedra, a man named Eduardo Casanovas saw fit, like many others, to flee the country when the rebels took over this province almost without firing a shot.

The Fascist Press demanded his return and threatened "extradition" proceedings. These were not necessary, as the Portuguese "international police" handed him over to the Spanish rebels and he is believed to have been shot.

Two Embassy police attached to the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon have mysteriously disappeared. In answer to repeated protests from the Embassy, the Portuguese replied that these police went to Spain voluntarily and gave themselves up to the rebel authorities. The two had distinguished themselves by investigating the activities of the rebel G.H.Q. which functions in Lisbon.

A Gloomy Portuguese Privilege

We quote the following from the News Chronicle of September 5th, 1936:

We print the following from a Portuguese journalist, dated Porto, August 28th:

You published that 2,000 marxistas were executed after Moors and Foreign legions entered the town.

It is true, but you left behind that some hundreds more were executed in our land close to the border.

We have the privilege to sweep out some 400 who tried to shelter in Portugal and as we do not wish to see our countrymen inoculated with marx-

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ismo we already had in the look out our Portuguese troops to execute any one coming into our country.

Those taken to our prisons in Elvas, near Badajoz, who had entered the day before their disaster were also executed in a mysterious way but we do not keep those pirates in our country.

Not a single Spaniard shall come into our Portugal belonging to the Madrid side. We are disposed to massacre them, with our means and if they are not sufficient, we have the moral and material support of Italy and Germany like the support of the Spanish rebels.

I can not give you my name because I am afraid you publish it and then be murdered by marxistas somewhere here, but I promise to send you some other reports for your paper.

Official Provocation Produces Two Effects

It will be remembered that on September 8th, 1936, a part of the Portuguese Navy mutinied in Lisbon harbour, on board the sloop Afonso de Albuquerque. Here is a report from a correspondent of The Times, published on September 10th, 1936:

Details are made known of the Government's preparations to counter the mutiny in Lisbon Harbour yesterday. Before the arrival of the sloop *Afonso de Albuquerque* a few days ago with 127 refugees, the commander informed the Minister of Marine by wireless that he was suspicious of the behaviour of a small part of the crew. From this and other sources the Government thoroughly prepared. At an early hour yesterday instructions were given to forts on both sides of the river to fire on any warship that moved.

The warships *Lima* and *Vouga* had already left for exercise outside the bar, but were recalled and stationed at the mouth of the river. In the city precautions were taken with machine-guns at strategic points, and cavalry and a strong military and police force were also in reserve. Before the outbreak a number of the crew of the *Bartolomeu Dias* and others went on board the *Afonso de Albuquerque* from the land.

The undoubted intention of the mutineers was to join the Spanish Government ships in the Mediterranean. It is considered that both ships in which the mutiny occurred can be repaired. At a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday it was resolved to dismiss the mutinous sailors without prejudice to criminal proceedings, and to punish the officers and sergeants who did not use their best endeavours to suppress revolt, and the commanders of the two ships as responsible for discipline. The prisoners are to be immediately sent to the colonial penal settlement and duly tried.

A note is necessary on this serious incident. Nobody who will reflect honestly on the matter can be surprised by what occurred. The press and the radio in Portugal (some of the stations, such as the Union Club, are given over to the Spanish rebels for their exclusive use) carry on a propaganda which is so scandalous and so provocative that it was bound to offer certain risks for the Portuguese dictatorship. After ten years of dictatorship it is not possible to irritate all through the day a portion, perhaps the majority, of the Portuguese people, with this political propaganda in favour of Franco, when they are unable to do anything for the Spanish people. For all such occurrences as that of September 8th the Portuguese dictatorship can legitimately blame no bogey but itself.

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A New Portuguese Legion

On September 17th, the agencies issued the following information :

The formation of a "Portuguese Legion," a voluntary army to combat Communism and Anarchism, is authorized by a decree published in Lisbon to-night.

"The new order which the army created in Portugal has endured for ten years," states the decree, "but there is now an enemy, Communism, which, disowning the family and the fatherland, wishes to overthrow the new order. Without any official initiative in recent days, 20,000 have volunteered to form a Portuguese Legion."

We should like to know whether this new Legion has been formed to combat Communism—even the Basque priests are Communists for the Spanish rebels and for Oliveira Salazar—in Portugal or also in Spain.

The Frontier between Spain and Portugal Disappears— for the Rebels

We reproduce the following from the Daily Herald of September 23rd, 1936:

A special envoy of the *Daily Herald* has been making exhaustive investigations into Portugal's part in the Spanish civil war. Here is his report, sent by radio from s.s. *Highland Princess* to avoid the Portuguese censorship.

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FROM IVAN POWER

On board s.s. *Highland Princess*,
Tuesday.

After inquiries in Lisbon and in a number of towns and villages along the Spanish-Portuguese frontier, I have discovered that Portugal is actively aiding the Spanish rebels in almost every possible way.

Though no arms from foreign countries are being landed in Portugal just at present, I am convinced that arms from Portugal itself are going over the frontier without restriction.

These arms deliveries, for the moment, are the result of private deals. Nothing is being done "officially" by the Government.

But it is obvious that the Salazar dictatorship, if it disapproved of this aid for the rebels, could stop it within an hour.

Besides arms, petrol and provisions for the rebels are going over the frontier daily.

A "Spanish Committee," nominated by the military junta of Burgos, is still in Lisbon. It is headed by the Fascist Gil Robles, Hernandez Dagila, the Marchese Orelliana, and Senhor Feirinha, and has the assistance of former diplomats of the Spanish Embassy.

For the sake of appearances, the Committee has now "separated," all except Robles having left the Hotel Aviz since Portugal's formal adherence to the non-intervention agreement.

Dagila and Orelliana are now at the Hotel Victoria in Lisbon, supervising the buying of provisions and, possibly, rifles and ammunition.

I was informed on excellent authority that, while the Lisbon-Madrid telephone is cut off, a private line from Burgos through Lisbon to Seville is still in use for keeping General Mola in touch with General Franco.

The same line enables the Spanish Committee in

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Lisbon to notify the Generals when supplies are coming through.

Most of the goods go by rail and the Portuguese frontier authorities raise no objections.

Sixteen fully-loaded petrol trucks, for instance, openly left the Alcantara docks in Lisbon for Spain last week.

In my tour of the frontier I visited Elvas, Estremoz, Caia, Portalgre, Castello de Vide and went across to Badajoz. The Portuguese garrisons, I found, had been greatly strengthened and the towns were patrolled by extra armed police.

In Elvas and Estremoz there were many women and children who had come as refugees from Spain; but the men had been sent back.

Last Thursday, I saw a number of rebel officers come into Portugal with the connivance of the frontier guard. They were coming to hold a conference at Elvas, presumably about getting more supplies to General Franco.

The Government-controlled press is open in its support of the Spanish Fascists. The general opinion in Portugal is that the rebels will soon be in full control of the situation in Spain.

It is definitely dangerous to express in public any sympathy with the Spanish Government in Madrid.

One prominent Lisbon citizen summed up the Portuguese view of the situation like this:

We think here, after seeing how the war is being conducted, that one side is as bad as the other, but it is always vital that we in Portugal remain on friendly terms with Spain.

As General Franco will soon, we believe, have the country under his control, it is not for us to quarrel with him.

**How the Spanish Rebellion was Prepared in Portugal,
and what Followed**

The Spanish republican paper Politica published the following report, on September 25th, 1936:

A conversation with an important Portuguese citizen, who has recently arrived in Spain secretly, has placed us in possession of many interesting details, all of them carefully proved, on the help which the militarist generals receive from the Oliveira Salazar Government.

Ansaldo's 'plane, coming from Spain, landed on the beach of Santa Cruz, where the authorities forced him to continue to the international aerodrome of Alverca. There Ansaldo quickly obtained the necessary permit to go to the camp of Marinha (Cascaes), which is used as a hippodrome, and where a 'plane can easily land.

The presence of the 'plane caused a good deal of agitation among the Spanish colony in Estoril, and roused general protests among the popular sections of the town. The machine was left practically abandoned on the field while the ex-General Sanjurjo and his boon companions ate and drank their fill.

When the very abundant banquet was over, Sanjurjo went to take his leave of Oliveira Salazar, who received him with great amiability, and sent with him Captain Lourenco (Chief of the international and political Police Service) as far as the hippodrome. This Captain Lourenco is the brother of a Colonel Lourenco, ex-Military Attaché to the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid, who keeps in continual contact with the Spanish rebels and is an intimate friend of Mola. In the wallet of a rebel commander, killed in Somosierra, was found a letter, of very recent date,

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written by Lourenco to Mola, in which he spoke at length of the sedition.

While Sanjurjo and Ansaldo were drinking, a Portuguese peasant passed by the 'plane—knowing its owner and its destination—and threw a handful of fine earth on the engine. This was the reason why the machine crashed in flames and Sanjurjo was killed shortly after Ansaldo began his flight to Burgos.

On July 29th three bombing 'planes belonging to the rebels made a surprise landing in Alverca. The crews, all of them Spaniards, and mostly military, jumped out, and went towards the officer on duty in the aerodrome. They spoke to him as to an accomplice. But this officer was not a Fascist, and when he heard that the rebels needed petrol, he answered sternly:

"I am not permitted to attend to your wants. You are rebels against the Government of your country, and the laws oblige me to detain you and to confiscate your machines."

The Spaniards believed that this was a joke, and replied in a bantering tone. But the worthy Portuguese officer made them see very clearly that they were making a mistake. There was a violent scene, but the officer insisted on the detentions, and on the petrol embargo.

But the next day the officer was transferred to another unit, and the insurgent 'planes, supplied with petrol, set off for Seville.

Shortly after the Fascist rebellion broke out in Spain there arrived from Lisbon in Torres Vedras six automobiles in which there were Spaniards and a vast amount of war-material of different kinds. The convoy was directed by an officer of the Spanish Navy. The Spaniards carried pistols and small daggers, which caused a very bad impression among the

inhabitants of the town. The rebels entered a café, and when they heard that the wireless was transmitting news from Madrid, they changed the station, and insolently announced to those present, in a threatening tone, that "listening to that Communist rabble, who told nothing but lies and infamous reports, was prohibited."

The customers in the café rose unanimously against such a piece of bravado. The naval officer replied with a "Long live Fascism!" and dozens of persons threw themselves like an avalanche after him and his cronies. The episode ended with the precipitous flight of the rebels who, as fast as their cars would carry them, drove to the beach of Santa Cruz—some fifteen kilometres distant from Torres Vedras—where they embarked all the war-material on a vessel which they had ready.

The cars were seen to contain Lewis and Leenfield machine-guns, which are those used in the Portuguese army: Portuguese Mausers, and aeroplane bombs.

The epilogue to this occurrence is edifying; twenty-four hours later a brigade of police arrived in Torres Vedras from Lisbon, and detained fifteen anti-Fascists, from among those who had answered the provocations of those intruders: they were taken to prison, where they still remain.

The official centre for help for the Spanish rebels of Vigo and Tuy is in the frontier city of Valença do Minho. These services are directed, with every consideration shown to the rebels, by two officers from the Portuguese Army: Captain Gomez, military commandant of the fortress, and Lieutenant Barlido da Costa, Government delegate: both of them are notorious Fascists and Monarchists.

Besides the two official aerodromes, especially that of Alverca, the Spanish rebels use two auxiliary landing

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fields, one near Barrancos, and one between Elvas and the frontier, not far from the Portuguese fort of Santa Lucia.

Coinciding with the attack on Badajoz and Merida, there arrived one day in Extremoz three lorries, driven by Spaniards, which had entered by the frontier at Villanueva del Fresno, to the south of Badajoz.

In Extremoz they were helped in a direct manner by an Infantry sergeant, and loaded on the lorries many machine-guns both light and heavy, the first of Vickers manufacture, and the second Vickers-Berthier.

The people of Extremoz, who were present through all this, angrily showed their indignation, which increased when it was known that the material belonged to the Cyclist Battalion No. I, which forms part of the Cavalry Brigade garrisoning the town of Elvas, and which is one of the best armed units in Portugal.

The lorries, loaded with arms, returned to Spain by the same road on which they had come.

On July 23rd a person dressed as a civilian went up to the sentinel of the machine-gun battery in the Edward VII Park in Lisbon, and showing an identity card, asked to speak with the officer in charge.

This unknown person was immediately received with every kind of consideration—Port wine, toasts and embraces—and went on to see the machine-guns and choose those which pleased him best. The next day the selected armaments, carefully packed in several cases, left the Park, and were sent to Spain. For proof, we are able to say that the machine-guns sent to the rebels bore the numbers, 23,246 and following numbers.

The privates and non-commissioned officers in the battalion, who saw all this, could not restrain themselves and reported the irregularity to their

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chiefs, who managed to remain uninformed of the protest, and did not let the accusation proceed.

From this information can be drawn the following important conclusions :

(1) *Clear proofs of the moral and material support given by the Portuguese officers to the Spanish rebels.*

(2) *The solidarity of the Portuguese people with their brothers in Spain, eloquently shown in the conduct of the countryman who put Ansaldo's 'plane out of action ; the conduct of the officer in Alverca ; that of the inhabitants of Torres Vedras : of the people of Extremoz : of the soldiers and N.C.O.s of the battalion of the Edward VII Park. . . .*

The " Lima " Arrives at El Ferrol

From a report on Galicia, which appeared in Politica on October 9th, 1936, we take the following paragraph which, in alluding to the Portuguese attitude, confirms our previous information :

In the middle of August there arrived an Italian ship, bringing a large contingent of pilots of Italian nationality. On September 22nd disembarked the crews of the German cruiser *Leipzig*, and the Portuguese warship *Lima* : after they had marched through the streets, to the accompaniment of stentorian cheers from Phalanxists and Requetés, and cries of " France, never! " and " Germany and Italy, Yes! " they were given a banquet in the fort of Monte San Pedro, which defends the entrance to the estuary of El Ferrol. The officers of the Portuguese ship even dared to speak from the balcony of the Town Hall, and harangued the crowd.

Lisbon Lives on a Volcano, because of the Provocative Policy of the Dictatorship

A magnificent picture of what Lisbon is like after ten years of Salazar's terrorism is given in the following article from the pen of the English journalist Ralph Fox. This article appeared in the Daily Worker on October 14th, 1936:

To the tourist, Lisbon is a clean, attractive city of wide avenues, green trees, bright flowers, "quaint" little narrow alleys carved out of steep hillsides over the blue Tagus; the Portuguese a quiet, amiable and ineffectual people with a cheap currency and attractively low prices.

You might be in Lisbon for a month and have no other impression.

When the revolt took place in the fleet at the beginning of September, hardly anyone knew that anything out of the ordinary had occurred. It was all over in fifteen minutes.

Yet the tourist is living in the capital of a country whose Government is almost crazy with fear. It was touch and go that September morning, when the forts opened fire on the rebel warships.

Up at the airdrome, thirty kilometres outside the city, twenty bombers were lined up, their racks loaded with high explosive, waiting the signal to go up and bomb to pieces the forts supposed to protect Lisbon. For the Government of dictator Salazar expected a general rising that day.

If the fleet had sailed, according to plan, the forts on the hills outside the town would have opened fire on the Government buildings and the barracks of troops loyal to the dictator.

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Two days after the abortive rising in the fleet outside the ultra-modern blue and cream façade of the Victoria Hotel, headquarters of the Spanish rebels in Lisbon, there took place a strange incident.

A Spanish monarchist, wearing his red and yellow colours, coming out of the hotel, was offensive to a Portuguese passer-by, "threw his weight about," as an English observer told me.

The Portuguese, most unusually for this docile people, answered back. A crowd gathered, hostile cries rose against the Spaniards, who hastily withdrew to barricade themselves in their rooms and to the revolvers they never move without in this friendly capital.

In a moment there was a spontaneous demonstration on Lisbon's most fashionable boulevard against the dictatorship, against the Spanish rebels and for the people of Spain.

The police, who are the most prominent feature of Lisbon's streets, with drawn revolvers forced the crowd to disperse, without daring, significantly, to fire or to make arrests.

Lisbon is a town making ready for a second earthquake bigger than the catastrophe which destroyed the city in the eighteenth century. The signs are all there.

You are walking home at night. You see a crowd, and hurry up. You are just in time to watch the riot squad, some thirty strong, drive off in their big patrol wagon.

They are armed with rifles. Mixed soldiers and police, a few plain-clothes men. . . . They have arrived just too late to catch the orators at a lightning meeting.

As you drive through the street one night, your taxi is stopped by armed police. They divert it down other streets. You have passed near to police headquarters when "something is up."

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On walls, in the parks, in lavatories, you see the hammer and sickle chalked or painted. The Government is in a panic because a mysterious agency is engraving a hammer and sickle on the spreading sail of the ship which adorns the Portuguese ten escudos piece.

All such marked money was declared illegal tender. The pieces grew so common this would not work. They had to be accepted, but if you tendered one you could be sure of a grilling from the secret police as to where you got it.

My first day on the bathing beach, at Estoril Lisbon's fashionable resort, a sergeant of Engineers on leave started talking to me.

He was sorry to learn I did not know Esperanto. In Russia they learn it, he said innocently, adding, for emphasis, *Soviet* Russia.

He tried many times in the afternoon to draw me into conversation on Russia, and it was clear where his sympathies lay. My only regret was that the nature of my work did not allow me to respond.

In the big hotels, however, there is another Portugal. Here flying officers in smart uniforms, covered with ribbons for all the wars Portugal has won, talk with the Spanish rebels.

Here Italian and German Fascists exchange their "Heils" and salutes. Here you may see little groups of Spaniards in earnest conversation.

They rule in the hotels. The monarchist colours are everywhere. At ten o'clock at night they crowd around the radio to listen to the exhortations of Queipo de Llano from Seville. As a rule all they hear is a hiss or a long howl as Madrid jams it.

I heard a Portuguese official explaining to a French journalist the country's new orientation.

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"We have left Britain now," he said. "Our friends are Germany and Italy. With the new Spain we shall be a bulwark against Bolshevism and anarchy at this end of the Mediterranean."

I listened to a Spanish follower of Franco explaining to me his country's future.

"Franco will form a strong Government," he said. "Portugal will be our ally and act with us. Britain won't like that, for Spain and Portugal together, under Franco's leadership, will be a great military power. There is Gibraltar. For three hundred years we have said nothing. But we haven't forgotten."

It only remains to add that Lisbon is one of the poorest cities in Europe. That the Government for all its boasted "salvation" of the country, is hopelessly inefficient, that wages are terribly low, rents high, social legislation exists only on paper, and the one thing it is considered indecent to mention in Portugal is how much people get for the work they do.

But dictator Salazar has just appointed a new Under-Secretary for Corporations and given a collective contract to the barbers. He has also cut the textile workers' wages and raised the employers' profits. So Fascism, resting on bayonets and the secret police, restores the national life.

"Since the trouble in Spain," a Spanish monarchist told me, when I described to him how my taxi was held up by a police cordon, "there are hundreds of people arrested."

That is Portugal to-day.

Portuguese Gunners Take Part in the Unloading of the "Kamerun"

On October 16th, 1936, the Journal des Nations published the following:

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The Austrian Press Service reports from Brno:

The Austrian C.C.S.R. has received the following information from a particularly reliable source:—

Austria is represented in Lisbon by the Consul Wimmer, who is the owner of a great import and export firm, which generally deals with the importation of machines, machine-tools and tools into Lisbon.

The German boat *Kamerun*, whose adventure of August 18th is so well known, was carrying a cargo for the firm of Wimmer. On August 22nd, the steamer *Wyberg* arrived in Lisbon. When the cargo was transported on to the quay, the Portuguese customs officers were withdrawn, and some Portuguese artillery officers, assisted by M. Hadebank, an official in the firm of Wimmer, supervised the unloading of the cargo. This was declared to consist of "machine parts." In fact, these were aeroplane parts sent by the firms of Heinkel and Junker, accessories which make it possible to change transport 'planes of the Heinkel and Junker patterns into bombing machines. The quantity of these parts delivered was enough for eighty to one hundred 'planes.

Hospitality of the Portuguese Dictatorship

The Barcelona correspondent of the Spanish news agency, "Febus" obtained the following information in the Catalan capital on October 17th, 1936:

We talked with a group of Spaniards from Estremadura and Andalusia who had been repatriated from Portugal. All of them complained of the lack of consideration with which they had been treated. They

had been the victims of every sort of persecution. One of them declares that they entered Portugal on September 10th, after remaining several days close by the frontier. "We did not pass the frontier before because the Portuguese guards put great difficulties in our way, which made us fear that we might be handed over to the Fascists by the Portuguese, as actually happened to some of our companions: some of them were shot in the bull-ring of Badajoz, to the strains of the Royal March: among them was the Member of Parliament, don Nicolás de Pablo.

"In Portugal we met numbers of Spanish citizens who had fled in terror from their homes when the Fascists had forced them to dig graves and to bury the dead. These refugees declared that many of those shot had been first mutilated. In Oliva de la Frontera more than 200 inhabitants were shot."

Among the repatriated Spaniards who reached Tarragona are two girls whose hair was cropped by the Fascists. Moreover one of the girls was barbarously assaulted. When the Mayor of Jerez de la Frontera reached the frontier he was not allowed to cross, in spite of the fact that he was wounded in one leg. Before the Fascists executed him they forced him to watch the shooting of his own father, a man advanced in years.

Nor was their treatment on board ship any more humane. The captain repeatedly asked them to return to Lisbon and place themselves under the orders of the Burgos Junta, which they refused to do. . . . "On the ship we suffered many privations. Moreover we were told that we should have to flee from Catalonia, which was just about to fall into rebel hands. When we arrived off Tarragona we were forbidden to give the clenched fist salute or to make any manifestations of any kind. A son of Lieutenant Borrego, who was on

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board with us, was confined in the hold for three hours because he gave the clenched fist salute when the Delegates from the Generalitat came on board to take us off."

More about the Treatment Received by the Spanish Ambassador.

Perhaps the English journalists quoted earlier have already said enough about the situation of the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Sanchez Albornoz, in Lisbon. But we should like to make known certain information received from Lisbon by the Spanish Government on October 19th, 1936.

According to these reports the tragic situation of the Spanish Ambassador should be emphasized. The rebels, operating in Lisbon with greater freedom than in the actual territory of Spain, every day sent threatening anonymous letters to Señor Sanchez Albornoz. They announced that they would kidnap his daughters, and kill him, if he did not accede to the demands of Franco. In view of these threats the Ambassador informed the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs of what was happening. Thereupon the Portuguese dictatorship put a police guard around the Embassy. But, under pretext of safeguarding the life of Señor Sanchez Albornoz, the police, acting in collusion with the rebels, devoted themselves to spying on him. The Ambassador ceased to have visitors. No one dared to go to the Spanish Embassy. What had happened? Simply this, that the police arrested everybody who had been there, or handed them to the rebels who imprisoned them in Badajoz, when they did not make them pay a heavier penalty.

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As a consequence of all this, the Ambassador remained completely isolated. Once a bank refused to pay cheques to him, and he tried to consult a lawyer. The consultation had to be by telephone. No lawyer dared pay a visit to the Spanish Embassy.

The Portuguese police opened correspondence addressed to the Spanish Embassy, and kept the letters which they considered of interest to the rebels. The cipher telegrams which arrived for Señor Sanchez Albornoz were also censored.

Finally, even the cook from the Spanish Embassy was shadowed about the streets of Lisbon !

Lisbon severs diplomatic relations with Madrid

On October 23rd, 1936, Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government, as reported in the following dispatch from Reuter's correspondent in Lisbon, (October 24th, 1936):

The Portuguese Government in a Note to the Spanish Ambassador here has announced that it is severing diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government.

The Note, transmitted to Señor Albornoz, states that the Portuguese Government is taking this step for reasons set out in the Note. The Government has telegraphed orders to the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires, who for some weeks has been staying at Alicante, to embark in a Portuguese naval vessel anchored in the port and to return to Lisbon.

The Note adds that the Portuguese Government reserves the right to publish at an opportune moment that section of the Note giving reasons for the rupture of relations with Madrid.

The Portuguese Note

On October 27th, 1936, the Portuguese press published the text of the note in which the Portuguese dictatorship attempted to offer reasons for the severance of diplomatic relations with Madrid. The note is a collection of cynical untruths. And the action of severing relations in itself must be regarded as a gesture in favour of the Spanish rebels. The documents which we reproduce in this chapter fare more than enough to reveal the sinister background of all Oliveira Salazar's policy, and the Portuguese note is only one aspect, by no means the worst aspect, of that policy.

The following is the message which The Times correspondent sent to his paper (published October 28th, 1936):

The newspapers publish to-day the Note from the Foreign Minister handed to the Spanish Ambassador on Friday suspending diplomatic relations. The Note explains that the reasons for this action were:

1. That although the Spanish Note of September 15th taxing Portugal with assisting the insurgents was not received in Lisbon till September 22, Spain did not wait for the Portuguese reply to the accusations, but submitted the Note to the signatories of the Non-Intervention Pact and to the League of Nations. The text of the Note was published in the European Press, in addition to its being submitted to the Non-Intervention Committee in London. Such behaviour, in not awaiting a reply, was against all diplomatic usage.

2. That the Portuguese diplomatic bag was violated in Spain by various Workers' Committees, &c. (evidence of this being adduced).

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3. That Portuguese diplomatists were molested in Spain, in particular the Third Secretary of the Embassy in Madrid, who was accused of relationship to a Spanish nobleman and submitted to interrogation and treatment not in accordance with diplomatic usage.

4. That when Spanish Government sympathizers were being repatriated by the Portuguese Government to Tarragona, the Spanish demanded to search a Portuguese vessel flying the naval flag, and a serious incident was only avoided by the prompt action of the Portuguese commander.

5. That the charges made before the Non-Intervention Committee that the Spanish Ambassador was a virtual prisoner in Lisbon were absurd, examples being given of the normal freedom he enjoyed and the facilities given him for communication with the world. The Spanish Military Attaché had been proved to have meddled with the internal politics of Portugal and therefore had been requested to leave.

The Note states that since the Spanish accusations were entirely devoid of foundation and instances had been given of Spanish infringement of diplomatic practice, the Portuguese Government felt it essential to publish the facts to the world, and that no useful purpose would be served by the continuation of normal diplomatic relations.

The Spanish Ambassador left here yesterday in the Blue Star liner *Almeda Star*. He was seen off at the quay by the Director of the Protocol, the Mexican Minister, and the Secretary of the French Legation. The Counsellor of the British Embassy, Mr. Charles Dodd, and the Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Beaumont-Nesbitt, are going to England in the same ship.

The Famous Exploit of the Portuguese Ship "Ciudad de Macao"

Serious as are the events mentioned above with regard to the attitude of Portugal towards the legitimate authorities of Spain, nothing can equal the attack made by the Portuguese ship Ciudad de Macao on the Spanish Guinea possession of Bata. Here is an account of the incident, according to the report which the Spanish Embassy in London communicated to the British Foreign Office on October 23rd, 1936:

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has communicated to the Spanish Embassy in Paris a telegram sent to it by the French Commissioner in Cameroon at the request of the sub-Governor of Bata, a Spanish Guinea possession.

According to this telegram, on the 14th October at eight o'clock the Portuguese motor-ship *Ciudad de Macao*, with the hull and funnels painted in colours similar to those of a German vessel whose arrival the German Consul had announced, appeared in these waters.

The *Ciudad de Macao* fired without warning, and at very short range, four shells at the motor-ship *Fernando Po*, flying the Spanish flag, which set this vessel on fire and sunk it. The Captain and the crew of forty of the *Fernando Po* were drowned.

The *Ciudad de Macao* then fired four more shells on the official residence of the Sub-Governor of Bata which did not hit their objective but caused great panic among the natives.

A few moments later four motor-boats provided with machine-guns were sent out from the said Portuguese vessel and threatened the said position,

obliging them to retreat to Ebeyen where the Europeans, the colonial guards and about forty militiamen are to be found.

Franco's Aeroplanes, and Aeroplanes of the Spanish Government, in Portuguese Territory

We extract the following from the News Chronicle, October 28th, 1936:

The British Government, it is announced, have satisfied themselves that Portugal has observed the Non-Intervention Agreement. The *News Chronicle* to-day produces further damning evidence of how this agreement is "observed."

The information comes from a British resident in Portugal, who has forwarded photographic proof of the assertions made.

The *News Chronicle* has satisfied itself regarding the authenticity of the facts recorded. They are these:

On Oct. 2—about five weeks after Portugal's adherence to the Non-Intervention Pact—three Italian fighter 'planes, piloted by Italians, were forced down at Portalegre owing to petrol shortage. The Flight-Commander's machine overturned on landing.

Eye-witnesses state that the machine-gun belts and the bomb-racks were empty, and the fact that the machines retained the reek of cordite confirmed the assumption that they had been actively engaged just before crossing the frontier from Spain.

Within an hour the two undamaged 'planes had been supplied with petrol, Portuguese officials arrived from the town, and an alfresco banquet was held in honour of the pilots. The two refuelled 'planes then took off for Spain to continue their service with the rebel air force.

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A lorry bearing a Seville registration number arrived from over the border with Spanish mechanics and the third 'plane was dismantled, mounted on the lorry and transported back to Spain.

The *News Chronicle* is in possession of photographs of the 'plane after landing—with the Italian pilot and Spanish mechanic in attendance—and of its departure in the Seville lorry.

Very different was the fate meted out to a Spanish Government bomber which made a forced landing at Alpalhao.

Realizing that they had landed on unfriendly territory, the two occupants declared they were deserters from the Government side.

They were not feted but arrested and held for "further questioning" for seven days.

Their aeroplane was promptly packed on a Portuguese lorry and sent across the frontier to the rebels. Photographs show the 'plane in course of transit by this means.

Finally, the two airmen were transported to the same destination. Word came later that both had been summarily shot on arrival.

The Conduct of the Dictatorship Alarms Right-thinking Portuguese

Before the scandalous conduct of the Portuguese authorities, some distinguished Portuguese who live abroad felt it their duty to speak in condemnation of such a monstrous policy. The following letter appeared in The Times on October 30th, 1936:

SIR,—We beg you to permit us the courtesy of your columns to make the following declaration.

We, the undersigned Portuguese, compelled to live

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abroad and hence able to express our opinions freely, are alarmed at the sudden change of foreign policy shown by the Portuguese dictatorship. This change, made without consultation with our national opinion, threatens Portuguese security and Portuguese colonies, and we feel it our urgent and undeniable duty to declare that:

1. We must defend our national independence as well as respect the democratic liberty of other States. Therefore we repudiate the interference by the Portuguese Government in the internal affairs of Spain, especially as that interference is directed against a Government elected freely and legitimately by universal suffrage.

2. We are convinced that Portugal's freedom depends on the very existence of her colonies. To conserve them we must continue the traditional policy of an Anglo-Portuguese alliance. We consider it treasonable to jeopardize this entente.

3. By proclaiming these principles we consider ourselves the true defenders of this tradition, which is based on mutual sympathy and understanding supported by geographic and economic facts. On many occasions this old alliance has been sealed by blood and the two countries have fought on the side of freedom, as in both the Napoleonic and the Great Wars.

4. We are certain that the sentiments and character of Portuguese people in their democratic culture require us to maintain close friendship with French democracy.

5. In this tragic hour that darkens Spain and menaces greater strifes, our fraternal sympathy is with those who defend labour and democracy against its usurpation by the oligarchic classes.

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6. We are sure that, if Portuguese people could express themselves freely, a vast majority would ratify these points which we have made.

Thanking you sincerely, we are, Sir,

yours, &c.,

ALBERTO DE MOURA PINTO (ex-Minister of Justice, ex-M.P.); ALBERTO ALEXANDRINO DOS SANTOS (ex-captain, ex-Government Sect. Angola); ARMANDO ZUZARTE CORTESÃO (writer, ex-Agent-General for Colonies, Member of Institut Colonial International); FERNANDO DE UTRA MACHADO (ex-Minister for Colonies and Governor-General of Angola); GONÇALO DE REPARAZ, Junior (professor and writer); ISRAEL ANAHORY (ex-Consul); FRANCISCO DE OLIVEIRA PIO (ex-captain and ex-Resident of Angola); JAIME DE CASTRO MORAIS (ex-Governor-General of Angola and Portuguese India); JULIO CESAR DE ALMEIDA (ex-Consul and captain in Mozambique and Macao); JAIME ZUZARTE CORTESÃO (historian, Member of Academy of Sciences, ex-Director of National Library of Lisbon, ex-M.P.).

Madrid, Sept. 21.

Portuguese Delicacies for the Spanish Rebels

We quote from a report made by the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Salamanca, with reference to Portuguese aid given to the Spanish rebels. This appeared on December 24th, 1936:

Although the Madrid front is still quiet I understand that there is no reason to suppose that the Nationalist advance will slacken over Christmastide.

The troops will enjoy such fresh delicacies as ham and turkey, which have been supplied partly by Portuguese subscribers.

German-Portuguese Collaboration Against the Spanish People

One of the most interesting items of news which has come from Lisbon, denouncing the intervention of Portugal in the affairs of Spain, is the following from the "Exchange" correspondent in the Portuguese capital, which appeared on December 24th, 1936:

Ten large three-engined warplanes made in Germany, and each costing about £20,000 arrived here to-day, and constitute the first step in the Government's programme of rearmament.

The machines are the latest Junkers product, with seating accommodation for forty people, and they can carry 4,500lb. of bombs. They have a range of 750 miles, and each has an armament of three machine-guns.

The above information calls for some commentary on our part. In exchange for what does Germany supply these—and other—tri-motor 'planes to the Lisbon Government? One of the conditions which the Spanish rebels bound themselves to fulfil when they received the first help from Portugal was that Germany would compensate the Portuguese dictatorship for the materials which Oliveira Salazar supplied to Franco. So, for instance, at the beginning of the revolt, Portugal gave the Spanish rebels a good number of tanks, almost all that Portugal possessed, with the condition that some time later Germany should supply Portugal with other tanks, more modern and more efficient. Germany has landed tanks in Lisbon before this. Were they for Franco, or were they for Salazar, in exchange for those which Salazar had sent

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to Franco? And those German bombers, are they for Franco, or are they for Salazar in exchange for those Portuguese tanks and 'planes which were supplied to the Spanish rebels? However this may be, there is one undeniable fact, that the arrival of the ten German tri-motor 'planes in Lisbon is directly linked with the help given by Portugal to Spanish Fascism.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REPORT AND FINDINGS OF COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO INTERVENTION IN SPAIN

THE Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of International Law, respecting intervention in Spain was composed of the following members:

Miss Eleanor Rathbone, M.P.
Lord Faringdon
Mr. John Jagger, M.P.
Professor J. B. Trend
Mr. E. L. Mallalieu
R. McKinnon Wood

The Joint Secretaries of the Committee were Mr. Geoffrey Bing and Mr. J. Langdon-Davies.

The first public and private sessions of the Committee were held at the Friends' House, Euston Road, London, on Thursday and Friday, September 24th and 25th, 1936. Subsequently, an interim report containing provisional findings was issued. During the following week additional evidence was considered and further material examined by the Committee which held a final public session on Thursday, October 1st, 1936. The Committee then retired for the purpose of considering and preparing a final

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report, sufficient corroborated material for this purpose then being within its cognizance. As appears from this Report the Committee's Interim Findings are considerably strengthened by the more recent information made available.

PREFACE

Miss Eleanor Rathbone and her colleagues have rendered an important public service. Their report fortifies the evidence furnished by the Spanish Government to the League of Nations of grave breaches of the "Non-Intervention" Pact persisted in by Germany, Italy and Portugal. The facts which this Report reveals and the conclusions it draws deserve the close attention of everyone, of whatever party, who cares for Parliamentary Democracy and International Peace. In Spain to-day, foreign aircraft and foreign tanks are overcoming the resistance of a Government which has behind it the great majority of the people. That is a plain violation of the Covenant of the League. It is aggression by a new technique.

This new technique is capable of application in various other countries in Europe to-day. If it is permitted to succeed in Spain, Europe may all too easily go into a disastrous anarchy of civil and international war.

At the beginning of the revolt the policy of Non-Intervention had much to recommend it. Had it been promptly applied and loyally observed, the Spanish Government would long ago have re-established order. But after two months of fighting, that

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policy is still being applied by Democratic Governments only, whilst the Fascist Powers are systematically disregarding it. The constitutionally elected authorities have thus been deprived of their legal right to purchase war-material abroad, their forces have been disarmed and left a defenceless prey to the foreign mercenaries whom General Franco has imported from Morocco and elsewhere. It has become no longer "Non-Intervention," but a decisive intervention against the causes in which the British people believe.

In these circumstances it is of urgent importance that the British Government should reconsider its policy and should find some means of remedying a situation which threatens the vital interests both of Great Britain herself and of the British communities beyond the seas.

PHILIP NOEL-BAKER

REPORT

On September 27th, 1936, we issued a short interim Report in which we set out the following provisional conclusions:

1. Before the outbreak of the revolt there was extensive activity in Spain by agents of the German Nazi Party, while Nazi propaganda in the Spanish language was smuggled into Spain through diplomatic channels. There is also some evidence of the supply of arms.

2. Large scale importation of arms from German and Italian sources and even of expert personnel was pressed forward from the outbreak of hostilities

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right up to the time of the embargo. Thus the initial superiority of the Government, especially in aeroplanes, has been changed to a paralysing inferiority, both in quality and quantity.

3. Deliveries of war-material, though lessened, did not cease with the signing of the Non-Intervention agreements.

4. Something almost amounting to an occupation of Majorca has taken place by Italy; Italian officers being in command of the entire rebel activity there.

5. Extensive rebel activity is carried on openly in Portugal with the connivance of the Portuguese authorities, in particular liaison between the Northern and Southern Rebel forces is effected on Portuguese territory.

6. In striking contrast to the well-equipped rebel forces, the legitimate Spanish Government's militia are now handicapped by a crippling shortage of modern arms, and indeed, in some cases, of fire-arms and ammunition of any description.

We have now heard further evidence and examined a number of other statements which confirm our former findings that assistance in the form of supply of munitions and expert personnel together with other forms of collaboration, has been furnished to the rebels by Italy and Portugal since the date of the Non-Intervention Pact.

In respect to German action, although the evidence before us subsequent to the date at which non-intervention was supposed to become general is less abundant, some of it is of a most serious character. We have received, moreover, a large amount of evidence

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showing German assistance both before and after August 8th, 1936, the date upon which the German Government informed the French Government that no war-material had been sent, or would be sent, to the Spanish rebels. An additional circumstance which raises a grave issue is that the British Government has, according to our information, been made aware by persons in its own employ of the breaches of the non-intervention agreement.

Even from the limited evidence which has been before us, it appears in our view that certain of the nations contributing to the international agreement have, without question, been guilty of bad faith. Other governments, among them the British Government, possess infinitely more facilities for obtaining information than can possibly be at the disposal of such an enquiry as our own, and these governments must have been able to ascertain that bad faith and breach of agreement which in our opinion has indubitably been established by the evidence which we have been able to examine.

The following statement analyses the evidence which we have collected under the heads of the various countries concerned.

In a certain number of cases we have been unable to indicate the source of the information or evidence which we have received either because to do so would endanger those who have provided it, or because the evidence was offered to us strictly on the condition that we did not reveal the source from which it came. We have, however, been most careful when dealing with such evidence only to admit it if we had the

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strongest reasons for believing its authenticity, and we have usually only referred to such evidence when we have been able to obtain a certain measure of independent corroboration.

Examination of Supplies to the Rebels by Various Countries

(I) GERMANY

It was evident to us from the photographs of documents found in Barcelona at the headquarters of the National Socialist Party that for some time previous to the outbreak of the revolt German subjects in Spain had been pursuing illegal activities and had had in this the support of the German diplomatic and consular representatives. We had before us the photograph of a letter signed by the German Consul at Cartagena, which speaks of methods of smuggling propaganda through the customs and from other letters it appears that some of this propaganda was in the Spanish language. There is some evidence to show that, just prior to the revolt, a consignment of arms was sent to the rebels from Germany.

After the outbreak of the rebellion, we have no doubt whatever that there were supplied from Germany large quantities of munitions for the use of the rebels. We set out one or two cases which seem to us well authenticated.

On July 31st a German ship the *Usarama*, left Hamburg for Lisbon having on board twenty-eight modern bombing 'planes and a cargo of bombs and artillery and machine-gun ammunition. This material was landed at Lisbon and we have every reason to suppose, delivered to the rebels.

On August 6th, the German steamship *Montesarmiento*, nominally a refugee ship, arrived at Lisbon carrying fourteen aeroplanes and nearly one hundred and fifty pilots, mechanics and technicians.

On August 9th, a German aeroplane landed by mistake in Government territory. We have examined the verbatim report of the examination of the occupants of this 'plane. In their evidence they stated that they had been ordered to deliver the 'plane to the German Consul at Seville and that it was intended for evacuation by air of the German refugees. Photographs of the interior of the machine, however, showed that all passenger amenities, such as seats, had been removed, whilst the 'plane admittedly possessed bomb traps and cockpit and conning tower for machine-guns. But as the crew of the 'plane also said in their examination that it had not been sent by the German Government, but by the Junkers Company, this explanation does not seem to us to be tenable. Indeed the testimony given by the crew is most confused. The pilot's explanations of his actions appear significant. He described how, though he had been ordered not to fly over Government territory, he had yet been told to proceed to Barcelona, and how this order had in its turn been cancelled while he was actually in the air, and he was told to go to Seville.

Under these circumstances we consider it is a matter for comment that the German Government should have used the detention of this 'plane as a reason for refusing to implement the non-intervention agreement. We have some reason to believe that this

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'plane was one of a consignment of ten and that it came from the "Sonderflotte," or Reserve fleet.

Mr. Koestler, in his evidence, confirmed the information which we had received from another source, that the German ship *Kamerun*, which was prevented by the Spanish Government warship from entering a rebel port, and therefore unloaded at Lisbon on about August 20th, was in fact carrying arms.

There is some evidence to show that the supply of war-material carried by Germany did not cease with the Non-Intervention Pact. Though we have not been able to test these later cases by oral evidence, we have had before us reliable documents which show that on September 7th, a train from Portugal, consisting of twenty-three freight cars, arrived at Seville. These cars contained fourteen aeroplanes in cases despatched from Hamburg. On September 20th, according to the same document, twelve German aeroplanes arrived at Tetuan in Morocco.

We have had very considerable evidence of the presence of German pilots serving with the rebel forces.

One witness, Mr. Arthur Koestler, a Hungarian newspaper man who on arrival in Lisbon had a German newspaper protruding from his pocket and was therefore immediately greeted by a porter as a German pilot, so familiar had the sight of these become in Lisbon. Mr. Koestler further told us that he had learnt from an employee of the Junker's firm at Lisbon that the Junker's agency had been removed from Madrid to Lisbon shortly before the outbreak

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of the revolt, and that Herr Grote, the agent, had been seen in the company of numerous German pilots. In Seville Mr. Koestler himself saw a number of German pilots in rebel uniforms.

An Italian pilot Vincenzo Patriarca who was captured by the Spanish Government forces in the second week of September, made a statement which we have seen. In this he said that at the time he was there, there were at Cáceres aerodrome behind the Talavera front some ten German 'planes and some twelve German pilots together with more than fifteen German mechanics. It is interesting to note that at this aerodrome out of the twenty-three 'planes listed by Patriarca, only four were of a type which the rebels could have captured from the Spanish Government. In Seville, Patriarca said, there were at least twelve Junker transport machines together with other German machines. Though there were Spanish pilots there, they did not fly and all 'planes were piloted by Germans.

We have heard the evidence of several witnesses who have visited the various fronts in Spain, among these were Mr. George Stolz, the Assistant Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, Viscount Churchill who was a Staff Officer in France during the Great War, Alderman William Dobbie, M.P., and Mr. Claud Cockburn, an English newspaper correspondent. Three of them had personally observed Government troops being attacked by aeroplanes, which they were able to identify as Junkers from their resemblance to the captured German 'plane to which we have already alluded.

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Mr. Cockburn who was at that time serving in the front line as a militiaman, described these 'planes as the sole factor which enabled the advance of the enemy in the sector where he was. Alderman Dobbie brought back with him an unburnt incendiary bomb which was dropped in the Toledo sector around September the 8th. There can be no doubt that this bomb which we have examined was of German manufacture.

To such an extent have German Junker 'planes become the main feature of the Rebel Air Force that a rebel newspaper published in Vigo, in describing an aerial bombardment, speaks in a headline of "Our National Junkers." This is the more remarkable because we have had before us the statement of the Spanish Air Ministry which shows that previous to the revolt, the Spanish Air Force did not possess any Junker 'planes.

A further serious violation of non-intervention was reported to us by Mr. William E. Dodd, the son of the American Ambassador in Berlin, who himself saw as recently as September 25th, when he was at Vigo, a rebel port in Northern Spain, some fifteen armed volunteers land carrying full arms and equipment from a German ship.

(2) ITALY

We have before us considerable evidence of Italian intervention. Three witnesses described to us the present state of Majorca, the chief island in the Balearic group, which appears for all practical purposes to be occupied by Italy. A vivid picture was

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brought before us of the preparation for the revolt undertaken both by German National Socialist agents and by the Italian Count Gonfarelli. One witness, Mr. Karl Otten, whose bedroom in the Hotel Mediterraneo in Palma overlooked the harbour, actually saw Italian 'planes being unloaded from Italian ships; another witness, Mr. Arthur Sechoff, told us that these deliveries were still continuing on September 2nd when Italy had already agreed to the Non-Intervention Pact. Mr. Sechoff described to us the scene at the fête held in Palma on the 6th September to celebrate the withdrawal of the Government troops. Count di Rossi rode on a white horse in the centre of the troops clad in a fantastic uniform consisting of knickers and gaiters, a Tyrolese coat, a steel helmet and a large sash of Italian colours.

A retired British officer who had lived fourteen years in Majorca, produced to us a letter written on September 15th by a close friend of his from the Island. Italian intervention was described in the following terms:

The situation in Majorca is that it is in the hands of the Italians. We have always in the port Italian battleships and every week at least one Italian cargo boat unloading guns, 'planes, bombs, anti-aircraft guns and sending them all through Majorca. Not only that, but the Italian Army flyers, soldiers, sailors, officers, are living here and they behave as the owners of the Island. The Chief of the Majorca Forces is the Italian Conte di Rossi. . . .

The following other cases of Italian intervention at Majorca have been reported to us.

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On September the 6th, three Italian bombing 'planes arrived at Palma.

On September the 7th, the Italian ship *Nereide* from Genoa unloaded at Palma 360 tons of war-material, including a number of large bombs.

There is also considerable evidence of Italian intervention on the mainland. Patriarca, the captured Italian airman, whose statements we have seen, described himself as a member of the Italian Air Force Reserve, and stated that he was accompanied by other airmen who were pilots in one of the three squadrons of Italian Fiat 'planes which came from Italy. Though on August 6th Italy when adhering in principle to non-intervention had enquired whether moral solidarity with one of the parties in conflict did not in itself constitute intervention and whether the engagement of non-intervention would have a universal character binding individuals as well as governments, Patriarca, when at Melilla a rebel town in Morocco, was entertained by the Italian Consul together with other Italian pilots serving with the rebels.

We have seen the identification plates from Patriarca's 'plane and his parachute which is dated as having left the Italian factory on July 16th, 1936, and must therefore inevitably have been exported to rebel territory after the outbreak of the revolt on July 18th. Patriarca said that there were at the rebel aerodrome at Cáceres near Badajoz six Italian pilots and three mechanics and nine Fiat 'planes. In Seville there were to his knowledge, six Fiat and five Savoia 'planes.

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We have had information of the following further cases of Italian intervention on the mainland.

Between August 28th and August 31st, at least twenty Italian 'planes accompanied by Italian pilots, were unloaded at the rebel port of Vigo in Northern Spain; we have reason to believe this was well-known to the British Government.

From a written statement made to us by a resident in Morocco whose name we cannot disclose, as to do so might endanger him but who is well-known personally to one member of our Committee, we have evidence which is confirmed from another source that on September 12th, twelve days after Italy's final acceptance of the Non-Intervention Pact, an Italian boat the *Alicantino* unloaded at Río Martín near Tetuan unassembled aeroplanes and arms and, we have reason to believe, gas bombs.

On September 20th—that is nearly three weeks after Italy's adhesion to the Non-Intervention Pact—we had evidence that a large consignment of Italian aeroplanes was unloaded at Vigo. On this point we heard evidence from Mr. William E. Dodd, Junior, who was on a German steamer the *General San Martin*, at Vigo. He stated that he had been told on September 25th by the British Pro-Consul, that the Italians had delivered this cargo some three or four days previously, that is to say about 19th or 20th of September. Mr. Dodd said that he remarked on this to the Pro-Consul, who replied that the Pact had no meaning; it was being openly violated.

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(3) PORTUGAL

Owing to its peculiar geographic position, Portugal must play an important part in the control of the supply of arms to the rebels. All the evidence which we have had before us has gone to show that Portugal has abused this position and has openly supported the rebels and is still continuing to do so. It is quite certain that both before and after the Non-Intervention Pact, Portugal has allowed her territories to be used as a base from which the rebels can attack the Spanish Government.

Mr Koestler described to us how the Ambassador of the Spanish Government was kept a prisoner in his Embassy, while an unofficial Embassy representing the rebels and established in the Hotel Aviz, was accepted by the Portuguese authorities. Mr. Koestler had an opportunity to talk with these rebel representatives and they explained to him that through the help of the Portuguese Government, they were able to exchange pesetas at the old former pre-rebellion rate, which meant in effect that they were receiving a considerable subsidy. Telephonic communication was maintained between Lisbon and Seville but was reserved exclusively for rebel use. We have seen the visiting card of Mariano de Amoedo y Galarmendi formerly First Secretary in the Spanish Embassy and now head of the rebel "Embassy," in which he describes himself as *Chargé d'Affaires for Spain ad interim*.

In August, as has been stated, German ships unloaded cargoes of war-material in Lisbon Harbour

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which were then transported to Spain. It appears, however, that after the Portuguese adherence to the Non-Intervention Pact, this form of support for the rebels ceased for a time. We had the evidence of Mr. Dodd and Mr. Ivan Power, special correspondent of the *Daily Herald*, who both agreed that while they were in Portugal, no arms were unloaded at Lisbon. We have, however, received information that on September 29th, a consignment of war-material which included poison gas, was landed at Lisbon and sent to the Spanish frontier. This information we have been unable to check by oral evidence.

In his statement, the Italian airman Patriarca said that he had been allowed to use the Portuguese flying field of Abrunheira Portalegre. We have received further well documented accounts of the use by the rebels of the Portuguese flying field of Caias.

At the frontier near Elvas, Mr. Ivan Power saw in the second week in September a rebel car flying the rebel flag and containing armed rebels, cross the Portuguese frontier. He managed to secure two photographs of the car which he has shown to us. On making subsequent enquiries, he is told that the rebels were proceeding to Elvas (a Portuguese town) for a conference.

The other recent cases of Portuguese intervention of which we have information, are the following:

On September 4th, a tank said to be Portuguese and manned by Portuguese officers crossed the frontier into Spain at Badajoz.

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On September 7th, a truck of explosives from the Portuguese Government factory of La Barcarena was sent to Cáceres in Spain. In this connection it is interesting to note that Mr. Ivan Power said that it was his belief that war-material was still leaving Portugal for Spain—even after the conclusion of the Non-Intervention Pact.

We had evidence of the following cases of intervention in August, that is to say before the final signing of the Non-Intervention Pact.

On August 8th, five lorries whose numbers we possess, were loaded with munitions at Evora in Portugal and afterwards left for Spain.

On August 9th, a Portuguese steamship the *Santa Irene* discharged war-material at Ceuta in Spanish Morocco.

On August 10th another Spanish ship the *Pedro d'Alemquer* discharged war-material at Lisbon. The same day lorries laden with war-material, left Vedras for Galicia (Spain).

On August 19th, 300,000 Escudos worth of military material from the State munition factory of La Carcarena was sent to Spain.

Analysis of the Evidence

The evidence which the Committee received may be divided under four heads:

1. Evidence from persons who visited territory under Government control supplemented by documents and material obtained from the same source.
2. Evidence of persons who visited rebel and Portuguese territory.

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3. Evidence of persons normally resident in Spanish territory which is now occupied by the rebel forces.

4. Documents of an official and semi-official nature among which are included the records of the examination of the German and Italian pilots who were captured and the German documents seized in the Nazi Headquarters in Barcelona.

1. The witnesses examined under this head were (a) M. Georges Stolz, the Assistant Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who was in Spain from the 10th to 15th of September and who visited the Alcázar and the Talavera fronts. (b) Alderman William Dobbie, M.P., who was in Spain from September 16th until the 21st and who visited the Alcázar frontier. (c) Viscount Churchill, who went to Spain at the end of last August and returned on September 27th, and who visited the Aragon and the Madrid fronts. (d) Mr. Claud Cockburn, an English journalist who had visited all of the fronts on the mainland with the exception of that in the north, and who had been in Spain from the beginning of the revolt and only returned on September 16th. (e) Viscount Hastings and (f) Mrs. Isabel Brown, who confirmed the evidence of Mr. Stolz and Alderman Dobbie, and who produced photographs of the captured German Junkers' plane. (g) Mr. Seymour Cocks, M.P., whose evidence we heard in private and who, accompanied by Alderman Dobbie, Lord Hastings and Mrs. Brown, had visited the leading members of the Government and had discussed with them the situation. These witnesses

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had brought back from Spain with them various interesting material which included copies of documents, found on the bodies of foreign rebel airmen, an incendiary bomb, the identification plates of various aeroplanes, and an Italian parachute. These witnesses furthermore were unanimous in describing the overwhelming superiority in armaments enjoyed by the rebels. This disparity between the forces will be best indicated by the following, amongst many other, passages in the evidence.

Mr. Dobbie said that on the morning of September 1st, he saw troops marching through the streets of Madrid, only the first four or five ranks had rifles, the rest were marching to the front "with clubs, sticks and knives."

Lord Churchill spoke of the entire absence of ammunition dumps on the Aragon front, and Mr. Stolz told us that during the bombardment of the Alcázar the Government artillery were so short of munitions that they could only fire one shell every eight or nine minutes.

Lord Hastings described civil aeroplanes setting out to bomb the rebel lines unaccompanied by pursuit 'planes. The only method of discharging the bombs was to throw them through the door of the 'plane.

This evidence confirmed our information from other sources that the Spanish Government lacks sufficient arms to conduct effectively the war against the rebels. It was further made plain to Mr. Seymour Cocks who interviewed leading members of the Government, that the abundant supply of arms to the rebels was having a disastrous effect upon the

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position of the Government which, though secured of the support of the great majority of the population, suffered from a grave shortage of munitions, especially aircraft.

Mr. Cocks suggested to one member of the Government that if the Non-Intervention Agreement were to be abandoned, more arms would be supplied to the rebels than to the Government. To this the member of the Government in question replied that the Spanish Government would be prepared to take the risk rather than wait while the British and French Governments made further efforts to make the embargo watertight.

2. We heard three witnesses who had visited Portugal, Mr. Arthur Koestler, a well-known Hungarian journalist who was in Lisbon on August 25th and 26th, as the special correspondent of the *News Chronicle*. Mr. Ivan Power who was in Lisbon in the middle of September as the special correspondent of the *Daily Herald*, and Mr. William E. Dodd, the son of the American Ambassador in Berlin who arrived in Lisbon on September 18th and left on September 23rd. Mr. Koestler also visited Seville, the headquarters of the rebel army in the South on August 27th and 28th, and Mr. Dodd was in the northern rebel port of Vigo on September 25th.

3. Evidence from residents in rebel territory was confined to three witnesses who came from Majorca in the Balearic Islands. One of these, a Majorcan resident we heard in private. The two witnesses who we heard in public were Mr. Karl Otten, a German author of repute, and Mr. Arthur Sechoff, a German

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refugee. Mr. Otten left Palma on August 26th and Mr. Sechoff on September 6th. We also had submitted to us by a retired British officer, who did not wish his name to be given but described himself as a British Imperialist and a member of the Conservative Party long resident in Majorca, a letter written from Majorca on September 15th, to which reference has been previously made.

4. We were able to satisfy ourselves by oral evidence that the photographs of the documents shown to us were photographs of the documents seized in Barcelona.

Historical Résumé of the Events Leading to the Revolt

As the question has been raised as to the constitution and legality of the present Spanish Government, we think it of importance to include a short résumé of its history and the events leading up to the present revolt, which has been prepared for us by the Union of Democratic Control.

On February 16th, 1936, elections were held for the Spanish Cortes. These elections were on the basis of the electoral law of 1933 on a system usually known as that of the "limited vote."

As a result of pre-electoral arrangements only three lists of candidates were offered in the majority of constituencies; those of the Right comprising Monarchists, Right Republicans, the Gil Robles Catholic Party and Fascists, those of the Centre and those of the Left comprising Left Republicans, Socialists, Communists and Catalonian Left parties.

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The result of the elections was to give 265 seats to the Left parties, 144 to the Right and 64 to the Centre parties.

It should be remembered that the holding of the election was in the hands of the Right Wing Government parties, Lerroux-Gil Robles and consequently no question of their manipulation in the interest of the Left can arise. The elections undoubtedly were, and were considered to be, perfectly valid and constitutional. It has subsequently been stated that the actual number of votes cast for the Right parties in the elections was greater than those cast for the Left. Although this would be perfectly in accordance with the working of an electoral system such as that of Spain or England it is actually untrue. The analysis of the votes carried out by the Proportional Representation Society show 4,523,000 for the Left parties and 4,541,000 for the Right and Centre combined. Moreover the figure for the Right parties includes that for the Basque Nationalists who have subsequently shown their support for the Left Government. Thus there could be no question that the proportion of seats in the Cortes reflects the fact that the Right parties were in an electoral minority.

On February 19th, a new Government was formed by Señor Azaña. This Government was composed of members of Republican parties and contained no Socialists. The constitutionality of this Government was never put in question in the Cortes and it always secured substantial majorities in voting.

The internal condition of Spain during the whole of the period subsequent to the elections was a dis-

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turbed one. These disturbances mainly took the form of strikes and movements of peasants to occupy land in advance of the settlements promised to them under the Land Reform Law. The causes of these were plainly economic and reflected the extremely depressed standard of life of both the industrial and agricultural population. Besides these, however, were widespread acts of violence consisting of shooting affrays, murders and some destruction of churches. It is difficult to fix the responsibility for these actions. They were to a certain extent due to permanent feud between the extreme parties of the Right and Left but for the most part were the work of individuals rather than parties. The situation placed the Government in extreme difficulty. The normal application of the law proved too slow to be effective in quelling these disorders. To take stronger measures would have meant reliance on the army which was, as it turned out, not unreasonably distrusted. The only alternative was a dictatorship of the Left which President Azaña refused to contemplate.

The very lack of organization which existed in the days immediately following the military coup is conclusive proof that no plans could have been made by any of the Left parties for the taking over of power.

The course of actual events points to a very different explanation. On July 11th armed Fascists seized the radio station of Valencia and declared that a Fascist Government had been set up. On July 12th Lieutenant Castillo of the Civil Guards, whose life had been continually threatened by Fascists, was murdered. On July 13th, Señor Calvo Sotelo, the leader of the

extreme Right, was taken from his house by armed police and shot, admittedly as a reprisal. It has been stated that the Fascist rising took place as a direct result of this assassination but ample documentary evidence has since been found from searches on Fascist premises that the revolt was planned so early as February.

Meanwhile it had been clear that serious disaffection existed among army officers, particularly in Morocco. Attempts to remove disaffected officers were met by open mutiny which became general on the 18th. On the 19th simultaneous military and Fascist outbreaks clearly on a long prepared plan, broke out in every garrison town in Spain.

On July 19th after the outbreak of the military revolt the Government resigned and a new one, still containing no Socialists, was set up under Señor Giral, a Left Republican and member of the previous Government. This was recognized as the Government by all parts of Spain not under control of the rebel generals.

In formal confirmation of this the Spanish Supreme Court of Justice issued on August 4th, a document calling on judges and magistrates throughout Spain to remember that the acts of Government supporters are legal and those of the rebels illegal everywhere.

On September 4th, the Prime Minister resigned and was succeeded by Señor Caballero who formed a Cabinet, six of whose members were Socialists, two Communists, two Republicans, one a Basque Nationalist and one a Catalan member. The change which took place as a result of negotiations initiated

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by Señor Giral himself who remained a minister, was intended to produce a Government whose composition represented more exactly the forces engaged in the defence of the Republic and was instituted with full approval of President Azaña and Señor Giral. It is therefore in every sense a Constitutional Government.

Chronology on Non-Intervention in Spain

It is convenient to summarize here the main dates in the history of the Non-Intervention Agreement.

On July 25th, at a French Cabinet Meeting it was agreed that the French Government should adopt an attitude of strict neutrality and that no war-materials would be allowed to be exported to Spain.

On August 1st the French Cabinet decided to appeal to the British and Italian Governments "For the rapid adoption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for Non-Intervention in Spain."

On August 4th the British Government's reply to the French Note was handed to the French Ambassador. It was understood to be in agreement with the French principle of non-intervention in the Spanish conflict and to have suggested ordinary diplomatic negotiations as the best means of achieving an agreement.

On August 5th, in reply to the representations made by the French Chargé d'Affaires, the foreign Commissariat stated that the Government of the U.S.S.R. accepted the principle of non-intervention

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and was ready to take part in the proposed agreement. They also desired that "the assistance rendered by certain States to the rebels against the legal Government of Spain," should be immediately discontinued.

On August 6th, an official reply to the French appeal for a Non-Intervention Agreement regarding Spain stated that Italy adhered in principle to the thesis of non-intervention, but enquired whether moral solidarity with one of the parties in conflict did not in itself constitute intervention, and whether the engagement of non-intervention would have a universal character binding individuals as well as Governments.

On the same date the Belgian Government accepted an invitation from the French Government to join in an Agreement for Non-Intervention and issued an order prohibiting the export of all arms to Spain.

On August 8th the German Government informed the French Government that no war-materials had been or would be sent to the Spanish rebels. On the same day in France, an official statement was issued announcing that the French Government would suspend exports to Spain from any French source of all war-materials and aircraft of any kind.

On August 10th the Government of U.S.S.R. informed the French Government that they were willing to give their adhesion to the French text for non-intervention.

On August 12th it was announced that the French Government had received favourable replies to their proposals from Belgium, Great Britain, Poland and the U.S.S.R. It was stated officially that the Italian

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Government had not modified their view that to secure complete and effective neutrality in the Spanish conflict all private displays of sympathy with either side should be forbidden, and that there should be no enrolment of volunteers to join the Forces.

On August 14th, the Swiss Government issued a Proclamation of Neutrality with regard to the civil war in Spain.

On August 15th, the British Government issued a warning and an appeal in which it was stated that no licences had been issued since the commencement of the civil war for the export of arms or munitions to Spain. On the same day the Portuguese Government accepted Non-Intervention in principle.

On August 17th, the German Foreign Office handed to the French Ambassador a letter expressing agreement with the proposals for a Pact of Non-Intervention subject to reservations.

On August 18th the German Government published an official statement which announced their acceptance of the proposed Prohibition of the Export of Weapons, Munitions and War Supplies as soon as the Italian, Russian and Portuguese Governments had adhered to it on condition that the Spanish Government released the German transport aeroplane still held in Madrid (this was the aeroplane which is dealt with in the body of our Report).

On August 19th the British Government prohibited the export of arms and munitions of war of all kinds to Spain including civil aircraft.

On August 24th the German Government informed the French Government that they would put the

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Arms Embargo on Spain into immediate operation, though the question of the seized aeroplane had not yet been settled.

On August 26th the French Government invited the Powers who had placed an embargo on the export of arms, to take part in further discussion. It was suggested that a Committee might be set up in London.

On August 27th a Portuguese decree was published prohibiting direct or indirect export or transit to Spain of arms and munitions.

On August 28th it was announced that the Italian Government had placed an embargo on war-materials to Spain and that this was being made to apply to all contracts in course of execution.

On September 9th the first meeting of the International Supervisory Committee on Non-Intervention in Spain met in London. The following countries were represented:

Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Soviet Union, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

In conclusion, it is abundantly clear to us that the Spanish Government has suffered severely from the Non-Intervention Agreement and that it has been denied arms and material essential to it for the suppression of the revolt. At the same time men, arms, and other assistance have been furnished to the rebels from foreign sources in breach of the Pact.

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We are convinced that the Spanish Government does not now desire Non-Intervention and that it is in fact the unequal work of the Non-Intervention Agreement which has resulted in their being placed in their present disadvantageous military position.

There can be no doubt that the present Spanish Government is a legally constituted and recognized Government entitled to all the privileges and advantages of such a position. Intervention in the affairs of such a legally constituted government by other governments, by the preparation of rebellion and by the supply of arms and assistance to the rebels (who in this case have not even been recognized as belligerents) is a gross violation of the principles of International Law and must be likely to endanger peace throughout the world.

ELEANOR F. RATHBONE.

J. B. TREND.

R. MCKINNON WOOD.

E. L. MALLALIEU.

FARINGDON.

JOHN JAGGER.

GEOFFREY BING

JOHN LANGDON-DAVIES

} *Secretaries.*

LONDON, *October 3rd*, 1936.

CHAPTER EIGHT

FASCIST AND NAZI INTERVENTION AT SEA IN SPANISH WATERS

The Collapse of Maritime Law

If it is an established fact that the Spanish rebels have received by land and air sufficient help to enable them to carry on the war against the Government forces which, though more numerous, were unarmed, it is no less certain that the support which they have had from all countries, both Fascist and so-called democratic countries, at sea, has considerably strengthened their position. It is at sea that the greatest outrages have been committed against the Government forces, and that the law has been most mocked. What are we to understand by international maritime law? There is a great deal of confusion in this region. But to judge by what the experts have written on the application of international law to the Spanish war, it seems clear that the rebels, who are traitors risen against the legitimate Power, were not entitled to receive any help, either directly or indirectly, from outside sources. Nevertheless, supposing that they were considered belligerents—the furthest concession that the law could make them, in certain cases—it is clear that no foreign power could assist them at sea, or by land, without committing an aggression or an act of war against the Spanish Government. Nor, from the point of view of international law, can the help given by Italy and Germany be con-

sidered legalized by the fact that both these countries have recognized Franco's Junta as the only legitimate government for Spain for such a recognition is itself a flagrant breach of the law. The Spanish Government has suffered at sea also the consequences of this tragedy which is the basis of all foreign intervention in Spain: the fact that since there are some countries—the Fascist countries—which have decided to break and over-ride every existing law, other countries—the so-called democracies—have not shown the slightest intention of seeing that these laws are respected, and have even supported, sometimes by action, sometimes by omission, the crimes of the Fascist interventionists.

There have been many commentaries in the English press on the subject of maritime law as applied to some of the incidents caused by the conduct of the German, Italian and Spanish (rebel) fleets in Spanish territorial waters. We reproduce a leader which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on August 22nd, 1936:

*The action of the Spanish cruiser the *Libertad* in stopping the German merchant vessel the *Kamerun* outside territorial waters, searching her, and forbidding her to proceed to Cadiz, which is in rebel hands, has raised a noisy protest in the German officially inspired press. The admiral in command of the German naval forces in Spanish waters has sent a telegram to Madrid describing the affair as "a crime against the right of free navigation" and threatening a display of force if such an incident recurs. The British Foreign Office is understood to be carefully examining the position in international law. But some even of the more responsible British Conservative newspapers do not so much as hesitate before delivering judgment.*

The naval correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, for example, considers it perfectly right for the German Government to treat the Spanish warships (if they repeat such a search) as pirates, and adds that "in similar circumstances Great Britain would probably take the same action." International maritime law does not lend itself to any such "snap" judgments, and it can be argued that the Madrid Government has a good case. On August 10th the Spanish President signed a decree declaring Cadiz and various other ports in rebel hands to be in "war zones," and it appears that foreign Powers were notified to that effect. If, as may be argued, this decree was equivalent to a declaration of blockade or of partial blockade, then the Madrid Government was in the right in stopping a vessel which was attempting to break the blockade, and no question of piracy can arise. The only point open for argument (and it is an important point) is whether the Madrid Government fulfilled all the conditions necessary to constitute blockade.

The conditions are three: first, that the area blockaded shall be in the hands of "belligerents"; secondly, that the blockade shall have been properly notified to the other Powers; and, thirdly, that the blockade shall be "effective." The first condition is the most ticklish. It can scarcely be expected that a Government trying to suppress rebellion will voluntarily "recognize" the rebels as belligerents. Such an act of recognition can only be determined by the Government's acts. Now the most obvious act of involuntary recognition is, as the precedent of the American Civil War proves, to declare a blockade. Thus we get the dilemma: there can be no blockade without a recognition of belligerency, but as between a recognized Government and its insurgents blockade

itself is an action constituting (involuntary) recognition. When we turn to the second condition, that both the Powers concerned and the ports concerned should be notified of the blockade, it is not necessary for individual ships to be notified, but once a neutral vessel is stopped the boarding party must inscribe the fact of blockade on the ship's log. As to the third point, the "effectiveness" of the blockade, the best opinion is that the blockaded place shall be "watched by a force sufficient to render the ingress or egress dangerous." The blockade must, of course, be general and must be maintained without intermission. It seems likely that the forces at the disposal of the Madrid Government in the Straits of Gibraltar are adequate to fulfil the conditions required. Hence, assuming that the decree of August 10th was a blockade decree, the case for dubbing the *Libertad* a pirate is poor. Whether the Madrid Government did wisely in implicitly recognizing the rebels as belligerents is another question, but it should be observed that such an action does not confer any belligerent rights on the rebels in relation to neutral Powers unless they too choose to recognize the rebels as belligerents. One wants to know whether the British Government considers that the Madrid Government has constituted a blockade, and if not, which conditions necessary for blockade it is deemed to have failed to fulfil.

Declaration of the Spanish Government on War Zones

On August 20th, 1936, the Spanish Foreign Office informed the Representatives of Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, United States, Turkey, Greece, Finland, and Jugo-Slavia, in Madrid, that the Spanish

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ports in rebel hands, including those of Melilla, and Ceuta, the Balearic towns, the ports in the Canaries, and those in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco, had been declared war zones by the Spanish Government. These representatives were asked to inform their Governments of this fact, and that in consequence cargo boats with supplies for the rebels would not be allowed to enter the ports in question.

The Stopping of the "Kamerun"—the Law

With regard to this same incident—the stopping of the Kamerun—the News Chronicle writes as follows, August 20th, 1936:

According to international law as laid down in the Declaration of London a belligerent country is entitled to stop and search neutral vessels in any but but neutral territorial waters.

The signal "Heave-to" must first be made by flags in the Commercial Code. On the signal being ignored shots may be fired across her bows, followed if necessary by shots at the vessel herself.

The owners of the vessel are entitled to costs and damages in the event of wrongful seizure or delay. Spain, in process of combating a revolution, may be considered as a belligerent, and any country giving assistance to the rebels may, *ipso facto*, be held to be in a state of war with Spain.

Countries not in a state of war may only arrest ships of other nationalities within their own territorial waters. Three miles and any bays and estuaries was the original territorial limit.

This was fixed at a period when three miles was the extreme gun range. Various countries now claim

increasing distances up to six miles, but three miles is still generally accepted.

The Rebel Crimes

In spite of (or even in agreement with) all the confused lucubrations of the experts, the clear fact remains that in Spain there is a constitutional legitimate Government against which has rebelled a group of traitors who dispose of various warships which they have seized from that Government. These insurgent ships have been declared pirates by the constitutional authorities of the Government.

The Cruiser "Almirante Cervera" declared a Pirate

On July 28th, 1936, the Spanish Ambassador in London was informed that a decree had been passed declaring the cruiser Almirante Cervera a pirate ship, and outlawed, without the right to fly the Spanish flag, and liable to be taken under arrest by the authorities of any country. He was instructed to notify the British Government of these facts.

Franco and Foreign Fleets

When these ships have been declared pirates by the legal Government of the country the duty of foreign fleets consists, not in protecting them, but in pursuing them and taking them captive. No country had then recognized the Spanish rebels as belligerents—the recognition of the Burgos Junta as the legal Government by Germany and Italy only took place on November 18th, 1936,—and therefore it is clear that officially Franco and his adherents are for all countries rebels and insurgents and their ships, pirate ships.

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Nevertheless the rebel forces move freely at sea wherever they wish, because since the rebels are closely united with the German and Italian ships, the Government fleet has lost most of its effectiveness, as we shall see later.

On November 18th, 1936, Franco announced the blockade of Barcelona, and Italy, as described in the relevant chapter of this present work, declared that she would support this blockade "morally."

Other countries kept silent. Nobody had anything to say. Yet for the French and English Governments Franco does not represent a legal Power, nor even a belligerent Power. It seems to appear natural to all of them, or at least it does not appear wrong to them, that a pirate fleet should announce a blockade in consequence of which not only would Spanish interests suffer, but also the commercial interests of France and England which have not suspended their transactions in Spanish territory.

The same might be said about the laying of mines at the entrance of the harbours under Government control, by rebel ships. We extract the following from the Morning Post of November 27th, 1936:

A warning to ships calling at Barcelona that they do so at their own risk was broadcast from the Junta wireless station at Tetuan yesterday, says the Central News.

It is not certain that the rebels succeeded in mining the Government harbours, in spite of their announcement. In any case, they had no ships of their own for laying mines, and they can only have fulfilled their threats by the help of the fleets of other countries. Doubtless the threat was only verbal, and had one intention: that of

working against the Government by spreading panic among the crews and the foreign ship-owners.

On December 5th, 1936, Reuter's correspondent telegraphed :

According to a rebel broadcast from Teneriffe General Franco has announced that mines will be laid shortly in the Mediterranean to block the Government ports. All " Marxist boats " found in Spanish territorial waters will be bombed, it is added.

The rebel policy of alarmism continues. On December 19th, 1936, the Daily Herald correspondent in Copenhagen wrote :

The Danish Foreign Office to-night issued a warning received from the Franco Government by the Danish Minister in Lisbon that:

Mines have been laid in the harbours of Málaga, Almeria, Cartagena, Valencia, Barcelona, Tarragona, Bilbao, Santander and Gijon.

Foreign ships calling at these ports are warned that they must follow certain channels.

Tarragona, Santander, Bilbao and Gijon are said to be completely closed. Ships wishing to leave must do so before midnight, Sunday.

No such notification (writes our diplomatic correspondent) has been received by the British or French Governments. But this may be due to the fact that communication via Hendaye, where the British and French Ambassadors are, is slower than via Lisbon.

Official circles in London think it extremely unlikely that all these ports can, in fact, have been mined. The " warning " is probably another piece of bluff by the insurgent Government.

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On January 1st, 1937, The Times correspondent in Gibraltar wrote :

A cargo-laden steamer bound for Málaga is reported to have struck a mine and been severely damaged at the entrance to Málaga harbour. The Nationalists are reported to have mined the entrances to ports on the east coast of Spain.

Whether or not the allegations in the preceding reports are true, there is no doubt that a pirate fleet should never be allowed to take such liberties at sea. If the democratic countries had faithfully observed the law—the bandits are only fulfilling their mission in breaking it—then neither could Franco have done exactly as he pleased on the sea, nor could the Fascist powers have lent him their boats and their men to blockade the Government ports.

How the German and Italian Fleets help the Insurgents

The German and Italian squadrons in Spanish waters constitute one of the most powerful aids for Franco. The intervention of these foreign ships is continuous and takes various forms. The German and Italian vessels keep in constant communication with the rebel fleet. This fact is stated by the diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, who writes the following on August 21st, 1936, i.e., one month after the outbreak of war :

Co-operation between the Germans, the Italians, and the Spanish rebels goes on all the time. German and Italian ships in the Mediterranean are in constant wireless communication with rebel ships and rebel headquarters. Two rebel ships (one of them is the *España*) have been taking in coal from German and

Italian ships. There is close collusion between German and Italian vessels.

Lights Kept Burning on the Ships

One of the forms of Fascist intervention at sea is to keep the lights burning on the ships, so that these serve as a guiding-mark for the rebel 'planes.

We extract the following from the News Chronicle of November 7th, 1936:

Two rebel warplanes made a night attack on the Spanish Government port of Alicante. With the first alarm the town was plunged into darkness. But out in the bay two warships kept their lights ablaze. One was German and the other Italian.

Complaining to the Embassies concerned, the Alicante authorities said the warships' lights enabled the rebel bombers to find their positions accurately. Several bombs fell near foreign ships.

More Details on the "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Rebels, Germans and Italians

The following information was communicated to the Spanish Ambassador in London by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Madrid, on November 2nd, 1936:

It is reported that the Italian and German fleets in the Mediterranean are commanded by the German Admiral Schuster. Also that there are submarines and torpedo-boats stationed between Barcelona and San Remo. Also that two Italian submarines flying the two-coloured flag are off Cadiz.

On November 3rd, 1936, more information was sent to the Ambassador from the same source. It was

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stated that German boats were affording protection to merchant ships (German) which were supplying war-material to the rebels. The German fleet was in wireless communication with the crews of rebel 'planes; these crews were themselves German and Italian. This collaboration had been effective in the two recent aerial attacks on Malaga, and a rebel 'plane with a damaged wing had been picked up by a German cruiser. Spaniards evacuated by German ships, and taken to Genoa, had been brought back to Spain to the rebel side under an escort of German warships. . . . Three merchant vessels of German nationality had landed tanks and crews at Seville.

Foreign Submarines Torpedo Government Ships

Another gesture of German intervention was the torpedoing of Government ships from submarines. The following extract is from the Manchester Guardian of November 24th, 1936:

It was announced from Madrid early yesterday morning that "several submarines belonging, it is believed, to a foreign fleet (since the insurgents do not possess any) attacked ships of our squadron at the entrance to Port Cartagena at 9 a.m. on Sunday. A torpedo struck and damaged the cruiser *Miguel de Cervantes*. Other torpedoes were launched by submarines against the cruiser *Méndez Nuñez*, but caused no damage."

H.M. destroyer *Glowworm*, which is lying off Cartagena, saw an explosion take place on board the *Cervantes* (says Reuter.) The *Cervantes* took a list of about eight to ten degrees. Later in the day she was towed into port.

Reuter reports that semi-official quarters in Berlin state that there are at present no German submarines in Spanish waters, and it is officially denied in Rome that the Spanish ships were attacked by Italian submarines.

It had been reported earlier on Sunday that the Government ships were preparing to challenge the rebels' control of the Straits of Gibraltar.

The Insurgents do not Possess a Single Submarine of their Own

This denial by the Fascist countries is valueless. The cynicism of the German and Italian authorities is too well known. The rebels did not possess any submarines. So the attack on the Government ships was made either by foreign submarines, or by rebel submarines bought from Italy or Germany, or from both these countries.

The Times correspondent in Rome writes on November 25th, 1936:

Admiral Magoz, the representative in Rome of the Burgos Government, made a statement to-day in which he pointed out the means at the disposal of General Franco for enforcing an effective blockade.

After enumerating the various surface vessels, he declared that the Nationalist fleet also counted on the co-operation of "not a few submarines, of which some were formerly with the Reds but succeeded in escaping from the Communist Junta, and others were captured in a successful encounter with the enemy warships." The Government of General Franco possessed now, with ships and aeroplanes, all the indispensable elements, and "it may be taken as absolutely certain that the imminent total blockade of the Spanish coasts will reach full efficiency."

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The suggestion that Government submarines joined the rebels is utterly false.

Explanation Given by the Spanish Minister of Marine and Air

On the subject of the preceding, and with regard to other incidents which have proved the scandalous intervention of the foreign fleets, the Spanish Ministry of Marine and Air publish an extensive note.

The Ministry formally denied that the rebels, either at the outbreak of the revolt or later, possessed any Spanish submarine. The only submarine which the Government had lost was one which had been sunk in the Cantabrian Gulf when on its way to Asturias. This disaster was reported in the world's press, and convincing photographs were published in L'Illustration française and Paris-Soir. In the opinion of experts the attack on Cartagena on November 22nd must have been made by at least two submarines.

Further information in possession of the Ministry was to the effect that in the enemy service off Ceuta there were eight submarines of Italian origin. These were painted black and usually remained outside the harbour.

The above information was communicated to the Spanish Ambassador in London by the Spanish Foreign Minister, on November 30th, 1936.

More Details in the English Press

The Times correspondent in Valencia wrote as follows, on November 25th, 1936:

The Air Ministry late last night issued a statement of conclusions based on its investigation into the

submarine attack on two Government warships at Cartagena on Sunday morning and into other insurgent naval activities along the Spanish coast. It finds that "the submarines of necessity belong to a foreign fleet," and further concludes that in respect of the recent sinking of a number of Spanish merchantmen "a large part of the said aggressions, committed under cover of darkness, must be charged to foreign warships." The statement also contains the direct charge that before Germany and Italy broke off relations with the Republican Government their vessels of war anchored in Spanish ports engaged in espionage and collaborated with the insurgent fleet.

With regard to the Cartagena incident, it is stated that at about nine o'clock on Sunday morning various submarines attacked the cruisers *Miguel de Cervantes* and *Méndez Nuñez*, which, with the battleship *Jaime I*, were lying at the entrance of the harbour. The *Cervantes* was struck in the stern and damaged but the *Méndez Nuñez* escaped. It is concluded that there were at least two submarines, which must have been foreign inasmuch as the insurgents possess none.

With regard to the attacks on Spanish shipping the statement says:—

During recent weeks a number of night bombardments have been directed from the seaward against several points on the eastern coast, resulting in the sinking of various Spanish vessels carrying food-stuffs along the Mediterranean. These acts, always carried out at night, have been attributed to the rebel cruiser *Canarias*. There are ample grounds for believing that the said warship could not possibly have carried out all these activities, inasmuch as its presence in places far removed from the scene of attack could be definitely proved. The

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logical deduction is, therefore, that a large part of the said attacks, committed under cover of darkness, must be charged to foreign warships.

The part of the statement referring to the activities of the Italian and German fleet says that since the outbreak of hostilities the warships of these Governments,

performed acts at variance with the obligations of neutrality, devoting themselves to aiding the few units of the Spanish fleet which remained in the power of the rebels. The Republican fleet has been constantly spied upon by the said foreign ships, which, occupying strategic positions, were able perfectly to note its movements, which were thereafter immediately known by the rebel ships.

A number of instances are cited. It is stated that on August 4th the German battleship *Deutschland* placed herself between the port of Ceuta and the Republican fleet which was about to attack that town in an effort to prevent the embarkation of insurgent forces for Spain. German cruisers and destroyers, it is furthermore alleged, constantly watch the Republican fleet at Málaga, informing the enemy of its movements. On nights during which aerial bombardments took place the German warships remained illuminated, thus acting as beacons "perfectly indicating the situation of the city." Both German and Italian ships are accused of acting in the same way when a squadron of Junkers aircraft bombed Alicante. "The presence of German ships was always alternated with that of Italian."

A German cruiser, it is alleged, followed the Republican fleet from Gijon to Bilbao on September 26th, and the following day the fleet was closely

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observed by the same cruiser while carrying out operations on the Basque coast. This cruiser was convoying a German cable ship, which, the statement says, is suspected of having mined the port of Bilbao, inasmuch as the insurgents had no minelayer.

It is Unfortunate that Submarines Submerge !

The diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian adds a brief commentary to the report on the torpedoing of two Spanish ships, on November 25th, 1936:

The mystery of the submarine which was reported to have attacked two Spanish Government cruisers remains unsolved, though a presumption that the submarine was German continues to prevail in certain well-informed quarters. With regard to the German destroyer *Leopard*, which (as stated here yesterday) was in the vicinity when the incident occurred, it now appears that she made for the scene of action as though to assure herself of the effects of the torpedoing.

There is, as a matter of fact, no reason for disbelieving the *communiqués* issued by the Spanish Government, though they lack the precision of detail which would put a mistake on the part of that Government beyond any doubt.

In effect, if the Government had succeeded in capturing the attacking submarine, all doubts would be cleared away (although we cannot even be certain of that). For how can we convincingly prove the fact of German intervention at sea to those persons whose interest is not to know such a fact, so that the "democratic" fleets may not have to take action ?

In a leader of November 26th, 1936, the News Chronicle puts its finger on the trouble :

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The Spanish Government's allegations of outside naval aid to the rebels is highly disquieting. Rome and Berlin issue denials, and Franco's envoy in Italy claims that his side, which began the war without any submarines, now has "not a few"—some gone over from the Government and some captured in battle.

Just how few, or how many is meant by this remarkable phrase? Why have no *communiqués* announcing these important gains to the rebels' naval forces been issued?

To avoid misunderstandings, the British Government should request the Spanish Government to furnish it with the number and the markings of all submarines which it had in its service when hostilities began and of any it has since lost by defection or in battle. The Burgos Junta should be requested to furnish an exact list likewise. "Not a few" is not good enough: even Franco can count.

It would have been simple enough to prove whether or not the affirmations of the Spanish Government were exact . . . if England or France had intended to find out. The Spanish Ministry of Marine and Air suggested that a neutral naval commission should examine the rebel submarines. The proposal broke down because neither in France nor England was there any interest except that of hiding the activities of the German and Italian fleets. Thus compromising situations could be avoided.

Expert's Report on the Torpedo

The following report by the chief of the Spanish submarine flotilla, Captain Don Remiguo Verdía, on the attack which was made on the cruiser Miguel de

Cervantes in the entrance to Cartagena harbour, is clear enough :

An examination of the fragments of the torpedo proves that they belong to a " White Head " torpedo, 533, made in Fiume (Italy), exactly equal in dimensions to the regulation type employed in our navy, but with this particularity which proves that it is not one of ours:—we use *metal* screws to join the head of the torpedo to the air-chamber, and in this case *steel* screws have been used.

The calibre of the tubes on submarines of type B is 450 *mm.* and the diameter of the torpedo which we found is 533 *mm.* It was, therefore, fired from a foreign submarine, and probably an Italian one, since the torpedo itself was Italian in origin.

As the second of the torpedoes will probably be found nearly intact, we shall be able to complete and confirm this information.

Italian Submarines for Franco

The following letter which was given a prominent place in the News Chronicle of November 27th, 1936, not only throws light on the rebel submarines, but supports our statement that if anyone has remained uninformed on the events at Cartagena it is simply because he did not wish to know the truth :

SIR,—To anyone who has recently been in Italy, like myself, the news that Rome has officially denied the Italian nationality of the submarines which appeared at Cartagena this week does not come as a surprise.

In Rome, people were openly discussing the news that many Italian submarines at Gaeta, near Naples,

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were being repainted for service on Franco's side in Spain and would shortly be delivered.

Perhaps Mr. Eden "did not know about it"; but then why should an English tourist know? What is the British Embassy in Rome for?

Yours faithfully,

ENGLISH TOURIST.

November 24th, 1936.

The Shelling of Alicante and the German Camera

The following dispatches throw light on the shelling of Alicante on November 29th, 1936, by rebel 'planes acting in complicity with the Fascist fleets.

The Manchester Guardian writes, November 30th, 1936:

The rebels have made a severe air attack on Alicante. Enormous damage is said to have been done to the port by incendiary bombs. According to a Gibraltar report half the city is in flames. An official Spanish statement says that the petrol dump was aimed at. A German ship, it adds, had previously sailed near enough to the port to be able to photograph the dump.

The same day the Daily Telegraph published the following dispatch from the British United Press in Alicante :

It is officially stated that two people were killed and twenty-four were wounded in air raids by insurgent 'planes on Alicante, lasting from 5 p.m. yesterday until 3 a.m. to-day. About 200 bombs were dropped, setting fire to a gasometer, a petrol tank and damaging other buildings.

At one time the fire became so serious that the fire brigades from Albacete and Murcia were ordered

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to Alicante. Several bombs believed to have been aimed at a Russian ship unloading food supplies in the harbour failed to hit their objective.

The bombardment caused panic among the population. Thousands of people huddled together in cellars and bomb shelters throughout the night.

The raids were carried out by two bombers, escorted by four fighting 'planes. It is alleged that the 'planes took off from two ships of "foreign appearance" and returned at periodical intervals after replenishing their supplies of bombs. B.U.P.

On December 1st, 1936, the Manchester Guardian wrote :

A Reuter telegram from Alicante says that at least a hundred bombs were dropped on Alicante by rebel 'planes during the Saturday night air raids, according to the Civil Governor of the port. His estimate of the damage was one person killed, seven wounded, and some houses damaged, but no military objectives hit.

The Governor alleged that two of the seaplanes which took part in the raid returned to a German mother-ship that was anchored some distance away to refuel and load up with bombs.

All yesterday large numbers of families were leaving the town and taking refuge in the countryside. The damage was possibly greater than the Civil Governor admitted, as many incendiary bombs were dropped.

A Foreign Submarine Sinks a Spanish Government Submarine

On December 13th, 1936, another foreign submarine torpedoed and sank off Málaga the Spanish Government

submarine C 3. Forty-four members of the crew were drowned. Only the captain and two sailors were saved.

The Advantage of Internal Explosions

But as on the former occasion nobody wished to know what had happened. In Gibraltar they attributed the sinking of the submarine to an "internal explosion."

And the Morning Post correspondent wrote as follows from Gibraltar, on December 15th, 1936:

Latest advices received here appear to shed doubt upon the report that the loss of the Spanish Government submarine C3 was due to torpedo attack by another submarine.

The British destroyer *Acasta* was at Málaga at the time of the loss of the submarine C3. Immediately after the dull sound of an underwater explosion at about 2.45 p.m. on Saturday, numerous armed trawlers searched the area around Málaga. These were supported by strong air patrols, and yet no trace of a hostile submarine was seen.

It will be remembered that the torpedoing of the Spanish Government cruiser *Miguel de Cervantes* at Cartagena last month was alleged by Madrid to be the work of a "foreign submarine." It was subsequently proved that the torpedo attack against this ship was delivered by a submarine which had deserted the forces of the Spanish Government for those of the Junta.

In the absence of further information opinion inclines to the theory that the submarine C3 was lost through an internal explosion. This solution receives support from the known fact that one engine of the ill-fated submarine was known before the vessel was lost to be seriously defective.

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The preceding sarcastic report has the advantage of delivering the English fleet from the embarrassing task of seeing that the law is kept on the sea.

A Foreign Warship Shells the Coast of Catalonia

Another proof of the intervention of the Fascist fleets is afforded by the shelling of the Catalan coast on December 20th, 1936, by a "mysterious" warship. At 7.30 a.m. that day a warship shelled the village of Culera. She fired sixty shells. She was accompanied by two other warships which remained at a distance from the coast. It has been proved that the vessels in question were provisioned in Asinara (Sardinia).

The Incident of the German Steamer "Palos" and her Cargo

The scandalous behaviour of the German fleet in Spanish waters was bound, sooner or later, to provoke some serious incident. Here is what happened with the German steamer Palos in Spanish waters off the coast of Biscay. The report which we give was made by the Basque Autonomous Government.

On December 20th, 1936, the cruiser auxiliaries of the Basque Government sighted at four miles from the coast between the Capes of Ogonó and Machichaco, the German steamer *Palos* navigating towards the west, proceeding from Pasajes. From an excess of consideration and even presuming, not without foundation, that the said German steamer carried war-material for the insurgents, she was not detained. On the morning of December 23rd, the

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cruiser auxiliary in the service of the Basque Government, named the *Bizkaia*, which forms part of the auxiliary fleet of the Spanish navy, sighted a ship which proved to be the German *Palos*, navigating in the direction of Pasajes.

In view of the intense traffic of ships of the German flag observed in these days in our seas, the Commander of the *Bizkaia* decided, keeping strictly to the rules of international law, to exercise the right of visiting the said ship, for which purpose he sailed in the direction of the *Palos*, which was at a distance of approximately two miles to the East, hoisting on his foremast the intelligence pennant of the International Code of Signals, in order to initiate a conversation with the German steamer, without obtaining a reply.

Then the Commander of the cruiser auxiliary gave orders for the hoisting of the flag which in the International Code means "Stop your engines," without being obeyed. The *Bizkaia* accelerated her speed, succeeded in getting within firing range, not wishing to use force, but merely persuasive measures, since she was within her rights according to the international rules, at not being obeyed, to fire; she drew up alongside the *Palos*, sounding her siren various times in long and short calls. Thereupon the German steamer slowed down but did not stop.

Before this disobedience and resistance to the regulation orders given by the Commander of the *Bizkaia*, the latter ordered that they should appear to turn the cannon on the steamer *Palos*, which continued sailing at a moderate speed towards her destination persisting in her resistance and wishing, seemingly, to provoke aggressive procedure. In view of these facts the order was given to go through the actions of loading the gun which was clearly seen from on board the *Palos*, since she was now only about

fifty metres distant. This step resulted in the immediate stopping of the engines of the *Palos*, and on the Commander of the *Bizkaia* announcing in English that he was lowering a boat with an officer and several of the crew to board the *Palos*, in unintelligible language but in discourteous tones with great gesticulation, the German captain replied. Accordingly the Commander of the *Bizkaia* lowered the boat and on arriving alongside the *Palos*, they were not even thrown a rope to attach it, nor were they given any kind of ladder to enable them to carry out their visit.

Then, with great patience, the Commander of the *Bizkaia* indicated to the Captain of the *Palos* that he should lower his ladder, which he definitely refused to do. In view of this strong resistance, the order was given to the officer and men to return, and at the same time the German captain was informed that his ship was detained on account of his incomprehensible behaviour. The detention was made at 9.45 on the morning of the 23rd.

In order to see that his order to proceed to Bilbao was carried out by the Captain of the *Palos*, the Commander of the *Bizkaia*, after having had recourse to all regulation methods, was obliged to turn his guns on the German steamer without firing a single shot, which as has been said before, he had a perfect right to do under the regulations of international law.

Navigating in this manner and at three miles from Cape Machichaco, with the German steamer *Palos*, the cruiser auxiliary *Bizkaia* accompanied by another cruiser auxiliary which had arrived a few moments before, passed the English destroyer *Fame*, bound for San Juan de Luz from Bilbao.

To prove that the detention was in accordance with international law the *Bizkaia* veered round encircling the escort and proceeded on its way. The

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Basque Government, always punctilious over rules of justice, sent to the Commander of the *Bizkaia*, through the Head of the navy, the following radiogram: "Bring merchant boat north of Cape Villano to effect visit and avoid entrance to Bilbao and consequent registration. In case of refusal bring her Harbour Abra Bilbao." This order was carried out, but there were found on board in addition to the crew two German passengers, one of whom was a lady who spoke Spanish and who was going to Seville, and also a Spanish subject who was on his way to Pasajes, who in spite of his distinguished bearing, possessed no documents whatever. Moreover, in the Bill of Lading and Certificate of the ship, were listed with generic denomination, goods that were contraband of war, on account of which it was decided to take the ship to Bilbao.

There is no doubt that from the moment of the detention of the ship at 9.45 on the morning until 11.30, when at the altitude of Plencia, the right of making the visit was exercised. There was more than time to destroy and burn all documents existing on board that might have proved compromising.

Once in the port of Bilbao, the registration of the ship was proceeded with. Great quantities of war-material bound for the insurgent force of Pasajes, Vigo and Seville were found, among them being several complete field wireless sets of a most modern type, in addition to all kinds of war machinery and chemical substances for the same.

The steamer *Palos* as soon as all formalities had been carried out, and having been treated with all possible consideration during her stay in this port, was authorized on December 28th to continue her journey, the Spanish subject who was without documents and the contraband goods being detained.

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Testimony of the excellent treatment given to all on board is borne in the declaration of the second officer who informed the authorities of the Basque Government, who boarded this ship on her arrival, "that he never hoped to receive such affable and correct treatment." The Captain also recognized the unreasonableness of his first attitude which had caused so much disturbance to his boat and retracting nobly he invited the authorities of the Basque Government to a lunch in his cabin.

On the day after the detention a new inventory of the goods found on board was made, this taking place on the 25th, Christmas day; the German lady passenger who was on board had need during the carrying out of registration of the help of a woman official in her cabin, which was granted graciously, and when she enquired from this woman if the festival was held in Bilbao, she was answered in the affirmative, and when she wondered whether in these days Christmas was still commemorated, and was told again truthfully that it was celebrated with as much, or even more, splendour as other years, she could not hide her surprise.

The head of the services of the "Marina de Guerra" of the Basque Government, interpreting faithfully the feeling of that Government, as a result of the register taken on board the German steamer and the information of the official chemists in regard to chemical substances among the cargo, and notwithstanding the continued disobedience of the Captain, although strictly without prejudice to the courtesy due to prevent harm to foreign trade, decided that the war-material found on board the steamer *Palos* should be detained, and that the said ship should proceed on its voyage for commercial purposes, the passenger who was found to be without documents

and who according to information is a personage of the insurgent army, also remaining under the orders of the Home Department of the Basque Government.

Sentence

The head of the services of the "Marina de Guerra" of the Government of Euzkadi, and the Maritime Delegation of Bilbao: The documents relating to the visit and search of the German steamer *Palos*, having been perused, it appears that the warship *Bizkaia* forming part of the Spanish Navy, proceeded to examine the German steamer *Palos* for the purpose of putting into practice the right of visiting on the 23rd of the present month, when the said ship was bound for Pasajes, five miles from the coast. Since the aforesaid steamer *Palos* refused to obey the orders regarding any visit notified in accordance with the regulations in force, and since finally several hours were spent in this attitude of resistance and by order of the above-mentioned ship *Bizkaia*, she entered the port of Bilbao in order that the examination might be carried out. Since it was proved in this port that the steamer *Palos* carried a passenger of Spanish nationality who was lacking in all personal documents, various goods of a contraband nature, and since the time during which the orders of the steamer *Bizkaia* were resisted was considerable and moreover, since in the steamer *Palos* there were traces that documents had been destroyed on board the same in order that they might not fall under the observation of the Spanish Marine authorities. Since the steamer *Palos*, according to documents on board, left the port of Hamburg for the ports of Pasajes, Seville and Vigo, which are in the hands of the forces rebelling against the Government of the

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Spanish Republic, which forces are recognized as Government by Germany, with which the exercise of the right to visit is unquestionable in according with ruling legislation. Considering that the field transmitting and receiving stations of radio telegraphy and radio telephony conditioned to be carried on the back are an effect of war as is also celluloid in France, being used for the preparation of "stopines," for cannon projectile, and cases for mortar supplement, as also a case of machinery for the rebel boat *Ciudad de Alicante*. I herewith decree: That the effects of war indicated in the preceding paragraph be retained and that the steamer *Palos* be authorized to continue its journey for commercial purposes, the passenger without documents found on board the said ship and whose Spanish nationality has been proven being detained at the disposal of the Home Department (Departamento de Gobernación).

Radiogram transmitted at 19.10 o'clock

After replying letter steamer *Palos* is authorized to put to sea.

Signed—Jefe Marina de Euzkadi.

Radiogram for the "Jefe de Marina" (Head of the Navy)

The steamer *Palos* being authorized to put to sea I suppose that she has her entire cargo and that the crew and passengers are all on board. I await reply to these details indicating the hour of the ship's departure. Commander of the cruiser *Konigsberg*.

Radiogram from the "Jefe de Marina de Guerra" to the Commander of the cruiser "Königsberg"

Signed voluntarily by Captain of steamer *Palos* conformity resolution Marine Department Basque

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Government that he be supplied with necessary harbour pilot for the desired time of 21.30 in order to continue his journey. Documents, crew and German passengers, are all on board.

Radiogram from the Commander of the "Konigsberg" to the Chief of Marina of Euzkadi

Steamer *Palos* being authorized to put to sea, I will wait for her in front of the bay. I await orders.

Radiogram from the Chief of Marine of Euzkadi to the Commander of the cruiser "Konigsberg"

I beg you to await sailing merchant German ship *Palos* keeping outside Spanish territorial waters.

The Cynicism of the Nazis

We have given the version of the Basque Government. The German version is all vagueness and dissimulation. The Reich authorities deny that there was any war-material of any kind on board the Palos. They speak of three passengers, without mentioning that one of these was a Spaniard without papers, doubtless a rebel. The German official note lays great emphasis on the "Red" authorities, and the "Red" cruisers. We take the following extract from an account by The Times correspondent in Berlin, published on December 28th, 1936:

It is officially announced here that, according to information received, "Red" Spanish men-of-war have seized the German steamer *Palos* (997 tons) outside Spanish territorial waters in the neighbourhood of Bilbao and taken her into the port. The *Palos*, it is stated, was bound from Hamburg via

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Rotterdam for "Spanish ports." It is declared to have been established beyond doubt that the cargo did not consist of war-material, either of a direct or an indirect nature. The statement concludes:

The necessary measures for the release of the steamer have been set in motion. It is expected that before these measures come into force the Red authorities will bring themselves to release the absolutely unjustifiably seized steamer with her cargo intact and the three passengers on board.

The suggestion that the Palos was detained outside Spanish territorial waters is completely indefensible, as the report of the Basque Government affirms. In fact, if the Spanish fleet has erred in anything, it has been in the direction of tolerance : and such an error is very understandable when one realizes that the Spanish authorities were supremely interested in not adding new conflicts to those which they already had since the outbreak of the rebellion.

British Witness

The following report from Philip Jordan, Valencia, December 30th, 1936, may throw some light on the incident, and on some of its consequences. The News Chronicle correspondent writes :

Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Foreign Minister of Spain, to-day instructed the Spanish Ambassadors in both London and Paris to bring to the notice of the British and French Governments the latest instance of active German intervention on the side of the rebels.

I was sitting with him in his office when he received by telephone from José Antonio de Aguirre, President

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of the Provisional Basque Government at Bilbao, the latest details of this outrage.

Early last week the German ship *Palos*, which had been arrested in Spanish territorial waters, was taken into Bilbao Harbour.

It is now confirmed that in addition to carrying considerable quantities of food for the rebels she was also carrying to the same destination a large quantity of high explosives and apparatus for the immediate construction of eleven powerful long-range radio telephones, with which, it is understood, Franco would at any time have been able to speak with either Berlin or Rome.

On board the *Palos* was also a Spanish national without papers or passport of any kind.

Upon the instructions of the Basque President all war-material was confiscated. The Spaniard was arrested and now awaits interrogation. The steamer was then allowed to go.

Early yesterday morning Señor Del Vayo tells me, the commander of the German cruiser *Königsberg*, which had been lying off Bilbao, received instructions from Berlin to demand, "on behalf of the Reich Government," an admission from Señor Aguirre that the *Palos* had been illegally detained twenty-three miles from shore, or twenty miles outside territorial waters.

As a British destroyer lying in adjacent waters was a witness of the arrest of the *Palos* while inside territorial waters, the President of the Basque Provisional Government was able to give an unqualified refusal to this request.

The *Königsberg's* commander also issued an ultimatum to Señor Aguirre demanding the immediate release of all the confiscated war-material and of the arrested Spaniard whose name and importance are not

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yet known. Should this demand not be granted, the Commander added: "Bilbao must be prepared for all consequences."

To this request also Señor Aguirre returned a categorical refusal.

At yesterday's meeting of the Spanish Cabinet in Valencia, this refusal was unanimously endorsed by the Central Government; and in his study at the Ministry of State, Señor Del Vayo this morning told Señor Aguirre over the telephone of the moral backing which Valencia offers to Bilbao.

That Señor Aguirre should have consulted Valencia about every move is of first-class political significance—showing, as it does, the solidarity of the anti-Fascist forces in Spain.

The consultations also refute the so often reiterated suggestion that the Basques demand not only complete internal autonomy, but equally complete severance from the future Federated Republic of Spain; and that they might thus eventually seek a separate peace with Franco.

Opportune Changes in the Command of the German Navy

The real character of the Palos incident cannot remain hidden from anybody, even if trustworthy information were lacking. It is just a repetition, a more complete repetition, of the history of the Kamerun which we gave in our chapter on the sending of German arms to the rebels. There is a great deal of significance in the resignation of Vice-Admiral Foerster, announced on December 31st, 1936, and the possibility of his replacement by Rear-Admiral Carls. The foreign editor of the Daily Express writes, December 31st, 1936:

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Vice-Admiral Foerster, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, has resigned, and will be succeeded, I learn, by Rear-Admiral Carls.

In his letter of resignation, Admiral Foerster is believed to have said that he "could not allow German warships to be exposed to grave risks along the Spanish coast." He resigned a week ago; the news has just become known.

Rear-Admiral Carls was in command of the German warships off Spain last August when the Spanish Government cruiser *Libertad* stopped and searched the German steamer *Kamerun*—sister ship of the *Palos*, just released from "arrest" at Bilbao.

Admiral Boehm, in charge of the new fleet of sixteen German warships then despatched to Spanish waters, issued orders to his commanders to use "whatever measures are necessary" to prevent Spanish warships on either side molesting German ships outside Spanish territorial waters.

Captains of Madrid Government warships were then notified by Rear-Admiral Carls that the action of the *Libertad* against the *Kamerun* was a "breach of the law of free shipping on the high seas," and that the Admiral

"Was not disposed to tolerate such acts of force. I have ordered the naval units under my command to answer any unjustified act of force with force."

Nazi Piracy

The replacement of Vice-Admiral Foerster by the blustering Nazi sailor Rear-Admiral Carls has a real significance in the light of subsequent events. Probably the former was not disposed to assault the weak Spanish fleet of merchant ships, or to carry out a policy which, it is certain, will never honour the Hitler flag. For the

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cowardice of the Nazi fleet in picking quarrels with the ships of the Spanish Government, taking them captive and then handing them over to the rebels, will always occupy a place in the history of the shameful deeds of National-Socialism.

These gentlemen of the Nazi Navy "gloriously" seized the Government ships Aragón and Sotón.

The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in Berlin wrote as follows, January 1st, 1937:

The German Government announced late to-night that a German naval convoy (the number of units is not stated) had to-day seized a "Red Spanish steamer" off the coast of Spain as a reprisal for the detention of part of the cargo of the captured German ship *Palos*. The official statement, which was first made known in the news bulletin of the German Broadcasting Company, states:

After the Red rulers in Bilbao had refused to hand over to the cruiser *Königsberg* the portion of the cargo and the passenger detained, the German Government, as has already been announced, was compelled to enforce its demands by reprisals. In the course of this action in defence of German sovereign rights against an act of piracy a Red steamer has been temporarily seized to-day by the German naval forces in waters around Spain.

It has been established beyond doubt that the steamer *Palos* when seized by the Spanish was sailing far outside the three-mile limit. The position of the *Palos* was twenty-three miles north-east of Cape Machichaco. The Captain of the *Palos* consequently refused to sign a document whereby the *Palos* was supposedly seized five miles off the coast.

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On Tuesday last it was made known here that the *Palos* had been allowed to proceed on its way on the demand of the *Königsberg*, the German light cruiser, which was sent to Bilbao on Saturday to secure the release of the *Palos*. Semi-official comment, however, stated that, as a portion of the cargo and a passenger actually a Spaniard on the *Palos* were still retained in Bilbao, "the incident could not be regarded as settled."

Yesterday it was intimated here that further measures would be taken in the sense of German sovereign rights. This action has now been taken, but neither the nature of the cargo the Spanish ship carried nor any details of the German naval unit which effected its "temporary capture," are disclosed.

A high naval authority, however, informed me to-night that this latest action was not carried out by the cruiser *Königsberg*. He stressed the German view that the counter-measures taken to-day, "in defence of German sovereign rights against an act of piracy," were carried out within the framework of international law. When I asked whether the Spanish steamer was being held as a "hostage" I was told that "dead pledge" were the juristic words covering this action.

To-day's action followed significantly upon the appointment of Rear-Admiral Carls to be Acting Admiral of the fleet.

The Nazi Warships Face up to the Government Merchant Ships

The Spanish ship seized is understood to be the *Aragón*. According to Lloyd's Register, the *Aragón* a passenger vessel of 1,896 tons, is owned by the Compañía Tras-mediterranea, of Seville.

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Although no confirmation is yet available, it is understood that the German warship which carried out the operation was the "pocket" battleship *Admiral Graf Spee*.

The capture of the Aragón, one of the most notable exploits of the Nazi Navy, took place in the south. In the north, the valiant Hitler fleet attacked another merchant vessel of the Spanish Government; the German cruiser Königsberg coming very grandly out of such a risky enterprise. The following report of the incident from the British United Press, appeared on January 2nd, 1937:

According to the Governor of Santander, Señor Olazaran, the German cruiser *Königsberg*, 6,000 tons, has shelled the Spanish steamer *Sotón* off Santona, between Bilbao and Santander.

The Governor stated here to-night:

The *Sotón* was fired on by the *Königsberg* without previous warning, while in territorial waters. None of the shells struck her.

After the firing the *Königsberg* seized the *Sotón*, and forced her captain to sign a document agreeing to navigate his ship on whatever course the German warship might indicate.

The *Sotón* went aground and her crew landed under the guns of the *Königsberg*. The situation has been reported to the Spanish Government at Valencia for action.

The Governor then wirelessly the Captain of the German warship as follows:

I protest energetically against this act of aggression against the Spanish steamer *Sotón* and I demand

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the immediate release of the crew, who have been made prisoners contrary to all international law. I demand an immediate reply.

The Captain of the *Königsberg* wirelessly the following reply:

The seizure of the *Sotón* is a reprisal against the illegal retention of part of the cargo and one passenger on board the steamer *Palos*. The *Sotón* did not obey my orders to stop.

A Liberal Commentary on this Exploit

"The Sotón did not obey my orders to stop," declared the Captain of the Königsberg with the superb psychology of the man who considers himself strong enough to disregard every law except that of his caprice and his own arbitrary will. The News Chronicle had a leader concerning the reprisals of the Nazis, which we reproduce here. This appeared on January 2nd, 1937:

We suggested last Wednesday that in view of the release of the *Palos*, the German merchant ship arrested by the Spanish Government, there was hardly now "room for the violence which at one time seemed possible."

We had apparently reckoned without the German Navy and the German Government. Nothing could well be more violent than the unprovoked attack of the German cruiser *Königsberg* upon a Spanish cargo steamer in Spanish waters, calmly admitted by the Berlin Government and defended as a "reprisal" for the detention by the Basque Government of the contraband cargo of the *Palos*.

It is extraordinarily difficult to understand the

mentality behind an act like this. If the German Government was not satisfied with the release of the *Palos*, it was in its power to protest, and its protest could hardly have been ineffectual.

Instead, the Commander of the *Königsberg*, apparently with the complete approval of the German Government, attacks a perfectly innocent and perfectly helpless Spanish cargo steamer which had nothing whatever to do with the original incident, wrecks it and defends his action as a "reprisal."

If this is Nazi Germany's idea of right and just behaviour between countries still nominally at peace of what value is her signature to any instrument, whether relating to the suppression of "volunteering" in Spain or anything else?

The Basque Government

Without the shadow of a pretext Nazi intervention in Spain has been continuous, and disastrous in its effect for the Spanish Government. In general, Hitlerism has used the supposed Communist peril to justify its conduct towards the people of Spain. So the Nazi Government and the controlled German press designate as "Red" everything which is under the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government. The ships which detained the German boat Palos were "Red," in spite of the fact that in the Basque Government there are four Catholic ministers, of whom one is the Head of the Cabinet, as will be seen from the following list of the Basque Ministers :

PRESIDENCY AND DEFENCE—Don José Antonio de Aguirre (Basque Catholic Nationalist).
 JUSTICE AND EDUCATION—Jesus Maria de Leizaola (Basque Catholic Nationalist).

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INTERIOR—Telesforo de Monzón (Basque Catholic Nationalist).

PUBLIC WORKS—Juan de Astigarrabia (Spanish Communist Party).

INDUSTRY—Santiago Aznar (Socialist Party).

AGRICULTURE—Gonzalo Nardiz (Basque Nationalist Association).

COMMERCE AND SUPPLIES—Ramón María de Aldasoro (Republican Left).

TREASURY—Eliodoro de la Torre (Basque Catholic Nationalist).

LABOUR AND COMMUNICATIONS—Juan de los Toyos (Socialist Party).

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE—Juan Gracia (Socialist Party).

PUBLIC HEALTH—Alfredo Espinosa. (Republican Left).

The History of the German Shot in Bilbao

In Bilbao a German who had been fighting against the Government forces was taken prisoner and, after a proper legal trial, was shot in accordance with the law. (In the chapter which deals with German intervention in the Basque country the reader will find all the data and details on this incident.) In an opportune moment the Nazis in Berlin exhumed this question in order to justify the valorous behaviour of the Königsberg and Admiral Scheer shown in their persecution of defenceless Spanish merchant ships. The final commentary of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung is really worthy of the Nazi gentlemen who are haunted by the spectre of Roehm.

The following dispatch from The Times correspondent in Berlin was published on January 4th, 1937:

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German naval activities in Spanish waters and the renewed frenzy of the press campaign on the whole subject of intervention go to confirm the impression, already recorded, that so far, at any rate, no decision to pursue a more moderate policy has been reached.

It is declared that as soon as the "breach of German sovereign rights" involved in the retention by the "Red" authorities of the passenger and part of the cargo of the *Palos* is made good, the *Aragón* will be released and further German reprisals will be countermanded. An alleged statement by the Basque Government that German men-of-war are in the port of Guetaria, near San Sebastian, is denied.

The German newspapers publish prominently to-day a message of the official news agency from Salamanca reporting the shooting over a month ago of a German citizen at Bilbao. According to a trustworthy source, it is stated, "a Reich German named Lothar Guedde was condemned to death at the end of November by the Red rulers at Bilbao in a mock trial and shot. The reason given for this monstrous measure was that Guedde had belonged to the organization of the Spanish Falange." Guedde is reported to have gone to his death bravely, crying: "Heil, Hitler! Long live Germany! Long live Spain!"

The newspapers comment with the most virulent indignation on this report, along the same lines as on the report issued on August 6th, and not since elaborated, of the shooting of four German citizens near Barcelona three weeks previously after summary trial by "a so-called Marxist revolutionary tribunal." The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* says:

Bolshevism means murder. . . . For half a year innocent persons have been slaughtered in Spain by Caballero's murderous bandits, yet one or two

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Governments still maintain intercourse with the chieftains of these sub-humans, as though nothing had happened. Where in this case is the indignation which England, for instance, has so often expressed in the course of her history at lesser misdeeds or even at invented atrocity reports?

The Outrage Committed by the "Admiral Scheer"

From official information received The Times correspondent in Madrid wrote as follows (published on January 4th, 1937):

According to official and private advices two of the finest ships in the German Navy spent New Year's Day hunting Spanish cargo boats. They were the cruiser *Königsberg*, which has apparently grown tired of waiting off Bilbao for the confiscated cargo and passenger of the s.s. *Palos* to be surrendered, and the "pocket" battleship *Admiral Scheer*, which has appeared in the Mediterranean.

A *communiqué* from the Navy Office says that the collier *Sotón* was sailing along the coast from Gijon towards Bilbao when she was held up in territorial waters by the cruiser *Königsberg*, which fired two shots at her. To avoid capture the master of the *Sotón* ran her aground near the entrance to Santoña harbour. A motor-boat armed with a machine-gun came alongside the *Sotón* and took off the mate, who, once on board the *Königsberg*, was obliged to sign a document notifying that the capture of the *Sotón* was a reprisal for the detention of the *Palos* at Bilbao. The *communiqué* goes on to say that the commander of the loyal naval forces in the Cantabrian seas has sent a destroyer and two submarines to protect the *Sotón*.

Private advices from Bilbao complete this story,

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saying that the master of the *Sotón* was ordered to pull off shore and follow the *Königsberg* at 3.15 p.m., but that the crew abandoned ship on the advice of the Civil Governor of Santander. The *Königsberg* departed at 3.25 p.m.

The exploit of the *Admiral Scheer* was somewhat different. She met and stopped four miles south of Sabinal lighthouse and then escorted away the steamer *Aragón* with a crew of twenty-five, which had left Almeria at 5.30 a.m. on New Year's Day with 1,200 tons of cargo, mostly foodstuffs, for Málaga. The officer commanding the naval station at Almeria proceeded to Sabinal by land and sent out an air patrol with the captain of the submarine flotilla as an observer. The warship, with her prey following close behind, was seen proceeding south. Several witnesses of the capture of the *Aragón*, among them a police official who happened to be in the lighthouse, have made statements to the effect that this capture also took place in territorial waters. The *Admiral Scheer* was again seen on Saturday morning alone off Cape Gata.

These incidents are recognized generally as being of the gravest nature.

Treatment Reserved to Colonies

The telegram sent by the Admiral commanding the German fleet in Spanish waters demanding the return of the cargo of the Palos and of the passenger who was on board, and the reply of the Spanish Government are contained in the following note from the British United Press in Valencia, January 4th, 1937:

The Spanish Government has emphatically rejected Germany's terms for calling off the campaign of reprisals against its shipping.

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These terms, it was announced by the Foreign Ministry to-night, were conveyed in the following telegram from the Admiral commanding the German Fleet in Spanish waters:

To the Government of the Republic—The German Admiral in Spanish waters is prepared, after the return of the passenger and the rest of the cargo detained from the German steamer *Palos*, to return the Spanish steamer *Aragón* and to suspend fresh reprisals. He expects a reply by radio.

The Foreign Office *communiqué* added that the Government had examined the situation and had declined to accept these proposals, "owing to the realization of an act of aggression and of war.

"Neither will the Government reply direct to the Admiral, not only because of the improper form in which the telegram was sent but also because of its tone, which is suitable only for the treatment reserved for colonies.

"In view of all these incidents, which fully confirm the Spanish thesis regarding the growing danger of an extension of the conflict—and which, if not rapidly restrained, will have irreparable consequences—the Government has decided to treat the new situation in the diplomatic manner which its extraordinary gravity necessitates."

Señor del Vayo, the Foreign Minister, addressing a Socialist youth meeting to-day, said: "We are firmly resolved, whatever may happen, not to give in to any threat of aggression by the German fleet, and to reply with all the means at our disposal.

"To this end all necessary orders have been given to use all our means of defence against whatever fresh aggression may arise at sea."

The Nazis Announce a Blockade of the Government Ports

In a world without any other law beyond the armed force of Fascism, it is not extraordinary that the Nazis should think they have the right to blockade the ports of the Spanish Government: something of this is suggested in the following report from a Manchester Guardian correspondent in Berlin, published in that paper on January 4th, 1937:

A spokesman of the Propaganda Ministry stated to Reuter to-night:

German warships in Spanish waters have perfectly clear orders not to hold up the trading ship of foreign Powers, with the sole exception of freighters belonging to the Reds.

Asked whether this last phrase meant that German warships had received instructions to hold up all merchant ships belonging to the Spanish Government wherever they might be encountered, the spokesman replied that the exact instructions given to the German warships was unknown, and that therefore it would be going too far to state that all Spanish shipping is to be held up.

Germany's future action, it was stated, depended largely on the procedure adopted by the "Spanish Reds," in particular the reply from the Basque Government, which has still not been received.

If Germany had not been disposed to violate all the laws there were to be violated, in order to achieve her ends of helping General Franco and converting Spain into a Nazi colony, the Palos incident might have been settled

without loss of time, and in accordance with justice. It would have been enough to submit the question to the arbitration of some organization or group of persons chosen to deal with it. But the Nazis preferred to employ reprisals.

The Opinion of a Legal Correspondent

With regard to the legal problems arising out of the Palos incident, a "legal correspondent" published the following interesting article in the Manchester Guardian on January 4th, 1937:

Unless justified by international law the seizure of Spanish vessels by a German naval force is the first overt act of direct "neutral" participation in the Spanish hostilities. It is therefore natural, that there may be a desire in responsible quarters, not confined to Germany, to search for some semblance of legal excuse.

The task is certainly not an easy one. For the German reprisals are occurring with the background of the undisputed breach of international law committed by the German recognition of the insurgents as the lawful Government of Spain and by the determination of Germany to treat the Madrid Government as an insurgent body, without even the right or standing of a belligerent. In comparison with that illegal and unprecedented act of intervention the inquiry into the legality of a particular incident seems almost incongruous.

In theory, so far as Germany is concerned, the Madrid Government is a *de facto* insurgent authority which can be tolerated only so long as it does not interfere with the right of neutral States or their subjects. Any such interference when taking place on the high seas may be treated as piracy. This is

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the reason why the official German *communiqué* speaks of "acts of piracy of a Red Spanish vessel." From this point of view, the answer to the question whether the German action is legally justified or not is very simple. It is in the affirmative. This is so for the obvious reason that Germany owes no duty of restraint or non-interference to an authority which she refuses to recognize and whose very claim to be a civilized authority she declines to admit. To put it paradoxically, Germany's conduct is lawful so long as it is remembered that it takes place within the orbit of a major breach of international law.

But the paradoxical nature of this answer shows also that it is an inadequate one. There are obvious limits to the logic of illegality, as the German Government itself seems to recognize. This explains the reference in the German *communiqué* to "reprisals" adopted "in defence of German sovereign rights against an act of piracy." A State does not adopt reprisals against pirates; it coerces them; it punishes them; it hunts them down by relentless offensive action. The chase of the *Huascar* by the British Navy offers an example of the kind of action a State takes against vessels of unrecognized insurgents interfering with neutral property. Lawyer and layman will smile when reading the solemn announcement of a Great Power professing to defend its sovereign right against pirates and engaging with them in an argument whether their act takes place within or outside territorial waters. This quaint clumsiness of terminology is probably not due to the reluctance of the German Foreign Office to consult its international lawyers. It is due to the impossibility which the German Government must by now realize of maintaining in law a position resulting from the illegal act of recognition of General Franco as the Government of Spain.

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The Madrid Government cannot, either in law or in fact, be treated as an unrecognized insurgent authority. When this is realized there ought to be no difficulty in disposing of incidents like that arising out of the seizure of the *Palos*. Normally the legality of the capture is determined by a Prize Court. In the absence of recognition of belligerency no Prize Court has, it appears, been set up by either side in the Spanish trouble.

But, unless the relations between Germany and the lawful Madrid Government are to be shaped by the overwhelming force of the German Navy, incidents like that of the *Palos* must, in fact, be settled by the rules of prize law and generally by the principles governing the rules of neutrals and belligerents. Assuming that Germany is willing to let the relevant rules of laws prevail, she would be entitled to resort to reprisals if the Madrid Government were responsible for a palpable illegal capture and if it refused to have its legality determined either by Spanish courts or by an international body. Even in that case, according to a recognized rule, the reprisals would have to be proportionate. This means that Germany could not continue to seize a number of Spanish vessels in reprisal for the seizure of a single German ship. (Germany is in a position to remember well the requirement of the proportionality of reprisals, as only eight years ago she was condemned by an arbitration tribunal to pay heavy damages to Portugal for having invaded in 1914 large parts of the Portuguese colonies in South Africa as a reprisal for some casualties in a frontier incident.)

Whether the seizure of the *Palos* was a breach of international law is, once we assume the right of the Madrid Government to resort to measures of self-protection, a mixed question of fact and law.

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Quite apart from the question of contraband and the recognition of belligerency, the Spanish Government is entitled to exercise jurisdiction for certain protective purposes not only within the three-mile limit but also within a further portion of the high seas. Many States, including Great Britain, claim jurisdiction rights within a so-called contiguous zone adjacent to the three-mile limit for revenue purposes and the like.

Great Britain has done so in a series of hovering Acts. Spain and many other countries have at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930 claimed a wide contiguous zone for the purpose of neutrality and generally of national safety. Spain's claim to a wide limit of territorial water is, in fact, of long standing.

In addition to the legality of seizure there is, of course, the question of the nature of the captured German cargo. Did it constitute contraband? Was it absolute or conditional contraband according to traditional facts which the Conference of London in 1909 attempted to codify? There is further the question of the articles "analogous to contraband" found on board the *Palos*—namely, the detained Spanish passenger. For the English reader this aspect of the incident will revive memories of the famous Trent case during the American Civil War, which nearly brought about a war between this country and the United States. Was the passenger in question a member of the insurgent fighting forces or a person proceeding to enlist in their service? The legality of his detention largely depends on the answer to this question.

All these disputed questions must be determined before the question of reprisals can arise at all. Reprisals are an answer to a breach of international

law. Accordingly the German reprisals would normally be legitimate only if the capture were flagrantly contrary to international law and if the Spanish Government refused to submit the legality of the seizure to impartial determination. If the German Government is of the view that the Spanish Government has no rights whatsoever, and that in its capacity as unrecognized insurgent it is therefore fair game for a display of German force whenever German property is involved, even if it is obviously contraband, then, of course, it is the end of the matter. But if the German Government purports to act in the sense of injured rights then the matter is largely one of maritime and prize law. The Spanish Government would be well advised to offer to submit these disputed questions of facts and law to a British Admiralty judge (chosen by Germany herself), or to an *ad hoc* commission of inquiry under the Hague Convention of 1907, which is in this respect probably binding both upon Spain and Germany. A commission of this kind was entrusted in 1913 in the Tavignano case between France and Italy with determining the locality of the seizure of a French vessel by Italy during the Italo-Turkish war.

The present dispute is, in the first instance, one as to facts,—namely, of the place of the capture and of the character of the goods and person detained. Disputed questions of law could be settled later on. Reprisals are not the proper or the legitimate means to settle either.

[The *Huascar* incident occurred in 1877 when revolutionaries in Peru seized the battleship *Huascar*. She took a supply of coal from a British ship and later stopped another British ship and took from her by force two Peruvian Government officials. An English squadron, regarding her as “engaged in piratical acts,” attacked her, but she escaped at nightfall and

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surrendered to a Peruvian squadron. Peru protested to the British Government, but eventually allowed the matter to drop.

The Trent case occurred during the American Civil War, when two men who had been appointed diplomatic agents of the Confederate States in London and Paris were taken off the British steamer *Trent* by an American frigate. The British Government demanded, and obtained, their immediate release.]

The Conciliatory Attitude of the Spanish Government

Even after suffering every kind of aggression from the Nazi fleet, the Spanish Government was ready to return the cargo to the German authorities, if the Non-Intervention Committee should decide that what the Palos was carrying was not war-material. To this end the Spanish Ambassador in London handed the following note to the British Foreign Office, on January 5th, 1937 :

On the 23rd December 1936 the German steamer *Palos* was detained in Spanish territorial waters with a considerable quantity of celluloid prepared for cannon charge, various radio-telegraphic and radio-telephonic sets for field use, and other war-material. The authorities proceeded to take over the war-material and, this done, the steamer was authorized to put to sea once more with all her remaining cargo, among which were provisions for the rebels, and her crew, with the exception of a Spanish subject who was found on board and was entirely without documents.

The fact that the detention took place in Spanish territorial waters proves that it was a perfectly legitimate act carried out in accordance with the right of search, which exercised in territorial waters and

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as a result of the right of vigilance, is one of the indisputed attributes of all States.

Under pretext of reprisals for the detention of the *Palos*, a number of units of the German fleet have carried out acts of direct aggression against Spanish merchant ships, preventing free traffic between the various ports of the Peninsula.

The steamer *Sotón*, commanded by Captain Pedro Lopez, was detained on the 1st January at 11 o'clock in the morning in the Cantabrian Sea by the German cruiser *Königsberg*, the Commander of this cruiser forcing the second officer of the *Sotón* to sign on board the *Königsberg* the following declaration:

I have been informed that the steamer *Sotón*, under the command of Captain Pedro López, has been captured by the cruiser *Königsberg* as a reprisal against the illegal detention of a part of the cargo and of a passenger of the steamer *Palos*, captured on the 23rd of December ultimo. I have been informed that I must obey orders of the cruiser *Königsberg* navigating in the direction indicated. I undertake for myself and on behalf of the other officers duly to carry out the orders given and to transmit orders to the Captain.

At the same time the following order was handed to the Captain of the Spanish ship:

Weigh anchor at 15.15. A quarter of an hour before, three long siren calls, look towards port and take easterly course. If any difficulty arises in carrying out this order the Second Officer must lower a boat immediately and give an account to the cruiser.

On the same day, the steamer *Aragón* of the Transmediterranean, which had called at the port

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of Almeria proceeding from Alicante on the 31st December with a general cargo of provisions and war-material for Málaga, while putting again to sea carrying on board 1,200 tons of cargo, was captured by the German man-of-war *Almirante Scheer*.

At approximately twelve o'clock on the 3rd the German cruiser *Königsberg* detained at the altitude of Cape Ajo within territorial waters the Spanish merchant ship *Marta Junquera* with 600 tons of cargo for Santander and Gijon. The said steamer sailed from Bilbao at eight o'clock in the morning.

On the 3rd of January the following radiogram was received:

To the Government of the Republic. The German Admiral in Spanish waters is disposed after the return of the passenger and of the rest of the cargo confiscated from on board the German steamer *Palos*, to return the detained steamer *Aragón* and to suspend further means of reprisal. He awaits a reply by wireless to the *Königsberg*.

The Government of the Republic cannot agree that the exercise of the right of vigilance in Spanish territorial waters being applied to German vessels trading with the rebels, warrants either the firing on Spanish ships—as in the case of the *Sotón*, or their seizure—as in the case of the *Aragón*, acts of aggression which constitute by themselves a flagrant violation of International Law.

On the other hand, the Government of the Republic could not agree to the impositions of a German Admiral who referred to himself as a "German Admiral in Spanish waters," without yielding in the matter of its sovereign rights.

Since the Government of the United Kingdom has been the spokesman of the Committee on

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Non-Intervention of London to the Government of the Republic in submitting to it the new plan of control elaborated by the said Committee which was accepted in principle by the Spanish Government in a spirit of international collaboration, and in view of the absence of diplomatic relations between the Spanish and German Governments, the Government of the Republic draws the attention of the Government of the United Kingdom to the above-mentioned facts, which constitute the last links in the chain of continued violations by the German Government of the Pact of Non-Intervention. Firstly, by the supplying of war-material and of experts to the armed rebel forces; and next supplying them with contingents of troops the "volunteer" character of which is given away by the completeness of the German regiment, and finally by provoking incidents on the sea and impeding freedom of traffic.

This manner of proceeding on the part of the German war navy stationed in Spanish waters, is likely to lead to the gravest complications should the Spanish Navy or Air Force, coinciding on the scene of such incidents, intervene to prevent the intrusion of the German Navy.

And since in the case of such an eventuality all the purpose of the policy of Non-Intervention and the efforts of the Committee of London to assure the localization of the conflict might be irreparably compromised, the Government of the Republic leaves to the high judgment of the Government of the United Kingdom the placing before the above mentioned Committee the examination of the new situation.

The British Government refused to present this document to the Non-Intervention Committee.

Rebel Piracy against Russian Merchant Ships

The aggressions which Russian ships have suffered when encountered by the pirates of the rebel fleet deserve special consideration here. We should like to insist on this point: it seems inconceivable that a rebel fleet can be allowed not only to commit every kind of abuse against the ships and ports of the legitimate Government of the Spanish Republic, but also to break the law in acts of violence against merchant ships which are not Spanish in nationality.

The Spanish insurgents have exercised their piratical acts especially against Russian merchant vessels. The list of incidents of which we have certain knowledge shows the real dimensions of the rebel crimes.

The British United Press communicated the following, on October 31st, 1936:

The Soviet steamer Dnistr, with cargo from Hamburg to Batum, was stopped and searched in the Straits of Gibraltar yesterday by the Spanish rebel cruiser Almirante Cervera.

After firing a blank shot the cruiser ordered the ship to stop.

Rebel officers inspected the ship's papers and cargo, then allowed the ship to proceed on her course.

The insurgents also detained the Soyuz Vodnikov. Reuter telegraphed from Moscow (published on November 16th, 1936):

According to the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the Soyuz Vodnikov was proceeding to Belgium with a cargo of 10,000 tons of oil destined for a German firm.

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"This is not the first time," added the Commissariat spokesman, "that the Spanish Fascists have permitted themselves insolent piratical actions, violating fundamental international laws of navigation."

The Daily Worker correspondent in Moscow wrote as follows on the subject of the Soyuz Vodnikov, November 18th, 1936:

It has been impossible up to now to get in touch with the Captain of the *Soyuz Vodnikov*, the Soviet oil-tanker detained by the Spanish Fascists at Ceuta.

The Fascists will not permit him to send any telegraphic account of the situation of the vessel nor of the circumstances under which he was forced to proceed to Ceuta.

The Berlin agency of Union Oil Export Company sent several telegrams between November 13th and 16th to the Ceuta port administration telling the Captain to proceed to the Belgium port Ertvelde.

The action of the Fascists seems to indicate that the vessel was seized on the open sea by an act of piracy.

The tanker was taking a cargo of 10,000 tons of petrol to Germany for Benzol Verband, which owns the petrol seized by the Spanish Fascists.

But the theft of petrol belonging to their own masters does not lessen the piracy of the Spanish Fascist generals in seizing the vessel.

On November 16th, 1936, The Times published the following telegram from its correspondent in Gibraltar:

A British subject who has arrived from Ceuta to-day informed me that the Russian oil-tanker *Soyuz Vodnikov* S.S.S.R. had been stopped in the Straits

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and ordered to Ceuta by the insurgent cruiser *Almirante Cervera*, which ordered her to discharge the large supply of oil on board intended for the use of the Spanish Government.

. *We give here a report from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Moscow, published on December 7th, 1936:*

The official Tass Agency reports the arrest and search of six more Soviet ships all carrying innocent cargoes, by Spanish Nationalist patrols. Their "piratical excesses," it says, "become more wicked and more systematic, creating by their provocative and criminal activities a serious threat to the safe navigation of main sea routes."

The six Red ships, the names of which are given by the Tass Agency, are:

The *Rion*, with coal from Danzig in transit for Iran via the Soviet port of Batum.

The tanker *Emba*, from the Black Sea for Avonmouth and Tallinn, with 10,000 tons of Russian oil products.

The *Stepan Halturin*, coming empty from Casablanca, after unloading timber from Archangel. Arrested in the Straits of Gibraltar, taken to Ceuta, searched and released.

The *Stchors*, from Rotterdam, with German coal, bound for Bagnoli, Italy. Stopped in the Straits and shot at by the insurgents, who ordered her to Ceuta. The captain held on his course, and is now making for Orán.

The *Kharkoff*, from Rotterdam to Porto Ferrario, taken under guard by the insurgent cruiser *Canarias* to Palma, Majorca.

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The *Kossareff*, from England, with a cargo of British coal, to Oran.

On January 4th, 1937, the newspapers published a Reuter telegram from Moscow, which read as follows :

Moscow, January 3rd.—The Soviet steamer *Krasny Profintern* (4,648 tons) was according to information received here, stopped near Gibraltar on New Year's Day by a Spanish insurgent warship. The vessel, which was carrying a cargo of German coal from Bremen to Naples, was escorted to Ceuta, but was released an hour after her arrival.

Another report from Moscow on January 1st, 1937, was as follows :

Two Soviet cargo steamers, the *Bela Kuhn* (3,972 tons) and the *Moscow* (6,086 tons), are reported to have been detained by the Spanish rebels off Gibraltar. The vessels were released after four hours.

The Russian Steamer "Komsomol" set on fire and sunk by an insurgent ship

On December 21st, 1936, the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Moscow sent the following report :

The official Tass news agency states to-day that the Russian steamer *Komsomol*—Young Communist—5,109 tons, carrying a cargo of manganese ore from Poti, in the Black Sea, to Ghent, was "set on fire and sunk at sea last Monday, by a pirate cruiser in the hands of Spanish rebels."

It is thought probable that the *Komsomol* was the vessel reported in *The Daily Telegraph* on Wednesday to have been seen in flames with a Spanish warship

standing by. The position then given was between Cartagena and Algeria.

The Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that they had just read of the incident in foreign newspapers. They were not yet able to say what the reaction of the Soviet Government would be.

Pravda, the official Communist newspaper, expresses the "deep, indignant anger of the toilers" at the occurrence. "It is difficult, at present," the paper adds, "to foresee the full consequences of this new and monstrous crime, this unheard-of Fascist provocation by the inspirers of war."

It follows, it is declared, "repeated arbitrary arrests, and the deflection from their normal course of Soviet ships on the high seas, under the false pretext of searching them for arms."

According to the Tass agency the *Komsomol* was taking 6,909 tons of manganese ore from Chiature mines, in the Caucasus, to the Providence Company, of Belgium, which had received all documents covering the cargo from the Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord of Paris, through Lloyd's National Provincial and Foreign Bank Ltd., of Antwerp.

In accordance with the terms of the contract, 80 per cent of the price of the cargo had already been paid by the Belgian company.

"Grave Concern"—Nothing More

A diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Herald wrote next day:

Grave concern was felt in international circles last night when it became known that a rebel warship was responsible for the sinking of the Russian cargo

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steamer *Komsomol*, reported last week in flames off the Spanish coast.

The fate of the crew of between twenty-five and thirty men is unknown.

The deepest anxiety is felt over this new development, which is regarded as one of the most serious from the international point of view in the Spanish rebellion.

The two most important Russian newspapers emphasize that the Spanish Fascists and their supporters cannot evade responsibility for "this outrageous act of piracy."

According to Russian circles, the sinking of the *Komsomol* is the culmination of a series of incidents in the Mediterranean involving the stoppage and in some cases the seizure, of Russian merchant ships.

Under international law such activities by General Franco, to whom belligerent rights have not been granted, constitute acts of piracy.

In Moscow it is stated that the *Komsomol*, though in Mediterranean waters, was not proceeding to a Spanish port, but was on her way to Belgium with a cargo of 6,000 tons of iron ore.

It is difficult to see how the Russian Government can refrain from taking some action.

Pirates

The Manchester Guardian made the following comments on the incident in a leader of December 22nd, 1936:

The Russians are extremely angry because a cargo-boat carrying manganese ore from the Black Sea to Ghent was—so they allege—"set on fire and sunk" a week ago by the Spanish rebels. Previously the official Soviet news agency gave details of six other

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Russian merchant vessels which had been stopped by rebel warships. Plainly the Spanish rebels, who have not been recognized by the Russian Government as belligerents, have no right whatever to interfere with merchant shipping and could strictly be treated as pirates for so doing. But who can doubt that the rebel General Franco would never have dared to take such impudent action unless he had the encouragement of the Fascist Powers which have recognized him not merely as a belligerent but as the lawful ruler of Spain?

With regard to the sinking of the Komsomol the Morning Post correspondent in Madrid telegraphed (December 23rd, 1936):

The sinking of the Russian steamer *Komsomol* is regarded here to-day as indicating that the Junta are doing their best to provoke an international conflict in the hope that in the general welter they might salvage something from the wreckage.

The aggressions on the town of Cerbère and the Air France 'plane on the Toulouse-Barcelona route are also regarded as pointing in the same direction.

Attention is drawn to the kinship of spirit in the various Fascist countries as illustrated by Italian aggression in Abyssinia and German infractions of the Versailles treaties.

Franco does not Deny It

On December 23rd, 1936, the Daily Herald published the following information :

Death—some executed by Spanish rebels, the rest drowned—has been the fate, it is feared, of the twenty-five or thirty men who manned the Russian steamer

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Komsomol fired and sunk early last week by one of Franco's warships.

Since the 5,000 ton vessel was sighted ablaze in the Mediterranean off Cartagena on December 15th nothing has been heard of what happened to her crew.

General Franco has not denied that the ship was sunk by a rebel cruiser. He has maintained complete silence about the incident. But last night the *Daily Herald* Gibraltar correspondent cabled:

From an insurgent source I learn that the *Komsomol* was abandoned ablaze by the rebel cruiser *Canarias*, which picked up four members of the crew.

They were executed later. The others perished in the sea.

If this report is confirmed it will arouse the most intense indignation in Russia.

Demands for stern action against the Spanish rebels have been made at mass meetings throughout the Soviet, without the fate of the crew being known.

When the report that they had been executed or drowned was received in London, it was telephoned to the Soviet Embassy.

M. Maisky, the Ambassador, was at the Foreign Office attending a meeting of the sub-committee of the Non-Intervention Committee.

An official of the Embassy at once left to give the news to M. Maisky in the meeting.

A Telegram from the Spanish Foreign Minister

On December 22nd, 1936, Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister, sent the following telegram to the Spanish Ambassador in Moscow :

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Request you to visit Commissar Foreign Affairs to express in my name, in the name of the Government and the Spanish people, profound indignation at this latest act of piracy by rebels in sinking Soviet ship *Komsomol*. We all feel great anxiety concerning fate of crew, who in the few days which they spent in the Valencian region made themselves so popular, and for all of whom we have warm sympathy remembering their firm and encouraging solidarity. I shall be grateful for any news. For the rest, the sinking of the *Komsomol* is a new proof of the exactitude of Spanish thesis on the grave peril which world peace runs hourly, if the well known forces of destruction and war are allowed to continue tricking those who, lacking all sense of European responsibility, will not hesitate to drag with them in their own downfall the general cause of Peace. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO.

Piracy against Ships of other Nationalities

Perhaps we could understand why the aggressions and humiliations which Russia merchant ships have suffered from Spanish rebel pirates do not disturb the capitalist powers. But what is really difficult to explain is that the rebels are able to attack and detain ships of any nationality without the democratic powers proposing to limit such criminal actions. The most that they have done is to make a platonic protest. We have been permitted to see Spanish pirate ships treated with every consideration, even when they are acting against the respectable interests of other countries. This, no doubt, is another form of intervention in favour of Franco on the part of the "neutrals."

The best proof that to allow this banditry at sea is

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to intervene against the Spanish Government, is given in the following Exchange telegram from Gibraltar, published on October 24th, 1936:

The Junta gunboat *Canovas* to-day captured a cargo-boat flying the Greek flag and stated to be carrying war-material valued at 32,000,000 pesetas (£1,240,000 at par), and including four complete batteries of artillery, 4,000,000 cartridges, 400 machine-guns, and 1,500 aeroplane bombs.

The vessel was escorted to Ceuta, and part of the cargo has already been transported to Spain.

The situation, then, is as follows : Italy and Germany supply an abundance of arms to the rebels. France and England give no arms at all to the legitimate Government of Spain. Not only do they not supply arms themselves ; they allow the rebel fleet complete liberty on the seas, so that the rebels can seize the arms which the Spanish Government acquires at high prices and with infinite trouble in other parts of Europe.

Another example of Fascist piracy is offered in the following Reuter message from Oslo, published on November 27th, 1936:

The Norwegian Government has made an energetic protest to General Franco, against the action of Nationalist armed trawlers in holding up the Norwegian steamer *Lisken*, 1,105 tons, on November 15th.

The *Lisken*, bound from Dundee to Valencia, with a cargo of seed potatoes, was stopped by the trawlers between Cape Villano and Cape Finisterre, North-West Spain, and compelled to put into the Nationalist port of Vigo, where the cargo was confiscated.

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The seed potatoes, bought by the Spanish Government, and transported in a Norwegian boat, were, therefore, stolen by the rebels . . . with only the protest—oh, these protests on official paper!—of the Norwegian Government.

A Press Association dispatch from Gibraltar, published on December 31st, 1936, stated :

The Danish steamer *Ingeborg S.* (1,200 tons) was to-day stopped by armed rebel trawlers in the Straits of Gibraltar and ordered to proceed to Ceuta, on the African coast. The *Ingeborg S.*, however, immediately changed her course and arrived safely at Gibraltar, where the incident was reported to the Danish Consul.

The Consul at once made representations to the Spanish authorities at Algeciras as a result of which the steamer was permitted to proceed on her voyage to Eastern Spain.

We can imagine what the authorities in Algeciras would say :

" If there are only going to be representations, well, let the representations come ! "

December 31st, 1936:

*A Lloyd's message from Gibraltar states :—The Belgian steamer *Navex*, bound east, has been stopped in the Straits and taken to Ceuta by insurgent armed trawlers.*

In this case there were not even representations.

CHAPTER NINE

THE SPANISH WAR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The powerlessness of the League to oppose the aggression of Italian Fascism against Abyssinia left little doubt as to what would be Geneva's attitude in the Spanish question. Consequently, if the Spanish Government turned to the League of Nations it was not with the illusion of obtaining the application of any international law, but simply as a means of exposing before the world the aggression of Italy, Germany and Portugal against Spain. The League has been used by the Spanish Republic as a tribune or loudspeaker from which she can inform the world of her tragedy. From that point of view, it has been some advantage for the Government to be represented in Geneva. But morally—we must leave aside all question of material support, which it is impossible to obtain from the League—the fact of having recourse to the League of Nations has produced small benefit for the Republic. At this present moment, when the aggressor States receive diplomatic homage from the democracies, and their representatives are welcomed in Paris and London with every show of flattering respect, it is clear that any nation which appeals to Geneva for justice, acquires, ipso facto, the reputation of being in a hopeless position.

In this present chapter we shall publish an account of the activities of the League in the matter of Spain, with certain relevant commentaries on these.

General Smuts Speaks on the League and Spain

The Manchester Guardian published the following dispatch, dated in Durban, August 20th, 1936:

"I look upon the revolt of the Spanish army in Morocco and the civil war in Spain not only as a most dangerous symptom in itself but as another product of the breakdown of co-operation in the League during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis," said General Smuts to-day in an interview with the *Natal Advertiser*.

"If France and Britain had stood firm in that crisis and seen the League through the position in the Mediterranean would now be safer, for the League would both have proved itself and have become a real bulwark against revolution and aggression.

"I am sure that the Spanish business is closely connected with the Italian business, and the two together have created a situation in the Mediterranean which must necessarily give the greatest concern to all Mediterranean Powers. Not only has the breakdown of the League resulted in the Mediterranean situation but in a wild armaments race.

"I frankly admit that rearmament may seem the only alternative after the desertion of the League and the abandonment of the policy of collective security.

"My point is that the armaments race should never have become necessary, but now we have started this scramble for armaments the question is how are we ever going to get out of it?"

General Smuts declared that the whole economic position of Europe was becoming a question of armaments. It was not the League that had failed but the Great Powers that had failed to stand by it in the first clear crisis with which it had been con-

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fronted. That had been the tragedy of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. At the most critical point in the career of the League the Great Powers, whose deepest interest it was to stand by it, failed to do so and let the League down very badly.

The irony and tragedy of the situation were that the action of the Great Powers was dictated by their view of the Mediterranean situation, and that situation to-day was worse and far more dangerous than it had ever been before. "I feel firmly convinced that only firm and courageous action by France and Britain can stop the rot."

Abyssinia was a grave warning, and perhaps the events in Spain were of an even more ominous character. Cracks and fissures were rapidly appearing, and the time was coming for the Great Powers to face their responsibilities and end the policy of drift.

General Smuts said he was convinced Germany would come into the League as soon as she saw that it meant business. Talk about reform of the League was mere camouflage, and the question had occurred to him whether it was not more necessary and important that the Great Powers should come together at this moment in an informal conference than another spectacular show which led nowhere.

Invoking Article 11 of the Covenant

The following letter was published in the Manchester Guardian on September 10th, 1936:

SIR,—One aspect of the situation arising out of the rebellion in Spain appears to have been overlooked in the controversies about non-intervention, neutrality and the like. Whatever individual views there may be about the character or policy of the

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Spanish Government, or the justification of the military leaders in rebelling against it, there is no doubt that it is an offence in international law to give help to rebels against a friendly Government.

The efforts of the French Cabinet, with British support, have been directed to persuading certain Governments, particularly those of Germany, Italy, and Portugal, not to send munitions, aeroplane pilots, and money to the rebels, offering as "consideration" the waiving of the indubitably legal right of other Governments to sell munitions or make loans to the Government of Spain.

It is tacitly agreed that help to the rebels has been given by, or with the connivance of, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Portugal. These are acts of aggression. It appears strange that the machinery of the League of Nations has not been put into motion. I should have thought this was a clear case for invoking Article 11 of the Covenant, under which there is a joint and several responsibility on all the States-members to act when there is a danger of war. This would certainly be quicker, and might be more effective than the present French policy of an International Neutrality Committee.—Yours, etc.,

STRABOLGI.

House of Lords, September 8th.

Lord Cranborne Discusses the Spanish Question with Señor Alvarez del Vayo, in Geneva

On September 18th, 1936, the Council of the League met in secret session to discuss the question of Abyssinia. The Times correspondent in Geneva wrote :

Great Britain was represented on the Council by Lord Cranborne, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,

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who during the day had discussed the situation in Spain with Señor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister. The Spanish civil war is not directly before the League, but it is evidently going to play an important part in the private discussions. The newly-appointed Spanish Ambassador to Great Britain, Señor de Azcárate, and M. Rosenberg, the Russian Ambassador to Spain, both lately officials of the League, have arrived here. The Spanish delegation appears to be taking a strong line on the subject of the International Non-Intervention Committee, but so far there has been no *démarche* with regard to the attitude of the Portuguese Government.

Statements by Señor Alvarez del Vayo in the International Association of Journalists

On September 20th, 1936, Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister, made the following statements on the occasion of a lunch given in his honour at Geneva :

“ We cannot understand why the democracies of the world refuse help to the legitimate Government of Spain while the goods which are refused to the Government are freely available to the rebels,” said Señor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, here to-day. He was speaking at a lunch given in his honour by the International Association of Journalists accredited to the League of Nations.

Describing the course of the rebellion, he said:

The military leaders were so sure of a rapid success that they left behind in their homes and offices in Madrid documents which show clearly that they had been engaged in plotting the rebellion for over a year before it actually broke out. Because

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officers deserted in such large numbers it has been necessary for the Government to improvise an army and to improvise a high command. Despite these terrible disadvantages the Government is sure to win, for it has both the time and the people on its side.

New Statements by Señor Alvarez del Vayo

In an interview with a representative of the Exchange Telegraph Señor del Vayo said :

You have just returned from Spain where you visited both sides of the fighting line and you know as well as I do that the revolt left the legal Government of Spain without an army and with only small supplies of munitions. You saw that in the neighbourhood of Irun and San Sebastian at the beginning of the revolt our militia had only sporting guns for weapons with which to defend the Republic. Although the rebels have everything they need while we have had the greatest difficulty in supplying our forces with arms and munitions, I have no doubt to-day that we shall triumph, for the people of Spain are with us.

Republican Spain of to-day is facing the same situation as that which confronted France during the Hundred Years' War. The women are with us with all their hearts and they are keeping up the moral of our soldiers. They are working for our militiamen, they are working for Spain. Millions of men and women are willing to lay down their lives in defence of the liberty which is threatened

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by a military dictatorship, and time is on our side. We want and will have a democratic Government such as you enjoy in England, but much as we desire to put an end to the suffering which our people are enduring so heroically, we will not enter into negotiations with rebels.

The heroic spirit of our militia was shown only a few days ago when, at the risk of their lives our men attempted to save the women and children imprisoned in the Alcázar of Toledo. Not only were the lives of our men risked, but we took every possible step to liberate the women and children, as the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps has officially recognized.

The rebels are already beginning to realize that that they have made bad mistakes. They thought they would succeed in staging a *coup d'état* like that of Primo de Rivera in 1923, but they forgot that the dictatorship had taught us many things and that our people had been visited by the Goddess of Liberty, have been imbued with the ideals of democracy, and want to enjoy the right of living as free citizens in a free country.

When the present Assembly of the League of Nations is over come back to Spain and visit Madrid, and you will learn for yourself that the press expresses its opinion in complete liberty. The only censorship we have—and, as a journalist [Señor del Vayo was formerly European correspondent of the Buenos Ayres newspaper *La Nacion*], I know how abhorrent the word censorship is—is exercised by the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs, and only for the purpose of preventing the publication of news of a military character which might compromise the success of our troops.

Mr. Eden Talks with the Portuguese Representative on the Eve of the League Assembly (September, 1936)

On September 24th, 1936, The Times correspondent in Geneva wrote as follows :

The general discussion in the League Assembly opens to-morrow morning. It is expected that Mr. Eden will be the first speaker, and that he will be followed by Señor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister. Some apprehension was felt at the meeting of the General Committee to-day that the discussion on the position in Spain might stray beyond the strict limits of the Assembly's detachment, having regard to the fact that it is an internal question and has not been brought before the Assembly. At the meeting of the Latin American States to-day the subject was mentioned in connexion with the strained relations between Spain and Uruguay and the danger of a similar state of affairs extended to other countries. It was decided to consider this matter at a later meeting.

To-day Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax, separately or both together, received visits from Senhor Monteiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Señor Alvarez del Vayo (who was accompanied by Señor Azcárate, the Spanish Ambassador in London), Herr Schmidt, the Austrian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and M. Lozoraitis, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister.

Most of these were courtesy visits, but Senhor Monteiro came to transact important business. After his earlier talk with Mr. Eden, in which they dis-

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cussed means by which Portugal might yet be induced to join the London committee on non-intervention in Spain, Senhor Monteiro consulted his Government, and to-day he was able to communicate their reply. In the position now reached it is reasonable to hope that satisfactory arrangements will be made in the immediate future for Portugal to be represented in the London committee. The end of the negotiations is in sight.

Attempt to Stop Señor Alvarez del Vayo Speaking in the Assembly of the League

What the atmosphere in Geneva was like on the eve of the Assembly can be seen in the following report which was sent by the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian there (published on September 25th, 1936):

Dr. Saavedra Lamas, the President of the Assembly, who is bitterly hostile to Republican Spain, made at the meeting of the General Committee of the Assembly this evening an attempt to prevent Señor Alvarez del Vayo from speaking on the Spanish situation in the Assembly to-morrow.

Towards the end of the meeting of the Committee Dr. Lamas (who is the chief delegate of Argentina) said that he was a new-comer to Geneva and was therefore not well acquainted with the procedure, but he supposed that he would be justified in stopping any speaker in the general discussion who dealt with any question outside the Secretary General's report. He would like to know the opinion of more experienced members of the Committee.

M. Motta (Switzerland) gladly seized the opportunity and warmly supported the President's suggestion. By a decree of the Swiss Federal Government

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the inhabitants of Switzerland are now forbidden to speak in public about Spain, and no doubt M. Motta thought that the delegates to the Assembly should not be exceptions to this rule.

There was, however, vigorous opposition. One member of the committee said that in the past while the Secretary General's support had served as a basis for the general discussion, that discussion had always been regarded as an opportunity for the members of the League to express their views on any international question, and there had never been any restriction put on the speakers. He insisted that the precedent should be followed on this occasion.

Dr. Lamas said that he would take the objections into account and the matter dropped. Mr. Eden and M. Delbos had left the meeting before the question was raised.

If Dr. Lamas attempts to-morrow to stop Señor del Vayo he will only give Señor del Vayo a tremendous advertisement, as the Spanish Minister's speech will be reported in the press of the world whatever Dr. Lamas and M. Motta think about it. It is reported that some of the Latin-American delegations intend to leave the Assembly when Señor del Vayo begins to speak.

SEVENTEENTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

Speech by Mr. Eden, Foreign Minister of Great Britain

In the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, on September 25th, 1936, when Germany, Italy and Portugal were committing acts of aggression against the people and the legitimate Government of Spain, Mr. Eden made the following speech :

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At this our annual Assembly it is our habit, indeed our duty, to review the events of the past year.

None of us can feel satisfaction at their course, nor is there in the international scene that confronts us any room for complacency. Indeed, the seriousness of the times is such as to command frank speech, so that I shall not apologize to you for using less guarded language than is usual at our Assembly.

What picture does the world present to us to-day, in September 1936? Nationalism is strong, its antagonisms are vibrant. Challenging enthusiasms for rival forms of government hurl defiance at one another. What must be the ultimate consequence of so much licence? Inevitably a general weakening of confidence throughout the world. And this in turn must be the cause—is indeed already the cause—of another disturbing element which no one can ignore. Each nation, and this applies even to the smallest and most peace-loving, is expending an ever increasing proportion of its national wealth upon armaments to the ultimate detriment of its economy. The recovery of world trade is hampered by many obstacles, both economic and political; a standard of living may even find itself sacrificed for a standard of armament. There is restlessness, there is restriction; the barriers of frontiers grow harder to pass. There is an insufficiency of free intercourse between people and people, while nationally controlled propaganda for rival theses confuses criticism and stifles the free development of thought.

Not a pleasant picture; but not a hopeless one either. There need be in all this no fatal seeds of war. It should be, it can be perfectly, possible for nations to live and work together, however divergent their forms of government. How is it to be done? In the first place, by the practice, the national practice,

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of a certain toleration and restraint. I do not believe that we increase respect for our own forms of government by pouring scorn on those of other nations.

Perhaps there is the more excuse for me to say this because it is a British tradition to distrust extremes. Maybe that tradition can be of service to Europe and to peace in the next few years.

I would not have you believe that, because we in the United Kingdom proclaim less loudly than others our faith in the democracy that we practice and in the institutions we have developed, that our faith in them is therefore weakening and that we should not be willing to make sacrifices in their defence. We are profoundly attached to our liberties and to our traditions and we shall not yield them up, nor should we allow anyone to wrest them from us. We believe in democracy and in its survival, if only because its ideals lie too near to the spirit of the British race ever to be quenched. For us no system, of whatever extreme, could ever be acceptable if it brought in its train the suppression of our liberties and the destruction of our traditions. After centuries of experience, democracy appears to us, not effete, but enduring; the epitome of man's endeavour to create a civilization wherein he can find freedom, individuality and peace.

Though such are our national sentiments, they do not prevent us from realizing that other peoples feel just as strongly about the form of government they practice, that they are just as determined to uphold their traditions. Of course we accept that fully and completely. The last thing we would wish to see is the nations divided into camps, their alignment determined by the forms of government they practice. This would be an added and a wholly superfluous complication in a world complicated

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enough already. The first rule of ordered life between nations is then surely this: faith in one's own national tenets, toleration for those of others. Unless we fix that rule firmly in our minds and in our conduct, we can scarcely hope to put order into the present disordered state of international relations. Moreover, in international affairs, conditions do not remain static. If they are not improved, they will further deteriorate.

We must all of us be conscious of the significance of our world economic problems in relation to our present difficulties, and I shall have something to say on this subject in a moment. And yet do we not each one of us know that the indispensable element in all economic recovery is confidence in the political future? And how can there be such confidence unless we show a respect and toleration for each other's national faiths and traditions? The responsibility upon us all to observe this first rule of toleration and respect, of good temper and good-will in our international dealings, is thus very heavy, but by itself it is not enough.

We have also need of an international order, the authority of which shall finally supersede the arbitrament of conflict between States. Mankind has made many attempts to set up such an order, attempts which have so far met with only a moderate measure of success. Yet these attempts must be continued. By its signature of the Covenant, every nation here, by its signature of the Pact of Paris, almost every nation in the world, has repudiated war as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes. Civilization has to put its promises into practice or perish. The best method so far devised for that purpose is this League of Nations, which can yet achieve, if the nations of the world so intend, the

aims of its founders, which can yet realize the fervent desire of most of mankind: the permanent establishment of peace.

So far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is concerned, its policy will continue to be based upon its membership of the League of Nations. More than that, its whole-hearted co-operation can be counted upon in order that the League may be strengthened for the work it has to do, both by the enlargement of its membership and by the more confident loyalty of its Members.

How are we to achieve these results? For let us not delude ourselves. Unless we can achieve them, the League may still retain some value, but that value will only be secondary. In considering the problem of the future of the League, let us recognize clearly that there are two essential elements to its solution: the League's machinery and the will to work that machinery. Of the two, the second is without doubt infinitely the more important. But this is not to say that the machinery cannot be improved. At the last Assembly, it will be recalled, Governments were asked to send in their observations on the lessons to be learned from the experiences of the past year. Since His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom did not do that in writing, perhaps you will allow me to make certain comments on this subject on its behalf.

The underlying motive for the work on which we are now engaged, of examining the Covenant and the procedure of its application, is the recent failure of the collective action of the Members of the League to achieve the prime object for which it was undertaken.

The principal causes of the failure of the League in this instance were twofold: the lack of universality

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of the League itself and its failure, for whatever reason, to play a more energetic and effective part in the earlier stages of the crisis.

The former of these two causes—a lack of universality—has unfortunately been operative to some degree ever since the inception of the League. It has been aggravated by defections in recent years; and the authority of the League has without doubt been greatly impaired by the fact that its pronouncements do not have the weight of a verdict of universal world opinion. In all, therefore, that we may do, we should bear in mind the necessity of winning the widest possible acceptance, so that we may reinvest the League to the greatest possible extent with that universality which alone can give it full authority and effect. For it is clear that, in any crisis, an early and unmistakable indication of world opinion must inevitably carry the utmost weight, and may avert the necessity of special measures to prevent or to arrest a disturbance of the peace.

If we examine, as we should and frankly, the causes of the abstentions and defections from the League, we may find that these are based on two principal objections; first, that the Covenant invites signatories to assume obligations and commitments which all the Governments of the world are not ready in present circumstances to accept; and, secondly, that the League stands, so it is alleged, for the maintenance of an order of things with which some Governments are not content.

It would therefore seem appropriate that all nations should examine the present incidence of their commitments and the possibility of making them more applicable to the realities of the world situation as it exists to-day. We must also seek to encourage

and facilitate the use of the League's machinery for adapting situations to changing circumstances and for the remedy of what may be recognized to be legitimate grievances.

The first of these two objects might be brought nearer achievement if we could find some method of enabling the League to intervene more effectively in the early stages of a crisis than recent experience has shown to be possible.

It is to be observed that the framers of the Covenant were wise in that they produced an elastic document which did not exclude any form of action in an emergency. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, machinery should be devised which would facilitate the effective intervention of the League earlier than is now to be expected in any dispute which arises.

The first paragraph of Article 11, the Assembly will recall, provides that: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." This paragraph therefore gives wide opportunity for useful action, but the activities of the Council have, in the past, been hampered by the assumption that the rule of unanimity must apply to this provision of the Covenant, and that the consent of the parties to the dispute is thus necessary before the Council can make any recommendation.

It is for consideration, therefore, whether the Council should not be given more latitude, enabling it to make recommendations under the first paragraph of Article 11 without the consent of the State in controversy. His Majesty's Government attaches

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importance to this proposal. If it were to find general acceptance, then in the examination of any case that arose, and in any steps which such an examination might show to be practicable and desirable, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to play its full part.

It seems to us all-important that the Members of the Council should, in any dispute, clearly express their views at an early stage and should be asked to indicate the measures that they would be prepared to take to give effect to them. Discussion of such measures would show clearly how far the Powers represented on the Council would be prepared to intervene in any given case. If at the outset, or at an early stage in the dispute, the parties are left in no doubt of the will of the Council and of the determination of Member States to enforce it, this must act as a powerful deterrent to any party contemplating aggression in violation of the Covenant. And the earlier such party is brought to realize the situation, the easier it will be for him to modify his attitude and to conform to what the Council may recommend. Delay too often means that one or both of the parties commit themselves to military preparations which become increasingly difficult to revoke, and that the other Members of the League are thus faced with a situation in which it is more difficult and more hazardous for them to intervene with effect. The best way to serve peace is to ensure, so far as possible, that Governments know where they stand. If, on the other hand, it appears that Members of the League would not be prepared in the circumstances contemplated to intervene effectively, then it is better that the realities of the situation should be understood.

I turn now to another aspect of the same problem. In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, there is every advantage in the negotiation of regional pacts devised to strengthen general security. One of the great advantages of regional pacts is that their terms are known in advance, as are the conditions in which they will apply. The value of agreements for collective action, as a deterrent to an aggressor, depends largely on the certainty that they will be applied. The uncertainty of the operation of wider and more ambitious schemes may tempt an aggressor to hazard the risk that they will not be operated.

His Majesty's Government is therefore in favour of regional pacts, provided that they are consistent with the Covenant. It is for consideration whether such regional pacts should be submitted to the Council or the Assembly for approval. The approval of the Council or Assembly might even perhaps be dependent on compliance with certain conditions to be defined. Under such regional pacts, those who were parties to them would, of course, be free to assume definite obligations beyond those at present embodied in the Covenant. His Majesty's Government is resolved to endeavour to negotiate such a pact in respect of Western Europe.

Such, in broad outline, are the directions in which His Majesty's Government considers that we might seek improvement of our machinery for dealing with disputes and with breaches of the peace. But that is not, however, the whole of our task. Reflection shows one thing clearly—there is nothing essentially wrong with our charter, the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its general principles are right: it forms a logical and reasonable system which should not be incapable of practical application.

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Well, then the moral to be drawn is that its shortcomings have been due to the failure, on the part of States Members of the League, to apply the system loyally and integrally. Unless the League evidently commands the complete and ultimate loyalty of all its Members, and unless its membership be truly representative if not universal, it cannot have the authority which the peace of the world so clearly demands.

If nations are to be prepared to co-operate fully and loyally for the maintenance of peace, that peace must rest on a basis that appears to them desirable or at least acceptable. They will only strive to maintain a *status quo* that has won general acceptance, or to prevent forcible change of that *status quo*, if they are convinced that there exist peaceful methods whereby just changes can be effected.

That is, let us admit it, in the judgment of some, a principal failing of the League; it has come to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as an attempt to stereotype a state of things that can hardly be expected to endure for all time. It is true that Article 19 of the Covenant recognizes the impracticability of a rigid maintenance of the *status quo*. Moreover, there is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, nothing to prevent the Assembly, should it think fit, from embarking on the discussion of matters arising under that article, though, of course, the powers of the Assembly do not extend to decisions on the substance of such matters. It would plainly be impracticable, for example, to seek to give the Assembly power to impose changes against the wish of the parties concerned.

Human life, however, is not static, but a changing thing; and it would be a mistake to try to encase world affairs in a rigid mould of a particular date.

A frank discussion of grievances may go some way towards removing misconceptions, and a clear expression of opinion on the part of a great majority of the Assembly would undoubtedly exert moral pressure on the side of remedy of injustice. The ideal, I suggest to the Assembly, for which we should strive is a balanced system wherein justice is done to all and where none should have a sense of hurt or grievance. Therefore, our peace-preserving machinery would lose something of its point and of its efficacy unless we are sure that the peace which we aim to preserve is one that by its justice commends itself generally to the nations of the world.

In proposing modifications of our procedure, His Majesty's Government does not deceive itself—and I am sure not one of you in this Assembly deceives himself or herself—into thinking that, by modifications of machinery alone, we can vitalize the League. It is for that reason that His Majesty's Government has sought, in accordance with the terms of the *communiqué* agreed on in London towards the end of July, to draw together representatives of certain Governments, to see whether the first steps can be taken towards a European settlement. We are persisting, and we shall persist, in that endeavour. Let us not be blind to the fact that, without the co-operation of all the principal Powers, the League can have no full authority, and that we shall not get that co-operation unless all are convinced that it will be possible for them to obtain justice from the League and that it will therefore be in their interests to enforce peace through the League.

So much for the question of the application of the Covenant. But, if you will allow me, I wish before concluding to refer briefly to certain other points.

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First, it might be thought desirable and calculated to remove a cause of misgiving if the Covenant could be separated from the treaties of peace in which it now remains incorporated, and were to take the form of a self-contained convention. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would favour such a course.

So far, I have dealt with political considerations; but, as the years pass, we must all become increasingly conscious of the close and, indeed, inextricable connection which exists between the political and economic factors of our problem.

Economic considerations are matters, of course, of the deepest concern to the people of the United Kingdom, not only because of their commercial and industrial activities, but also because they realize how profound an influence economic factors exercise upon the peace of the world. I therefore wish to affirm the desire of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist, so far as it possibly can, in dealing with this aspect of the situation. The present situation has been summarized in the Secretary General's Note; an indication of the ways and means of dealing with it has been given in the admirable report of the Economic Committee; and this report has been fully endorsed by the Financial Committee. His Majesty's Government wishes to express its appreciation of the work which these reports represent.

Economic recovery, and more especially the recovery of international trade, is an aid to peace. There is a growing realization of the significance of this factor in the solution of our international problems. That is all to the good. But, as the Secretary-General points out, recovery is "uneven and perhaps insecure." I believe that some steps can be taken,

here and now at this present Assembly, to promote the smoother and surer progress of that recovery. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will willingly give what help it can to further this endeavour, for it is an object of its policy to seek to re-establish normal commercial and financial dealings between the nations of the world.

What I have said as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government is in relation to the wider aspects of international economic co-operation. I now mention one subject in particular on which there may be some misconception, and which appears now ripe for discussion and enquiry. This is the question of access to certain raw materials in regard to which some observations were made by the United Kingdom delegate in his speech at the last Assembly. This is a matter which seems suitable for discussion at Geneva, and, indeed, for impartial expert inquiry under the auspices of the League on the lines suggested by the United Kingdom delegate last year. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the taking of steps in this direction by this Assembly.

One other subject I must mention before I close—the subject of armaments. I have said—and we know it—that most nations are now engaged in increasing their expenditure upon armaments. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is among this number. We have, indeed, made no secret of it. We are engaged upon fulfilling a very considerable programme for the re-equipment of our three services—navy, army and air. We are making good progress with that programme. We have entered upon this re-equipment of our defences because we thought it a national duty. Though I do not conceal from you that there are other ways in which I believe the

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majority of our people would prefer, were it possible, to spend their wealth, we shall persist in it unless and until the nations of the world reach an international agreement for the limitation and reduction of armaments. This assurance I can give. In any attempt to secure such an agreement, our full co-operation is assured. I must, however, add one word of caution. If disarmament is to be real, it must be not only military but mental, not only weapons but the war mentality must be laid aside. A standstill in armaments calculated to give a permanent advantage to nations which had urgently concentrated upon achieving the most intensive measure of armament within their power would be no service to peace. We could have no lot or part in that.

In connection with the problem of disarmament, I have seen a recent reference to the question of publicity in relation to national defence expenditure. I understand that there is already in existence a draft Convention which was drawn up by one of the sub-Committees of the Disarmament Conference. I should like to emphasize that, if a convention on these lines could be generally accepted, it would meet with the warm support and approval of His Majesty's Government.

In the course of my remarks to-day, I fear I have detained you long and covered a wide field. I have put forward, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, certain suggestions for altering the methods by which we work. If the modifications we have suggested could be incorporated in our machinery, they would, we believe, further the dual objective which I mentioned to you at the outset—the enlargement of our membership, the more confident loyalty of our Members.

But I have also sought to put before you wider

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considerations than those of machinery, for in the last resort it is not the machinery but the will to work it that counts. Do the nations of the world wish to establish an international machinery for the settlement of disputes between them without recourse to force? If all nations so will it, it could be done, and it must be done, unless we are prepared to watch with folded hands the final calamity which is the drift of humanity to war. Let this Assembly then make its effort. Let it frankly consider the possibility of improvement from within. Let it endeavour to make allowances for criticism from without. Let it determine to do all in its power to facilitate the collaboration of others in a task which is a task for all.

Speech by Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Foreign Minister

The Spanish delegation comes to-day to the tribune of the Assembly of the League of Nations, conscious of its double responsibility: the responsibility that rests upon all those who, in the present grave international situation, take part in the conduct of foreign affairs, and the responsibility which arises from the part that Spain is playing at present in international life.

It would be both useless and dangerous to ignore the fact that what are called "Spanish affairs" do not concern us alone. For they bring before us, in an acute form, this dilemma: either the danger of war must be squarely faced in order to prevent the outbreak of war, or else that danger must continue to be ignored, with the risk that, when its existence is ultimately admitted, it may be too late to implement the will to peace that still remains in the world.

The double responsibility to which I have just

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referred makes it incumbent upon the Spanish delegation, to-day more than ever, to speak with perfect frankness in the interests of all, in order to make the international bearing of the Spanish problem perfectly clear.

We must first of all say this, and we say it with emphasis: that the cause for which the Spanish Government stands, the cause of which it is the symbol, is the cause of peace. That may seem a cruel paradox; yet it is for this cause that, from one end of Spain to the other, men are fighting and dying rather than let themselves be bereft by force and violence of their faith in democracy and liberty at home or of their determination to seek peace as their guiding rule in their relations abroad. I have seen with my own eyes the price that is being paid for freedom and for peace.

The Spanish people, which to-day, weapons in hand, is defending that ideal, as yesterday it secured the triumph of its ideal through the ballot box, the Spanish people, I say, cannot justly be accused of trying to impose its ideal on others by force, by conspiracy or intrigue, or by openly taking part in a civil war on foreign territory. No country, however contrary its political régime may be to ours, need fear that the Spain which we represent will ever attempt to interfere in its internal affairs. Whatever grounds the Spanish Government may have—and those grounds are many and are supported by overwhelming evidence—for condemning conduct that is incompatible both with the rules that govern international life and with the obligations that are binding upon all the States Members of the League, the sovereignty of every country is, in our eyes, as sacred as is our own independence. This applies particularly to our immediate neighbours, with whose

independence no one in the Spain we represent has ever dreamt of interfering.

We respect all the beliefs of others; but we demand the same respect for our own.

In the beliefs we profess, we have full authority to speak in the name of the Spanish people. We must proclaim that fact, because on this subject there have been the wildest misstatements. At this decisive hour, the Government that presides over the destinies of the Spanish people has the highest moral authority, which issued directly from the will of the nation. The Government came into power as the result of the elections of February 16th, elections that were directed against us, but which we won, thanks to the overwhelming force of public opinion. Behind this Government, composed of the representatives of the Popular Front, there is to-day, opposing the negative and subversive forces in the State, every positive element in the nation, from the vigorous Catholic element of the Basques to the most radical workers' organizations. And this Government, as its Ministerial declaration has proclaimed, makes the policy of peace, based upon and guaranteed by a system of collective security, the rule and axis of its international policy.

I do not wish to dwell upon a fact that is notorious, although false interpretations have frequently been given in order to distort it: the civil war was forced upon us. It was not we who began this struggle, but those who would not accept the will of the Spanish people, and whose only thought, long before the elections, as a mass of evidence in the hands of the Government irrefutably proves—was to plot a rebellion against the nation, and to complete their preparations for a military rising. The responsibility before history for all the bloodshed in Spain—and the thought

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of it fills us with anguish, though it does not shake our unfaltering will to victory—therefore falls wholly upon those who turned their arms against the legitimate and constitutional authority of the Republic.

Collective security—how many illusions have in the last few years been born of that magic formula, only to be turned into bitter disappointments. The formula in itself is perfect: a State is the victim of aggression at the hands of another State, which is declared the aggressor. The other States hasten to the assistance of the victim. All risk of war is thus reduced to the improbable case of a State launching out upon an adventure with full fore-knowledge of failure. The complete application of the formula of collective security would thus mean an end to war.

It was too good to be true! Recent events, the bitter memory of which still darkens international life, have brought to light the obstacles to the organization of collective security envisaged on such lines. In view of the threat to the lives and fortunes of millions of men from the most frightful of wars, which, unless we look facts resolutely in the face, may suddenly burst upon us, it is an imperative duty no longer to deceive ourselves. No dialectical subtlety can convert into successes the failures of which we are all fully aware.

The whole question of reforming the system of collective security is therefore open to-day. The Spanish Government cannot make a better contribution to the efforts we must make to correct the errors of the past than by submitting for your consideration its own bitter experience.

That experience compels us to ask ourselves whether, in future, war will continue to take its classic form—that is, by the attack of one State upon another. Reality to-day, the stern reality my

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country is experiencing, shows that already this is no longer the case, and that it will never again be the case. The war of the future, although it may assume the appearance of a conflict between two States, will, in fact, be a conflict, a collision, a clash in the drama of history, between two ideologies, two mentalities, two different conceptions of life. The era of national wars is steadily vanishing. Just as in the Europe of the sixteenth century men took sides and fought for two religious ideals—Catholicism and Protestantism—so to-day men may be said to be divided by two political ideals—democracy and oppression.

This being so, the position being what it is, we may ask whether it is right to continue speaking of war as if it were a possibility of the future. Would it not be more honest to consider that war is already a reality with which we are faced to-day? The blood-stained soil of Spain is already, in fact the battlefield of a world war.

It may be argued that the struggle in Spain is a civil war. But is that really the case? Is it true that what is dividing Spaniards to-day is something that concerns them alone, that concerns, them particularly and specifically? If that is so, why has the struggle in Spain suddenly become one of the gravest, not to say the gravest, of all international questions at the present moment?

The truth is that the slow and painful development of a democratic social structure, which the Spanish people have voluntarily chosen, has led their adversaries to commit a veritable act of aggression in the name of the contrary principle. The instrument of this aggression has been the army. The people, loyal to their institutions, have stood firm, in circumstances probably unique in history. This

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struggle, once begun, immediately became an international issue. The aggressor—in this case the rebel army—has received, beyond any possibility of doubt, both moral and material assistance from States whose political régime coincided with that to which the rebels are wedded.

I do not propose here to go into this question in detail, or to bring such international conduct to book. It is enough for me to say that such conduct implies the negation of the most elementary and essential principles and rules of international co-operation, and, hence, that it is incompatible with the maintenance of "open, just and honourable relations between nations."

While my Government reserves the right to raise this issue in all its gravity if it sees fit, I will not go further than is necessary to-day into this aspect of the problem. I am sure that world public opinion has already passed judgment upon it.

But I should be failing in the frankness I imposed upon myself at the beginning, if I did not point out to the Assembly the consequences for the whole future organization of collective security that may result from an international situation such as that which has been created in the case of Spain. Obviously a system of collective security, if it is to restore confidence to the peoples, must, before all protect States against the risk of internal rebellions which are supported and fomented from outside. If peace is to subsist, it is imperative to put an end to a situation wherein civilian or military elements which endeavour to subvert their lawful Government by armed force should be able to receive, amidst world-wide indifference, moral and material aid from foreign Governments whose political ideology coincides with their own. A system of collective security

which took no account of such a possibility—which, in my country, has already become a reality—would lead to universal disappointment.

The policy of non-intervention! I am speaking here before an assembly of statesmen, of representatives of Governments, on whose shoulders rests the responsibility for well-being and order in their respective countries. Who among you could fail to understand why it is that we, the men responsible for the future of Spain, for the future of the Spanish people, the whole Spanish people, must perforce regard so-called non-intervention as a policy of intervention detrimental to the constitutional and responsible Government? Who among you could fail to recognize that we cannot allow ourselves to be placed on the same footing as those who, breaking their solemn oath to the Republic, have risen in arms to destroy the constitutional liberty of our country?

Who, among the statesmen present in this Assembly, could accept the right of generals, who have taken their oath to the Constitution, to attempt to overthrow that Constitution by bringing into the country thousands of foreign troops from another continent?

I acknowledge the noble and generous purpose that actuated the proposal for non-intervention. But I must also, and with deep bitterness, point to its disastrous results, disastrous both to my own country and to the future of international co-operation. The legal monstrosity of the formula of non-intervention is manifest. That formula, as I have said, places on the same footing the lawful Government of my country and the rebels, whom any Government worthy of the name is not only entitled but bound to suppress and punish. From the juridical point of view, non-intervention, as applied to Spain, represents an innovation in the traditional rules of international

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law, for it means withholding means of action from a lawful Government.

But if we examine the actual way in which the formula of non-intervention has been applied and the results that have ensued, can we still call it "non-intervention?" Non-intervention should consist wholly in ignoring the internal situation of a country and in retaining the full juridical and practical validity of the commercial agreements previously concluded.

We would accept a strict policy of non-intervention. We have asked no one to intervene or to help. But when the normal commercial relations with Spain are suddenly interrupted, when the export of war-material for the lawful Government suddenly stops, when contracts concluded with the Spanish Government before the rebellion are cancelled, then we must affirm once again that this policy of non-intervention has been applied solely to the detriment of the lawful Government and, consequently, to the advantage of the rebels.

To undertake not to authorize the sending of war-material to rebels who have risen against a lawful and recognized friendly Government—that is to say, to undertake not to engage in a disguised form of attack against a lawful Government—merely shows, I regret to say, to what depths we have sunk in carrying out international obligations. Such an undertaking does not deprive the rebels of anything they could legitimately have obtained; it involves no more than a promise not to violate one of the most elementary obligations.

On the other hand, to prohibit the export of war-materials to a lawful Government is to deprive it of the essential means of maintaining law and order within its territory, to say nothing of the blow struck at normal trade relations through a ban on the purchase

of war-materials by a lawful Government. Hitherto, it has been unanimously recognized that such transactions were part of the normal trade relations between countries.

In practice, the so-called policy of non-intervention amounts to a direct and effective intervention on behalf of the rebels.

In the notes which I have had the honour to communicate, in the name of my Government, to the Powers signatories of the non-intervention agreement, and which I have transmitted to the Secretariat for distribution to all the Members of the League, the policy of non-intervention is explicitly denounced as constituting a *de facto* blockade of the Spanish Government.

These notes, and others communicated with them, contain evidence of the way in which the non-intervention agreement is being carried out. I will not weary the Assembly with a recital of the facts set forth in those documents.

I desire merely to add that since these notes were communicated to the signatory Powers, and at the very moment when I was preparing in Geneva this speech to the Assembly, I received from my Government further detailed evidence as to quite recent events which shows that, even to-day, the non-intervention agreement supposed to be in force is not being applied effectively as far as the rebels are concerned.

In short, it is part of the normal and permanent obligations assumed by foreign States on friendly terms with a lawful Government to prohibit any form of assistance to those who have rebelled against that Government. The loyal fulfilment of such an obligation cannot be made the object of a special agreement without casting doubt on the validity of all international obligations that are not similarly guaranteed. The

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obligation not to supply arms to rebels incumbent upon every Government with which the Spanish Government maintains normal relations is not a result of the non-intervention agreement. Any violation of the above obligation, whether it took place before or after the coming into force of that agreement, has, in our eyes, the same character and is regarded by us with the same disapproval.

The Government of Spain wishes to continue to take part in the common work at Geneva, and to carry out the moral obligation which the Republic assumed when, on its foundation, it incorporated the Covenant in its Constitution. Mere justice, however, demands that that Government's duties, always so loyally fulfilled, should also be binding upon others.

We know that we must solve our internal problems ourselves. The Government, supported by an overwhelming majority of the Spanish people, is certain of victory. That victory is, moreover, the only possible way of saving Spain from the continuance indefinitely of a struggle which cannot end in victory for the rebels except through the slaughter of millions of Spaniards, who are resolved to die rather than submit to a régime that is an offence against human dignity, and which is, moreover, incapable of maintaining itself as long as there are free Spaniards living in Spanish territory.

The issue would already be virtually decided had not the Spanish people been compelled, for the reasons I have indicated, to defend themselves against a far more greater and more extensive aggression. Apart from the proofs, to which we have referred, of the reality and continuance of this aggression, there is daily proof, sealed with our blood, that the rebels are using in action immense stocks of foreign war-material which they did not possess when the rebellion

broke out. Every Spanish defender of the Republic and of liberty who falls under the fire of these foreign arms, imported, despite the non-intervention agreement, with the utmost cynicism and in increasing quantities, is an unanswerable proof of the crime that is being committed against the Spanish people.

As a final indication of how the Spanish question is bound up, in all its numerous aspects, with the international situation and with all the work for peace, and in order to make the public opinion of the world understand which are the forces of war in Spain and which are the forces of peace, which party can be expected to add to the troubles of Europe and which can be relied on to carry out a constructive policy based upon ideals inspired by the founders of the League, I feel bound to point out a connection between the assault on democracy in my country and the more grandiose intention to threaten the peace of the world. It should not be forgotten that the military rising began in territory which has been entrusted to the protection of Spain by international agreements and which has frequently been the source of serious threats to an international zone that remains to-day, as in the past, a constant temptation for certain ambitions.

The forces of international disorder stop at no folly, however dangerous. That is why we proclaim, while reaffirming our faith in the cause of peace and our devotion to the principles of the Covenant, that, by combating the military rebellion in our territory in order to restore law and order in all fields, including that to which I have just alluded, the Spanish people and the democratic Government that represents it are fighting, not only for the internal peace and security of Spain, but for the security of other peoples and for the peace of the world.

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Speech of M. Delbos, French Foreign Minister

This Assembly has already witnessed many critical hours, but perhaps never before have so many clouds darkened its horizon. Besides the divergent interests which set people at variance and which Governments have had so much difficulty in overcoming, there exist other causes of discord and other risks of conflagration. These are all the more formidable because discouragement and scepticism have engendered in some minds doubt of the efficacy of the League of Nations. Our first duty is to restore confidence—a necessary preliminary to action.

This confidence inspires the Government and the country I represent. We refuse to regard the League as an artificial creation of the diplomats, as a mere façade, behind which reality—in this case, selfish interests—can be concealed. We think, on the contrary, that, despite certain appearances, the League derives an invincible power from the will of the nations themselves. We still rely upon it to ensure the preliminary condition of all human progress, which is, at the same time, an essential safeguard of every material good and spiritual value—peace.

That is an act of faith, of evident sincerity, since it is embodied in our very conception of life and of the world. After listening yesterday to Mr. Eden's speech, I could not say that this conception is specifically French. Nevertheless, the determination which he expressed, in the name of the British nation, never to allow the individual on its soil to be robbed of his liberties, the popular will of its rights, the democracy of its conquests, is the very essence of our Republic. France, too, would in no circumstances abandon her heritage, and this national vocation guarantees our sincere attachment to the methods of Geneva.

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What we desire is to defend, side by side with you, the liberty, equality and fraternity of the peoples, for such are the necessary conditions of international security and justice.

International law must be protected from the wrongful encroachments of "national law" and from the claims of that law to establish itself as universally valid. There are many forms of national society; not two only, as is commonly said, but a hundred of all types between the two poles of totalitarian dictatorship and liberal parliamentarism. While it is for each people to choose between them, there is only one reasonable form of international collaboration—that which allows every nation the right to govern itself and to organize itself as it thinks fit within its own frontiers, free from all foreign interference, and still more from all aggression; that is what we call liberty. To take account of each country's possibilities and responsibilities, to treat the national genius of every country with the respect we claim for our own, and not to suffer its voice, however faint, to be stifled in international discussions; that is what we call equality. Finally, not to do unto others as we would not have them do unto us, not to make use of force when so many means of conciliation and arbitration are available; that is what we call fraternity.

Without these principles, which you yourselves recognize—since you have tried to apply them with varying success, but with a perseverance all the more worthy of praise—we should fall back upon the reign of force. We should lapse into servitude and war.

The danger is all the greater since the temptation to use force and the attractiveness of violence, which have long been established in the realm of practical human interests, ambitions and greed, are now winning a foothold in the realm of thought. I refer to the

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conflict of doctrines which threatens to divide Europe into two enemy camps, whose rival proselytizing may revive the sombre furies of the wars of religion. Some say that this conflict is inevitable, and that no conciliation can be achieved between two universal and incompatible conceptions, destined to defy one another throughout the world and throughout history.

We cannot too often insist on the dangers of this diplomatic Manichæism, this ideological mobilization of Europe. To combat this too simple dilemma, we can put forward the example we are setting here. Each of the nations assembled at Geneva has been born of a particular stock, has selected an ideal and undertaken a mission. Each has its own physiognomy. It is this range of sentiments and traditions, this diversity of social and intellectual forms that makes up international life itself.

If we are to make mankind worthy of that name, each people must respect the liberty of others, while consenting to surrender a little of its own in the common interest. To those who may doubt the possibility of thus striking a balance between the individual and the collectivity, experience has a ready answer—our own experience as States and as Members of a League of States; the experience of past centuries, which proves the vitality of a hundred different racial formulæ and the impossibility of reducing all these fractions to a common denominator; the experience of our seventeen years of collaboration, which proves that there is no need for peoples to annihilate one another in order to co-operate, nor to convert, in order to understand one another.

Here again, it is League principles and League methods that can, and indeed must, safeguard peace. They will prevail in so far as we succeed in uniting, in organizing ourselves and in strengthening our will;

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for peace, too, is a victory, the true victory, that Governments must win by their wisdom, if they are to save their peoples from the pursuit of other victories achieved through bloodshed and through tears.

Heavy sacrifices will sometimes have to be borne, and personal feelings subdued, if that victory is to be won. That was in my mind yesterday as I listened to the moving speech by the first delegate of Spain. When the Government of the French Republic recommended non-intervention, it was not in a spirit of indifference. It had previously gauged the dangers of rival interventions in the supply of arms, the fatal consequences of incidents which must of necessity have occurred. Moreover, the French proposal has been approved by all countries, whatever their form of Government, to which France submitted it—a proof that the nations everywhere realized the danger, even as we did; they must also show the same loyalty in the observance of the undertakings into which they have entered.

I now come to the other problems that are pre-occupying Europe and the world.

The Treaty of Locarno was repudiated on March 7th, 1936, by Germany. A problem arose that we hoped to solve before the autumn by an agreement between all the signatory Powers. By means of such a settlement in a less strained atmosphere, it would have been possible, under the auspices of the League, with the collaboration of all the parties concerned, to attempt to establish European peace at last on more solid foundations.

We have not reached that point. The crisis that began on March 7th has not yet ended; perhaps, indeed, its very prolongation has made it more difficult to settle. The French Government, whatever guarantees it may retain and whatever assurances it has

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obtained, associates itself sincerely with the steps taken to hasten the time for a general explanation. It is still ready for any agreements which, by guaranteeing the security of all the States concerned and by excluding any concealed purpose of domination, encirclement or ostracism, are bound to strengthen European peace.

But we must not forget that it is primarily the duty of the League itself to guarantee the security of its Members, as was intended in the Covenant. In July last, the French Government proposed that the League's means of action—preventive and repressive—should be strengthened. A consultation on a wide scale has been opened. I sincerely hope it will be completed by the co-operation of the States that to-day are absent from our counsels.

In the meantime, I am glad to note the invaluable acceptance by a large number of Governments of the French suggestion that, as an exceptional departure from the rule of unanimity, a State whose action might threaten peace should be excluded from the right to vote on the Council in certain cases arising under Article 11. I also rejoice to see that the necessity for regional agreements is becoming more and more widely recognized. As regards these agreements, concluded in the spirit of the Covenant, France desires to set an example by her fidelity to those she has signed.

From our Secretary-General's report, I should like also to single out the study which the Economic Committee has submitted to the Council. The French delegation will revert to this subject later, but I should like to express now the great interest with which our Government received the Committee's suggestions and how much it hopes that the economic situation will be eased at the same time as the political situation. Nay, more, it regards these as inseparable:

they are, as it were, the two ends of the same chain. To guarantee peace among the peoples and to increase their well-being—these are two complementary aspects of the task we have set ourselves.

This conviction has led us to enter, first of all, into negotiations, the conclusion of which you have just learnt, with the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

An easier political and economic situation would be greatly facilitated, as the Economic Committee very pertinently remind us, if the world were not overburdened with armaments.

Less than three months ago, in this very place, the Prime Minister of France expressed the hope for an agreement, from which the peoples anticipate an immense relief. If it depends only on us, whatever the present difficulties may be—and we are not so simple as to underestimate them—that hope will not remain a platonic one. Resolved though we are to do all that our security demands, we are none the less ready to take, or to follow, any initiative that would guarantee the security of all and set up a just equilibrium. Accordingly our Government, when recently obliged to strengthen its national defences, declared that it would accede to any international regulation of armaments on a reciprocal and equitable basis. It has already set an example by working to that end. Reverting to the work done in Geneva with a view to a convention on the manufacture of and trade in arms, it has modified its own legislation, which now provides for the supervision or nationalization of the war industries. Encouraged by the fact that its action concords with the observations sent in by several Governments to the Secretary-General, my Government now asks that the question be brought again before the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference.

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In our opinion, the course to be taken is to adopt a plan of work and solve an initial difficulty. The plan may be summed up in three words, defining three successive stages—supervision, limitation, reduction. The publicity given to military expenditure, the true balance of the offensive and defensive armaments of each State at each point of its evolution are indispensable data. To supply them is to furnish proof of the loyalty of our intentions and the sincerity of our professions of faith in peace. Among these data, the authenticity of which will have to be periodically verified, the work of limitation will consist in setting up standards accepted by all. Once these standards have been reached or are respected, the attempts of countries to outvie each other in preparations for war, which are destroying the economic patrimony of Europe and jeopardizing civilization itself, would have no further justification. It might then become possible to contemplate a proportional, simultaneous and progressive reduction of armaments.

The initial difficulty arises from the fact that certain countries are behindhand in the armaments race. They are to-day obliged to make efforts to compensate for the greater speed they have noted elsewhere. To obtain an equitable solution affording the same guarantees for all, the disturbed equilibrium must first be restored, and this can be done only by discussions between those concerned. It is clear, moreover, that this work of international pacification, more than any other, requires the co-operation of all. We are well aware of the obstacles that stand in the way, but we think it wiser and bolder to attack them rather than to fly from them.

Here, as elsewhere, we have to examine together what can and must be done to save civilization at a time when the dynamic impetus of the opposing

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forces greatly intensifies the seriousness of the other causes of conflict. To cope with these stern realities, we must face them boldly, in the light of an ideal which, neither making, nor yielding to, threats, endeavours to reconcile all peoples. That ideal is our own; it is the ideal that permeates this Assembly. We have always placed our trust in it. We shall serve it all the better the more firmly we assert the strength of our union and the energy of our determination.

Speech of M. Litvinoff, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R.

In the session of September 28th, 1936, the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. made the following speech :

I confess that a review of the League's work during the past year is very far from inspiring the Soviet delegation with joyful reflections. This is partly to be explained by the fact that the Soviet delegation approaches any estimate of the League's activity from the angle of the quality, rather than the quantity of the questions dealt with, and that it judges the quality by the part which the questions play in the problem of consolidating world peace, which is the basic function of the League of Nations.

Among the eighty questions mentioned in the annual report of our Secretary-General, there are only three which bear on the problem of peace—namely, the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Locarno and Danzig. None of us can recall the settlement of the Ethiopian question without a feeling of bitterness, the more so because it continues obstinately to remind us of its existence. The question of Locarno, which was subjected to an abortive discussion at the April session of the Council, was placed on the agenda

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and then adjourned from one session of the Council to another, and has been put on the agenda of the present session of the Council also, in all probability, only in order to be adjourned and finally written off as a bad debt. The same can be said of the question of Danzig. It is indeed a meagre balance-sheet.

Turning to the agenda of the present session of the Assembly, we find on it only one question bearing on peace, and that has, for the time being, been remitted to the General Committee for a decision as to its ultimate fate. I refer to the question of the application of the principles of the Covenant. We, the Soviet delegation, are of the opinion that this is the only question the discussion of which might impart a substantial content to the present session of the Assembly.

I hope I shall be excused if I disagree with the view of some Governments, reported in the summary circulated by the Secretariat that the work of interpreting and applying the Covenant should be postponed until the political atmosphere has been relieved of its present anxieties. I would rather express the view that it is the very presence of these anxieties which constitutes the most powerful argument in favour of an early consideration of this question. It is just the approach of danger that has caused these anxieties. Are we to wait until the danger has become a reality? On the other hand, I should say it would be entirely unjustifiable optimism to believe in a rapid clearing-up of the political atmosphere. Is the League of Nations for ever to bear the character of a "waiting-room?"

I may be allowed to remind the Assembly that the question of the application of the principles of the Covenant did not arise in any academic way, but was brought into existence, and imposed upon us,

both by the unhappy outcome of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and by the whole course of the political events of recent years.

This course of events has not changed its sinister direction, which, as we all not only guess but know, and even feel, points to such a sanguinary clash between the peoples that our imagination is powerless to grasp all its consequences.

I will allow myself to speak with full frankness, thus following the example given by other speakers here, and refer to some of the matters alluded to by them.

Four years have passed since there first took shape more or less clearly, in opposition to each other, the ideas of peace, inviolability of treaties and international order, and against them the ideas of war, of contempt for international obligations and of a violent redivision of the world. But whilst on the one side the ideas are becoming organized and clothed in flesh and blood—or perhaps it would be better to say in lead and iron—the forces of the other side, unfortunately, remain shapeless, disunited and passive.

What, after all, is the present distribution of international forces?

I have not the slightest doubt that even the most politically inexperienced reader of newspapers knows which and how many are the countries whose aggressiveness makes them dangerous, if he is only familiar with the speeches and writings of the rulers of those countries. There are also some countries which strive to seek salvation in neutrality. If they really believe that it would be sufficient for them to write the word "neutrality" on their frontiers, there to arrest the flames of war, and if they have forgotten the recent lessons of history as to breaches of even internationally recognized neutralities, that is their affair. We have

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the right, at least, to ask them already to observe their neutrality to-day when some are preparing plans of aggression and others plans for self-defence. Unfortunately, they are often already placing their neutrality at the service of the forces of aggression.

By the side of these professedly neutral countries, there is a number of others, including some of the most powerful States in the world, who undoubtedly see the storm cloud advancing over Europe, understand its threatening character, feel the peril inevitably involved for themselves, and, it would seem, recognize the necessity of common defence, declaring again and again their adherence to the principle of collective security. We regret to see that, so far, they do not go beyond these declarations, and are doing nothing to clothe the idea of collective security in a suitable form, or to give it effective power, in the vain hope that the aggressor, taking heed of their exhortations, will undergo a change of heart and help them to restrain his aggression.

But the aggressor, who is basing all his policy on superiority in brute material force, with only threatening demands, bluff, menaces and the tactics of *faits accomplis* in the arsenal of his diplomacy, is accessible only to the voice of a policy no less firm than his own, and to a cold calculation of the relative strength of forces. Any exhortations and entreaties, and still more concessions to his illegal and senseless demands, any economic bribes offered to him, merely produce on him an impression of weakness, confirm his consciousness of his own power, and encourage him to further intransigence and illegalities. Even outside his frontiers, the legend of his invincibility may arise and thus give birth to a fatalist and pusillanimous mood in certain countries, which gradually, sometimes even without noticing it, may

lose their independence and become the vassals of the aggressor. In this way begins the process of creating a hegemony to be completed by the military subjugation of the countries which refuse to submit voluntarily.

Yes, we must not close our eyes to the existence of aspirations for hegemony, for the hegemony of a "chosen people," called by history itself, so it is alleged, to dominate all other peoples whom it pronounces to be of an inferior class. I will only refer in passing to the ideological consequences of such a hegemony, and to the violent destruction of all the treasures of mind and culture which were the pride of humanity in recent centuries, and the artificial resurrection of ideas belonging to the worst period of the Middle Ages.

Yet the aggregate power of the peace-loving countries, both in the economic and in the military sense, their total resources in man-power and in the war industries, considerably surpass the strength of any possible combination of countries which the aggressor might rally around him. I am deeply convinced that it would be sufficient for these forces in some way to combine, to display merely the possibility of joint action, for the peril of war to be averted, and for the aggressor to be obliged to ask, sooner or later, to be admitted himself to the common system of collective security.

"Are you calling for the formation of *blocs*?" someone may ask me. I know that for some super-pacifists the word "*bloc*" has become a bugbear. No, I am not asking for new *blocs*. I am prepared to be satisfied with a *bloc* which exists already, and which bears the name of the League of Nations, a *bloc* of countries that want peace and that have united for the purpose of mutual defence and mutual aid.

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All we ask is that this *bloc* should genuinely organize mutual aid: that it should draw up its plan of action well ahead, so as not to be taken by surprise, and that the organization of war which is taking place outside this *bloc* should be answered by effective action for the organization of collective resistance. It may be that not all the countries at present constituting the *bloc* known as the League of Nations wish to participate in such action. It may be that there are some among them who think security is to be found in the word "neutrality," or who hope, at the last minute, to desert to the side of the aggressor. But this in no way deprives of the right of joint action those who can and wish to defend themselves and who have no desire to be attacked one by one.

In response to the recommendation of the last Assembly, and to the invitation of the Secretary-General, the Soviet Government has presented its views on the best way of improving and making more precise the League Covenant. The principal idea contained in its suggestions is that of regional and, if necessary, bilateral pacts of mutual assistance. We have in mind regions of various geographical sizes and shapes, including even entire continents, since the larger the region covered by the pact, the greater the guarantees of security. We do not know, as yet, how many regional pacts of this kind will be concluded, and what will be the scope of their application. What is essential at this stage is to determine their place in the general system of collective security under the League of Nations, and to establish the interdependence of the several pacts: it will be necessary in this connection to provide for the security of those countries also which, for some reason or other, are not included in any such pact.

I shall not dwell any further either on this or on

the other suggestions of the Soviet Government, and will reserve my remarks until the question is discussed in the appropriate Committee. We shall also make our observations there on the suggestions put forward by other Governments.

Apart from those which have been forwarded by the Governments in writing, some have been made here verbally, and it would seem desirable to say a few words about them.

The Soviet Delegation does not under-estimate the importance of Article 11 of the Covenant, which has as its object to avert any threat of war by means of conciliation. Much may be said in favour of the abolition of the unanimity rule in some cases of this kind. We must be careful, however, not to open thereby the floodgates through which a torrent of all kinds of petty claims, unconnected with the preservation of peace, may pour into the League Council. We know from experience that it was only the unanimity rule which hitherto dammed up that flood.

It should be also borne in mind that procedure under Article 11 can be effective only in cases when the threatening disturbance of peace is the result of a purely unexpected and accidental dispute, the elimination of which will restore equanimity. Article 11 cannot, however, avert a breach of the peace which arises from calculated aggressiveness and the pursuit of conquest, for which disputes are deliberately engineered. The League of Nations has already had occasion to deal with such cases, when Article 11 proved to be quite powerless. At all events, the Council's recommendations under Article 11 will be effective only when they are backed by a well-armed Article 16. We therefore consider it much more important to eliminate the unanimity rule in the latter article.

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Some speakers here have been placing great hopes on an increase in League activities under Article 19, which provides for the reconsideration of international treaties. Such reconsideration is possible and desirable, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, only if the consent of all interested parties has been secured. A striking example is the recent revision of the Straits Convention, which was successful precisely because the preliminary consent of the signatories to the Convention was obtained. Without such consent, to raise the issue of revision—for which even those who have spoken recognize the necessity of unanimity—will not only fail to produce positive results, but will make relations between the interested parties still more acute, and thereby still further worsen the international situation. Hardly any of the countries are absolutely satisfied with existing international agreements, whether concluded in the recent or in the more remote past, and I question whether any beneficial results are to be expected from burdening the League with such claims. Is it not rather to be feared that the moral support which even a minority of the Assembly may afford to some claim will encourage the aggressor to a breach of the particular treaty involving acts of violence?

It is not for the Soviet delegation, of course, to object to the French proposal for calling together the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. The Soviet Government has always considered, and still considers, that disarmament is the most effective guarantee of peace, particularly if disarmament is total and universal, which, given good will, is easier to achieve than partial disarmament. But this is the sphere in which universality, and that not only on a European scale, must really be made an essential condition. I refrain, however, from expressing an

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opinion whether such universality, at the present time, is possible.

It is quite another matter when universality is spoken of in connection with improving the League Covenant. In principle, we are all in favour of universality. We ask for nothing better than the earliest possible entry of every State into the League—a League, naturally, affording genuine guarantees of security to all its Members, a League founded for mutual aid, a League which recognizes the equality of peoples. But if the idea is that, until such universality has been reached, we shall do nothing to improve the Covenant, and if we are once again invited into the “waiting-room,” I must express my dissent.

I would object even more strongly if, in the name of universality, the League were to set about eliminating from the Covenant all that makes it a weapon of peace and a threat to the aggressor. I should object vigorously to anything calculated, as I said at the last session of the Assembly, to make the League safe for the aggressor. We must, of course, admit that a State which openly exalts the power of the sword as against international obligations, for which it does not conceal its contempt, a Power which cynically calls on other States to adopt the same contemptuous attitude to their signature at the foot of treaties, with the object of finally destroying international confidence, such a Power cannot feel comfortable in a League of Nations which proclaims one of its principal aims to be “the maintenance of justice and the scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.”

A State which is governed by men who have incorporated into the programme of their foreign policy the conquest of other nations' territory, who

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at their festivities, before their people and the representatives of other States, enumerate the vast territories which they intend violently to separate from other countries, cannot sincerely accept Article 10, which ensures to all Member States their territorial integrity and political independence. A State which preaches the legality of so-called "localized" wars cannot make its peace with Article 16, which proclaims that resort to war against one Member of the League is deemed to be an act of war against all other Members of the League, and which prescribes a graduated system of sanctions against the aggressor.

Again, here in Geneva, under the auspices of the League of Nations, a Convention was signed the other day which prohibits even the mere incitement by wireless to breaches of internal peace in other States. Can a State sincerely accede to such a Convention which, as has been abundantly proved, maintains in all countries its agencies and secret services, built up of its own nationals, which actively interfere in the life of those countries, incite party against party, organize and finance insurrections, and openly afford military aid to rebels? Can we declare compatible with the principle of equality of nations which is one of the foundations stones of the League, the ideology of a State founded on racial and national inequality, and describing all peoples except its own as "sub-human?"

I would ask the supporters of "universality at any price:" Must we sacrifice all the fundamental principles of the League in order to adapt it to the theory and practice of such a State, or must we invite the latter itself to adapt its principles to the present ideology of the League? My reply at any rate is: Better a League without universality than universality without League principles.

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The Soviet delegation strongly urges that the question on the agenda of the application of the principles of the Covenant should be immediately transmitted to the First Committee without waiting for the advent of universality. If that Committee does not complete its work during the present session of the Assembly, the work should be continued by a Special Committee, charged with drawing up definite agreed proposals in the shortest possible time, so that, as soon as possible, an extraordinary session of the Assembly can be convened finally to adopt these proposals.

While this theoretical work is going on, Members of the League intending to participate in bilateral or regional pacts of mutual assistance should undertake diplomatic negotiations among themselves in order to achieve this object.

I assert that the more intensively and successfully this work is carried on, the easier will it be to come to an understanding, even with the aggressive countries, and thus achieve the desired universality.

We are far from objecting to attempts to reach an agreement even with the most aggressive countries. On the contrary, we consider it necessary to invite them to take part in any international initiative. But we are against allowing them to dictate the terms of the negotiations or paying them a bonus for condescending to negotiate. We think it abnormal that, on account of their refusal or deliberate procrastination, such initiative should be held up or brought to nought.

We consider that attempts at a universal agreement can be made by calling together a Peace Conference or the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Not being bound up with the past, and free as yet from all pacts, either of these organizations would represent

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a most suitable framework for the preliminary discussions of any question, whether political (including disarmament) or economic. If any State refuses to participate even in such organizations, everyone will see clearly that our road and theirs do not run together, and that we must finally organize peace and international order without them.

I have outlined to you a policy and measures which, if carried out both within the framework of the League and outside it, may genuinely end the stagnation into which the cause of organizing peace has sunk. These measures have the advantage that they imply immediate action, in contrast to the "waiting-room" policy at present prevailing—the policy of speculating on the frame of mind of elements hostile to peace, and the policy of concentrating all hopes on some particular conference which ever hovers a little way ahead, like the illusive blue bird—a policy leading to fatalism and capitulation in face of the aggressor. We are convinced that action alone, and certainly not passivity, can discharge the thunder clouds which are darkening the international horizon and avert a catastrophe.

The Soviet Government itself avoids, and will not recommend to anyone, any steps which might, in the smallest degree, increase the risk of war, or hasten its approach, independently of whether it is a question of war on its own frontiers or of war in more remote places. The Soviet Government has given many proofs of its love for peace, not only in words, but in deeds, in spite of many provocations and insults. Relying on its vast internal and external force, and proud of its achievements, the Soviet Government sometimes does not reply to such insults in the traditional way, not only through disdain and disgust at the sources of these insults, but mainly

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because it wishes to leave to others, not to assume itself, the responsibility for all the consequences of breaches in the elementary rules of behaviour as between peoples.

True to the principle that every nation has the right to choose for itself any political and social system, the Soviet Government does not discriminate between States according to their régime. Although it considers National Socialism and racism to be the deadly enemies of all working-people and of civilization itself, the Soviet Government has never preached a crusade against the countries which are a prey to these theories. Far from this, it has always striven to maintain with them the same normal diplomatic and economic relations as with other countries. The Soviet Government does not increase its army, its armaments, its aviation, in order to fight the germs of these theories, or to defend its frontiers against them.

The Soviet Government adhered to the agreement for non-interference in the affairs of Spain only because a friendly country feared the possibility otherwise of an international conflict. We acted thus, in spite of the fact that we consider the principle of neutrality inapplicable to a war levied by rebels against their lawful Government, and, on the contrary, to be a breach of the principles of international law—on which point we are in full agreement with the views of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Government understands that this unjust decision was imposed by those other countries which, considering themselves to be the champions of order, have established a new principle, fraught with incalculable consequences, according to which it is permitted openly to assist rebels against their legitimate Government.

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All these new proofs of the Soviet Government's desire for peace, albeit possessing sufficient means for self-defence, should convince you that the proposals put before you by the Soviet delegation are dictated by the desire to safeguard peace, not only on the frontiers of its own country, but also on those of other countries, and to bring about conditions safeguarding the security of all peoples. They are inspired by a sincere desire to restore in all countries a feeling of self-confidence and confidence in the help, if necessary, of others, and to resurrect faith in the ideal of international solidarity and justice.

Speech of Senor Monteiro, Portuguese Foreign Minister Made Before the Assembly on September 30th, 1936

I can readily understand the pessimism of all the speakers who have preceded me on this platform. A year's work has been completed, and we are forced to the melancholy confession that each day adds further troubles and misgivings to the heavy burden we already have to bear.

The peoples of the world are looking anxiously to the future, and the horizon seems to them to be dark with grave dangers. They feel that, in the logical course of events, to-morrow will bring us not fresh hope but unsuspected difficulty or disappointment.

The nations are in the grip of fear; and they appear to meet, not in order to work together in the cause of civilization, as the short passage of man on earth would seem to require, but to organize their joint defence. The spirit of co-operation is absent, and without it we cannot go on with our task. We shall have to create it anew in the midst of threats and dangers, as a battalion repairs its trenches in the thick

of the battle. To do this, each must bring his contributions in the form of frankness and truth.

But—and this is even more serious—the spirit of peace, too, is beginning to fail us. Europe resounds with the clang of arms, and the hearts of men re-echo the cry of war. Governments frequently affirm their desire to live peaceably. Some of them even claim to stand as a symbol of peace; but their acts lead to war.

We are convinced that those who threaten the unity of tranquillity of nations with ideologies that their genius has not conceived, those who divide men by setting them against each other in deadly hatred, those who foment disturbance and make one class the enemy of all the others, those it is who engender war.

In the light of recent events, it might be said that internal war has become, and is daily becoming more and more, a means of waging international war. Let us not speak of justice, humanity, liberty or principle; for, in some cases, it would be the most cruel irony.

The men who have conceived, and in some cases have carried into effect, the cold-blooded and pitiless extermination of those who do not belong to certain classes do not want peace; they want to make a desert. They do not want democracy or liberty; they want the empire of their own destructive hatred, of their own will or of their own interests. They respect no doctrines, no principle, no law. For all human respect begins with respect for human life, and where that elementary respect does not exist there can be no higher form of respect.

It would seem as if, because the spirit of peace is missing from the inner lives of nations, it is beginning to leave international life too. Gradually, yet quite noticeably, certain peoples are beginning to

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regard nations which have different ideologies, as enemies, not because they have different ideologies—that is nothing—but because they wish to impose them on others. The great danger of the moment is not the diversity of political organizations but the force of expansion, the violence and the proselytism of certain doctrines. When a man is attacked, his first right is the right of self-defence. Thus deadly rivalries spring up and thus the surest prospects of work in common fade away. One form of proselytism always calls into being its opposite form. Any Government which imposes a certain political form on a people by means of external war commits a heinous act; but if it resorts to the hypocrisy of internal conspiracy, it deserves general execration.

Never have any two peoples effectively applied the same constitution; but that fact has only rarely and temporarily prevented the necessary understanding from existing between them. Each people has its own genius and its own ideal; each history has its own logic; each environment has its own needs. Let us leave the peoples of the world to organize themselves according to the dictates of their own experience and of their own genius. Let us admit that what is suitable for one may not be suitable for its neighbour. Let us realize, for example, that the Parliamentary democracy which has brought happiness to one country may bring misfortune to another. In my own country, it has been the Moloch which for a century past has devoured the energies of the nation.

Let us not forget that words change their meaning in different latitudes and that institutions which in one part of the world work in a spirit of benevolence and tolerance, achieving a balance of contending wills, may in some other part of the world be no more than

a façade concealing the worst kinds of tyranny, violence and spoliation. They may bear the same name, but their spirit will not be the same.

Let us genuinely respect the independence and sovereignty of peoples; but let us not suppose that others will believe us simply because we proclaim the fact in a moment of distress and difficulty. Words and acts must be in accord, and as long as words run counter to acts, we are obliged to regard acts as representing the truth, particularly as the assertions of to-day are often belied by the words of yesterday. This problem is a serious one, and demands the most profound reflection. There are already numerous causes of disturbance in the world; let us not complicate international life by allowing the drama of our intestine quarrels to be played out upon the stage which is the scene of our divisions and antagonisms.

I should like to repeat what Mr. Eden said a few days ago: "The last thing we would wish to see is the nations divided into camps, their alignment determined by the form of government they practise." I should simply like to add this—let us not believe that all the virtues are on one side and all the vices on the other. Let us not argue as though ideas of peace and order were the property of one party, and the horrors of war and disregard of international undertakings an incurable infirmity of the other. Let us observe a happy medium.

These considerations lead me to pay a tribute to the policy of non-intervention in the civil war in Spain which has been advocated by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, and which has the support of all the chancellories of Europe. My Government has fully understood the good intentions by which that policy was actuated. Its aim was to prevent what M. Yvon Delbos called, in

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a happy phrase, the ideological mobilization of Europe. It did not, perhaps, allow for Portugal's particular preoccupations; but it is profoundly European in spirit. It has its place in the framework of the preventive policy which has so often been advocated here, but which has so rarely been put into practice. My country has been able to support it, while making reservations to safeguard its special circumstances. And I should like to say here that, once Portugal's word was given—as it was on August 21st last—it has been strictly kept.

Against this wise policy, I have heard the argument of a Government's legitimacy put forward. From the legal point of view, the contention of those who argue that a legitimate Government is entitled to maintain its normal commercial relations unchanged seems to me unanswerable. But it would lead to practical difficulties which might perhaps be insurmountable, at least when a certain stage of civil war has been reached, and especially if widespread movements bring about an upheaval of internal policy. The policy adopted already constitutes an important precedent which will doubtless be invoked in the future.

Everyone can see how easy it is for a Government to claim to be legitimate by invoking the national will, even if that will represents, not the will of the majority of the people, but what barely amounts to a certain organization of political forces. Let us suppose—the hypothesis will perhaps not be very common, but it may arise—that the majority of a people and all its truly representative factors—tradition, culture and strength, the desire for order and justice, the ambition to achieve unity and greatness, the cadres of labour and of the public services, and finally wealth—rise up against a Government. Could it still be regarded as legitimate?

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As will be seen, the problem may present a number of difficulties which a wise policy of non-intervention is able to avoid. Without it, there might easily be a risk, due to respect for a legal fiction, of succouring a Government which was divorced from the national will and had lost all legitimacy and even all authority. A time may come when legitimacy is no more than the vain appearance of a non-existent conformity with law.

This brings me back to Spain. In this connection, I must confess that our one desire is soon to see an end to the terrible struggle that is convulsing a country to which we were bound by the closest friendship—a friendship which the sufferings of to-day have made truly fraternal. Our only wish is for the greatness and prosperity of Spain, the mother of so many new countries, the cradle of so many geniuses, the creator of a tradition of heroism which comes down in its splendour from the remotest times of history to the tragic hour through which we are now living.

It is my hope that events will further strengthen the solidarity of the two Iberian countries. But the unanimity with which this policy of non-intervention was welcomed proves that we are still far from the spirit of peace of which I spoke. The first of our duties is to bring about a change of heart in this respect.

Is this still possible? That is the anxious question of the moment. I am not too optimistic of the result, but I should like to believe that the League of Nations is able to do a great deal to change the present aspect of things. At all events, it is the most effective instrument we have to hand. But we must introduce far-reaching reforms in its means of action, and perhaps in its organization.

The time seems to me to be an opportune one

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for undertaking this task. Events have proved the weakness of our present methods. Are we going to let the danger grow before we strengthen them? As the danger increases, will not also the powerlessness of our institution increase? Are we going to leave things as they are until there are no further risks? And what if the risks increase? Are we sure that this organization will survive? Let us avail ourselves of the lull before the storm which circumstances have given us.

We are not faced with a crisis of principle. The debates of recent Assemblies show that a sort of general agreement exists as to the objective of the League—peace within the framework of international justice. Even a superficial analysis of events proves that what is lacking is the will to apply the Covenant. The peoples of the world are not yet prepared to make the sacrifices such application entails. They already claim the benefits of collective security at times of difficulty or despair but they do not yet wish to pay the price of solidarity which it involves.

Article 10 for most Governments is still the cornerstone of this edifice. But discussions, doubts and disagreements arise as to its application.

Universality evokes certain doubts. But the idea of universality forms the basis of the Covenant; it constitutes the very essence of the system. The juridical formation of the whole is inconceivable without it. Once it is abandoned, we shall be constrained to seek means of action other than those indicated. We shall have to provide for forms of coercion, not only against the aggressor but also against those who will not accept the League's decisions. This task seems to me to be for the time being beyond us. The Powers should unite every effort to bring about the return to Geneva of the

States which have abandoned us, and to induce the States which have never given us their co-operation to join our ranks. If sacrifices are necessary to this end, in my view they should be made without demur. The co-operation of all countries is essential to the work for peace and to the influence of the League.

But universality is not enough; good organization of universality is necessary. The problems which are laid before the Council or the Assembly are not of equal concern to all States. Often, indeed, they interest a small number of countries only. The present organization of the Council forces all Members to undertake responsibilities in all matters submitted for their consideration. Public opinion is sometimes uneasy as to this state of affairs. Moreover, the Council seems isolated from the community of nations.

The statute governing the Council should be rendered more flexible, in such a way that all the parties competent or concerned in a given question should have no difficulty in making known their views. We often hear the praises of democracy sung here in the League; but we cannot honestly say that the organization and working of the Council are democratic. To my mind, decentralization would be profitable; it might effectively contribute to a closer link between the nations and the League.

The system of sanctions also calls for profound consideration if we are to make a reality of collective security. This question is of special moment: our strength depends on our potentialities in the matter of sanctions. Experience shows the weakness of our means of constraint. I need hardly repeat a view which I expressed from this platform some months ago:

We have seen clearly that collective security can be guaranteed by military sanctions alone.

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As in personal affairs, the time always comes when right must be supported by might. . . . Abandon once and for all the use of military sanctions, and you will have abandoned international order.

I still hold this view to be the most just and to be that which serves our highest interests. To abandon the study of the system of sanctions would perhaps be a mistake. Each State should take specific responsibilities in the matter, in order that there may be no doubt when the moment to act comes.

The Council procedure for the application of sanctions must be reformed. With the present system, surprises of all kinds are possible. No guarantees in fact exist. So long as the existing state of things is that which we all know and which has been brought into prominence through the painful experience of these last months, we cannot blame anyone for lack of confidence in League action. The future of collective security hangs on the organization of a rapid system of applying our means of coercion. We must admit that all the forms of action prescribed in the Covenant are vague, imprecise and nebulous.

A policy of repression is obviously not enough. A preventive policy is necessary. Punishment of the aggressor and prevention of aggression are good; but elimination of the causes of aggression is even better. A preventive policy will call forth more loyal and more active co-operation from all. Mr. Eden made from this platform a statement which seems to me to constitute the bulwark of the most constructive of policies: "We must also," he said, "seek to encourage and facilitate the use of the League's machinery for adapting situations to changing circumstances and for the remedy of what may be recognized to be legitimate grievances."

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Obviously we must not, in our efforts to remove causes of dispute, create fresh injustices. The remedy would be worse than the disease; but the Assembly would never have power to impose changes without the consent of the parties concerned.

The revision of some existing circumstances can be advocated in so far as such a step helps to restore international co-operation. But no one can fail to realize that rapid or hasty revision may engender fresh causes of disagreement, perhaps even keener than those we know to-day.

We must nevertheless recognize that there are injustices which we can mitigate. The task is not easy, for we are bound to meet with dogged and often understandable resistance.

The problems must be studied at leisure; and the idea of satisfying the ambitions of the powerful at the expense of the lesser nations must never be allowed to constitute a decisive factor. For the League was not set up to realise or to stimulate political ambitions.

Too many illusions perhaps exist as to the possibility of solving certain problems by the method of simple international agreements. A typical case seems to me that of granting facilities, in the matter of access to colonial raw materials, to the countries which express their need of them.

This question raises one difficulty only: that of payment. Raw materials are plentiful, and the producers ask nothing better than to sell their stocks and develop their production. It is the purchasers who are lacking, not the goods.

Africa is the subject of many a flight of fancy. Most people look upon it as a vast treasure trove only half exploited, and persist in regarding colonization solely as a matter of exploiting wealth. That is not so. The essential element in colonization

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is the native. Colonization means the raising of the black man to our level. It is a work of self-denial and sacrifice, demanding knowledge which can only be acquired by long study. It is a slow and arduous task based on understanding and on disinterestedness. It is not a profiteering matter. This we can testify in the light of more than five centuries of experience.

The preventive policy to which I have just referred will be possible and useful only if it is practised in an impartial atmosphere. The political and social neutrality of the League seems to me an essential element of its success. The League must be absolutely neutral where international policy is concerned. If not, the difficulties of international co-operation will be singularly increased. Speeches made at Geneva must never be interpreted as favouring one ideology and contrary to another. That is a point of vital importance.

**Speech by the Spanish Delegate, Señor Ossorio y Gallardo,
Made on October 3rd, 1936:**

The proposals and suggestions which have been made for applying the Covenant of the League of Nations ought to be one of the principal subjects discussed at this Assembly. Many delegates have given proof of their excellent intentions in this respect, and the Spanish delegation has been anxious from the outset, to ensure that any interpretation of the Covenant should serve to accentuate its character as a means of defending, and not of weakening, the autonomy of the peoples. The views of my countrymen were fully explained to you by M. Alvarez del Vayo, in a speech that was received by the Assembly in a manner with which we have every reason to be satisfied.

Among the allusions which have been made from this platform to the situation in my country, I should

like to draw particular attention to those contained in the speech delivered by the Portuguese delegate. I take this opportunity of expressing our appreciation of the gratifying words by which he told you how anxious he was to see our greatness and prosperity return again when the tragic hours we are now passing through are over. These generous words have their value, like all words; but, naturally, words acquire a greater value when they are accompanied by deeds in keeping with them.

It will be understood that our delegation is not able to express similar sentiments regarding other statements which have been made from this platform. We fully realize that certain arguments have been brought forward in a purely scientific spirit and without the least intention of applying them to concrete realities, still less to the situation in Spain. Nevertheless, we feel compelled to state publicly that we disagree with them. It is not enough to bear in mind a speaker's intentions. We must also consider how his audience may interpret the speech. If we raised no objections, if we remained silent, it might be thought that the Spanish delegation had given its tacit assent to certain theories.

I refer, in particular, to the opinion which has been expressed with regard to the legitimacy of public authorities. That involves a serious conception, so serious that it might even imperil the *raison d'être* of the League itself. By definition, the League is an Assembly of self-governing States, dominions and colonies. From this premise there follows logically a question of great importance: how are we to define the freedom of the peoples, and in what does this freedom consist? The members of the Assembly will, I am quite sure, be unanimous in believing that every people has the right to define its

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conception of its own freedom. If the freedom and personality of nations were a matter to be freely decided by the League or to be referred to the biased decision of another people, no country could claim to be master of its own destinies, and it would be impossible to know which States had, and which had not, the right to be represented at Geneva.

We cannot admit the theory that a State is more or less worthy of respect according to the enemies who are plotting against it. To base an argument on the fact that certain elements of wealth, power or culture have taken up an attitude hostile to a Government, would be to state the question in unacceptably ambiguous terms. Who is to decide in such a case to which party the wealth, culture or power inclines? When two social groups are at war in a single nation, each believes that it is defending justice, that the noblest forces are behind it and that it enjoys the deepest sympathies of the people. If we state the problem in that way, we cannot solve it by heeding the biased views of the two parties. But could such a question arise at all for any specific nation? The very suggestion would be met with indignant protests. Certainly not one of the States represented here would tolerate any attempt by a third party to define its sovereignty. By a process of elimination, we arrive at the only conclusion which is both legally and morally acceptable. The legitimate governing authority of a people is that which is elected in conformity with the legal rules of that people.

Certainly nobody has wished to criticize Spanish policy, since that would have amounted to an act of verbal aggression against the spirit of serenity, courtesy and public duty which should reign at our meetings. I should like, however, to make a few observations concerning the case of my own country.

The Republic exists because the Spanish people brought it peacefully into being, amidst the warm enthusiasm of practically all its citizens, the monarchy, which had recently been overthrown, preferring not to intervene. The people elected constituent Cortes, and these elections were fought in such conditions that they might be cited as models. The Cortes adopted a Constitution which is in force to-day. For us, Spanish Republicans, a Government is legitimate if it fulfils its constitutional obligation to come before the Parliament, and if it wins the latter's confidence. It is legitimate if it controls the State services, and if the people are ready to perform deeds of heroism in its defence. It is legitimate if it has the support of powerful intellectual movements. It is legitimate if it owes its origin to existing legislation passed by a duly elected Parliament. In a word, a Government is legitimate if it is not the puppet of any institution, and if it employs no officials who have been forced upon it by military *pronunciamentos*, by revolutionary movements, by financial influences or any other inadmissible means. A Government which is the true representative of its country's laws is entitled to the respect due to a legitimate authority which none can dispute, divide, or violate.

Perhaps I may be allowed to point out the complete agreement which exists between our conception of the legitimacy of the public authorities issuing from the sovereign will of the people, and the very idea which inspired the creation of the League. It was not for nothing that the Spanish Constitution embodied the principles of the League Covenant in the law of the land.

Let me remind you that our institution came into being as a result of the most terrible of wars, and that it was set up in order that mankind might not

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pass through such an ordeal again. The founders of the League did not place it at the service of the mysterious forces and irresponsible powers which had led to the tragedy of the war. They placed it under the safeguard of the peoples themselves. They entrusted the defence of peace to men of good will throughout the world, to the men who, when in the trenches, had established their claim on us. The old conception of a struggle between States made way for a new conception of the collaboration of the peoples of the world in a system resting on publicity, law and justice. The sword of the warrior who imposes his will on the vanquished was to be replaced by the legal code of the judge who defends the weak against the aggressor.

These principles of publicity, law and justice, and that other principle of freedom enshrined in the Covenant—these were the Spanish people's guides when organizing themselves into a national community. Governments derive their legitimate power from the mandate of free peoples, even as the hope of world peace rests upon the concert of free nations.

Allow me, in conclusion, to mention two characteristic examples. The first is taken from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a powerful army invaded Spain. It had every advantage—irresistible strength, money, and the prestige of warlike glory; and it could also count on the support of the royal family of Spain, a traitor to its duty. To these must be added a school of thought in Spain which counselled submission to the conquerors rather than obedience to the voice of the people. The Government suffered so many defeats, misfortunes and disasters that the territory under its control was reduced, not to a few great cities, but to one little town situated on the edge of the map of Spain, Cadiz. Yet those sober,

dogged Spaniards, who so stubbornly defended Cadiz and who very soon drew up a Constitution that was the source of the whole of nineteenth-century liberalism in Spain, represented for their contemporaries, as they have done for history, the only legitimate authority, the sole authority entitled to respect.

If someone, departing from the historical significance of this example, were to remind me that those good Spaniards had foreign assistance, I would venture to reply that, behind the good Spaniards of to-day is rallied the whole of world democracy, so nobly defended on this platform yesterday by the Mexican delegate, to whom we owe a profound debt of gratitude.

The second example is more recent, taken, as it is, from the year 1934. Certain political tendencies expressed by non-republican parties which had not voted for the Constitution having been given a place in the Government, the Socialist forces of Spain, especially those of the Asturias and of the Generalitat of Catalonia, revolted. The rebels felt they were acting rightly against this new political movement. And did anyone talk at that time of culture, military force, the power of public opinion? No. The movement was everywhere condemned, because it was directed against the legitimate Government. In order to give more weight to my words, I would refer you to what was said by the Sovereign Pontiff Pius XI, in a declaration recently published by the press.

Those are the Spanish delegation's views on lawful public authority and its right to universal respect. The contrary theory might be dangerous even to those nations which think they have least to fear from it; for it may happen that, in other countries, armed forces will rise against the Government and do their utmost to overthrow it. Would the Governments

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thus attacked allow us to judge between the two parties to the dispute? Would they allow us to forecast the outcome of the struggle, or to discuss whether or not the rebels should be placed on the same legal footing as the legitimate Government?

There are many countries, real friends of Spain, which are firmly resolved to live according to the principles of law. Yet some of these have thought fit to decree a curious form of neutrality, which makes no distinction whatever between the legitimate Government and those who are in arms against it.

We Spaniards feel keenly this utter lack of equity. But whatever happens, our attitude will remain, as before, one of dignity and respect. We have right on our side, and we are firmly resolved to defend the cause of peace, and to apply in all loyalty the Covenant of the League of Nations.

We have quoted the most significant of the speeches, and those which have most importance in relation with the Spanish question. It is amazing to see that while Germany, Italy and Portugal are making open war on the legitimate Government of Spain, Powers such as England and France pass timidly over the Spanish problem in the full Assembly of the League of Nations. Nothing could more clearly indicate that the League is dead.

As no tragedy is complete without its touch of sarcasm, it was inevitable that the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Senhor Monteiro, should permit himself to indulge in a grotesque license in his speech. Because for Senhor Monteiro, Minister of the most gross dictatorship in Europe, to theorize on the legitimacy of Governments,

when his own is the most illegitimate in the world, is nothing short of farcical. Such jesting in the presence of the dead body—the corpse of the League—is in bad taste.

Memorandum Distributed in Geneva by the Spanish Government. Accusations which it contains of Italo-German Intervention Against the Spanish Republic

The Spanish Government distributed among the journalists in Geneva copies of a memorandum citing concrete examples of intervention by Germany, Italy and Portugal on behalf of the insurgents. Here are the fifteen points contained in the document :

1. On September 29th it learned that a consignment of poison-gas and war-material from Italy had been sent from Lisbon to the Spanish frontier.

2. According to a dispatch from Tangier dated September 29th a ship (name given) was due to arrive in the port of this town. This boat was then to proceed from this port for Melilla with a cargo of war-material hidden under coal and with petrol.

3. On September 20th twelve big German aeroplanes which had been supplied to the Burgos Junta arrived at Tetuan in order to be used for transport. These aeroplanes transported troops of the Foreign Legion from Tetuan to Seville.

4. On September 12th an Italian cargo-boat (name given) unloaded at Rio Martin, a beach near Tetuan, gas bombs, dismantled aeroplanes, and arms. The officials in the service of the rebels took precautions to hide the name of the boat. Unloading took place in very bad weather and at some risk.

5. On September 6th three Italian three-engined bombing 'planes arrived at Palma, Majorca.

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6. On September 7th a ship (name given) carrying the Italian flag arrived at Palma at one o'clock in the morning. It unloaded 360 tons of war-material, including extremely powerful aerial bombs. This material was stored in the railway tunnel which traverses the town of Palma.

7. On September 7th a train from Portugal arrived at Seville consisting of twenty-three open freight cars with cases that contained fourteen aeroplanes from Hamburg.

8. A Portuguese airman (name given) and a well-known Portuguese business firm (name given) took orders to supply the rebels with petrol and oil from Portugal. The transport into Spain took place on lorries and by rail.

9. In the beginning of September a ship arrived at Melilla with two dismantled Caproni 'planes, several aeroplane engines, bombs, shells, and petrol. The ship was escorted to Melilla by an Italian destroyer.

10. On August 29th an Italian three-engined 'plane and three other three-engined bombers arrived at Palma, Majorca.

11. On August 27th in the evening a boat without name and without papers arrived at Palma, accompanied by an Italian destroyer. Its crew was Italian, and it was illuminated by the searchlight of a vessel of the same nationality, which entered the port and unloaded 160 tons of war-material. This boat left at dawn and re-entered the port at nightfall to complete its unloading. It anchored in the bay beside two Italian warships.

12. Machine-guns and shells to a value of 300,000 Portuguese escudos were supplied to the rebels by a munitions factory owned by the Portuguese Government. The machine-guns were sold as scrap iron. This material was delivered on August 29th.

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13. On August 15th, the Burgos rebels were sold by the representative of a Dutch firm (name given) two 'planes. The pilot who was to be in charge of these 'planes refused to take them to Burgos. They were thereupon flown to England and from there to Burgos.

14. On August 9th a Portuguese ship (name given) unloaded war-material on a Lisbon wharf and continued its journey to Ceuta with part of its cargo. This boat came from Germany, as well as another Portuguese boat (name given), which discharged war-material in the port of Lisbon on August 10th. On the same day two lorries loaded with war-material left Veirolas for Galicia.

15. On August 8th at midday there were five lorries in the central square of Evora (Portugal) with Seville number plates. These lorries were loaded with munitions in small cases with cord handles and seal. The man in charge, a Spanish Captain, had a telephone conversation with the Commander of the Policia Civica. At four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day these six lorries were seen in Estremoz. At ten o'clock in the evening the lorries left by the road which goes to Porto Allegre, and from there took the direct road from Estremoz to Elvas on the Spanish frontier. They remained at Elvas throughout the whole day of August 9th.

"This information," states the memorandum, "completes the list of undeniable facts mentioned in the diplomatic Notes of September 15th sent by the Spanish Government to the Powers that had signed the declaration and to the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Portugal. These facts prove that the Spanish military rebels continued to receive from some Powers war-material and assistance of all sorts even

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after the declaration of non-intervention had been signed.

“The Spanish Government has been informed of the reception of more arms by the rebels within the last few days, and of the presence of foreign officers in the rebel army, but is waiting to receive further details before it gives these facts the necessary publicity.”

The Secretary General of the League Refuses to Publish or to Circulate to Members of the League the Spanish Memorandum

The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian in Geneva telegraphed on September 29th, 1936 :

The Secretary General of the League of Nations has refused to publish or to circulate to members of the League the documents concerning violations of the “non-intervention” agreement sent to him on Saturday by Señor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister. The reason given for the refusal is, I understand, that the documents are merely a sequel to a speech made in the Assembly and relate to a question not on the agenda of the Assembly or the Council.

The Spanish Delegation is now considering the question of making a formal appeal to the Council under one of the articles of the Covenant.

Rebel Intrigue in Geneva

The News Chronicle correspondent in Geneva telegraphed as follows, that same day :

Up to a late hour to-night the League of Nations secretariat had still not decided whether to publish

the memorandum of the Spanish Government showing the part played by Portugal, Germany and Italy in supplying the Spanish rebels with arms.

This delay is to be the subject of an appeal in a secret meeting of the League Council by the Spanish Foreign Minister, Señor del Vayo, to-morrow.

It has received very unfavourable comment in Geneva, for usually the technical services of the League bring out the lengthiest documents, in Roneo form, within a few hours of their arrival.

The present delay, it is felt, can only be explained by political circumstances.

What these circumstances are is quite clear, for it is believed that the lobbyists of the Burgos Government—Señor Tuxiodor in Geneva, Señor del Val in London and Señor Quinones de Leon in Paris—have persuaded the highest officials of the League secretariat and many Assembly delegates that the victory of General Franco will be but a question of weeks.

Therefore it would be fatal for the relations of the new Spain with the League if the League secretariat fell in with the wishes of the present legitimate Government in Madrid.

The rebels at Burgos, who already have a public government with propaganda and diplomatic services, have succeeded so far in blackmailing the secretariat into refusing to publish Señor del Vayo's Note.

Meanwhile the restraint and moderation of the Spanish Foreign Minister, which has won the highest praise in Geneva, is being vigorously criticised by Left Wing elements in Madrid and Barcelona.

They complain of his inability to make the League intervene on their behalf, for they consider that Spain is as much a victim of foreign aggression as were China and Abyssinia.

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These Left Wing elements may soon succeed in bringing pressure to bear on the Spanish Government to appeal to the League, under Article 15 of the Covenant, against Germany, Italy and Portugal.

But if such an appeal were made, it would mean the end of the dream of bringing Germany and Italy back to Geneva, which both the British Foreign Office and the League Secretariat are most anxious to realize.

As the situation is seen here the secretariat feels that it must play "Big Power" politics; that is to say, placate France, Britain, Italy, Germany and Japan at all costs.

This may be the right line of policy to pursue, but if it is right then, in the opinion of Geneva, the principles underlying the Covenant of the League are wrong.

The Attitude of the Insurgents. Excessive Confidence

On October 2nd, 1936, the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Geneva wrote as follows:

Burgos will not reply to Madrid's allegations published here yesterday by the Foreign Minister, Señor del Vayo, I was informed this morning by a responsible spokesman.

The Spanish insurgents believe that they will be in control of the capital in a fortnight. I also gather that General Franco has no intention of seeking to supplant the existing Spanish delegation at Geneva even should he achieve further successes before the end of the present Assembly meeting.

The Burgos "Government" is confident that it will be recognized by several European Powers, supported by most of the South American States,

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once it has proclaimed itself in Madrid. For the rest, it is content to await the march of events.

The Spanish Government Asks for a Meeting of the Council of the League, November 27th, 1936

In view of the continued violation of all laws by Germany and Italy, the Spanish Government decided to ask for an extraordinary convocation of the League Council :

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Valencia, November 27th, 1936.

In notes addressed to the Powers parties to the non-intervention agreement, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and in my speech to the Assembly of the League, the Spanish Government has denounced the armed intervention of Germany and Italy in favour of the rebels in the Spanish civil war—such intervention constituting the most flagrant violation of international law. This intervention has culminated in the recognition of the chief of the rebels set up as a Government by the “wire-pullers” of these same Powers. Such a proceeding is virtually an act of aggression against the Spanish Republic. The declared intention of the rebels of forcibly preventing free commerce with the ports controlled by the Government claims attention as a factor likely to create international difficulties—difficulties which, as is well known, Franco declared his intention of provoking from the outset of the rebellion. These difficulties are increased by the fact that the rebels have been recognized by Germany and Italy, which, and particularly one of them, as is

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proved by information in the possession of the Government of the Republic, are preparing to co-operate with them in the naval sphere as they have done in the air and on land. These facts, through their very simultaneity, constitute for the Spanish Government a circumstance affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. On behalf of the Spanish Government, I therefore request Your Excellency, in the supreme interests of peace and in virtue of Article XI of the Covenant, to take the necessary steps to enable the Council to proceed, at the earliest possible moment, to an examination of the situation outlined above.—
JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, *Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Republic.*

Chile Opposes the Convocation of the Council

The sorry task of opposing the convocation of the Council was undertaken by Chile :

LETTER FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHILE ON THE COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

London, November 29th, 1936.

In my capacity as a member of the Council, I have duly communicated to my Government the telegram dated November 27th from Valencia, as also the telegram of to-day's date suggesting Monday, December 7th, or alternatively December 14th, for the meeting of the Council. In accordance with the instructions I have now received, I have the honour to inform you, in my capacity as a member of the Council, that Chile is of opinion that a meeting of the Council at the present moment would not be favourable to the objects

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which Article XI of the Covenant has in view. The Chilean Government considers that such a meeting would be liable to diminish the prestige of the League of Nations, and would not have a pacifying effect without the attendance and support of all the parties concerned. In the circumstances, my Government hopes that, if the proposed meeting of the Council is inevitable, the majority of the Council will agree to its taking place on December 14th rather than on the earlier date.

(Signed) AUGUSTIN EDWARDS.

The request for the convocation of the League Council made by the Spanish Government must not be thought of as an appeal for help. The Spanish Government by such action did nothing but point out the danger for the peace of Europe arising from foreign intervention in Spain, and especially in the Mediterranean.

Considerations Affecting the Spanish Request

On November 28th, 1936, The Times published the following with reference to this :

The Spanish Government's request for an inquiry by the League Council into the situation in Spain is made under the second paragraph of Article 11. This article, which aims at the prevention of war and at the restoration of peace when hostilities have broken out, was intended by the authors of the Covenant to be the "safeguard of peace." Its second paragraph refers to the case, less grave than war or threats of war, of a "circumstance affecting international relations." It makes provision for the intervention of the Council or the Assembly.

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Appeals under Article 11, paragraph 2, have been made in numerous disputes, some of major, others of minor, importance. One of the most recent and most notable examples of its successful use was the appeal by Yugoslavia for intervention after the assassination of King Alexander at Marseilles. On the submission to the Council of a case under Article 11 paragraph 2, the Secretary-General immediately communicates with the interested parties, drawing their attention to the need of taking whatever steps may be necessary or useful to prevent anything occurring in their respective territories which might prejudice the examination or settlement of the question, and requesting them to forward their replies without delay and to inform him of the steps which have been taken.

The present case, however, is not on a par with past disputes, except that it will rest, as always, with the officiating President of the Council (at present Don Augustin Edwards, the Chilean Ambassador in London) to decide whether the appeal shall be submitted to the Council and, if so, when. His decision will be reached after consultation with the other members of the Council.

Although many Governments may doubt whether a discussion of the international aspects of the Spanish war in the League Council can serve any useful purpose at the present time, the objections to establishing a precedent in this case for the rejection of an appeal will probably be recognized on all sides. It may be mentioned, though, that, whereas through the Non-Intervention Committee only European States have been brought into a juridical relation with the Spanish war, the submission of the Spanish Government's appeal to the League Council would involve extra-European, and notably Latin-American,

States, which have special views and sensibilities on this matter.

In Geneva the Attitude of the Chilean Representative is Criticised

The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Geneva wrote as follows, on November 29th, 1936:

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations has telegraphed to all the members of the Council proposing December 7th or 14th for the meeting of the Council to consider the appeal of the Spanish Government and asking them to inform him before next Tuesday which of these two dates they would prefer. This morning the date of December 7th had been definitely decided on, and I heard from an authoritative source that the date of December 14th was suggested by Mr. Edwards, the Chilean Ambassador to London, who is Acting President of the Council. His action is severely criticized in international quarters here, as it is considered to be an attempt to postpone the matter as long as possible.

There appears to be no truth in the rumour that has been circulated for the last two days that the British proposed that the Council should meet in London. It is the almost unanimous opinion in League quarters that it would be inexcusable in the present case to meet anywhere but in Geneva. The reason that has been given for a London meeting is that Germany should be invited to attend the Council and that the German Government would refuse to come to Geneva. Germany could be presumably invited. But the case does not appear to be one coming within the provisions of Article 17 of the Covenant, as the appeal is made under paragraph 2 of Article 11.

The Party of English Reaction Follows Chile

This brief comment from the Observer (December 6th, 1936) shows how the English reactionaries responded to the appeal for a meeting of the Council :

Last Friday week one side in the Spanish war appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11. Next Thursday the Council will meet at Geneva to consider that appeal. The time is far past when surprise could be caused by the attempted use of Geneva as a belligerent instrument. The perversion is too familiar. It is the distinctive contribution of Russia to the diplomacy of our time. Must a British Foreign Secretary again dance at Geneva to the Russian tune?

Such apparently was the criterion which prevailed at the Foreign Office. Mr. Eden did not go to Geneva.

The Attitude of Italy to the Convocation of the Council

The attitude adopted by Italy is revealed in the following message from the Daily Telegraph correspondent in Rome (December 9th, 1936):

Signor Mussolini has definitely decided not to send a representative to the special League of Nations Council meeting on Thursday. Señor Caballero, the Spanish Premier, has appealed to the League to discuss the alleged arrival of large numbers of Fascist and Nazi troops to reinforce General Franco's army.

From the first the Italians have accused Russia of inspiring Señor Caballero's move to cover Russian reinforcements for the Madrid Government forces. It is emphasized here that Mr. Eden, the British

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Foreign Secretary, and M. Blum, the French Premier, are detained at home by domestic problems and that many other foreign Ministers will seize that opportunity to follow their example.

Writing in this evening's *Giornale d'Italia*, Signor Gayda says that Italy has not even answered the invitation to go to the League meeting because she has no intention of explaining her position by any sort of declaration to the League.

Señor Caballero can apply to the Committee of Non-Intervention if he wants to lodge complaints regarding reinforcements. There he can obtain information about Russia's participation.

Also, Signor Gayda suggests, if the League wants to speak of warlike matters, it will find the war in the Far East and preparations for war in Moscow.

Mr. Eden not Going to Geneva

Any active resolution of the League was strangled by the fact that all responsible personalities were absent. This was pointed out by the Geneva correspondent of The Times in the following message (December 9th, 1936):

The announcement that Mr. Eden will not attend the League Council meeting has been followed by intimations that neither M. Yvon Delbos, the French Foreign Minister, nor M. Litvinoff, the Russian Foreign Commissar, will be present. France will be represented by M. Paul-Boncour and Russia by M. Potemkin. Turkey, Poland, and Latvia will be represented only by their permanent delegates here. Neither Italy nor Ecuador will be represented.

In these circumstances the proceedings will be formal only as there will be no delegate of sufficient

authority to take any important decision on the Spanish appeal. The normal procedure would be to appoint a committee to examine the juridical aspect of the Spanish appeal and to report to the Council at its meeting in January.

A Leader in the "Morning Post"

English policy at that moment and on that particular subject may be seen by examination of the gist of the following absurd leader which appeared in the Morning Post on December 10th, 1936:

To-day there assembles at Geneva an extraordinary meeting of the League Council convened at the request of the Spanish Government in order to examine the situation in Spain. To the unsophisticated mind it is not easy to understand what advantage either the League or the Spanish Government hopes to derive from this meeting. The ostensible pretext for summoning it is foreign intervention and the recognition of General Franco's régime by Germany and Italy, in virtue whereof the Spanish Government are exercising the "friendly right" conferred by Article 11 of the Covenant on each member of the League "to bring to the attention of the Assembly, or the Council, any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." A more disingenuous, not to say cynical, exploitation of the Article for private ends it would not be easy to imagine; and the inability of the League, on technical grounds, to prevent such an abuse of the "friendly" right merely serves to emphasize once more (if, indeed, further emphasis were necessary) the dangerous futility

of the League's existing mechanism for handling the discords between nations. Happily, the members of the Council have appropriately signalized in advance their sense of the merits of the occasion by unanimously abstaining from the despatch of their Foreign Ministers.

It is not difficult to detect the disruptive hand of Moscow as the prime mover in this appeal to the League. If the Non-Intervention Pact had been observed by all its adherents with common honesty there could have been no ground for the appeal; but it is the lords of Moscow themselves, the bosom friends of the appellants, who bear the foremost responsibility for the breakdown of the Pact. Let us recapitulate. The Pact formally came into existence on September 9th. From the moment of its inception there was a running fire of mutual recrimination between certain of the adherents on the score of alleged infringements; and there were, also, in the early weeks, manifold evidences of the military discomfiture of the Government party in Spain. By the friends of that party this discomfiture was represented as a consequence, if not, indeed, a proof, of the material support being rendered to its opponents by its foreign enemies. On October 7th, the Soviet Government, through their accredited representative, informed the Non-Intervention Committee that they could no longer regard themselves as bound by the agreement unless other countries ceased supplying aid to the Junta. In proof of the alleged aid they relied solely on an *ex parte* statement of their friend, the Spanish Foreign Minister; they were in a position neither to substantiate this statement nor to offer independent evidence of their own. A fortnight of inquiry produced no positive result one way or the other, except to exonerate the Portuguese from the charges levelled against them by the Soviets. Nevertheless, on October

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23rd, the Soviets made an official declaration that "they could not consider themselves bound by the Non-Intervention Agreement to any greater extent than any of the remaining participants." From that time onwards, and without any further attempt to establish the guilt of the other participants, the Soviets have openly and ostentatiously furnished the Madrid Government with whole shiploads of war-material.

The subterfuge resorted to by the Soviets discredits only themselves and their friends. They concocted an unsubstantiated indictment against others in order to justify their own predetermined breach of the Pact, and they significantly chose for the purpose a moment when the fortunes of their friends appeared at a particularly low ebb. The foreign sympathizers of the Junta not unnaturally retaliated with double measure. With an air of injured innocence, the protégés of Moscow have now gone to Geneva to complain before the world of the resources that are being arrayed against them by unauthorised foreign intruders, and they go, if you please, in the guise of disinterested protagonists of the public peace in Europe. Who, in face of all this, will any longer dispute that it is Moscow who is applying the lighted match to the Spanish tinder?

It is this policy of ill-will and supreme ignorance which has embroiled the Spanish problem, and which is leading Europe to war.

The Council Meets in Secret Session. December 10th, 1936

The following message was sent by the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian:

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The extraordinary session of the League Council, held at the request of the Spanish Government, began this afternoon with a short private meeting at which Señor Edwards (Chile) presided. Italy was not represented. The Council decided to meet in public to-morrow morning, when Señor Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, will make a statement on behalf of his Government.

Speaking as the representative of Chile, the President said that he would have occasion to raise certain questions of a humanitarian nature in connection with the request of the Spanish Government. I understand that he was referring to the case of the Spanish rebels that have taken refuge in certain embassies and legations in Madrid. The Embassies or Legations of certain Latin American States have been among the worst offenders.

I have obtained further information about this matter from an authoritative source. Several thousand rebels have been harboured in this way during the last few months. It was apparently thought at the time when they were given refuge that Madrid would soon be taken by General Franco and that then the persons given asylum would be useful to him.

That hope has been disappointed, and the Embassies and Legations concerned are now in a difficult position. They are, so to speak, the prisoners of their prisoners, and dare not leave Madrid because they could not take their guests with them.

It is understood that what Señor Edwards intends to propose is that the Spanish Government should allow the persons harboured by foreign Embassies and Legations to be evacuated and sent abroad. The Spanish Government is likely to raise certain objections to these proposals, one of which is that there would be no guarantee that the Embassies and Legations

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in question would not begin harbouring rebels again. Señor Edwards may try to meet this objection by suggesting that the legations concerned should be transferred to Hendaye, on the French frontier.

It appears likely that in many cases the Governments concerned did not know what their representatives in Madrid were doing. I have the best possible authority for saying that neither the British nor the United States Embassy ever gave refuge to a Spanish rebel. The French Embassy, I understand, harboured a few nuns and other harmless persons, and the Spanish Government winked at it. In most of the other cases the persons harboured, or most of them, were armed.

Extraordinary Session of the Council to Consider the Spanish Question. Composition of the Council

On December 11th, 1936, the Council of the League held a session to treat exclusively of the Spanish question. The composition of the Council was as follows :

President : M. EDWARDS

The Members of the Council were represented as follows:

<i>Bolivia :</i>	M. COSTA DU RELS
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :</i>	LORD CRANBORNE
<i>Chile :</i>	M. Edwards
<i>China :</i>	Mr. WELLINGTON KOO
<i>Ecuador :</i>	—————
<i>France :</i>	M. VIENOT
<i>Italy :</i>	—————
<i>Latvia :</i>	M. FELDMANS

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<i>New Zealand :</i>	Mr. JORDAN
<i>Poland :</i>	M. KOMARNICKI
<i>Roumania :</i>	M. BADULESCO
<i>Spain :</i>	M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO
<i>Sweden :</i>	M. SANDLER
<i>Turkey :</i>	M. SADAK
<i>Union of Soviet Socialists Republics :</i>	M. POTEMKINE
<i>Secretary-General :</i>	M. J. AVENOL

Speech by Señor Alvarez del Vayo, Spanish Representative

I had the honour of drawing the attention of the Assembly last September to the danger to peace arising out of a new form of aggression, which consisted in a State making war to all intents and purpose, but without declaring war, by first provoking a rebellion within another State, and then giving military assistance to the rebels. I fully realized, in making this statement, how strongly the demand was pressed from different quarters to supply irrefutable proof of my allegations. These proofs were in the possession of the Spanish Government. They were contained in the note addressed to the members of the Non-Intervention Committee in London, which were reprinted in our White Book.

To-day, these proofs have become such that no one can any longer entertain any serious doubts as to the facts of the situation.

Last September, I alluded to the tragic proof supplied by the youth of Spain, who fall in thousands in the trenches of freedom as the victims of Fascist aeroplanes and of the foreign war-material delivered month after month, despite the non-intervention agreement, by those who base their international

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policy on the systematic breaking of treaties and of their international undertakings. To-day, Madrid has become one more irrefutable proof. No one can doubt the validity of this evidence. Every foreign mission which has visited Spain has brought back fresh accusations against this monstrosity: that the capital of a State Member of the League has been reduced to ruins, and that the women and children of this capital have been butchered in hundreds by bombing 'planes under the orders of rebel generals and supplied by States which have, in fact, begun a war, and which are continuing to make war, while statesmen talk of preserving peace.

The war is there; an international war is raging on Spanish soil. We have seen how, in the last few days, the rebels, after the failure of their Moroccan troops, are now preparing to receive the assistance of fresh forces which they themselves call "blond Moors." Moreover, we must expect that poison gas, which has already been employed these last days, will continue to be used in the attacks against Madrid, and that the parts of the city in which the workers live will be bombed more and more violently in order to try to obtain by panic what the rebels have failed to obtain by other means. It would be both useless and dangerous to continue to ignore the situation. The worst thing that could happen to the League of Nations would be to contribute, by its own silence and inaction, to the spread of this war.

It is, of course, possible to conceive of a European peace which would result from a policy of successive surrenders to the aggression of the forces of destruction and of war. After Germany and Italy had succeeded in getting the upper hand in Spain and in using the occasion to retain for themselves the Balearic Islands and perhaps other naval bases in key positions either

in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic, the same game might be started again elsewhere. Other democratic countries, which are also looked upon as dangerous centres of international trouble and discord, might also be reduced to impotence. As the final result of this process, it is possible to conceive of a Europe wholly pacified because all problems and all difficulties would have been settled, thanks to the decisive action of international Fascism.

Such a peace, it is true, would have cost the lives of millions of men, women and children and would have meant that many capitals would have suffered the fate of Madrid, that hundreds of towns would have known the fate of Cartagena and of Alicante. But, from a formal point of view, peace would not have been disturbed. When the Spanish Government decided that it was its duty to assume the grave responsibility of requesting a meeting of the Council of the League, it did so precisely because it wished, so far as it was concerned, to declare in the most solemn fashion its firm decision to oppose any such paradoxical and murderous "peace policy."

Allow me to recall just what were the reasons that made the Spanish Government feel it was necessary to demand a meeting of the Council. In the first place, the Spanish rebels have just been recognized as a legitimate Government by two great European Powers—Germany and Italy. The moment the rebels had received this recognition their chief threatened to start a blockade of the Government ports in the Mediterranean. At the same time, naval attacks took place at different points on the Spanish coast by warships whose nationality it was impossible to establish. Two Government warships have been attacked by two submarines also of unknown nationality at the entry to the port of Cartagena.

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All these facts together have led the Spanish Government to fear that the international consequence of the Spanish military insurrection may become particularly threatening for the peace of Europe. The Spanish Government therefore considered it to be its duty to do all that lay in its power to enable the Covenant of the League to be applied at least for the maintenance of general peace. Since the power of the Covenant to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, about which so much has been heard of late, has been unable to stop the aggression of which Spain is the victim, it is to be hoped that the Covenant may at least be used to prevent the outbreak of the general conflagration which now appears to be daily more probable.

If the Spanish Government has now asked for a meeting of the Council, it did so solely for the reason that an international war exists in fact, and that this war, if it is still ignored, may, when it is least expected, produce a situation which can no longer be controlled. This view of the situation is not ours alone and cannot therefore be attributed to excessive apprehensions on our part. On the contrary, this view is finally confirmed by the Anglo-French *démarche* of December 4th, of which the whole world learned in the *communiqué* published the day before yesterday. I might have begun this speech by reading the first paragraph of this *communiqué*, which reads as follows:

The British and French Governments proceeded last week to exchange views on the situation created by the prolongation of the civil war in Spain and *the resulting dangers for the peace of Europe.*

If justification were needed of the Spanish Government's decision to demand the convocation of the

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Council, this quotation would lend it the highest authority.

The Spanish Government understands very well the political motives which made it difficult for the other Members of the League to ask for this meeting. But that only made our own responsibility so much the heavier. If, unhappily, a general conflagration should break out, and if no one had taken the initiative in securing the intervention of the League while it was still possible for the League to act effectively, the Spanish Government might justly be considered to have been more lacking than any other in respect for its obligations as a Member of the League of Nations. It is precisely because of our responsibility as a Member State that the Spanish Government took the initiative which has led to our meeting round this table.

There is no question therefore of submitting to the Council any request on behalf of the Spanish Government or of the Spanish people. We are not prompted by any selfish interests. We are not asking the Council to do anything to assist the Spanish people to solve their own problems. If our initiative had been due solely to consideration of our national interests we should have acted long ago. We are convinced that, even before the insurrection, the rebels were able to count on moral and material assistance from abroad. The importance and effectiveness of this assistance and co-operation, as regards aerial and land warfare, can hardly be doubted by anyone. But this assistance, although it was just as harmful to the Spanish people and just as much a violation of international law, was not such an immediate danger from the point of view of general peace. The activity of the foreign tanks and aeroplanes on Spanish territory was certainly no less grave for the Spanish people than the activity

of the warships and submarines along the Spanish coast. But it is obvious that this latter activity constitutes a more imminent danger to general peace. The object of the Spanish Government, when it took steps which led to the summoning of this meeting of the Council, was to nip this danger in the bud, to prevent the growth of this evil to proportions where it became unmanageable.

The Spanish Government has faith in the efficacy of the Council and of the technical and political apparatus of the League of Nations. We are convinced that the Council can find means of avoiding or of reducing to reasonable limits the dangers of the present situation. With the greatest respect, I must insist, at this point, upon the fact that I find it impossible to accept the view that a meeting of the Council of the League might, in certain cases, lead to increasing the danger of the international situation.

During all this time, the Spanish people, who, when setting up the Republic, were the first to incorporate the fundamental principles of the Covenant in their Constitution—not because they could foresee the military rebellion of July and the armed assistance from abroad, but because the cause of peace is dear to their hearts—have been disappointed to see how the institution that was created to preserve the peace of the world is repeating, in the case of Spain, the indecision it has displayed in the past. It would be vain and dangerous to overlook the fact that this feeling of disappointment has been shared in the last few months by the great bulk of world opinion, even outside the States Members of the League. It has been shared by millions who cannot resign themselves to the policy of successive surrenders to the forces of war and aggression. Those who want peace are conscious of the fact that they represent the will of the

majority, and, in spite of constant disappointment, they are always ready generously to overlook the errors of the past. On each new occasion, as was demonstrated in connection with another matter during the early days of the Assembly in September, those who want peace are ready to close their ranks again in defence of the true spirit of the League of Nations. Each time those who want peace show their desire for a clear and firm attitude.

At this grave hour, when all feel how close the danger of war has come, and when every sane European who has not fallen a victim to the aggressive contagion of Fascism is haunted by the prospect of the place where he lives and works going up in smoke and flames, as is the case in Madrid to-day, those who want peace in the world demand, and are right in demanding, a firmer and more resolute attitude than would be required in the case of a mere controversy between rival doctrines.

But I do not want this meeting of the Council to be purely negative, or even, as has been suggested, recriminatory in character. The interests of the League and those of peace demand that our discussions should end in constructive decisions. I realize fully, and I am the first to regret, that certain absences at this table make it more difficult for the Council to take constructive action. But I am convinced that there is no one here who thinks that these absences should be a reason for the Council declaring in advance that it is powerless.

And now allow me to add a few words on certain more general aspects of the question. From the first moment of the Spanish military insurrection, certain European Powers have been chiefly concerned to prevent the extension to the rest of Europe of the conflict that is drowning Spain in blood. The non-

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intervention policy and its executive organ, the London Committee, have been the means employed to attain this end. The Spanish Government has made its view clear on this question. It maintains its point of view in all respects, and the reservations that its view implies. The cynical and open violations of the non-intervention agreement by certain Powers, and the fact that the Committee has been powerless to prevent or to stop these violations, have had as their natural consequence the declaration by other Powers that they considered themselves bound by the non-intervention agreement only to the extent that the agreement was respected by its other signatories. It is, at any rate, clear that no one can have any doubts as to the complete ineffectiveness of the system, as it has been conceived and applied hitherto. There is certainly no doubt on that point amongst the heroic population of Madrid, victims of the cruellest and most barbarous aerial bombardments ever suffered by a civilian population, carried out by aeroplanes and by bombs which have certainly not been manufactured in Spain and by airmen who have certainly not been born on Spanish territory.

Allow me to insist on the constant endeavours and, one might say, the extraordinary sacrifices of Spain from the outset of the military rebellion, ever since the beginning of the foreign aid given to the rebels, in order to limit the conflict in the interest of peace and to prevent its giving rise to a fearful catastrophe.

It was because of this concern for peace that the Spanish Government accepted the non-intervention agreement, although it was profoundly convinced that the Government had every right openly to obtain everything it needed to put down the rebellion, and that the restrictions imposed on its right to trade freely

was a measure more arbitrary than anything hitherto known in international life. In its profound desire to co-operate, Spain accepted the non-intervention agreement. But this agreement did not prevent a cynical intervention on behalf of the rebels, an intervention which is responsible for the prolongation of the civil war and is responsible for a great deal of the blood which has been shed in the meantime.

I will not dwell longer on this lamentable and painful aspect of the question. I have purposely not brought with me this time the records of the evidence which is already so voluminous as to be difficult to handle. Anyway, in present circumstances, such proofs would no longer come as news to anyone. On the other hand, the Anglo-French *démarche* to which the *communiqué* I have mentioned refers constitutes the best evidence that the very Governments which, for the noblest and loftiest motives, and because of their desire to serve peace, took the initiative in proposing the policy of non-intervention share our anxiety as to the exactly opposite effect of this policy in practice, because of the violations committed by those who undertook to respect the non-intervention agreement. The question now raised is how to make good these shortcomings by setting up a system of control which will render the agreement effective.

You will understand why the Spanish Government, after our bitter experience hitherto, and because we believe that we have not the right to expose our people to fresh abuse of our confidence and to fresh disappointments, is concerned, above all, with making certain that the system of control will be such as to give all the necessary guarantees of effectiveness.

Spain has done everything that could be required of it as a Member of the League in order to serve the cause of peace. But peace cannot be attained at

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the instance of only one nation; it must be the result of the collective endeavour of all who feel equally bound by the obligations of the Covenant.

Before I conclude, allow me to put before you certain considerations as to the true and profound historical significance of what is called the "Spanish question."

If, in the course of these considerations, I touch upon aspects of the matter which might be regarded as an internal affair of Spain, that does not mean that the Spanish Government asks the League to intervene, nor even that it would be ready, without further ado, to accept the League's intervention. But it is becoming more and more difficult to draw a clear line between what is the internal affair of a nation and what may be regarded as a matter of international concern. In any case, the Spanish Government considers it its duty to put before the League in authoritative fashion the information necessary for a clear understanding of both the domestic and international aspects of the question.

In the eyes of many, the conflict in Spain is simply a particularly acute and bloody manifestation of two rival political doctrines: Communism and Fascism. I shall not insult you by assuming that it is necessary for me to refute here this puerile and over-simplified conception of the situation. This conflict, it is true, began with a clear and indubitable case of Fascist aggression, in order to prevent the democratization of the political régime in Spain. It is also certain that the Spanish people is firmly resolved not to let the upheaval produced by this aggression pass without eliminating finally and for all time the obstacles which have traditionally obstructed the political development of Spain towards democracy, freedom and social justice.

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Finally, the upheaval has been exploited, not to say instigated, by European Fascist Powers, in order to establish in Spain a Fascist political régime, which would put Spain, with all that it represents in resources and geographical position, at the service of the international policy of these Powers. That is the point which should, in the Spanish Government's view, be regarded as its central feature; that is the heart of the problem. The Government and people of Spain are sure of the final and complete victory of their cause. Afterwards, when Spain has once more regained normal conditions of democracy, liberty and social justice, the Spanish Republic will remember that its Constitution incorporates the fundamental principles of the Covenant of the League. These principles and the international co-operation which is their essence will certainly remain the basis of the national and international policy of the Spanish Republic.

Speech by Lord Cranborne, the Representative of the United Kingdom

The representative of Spain has, in his statement this morning, enumerated the reasons which have led his Government to bring to the notice of the Council, under Article XI, the present position in his country as a situation "which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." He has drawn attention to the recognition by certain Governments of the administration of General Franco. He has also brought to the notice of the Council certain facts indicating a definite tendency on the part of certain foreign Powers to intervene in the civil war. I do not wish to go into the relative merits of varying ideologies. The League should be tolerant of all ideologies and

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partisan of none. But no one can doubt that such action, on which ever side it may be, does constitute a threat to international peace. It has throughout been the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the unhappy conflict in Spain is, in its inception, an internal affair of the Spanish people, and that the political issues involved should not become the concern of other nations. It was this view which led the United Kingdom Government early in the conflict to welcome and support the initiative of the Government of France in favour of an agreement by European States not to intervene in the struggle. The non-intervention agreement is doubtless familiar to my colleagues, but they will perhaps forgive me if I remind them briefly of the steps which the members of the International Committee have hitherto taken to attain their objective.

The main task of the Committee has been to examine and report upon evidence which has been submitted to it tending to show that arms were being supplied from abroad to both parties to the conflict in Spain. Here I would confine myself to saying that His Majesty's Government believes that the maintenance in being of the Committee has in itself proved a factor of importance by acting as a deterrent to the indiscriminate supply of arms to Spain. Nor has any alternative method of circumscribing the conflict yet been advanced. The Committee has also had under consideration the question of preventing the despatch of aircraft by air to Spain. It has further studied the question of various forms of indirect intervention, such as the recruitment of persons for military service in Spain.

The representative of Spain in his speech this morning said that it was "clear that no one can have

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any doubts as to the complete ineffectiveness of the system as it has been conceived and applied hitherto." His Majesty's Government cannot accept this view. I think it will be generally conceded that the non-intervention agreement has been of inestimable value in preventing the struggle from extending beyond the frontiers of Spain. I would in particular draw the attention of the Council to the striking words used by M. Blum in his speech before the French Chamber on December 5th last, when he said that "the policy of non-intervention, in spite of the disappointments, the surprises, the deceptions and the dislocations to which it has given rise, has nevertheless diminished the risks and lessened the dangers."

It has, however, of late unfortunately become clear that the agreement is not being scrupulously observed. There can be little doubt that there have been breaches in favour of both sides. I do not propose to attempt to apportion the blame for this. No doubt differing views could be expressed on this point. The main, melancholy, unanswerable fact is that, to all appearance, the agreement is being violated in favour of both parties to the struggle. Arms are being imported. Moreover, it is a matter of common knowledge that the forces of both parties are now being augmented from foreign sources to a degree which has assumed alarming proportions. This can only still further tend to prolong and to extend the conflict. I would like to express the profound disappointment of His Majesty's Government that the agreement has not been more fully observed in the letter and in the spirit, and that as a result it has been impossible for the full results which were hoped for to be achieved.

Efforts to check these tendencies are being made. The Committee has approved a scheme of supervision which might, if it were accepted by the two parties

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to the conflict, help to prevent the entry of arms into Spain by land or sea. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has taken all possible steps, so far as it is concerned, to achieve this object. It has, moreover, now urged most strongly upon its fellow-members of the Non-Intervention Committee the desirability of immediately putting a stop to the entry of foreigners to swell the opposing armies. I am informed that within the last day or two, the members of the Committee, conscious of the seriousness of the situation, have agreed to consult their Governments as to the best method of putting a stop to this practice. I hope that it may be possible for the Council, in any resolution which it may decide to adopt with regard to the question before it, to show itself favourable to the strict enforcement of the non-intervention agreement. In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the maintenance and strict enforcement of this policy must play an essential part in limiting and shortening the war.

Such action by the Council would be valuable. It would aim at preventing the civil war from being extended or prolonged. But, it may be asked, is there no further action which could be taken to bring to an end a state of affairs which is so grave a reflection on civilization? In this connection, the Council may be aware that, during the last few days, conversations have been proceeding between the Governments of France and the United Kingdom with a view to putting an end to the armed conflict in Spain by means of an offer of mediation. The representative of Spain has said that the statement in the *communiqué* which appeared on this subject yesterday with regard to the dangers to European peace involved in the prolongation of the civil war provided a justification for the convocation of the Council. This situation, in the view of

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His Majesty's Government, is also a justification for the initiative to which I have just referred. The conception in the minds of the two Governments has been that certain interested nations should make an approach to the two parties with a view, as a first stage, to the negotiation of an armistice. With this object, the Governments of France and the United Kingdom have approached the Governments of Germany, Italy, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Portugal, and have asked them to take part in this initiative. Answers from all these Governments have not yet been received, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feels that it is entitled to ask the nations concerned for their co-operation in a task which is a task for Europe as a whole. His Majesty's Government is confident that they will realize the very real responsibility which rests on them in this matter. The moment is in many ways propitious. It is difficult to believe that any rapid end to the war is in sight. Its continuance must be disastrous. There can only be injury to the cause of peace and civilization and increased suffering to the people of Spain. His Majesty's Government therefore hopes that the Council of the League may extend its sympathy to the intention underlying this project.

Up till now, my remarks have been concerned mainly with the political aspects of the situation. There is, however, another aspect to which the League cannot and should not remain blind—that of humanity. The events which have characterized the Spanish civil war cannot but have touched the most insensitive heart. The ferocity of the struggle, the suffering caused to innocent women and children, these are facts which we cannot ignore. Is there any action which can be taken internationally to mitigate the

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horrors of which we are the witnesses? Many of the problems are of great urgency. There is the problem of the evacuation of the civil population of Madrid, a great city beleaguered and subjected to all the horrors of war. There is the problem of feeding the population in areas where the sources of supply are being rapidly used up. There are, moreover, other problems affecting both sides. There is the problem of medical supplies for the wounded and sick. There is the problem of the exchange of prisoners. All these are problems with regard to which the civilized world may well feel a moral responsibility. Much has already been done by the International Red Cross, the Save the Children Fund and other organizations. But with the exhaustion which war brings in its train, the need for co-ordinated international effort becomes ever greater. What body is there that could undertake this work? It has seemed, and I submit this to the Council, that it might properly be undertaken, say, by the International Relief Union, the International Red Cross, or some other appropriate body which possesses the necessary attributes of being international and strictly humanitarian in character.

I submit that it would be in accordance with those high principles which inspire the League that this work of pity, by whomsoever it may be undertaken, should receive such encouragement and assistance as the technical services of the League can afford. I suggest that the Council might consider whether the Secretary-General should not be empowered to provide such technical assistance if a due opportunity should arise.

If the Council can express its approval of the strict maintenance of non-intervention in the conflict while that conflict endures, if it can throw the weight of its prestige in the scales on the side of bringing the

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conflict to an end, if it can indicate that it is ready to lead its technical services to encourage an international humanitarian effort to mitigate the sufferings endured by the civilian population, if, finally, it can show itself willing to afford its advice and assistance in the ultimate work of reconstruction, this meeting of the Council will not have been held in vain.

Speech by M. Viénot, the Representative of France

The representative of France will certainly be the last to contest the value of the reasons for which the Spanish Government has found it necessary to draw the Council's attention to the menace to peace which the international situation resulting from the events in Spain involves.

It is already in itself a circumstance of a very serious character, which throws a gloomy light on the present condition of Europe, that an internal dispute should be capable of giving rise to interventions on such a scale as to lead a regularly established Government to denounce them before the Council as acts amounting to real aggression. But the position of Spain is not the only consideration in this matter. The turn which events have taken in Spain during the last four months, their extension to the international sphere, have created a danger to peace from which no Power is safe and from which the French Government was one of the first to attempt to preserve the European community.

Its anxieties in this connection were responsible for the proposal which it made at the beginning of August last to all the European States to assume a joint undertaking of non-intervention. It was these same anxieties which led the French Government, only a few days ago to address an invitation to the

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Powers specially interested in the developments in Spain to join with the United Kingdom and France in re-affirming their resolve not to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the Spanish civil war, in extending to other matters the undertakings already assumed, in providing for the scrupulous observance of existing commitments by strict supervision and, lastly, in endeavouring to ascertain the conditions under which the Powers might act jointly with a view to putting an end to the civil war and the dangers of complications which will continue until it is brought to a conclusion.

Under these circumstances, I need not say that the French Government will give its closest attention and its warmest sympathy to any suggestion which may be made for action by the Council in the matter.

In the meanwhile, I should like to supplement the United Kingdom representative's account of what has been done, and is being done, by indicating what steps we, from our point of view, consider it possible to take. After laborious negotiations, the European Governments agreed, in August last, to assert the principle of non-intervention, and to refrain accordingly from exporting arms or war-material destined for Spanish territory. A committee has been set up in London to follow the execution of these undertakings and to settle any questions that may arise in this connection. I am grateful to the Spanish representative for the tribute he was good enough to pay to the motives of those who were responsible for this international action, as also for his reminder of the Spanish Government's acceptance from the first of the principle of non-intervention, in spite of legal and moral difficulties the full force of which I fully appreciate. Moreover, the principle of non-intervention, which is in consonance with the whole

liberal tradition of the nineteenth century, finds its fullest embodiment in the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10 of which imposes on Members of the League an undertaking to respect the political independence of States, and denies each one of them the right to assert that it will only tolerate in the territory of its neighbours the system of which it approves.

I am well aware that, in spite of the efforts of the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, the enforcements of this principle by international agreement has been slow and that, since then, various incidents have seriously hampered its application on many occasions. But we are still convinced, as M. Blum recently told the French Chamber—and I am grateful to the United Kingdom representative for his reference to and endorsement of the French Premier's words—that our initiative has been a powerful contribution to the cause of peace.

Nevertheless, the moment has come to go further. The London Committee, as has just been stated, has evolved a complete scheme for the organization of supervision, which should make it possible to detect any arrival of war-material in Spanish territory in any quantity. The plan has been communicated by the United Kingdom Government to the regularly established Government of Spain, and to the authorities which are at present in *de facto* control of certain portions of Spanish territory. We are awaiting their replies. It is evident that if they are in the affirmative and are received quickly a step, a considerable step, will have been taken in the direction of eliminating those foreign interventions which give the present situation its serious character.

But that is not all. The question of volunteers has, in the last few weeks, become a really serious

matter. For a long time, the arrivals of volunteers in Spain were individual and intermittent; and many Governments were not, accordingly, in a position to interfere in order to restrict such activities on the part of individuals among their nationals. That is no longer the position. Large formations—and, it may be, even organized units—are now appearing in the war area; and there is reason to fear that the devastated territory of Spain may shortly become a meeting place for soldiers from all over Europe. Under these circumstances, the French Government welcomed the recent proposal of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the London Committee should take up the question of volunteers, which had already been raised by other Governments, and should press for the acceptance of the same undertakings in this connection as in the case of war-material, and their enforcement by means of effective supervision.

The question has not yet been settled. I do not doubt that, if the recent Franco-British initiative is favourably received by the Governments which have been approached in the matter, it will become possible to reach a solution shortly.

I pass next to the suggestions which the French Government desires to make to the Council in conjunction with those just put forward by the United Kingdom representative.

As we see the position, the way to prevent an aggravation of the international crisis to which developments in Spain have given rise is to implement the full effects of the principle of non-intervention, and to ensure its enforcement by strict supervision. The Franco-British *communiqué* of yesterday reasserts the principle of non-intervention.

I believe that, if the Council for its part, were

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prepared to adopt these same principles, it would be supporting very materially an endeavour in which we see the best means of putting an end to the dangers to which our attention has been drawn by the Spanish Government.

But the recent Franco-British proposal does not stop there. In addition to preventive action, it contemplates positive action, at the earliest possible moment, with a view to hastening the conclusion on Spanish territory itself of the civil war with all the appalling devastation it occasions, to which Lord Cranborne has just referred.

The question is a delicate one, as M. Alvarez del Vayo himself has clearly shown us by his reference to the increasing difficulty of drawing a dividing line between the internal and international aspects of a nation's life. But does not the very extent of this difficulty justify the Powers most closely concerned in searching for ways and means of making their services available with a view to ending the civil war? I do not think that the Council would be failing to show that discretion which is still necessary in the present position of the exchanges of views that are proceeding between States, if it were to express its sympathy with the efforts that are being made.

We for our part believe that, in the difficult circumstances in which appeal is being made to the Council, the League would thus be offering a notable contribution to the maintenance of peace, and would be acting entirely in accordance with the duties incumbent on it.

Speech by Mr. Jordan, the Representative of New Zealand

I am grateful for the opportunity to be here; I am happy in the knowledge that there is this Council

which can meet together in the spirit of the divine injunction: "Come let us reason together." We only wish that all the nations of the world were represented here to discuss this important and unfortunate matter.

It is not for me to express an opinion on the position, because that would be difficult without a full knowledge of the facts; the most I can do is to recall the position of Spain as we see it, and the relationship of the League to the situation.

First, I submit that this is the business of the League, according to the pledge we have undertaken. We find on page 81 of the booklet entitled "Essential Facts about the League of Nations," the following:

Maintenance of Peace (Article XI)

The purpose of Article XI is to ensure the maintenance of peace. It does not relate directly to the settlement of international disputes, but aims at removing or alleviating emergencies which threaten peace between nations. In order to achieve this result, it will often be necessary for the organs of the League of Nations to deal with the dispute which leads to the emergency, to find a solution for this dispute or to point the way to a solution.

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. . . .

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which

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threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

In an earlier passage it is stated that "the Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." It is clear, therefore, that we can be satisfied that this is our business. We ask, then, whether it is possible to have further particulars of the cause of the trouble, in order to see whether the action taken by the rebels is justified if, indeed, such action can be justified.

I ask myself, as a Member of the Council, whether the cause of the trouble which we have power to consider is such as to merit the attention of the Council; I ask what was the cause of the revolt. We find that reference is made to "dissatisfaction with the Government and its action"—the Government that was elected on February 16th last. I venture to remark that if a nation constitutionally elects a Government, that Government must surely be acceptable to the nation, more especially if it allows of means for its own removal.

Was it the outcome of that election that gave rise to the trouble? Was the result unsatisfactory to the minority; did the discontent arise spontaneously in that minority, or was it inspired by other influences?

These are questions which I ask myself as a member of the Council. We have been appealed to by a Member of the League, by a Member of the Council—a part of its very organization.

I said that it would be advantageous if we had further particulars of the trouble, because we are appealed to by the representative of Spain to make an examination of the situation. In addition to the statements made

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this morning by the representative of that country, I have gone through—as I am sure you have, Mr. President—the statements that were made on behalf of Spain at the meeting of the Assembly a short while ago, and I find the following.

We must first of all say this, and we say it with emphasis: that the cause for which the Spanish Government stands, the cause of which it is the symbol, is the cause of peace. . . . No country, however contrary its political régime may be to ours, need fear that the Spain which we represent will ever attempt to interfere in its internal affairs.

. . . The Government that presides over the destinies of the Spanish people has the highest moral authority, which issued directly from the will of the nation. The Government came into power as the result of the elections of February 16th, elections that were directed against us, but which we won, thanks to the overwhelming force of public opinion. Behind this Government, composed of the representatives of the Popular Front, there is to-day, opposing the negative and subversive forces in the State, every positive element in the Nation, from the vigorous Catholic element of the Basques to the most radical workers' organizations. And this Government, as its ministerial declaration has proclaimed, makes the policy of peace, based upon and guaranteed by a system of collective security, the rule and axis of its international policy. . . .

If peace is to subsist, it is imperative to put an end to a situation wherein civilian or military elements which endeavour to subvert their lawful Government by armed force should be able to

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receive, amidst world-wide indifference, moral and material aid from foreign Governments whose political ideology coincides with their own. . . .

Who among you could fail to recognize that we cannot allow ourselves to be placed on the same footing as those who, breaking their solemn oath to the Republic, have risen in arms to destroy the constitutional liberty of our country?

Who, among the statesmen present in this Assembly, could accept the right of generals, who have taken their oath to the Constitution, to attempt to overthrow that Constitution by bringing into the country thousands of foreign troops from another continent?

That is the situation presented to us by Spain, which now asks that we make an examination of it. What could be more fair?

I read again from page 81 of the booklet mentioned above: "The purpose of Article XI is to ensure the maintenance of peace." We have before us a country which is declaring that its purpose is the maintenance of the very thing that we have found ourselves to preserve. I repeat, Mr. President, that it is good to live in an age when you, from your far distant country, and I, from my far distant country, can meet with the representatives of near-by countries, having bound ourselves together in solemn pledge to maintain the peace of the world. Would that all nations were here to reason together on this subject.

On November 27th, after alleging the recognition of the rebels by certain Powers, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs wired as follows: "I therefore request Your Excellency in the supreme interest of peace and in virtue of Article XI of the Covenant to take the necessary steps to enable the Council to

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proceed, at the earliest possible moment, to an examination of the situation outlined above."

We are asked as Council to examine the situation. I wonder what will happen? Speaking for myself and the country I represent, I would say that we are most willing to stand with our fellow Members of the Council, and with the Members of the Assembly, in going thoroughly into the whole situation, and in acting in the interests of humanity and constitutional government. We are prepared to examine the cause of the trouble, and if necessary to act in accordance with the requirements of the situation. I say again that, although the statements before us are *ex-parte* statements, we must take notice of them. If there is another side of the problem, if there is some justification for the revolt, if there is some justification for intervention by other peoples, let it be stated to this body. Will those who have caused the revolt come forward and state their grievances, and I believe that my fellow Members of the Council, the public here assembled, and indeed the whole world, would listen attentively to any claim put forward for such justification. If, therefore, there is another side, can we not invite those representing it to come forward so that we may more fully determine what should be done? As the Spanish Government's request is that there should be an examination of the situation, I feel, as a Member of the Council, that it is our duty to hold the fullest investigation with the greatest possible speed. Having satisfied ourselves on the matter, we should then do our best to bring about a settlement in the interests of humanity, of constitutional government, and in accordance with the policy of the League, to which policy our respective Governments have pledged themselves.

Speech of M. Potemkine, the Representative of the U.S.S.R.

International public opinion has viewed in various ways the appeal of the Government of the Spanish Republic to the Council of the League. Different opinions have been expressed as to the utility and efficacy of such an appeal. It is not for us to express an opinion on the matter. The Spanish Republic, as a Member of the League of Nations, is exercising an undoubted right. Furthermore, it feels in duty bound to make this appeal, because the case it is referring to the Council is not only a clear case of aggression but also a direct threat to international peace.

The facts set forth in the authoritative and most dignified speech of the representative of the Spanish Republic are very grave. There is no doubt as to their truth. External aid has been afforded to the rebels who rose against the legal Government, freely and regularly elected by the whole nation, a Government vowed to the cause of democracy. Certain foreign Powers have openly intervened in the interests of the rebels. Those who intervened have become their accomplices, while still maintaining official diplomatic relations with the Government of the Spanish Republic. Only when the rebels, thanks to foreign support, were in a position to extend their military operations, were those relations broken off and the leader of the revolt hastily recognized as Head of the State. While, hitherto, the rebels have been supplied with war material, aeroplanes and experts, they will now be assisted by whole formations from abroad. It is even to be feared, from some of the threats uttered by the leader of the Seditious movement, that the naval forces of his protectors will not refuse to assist him to organize a blockade of the

ports held by the Government. Naturally, this form of intervention constitutes a particular danger to the peace of the world, for it may lead to the most disastrous international complications.

If the Council were faced simply with a case of aggression against the Spanish Republic, a Member of the League of Nations, its imperative duty would be to take prompt and effective action under the Covenant. But as the representative of the Spanish Republic rightly told us—and he has produced full proof—the peace of the world is jeopardized. Hence the Council has a far heavier responsibility. Since the matter has been referred to the Council, it must adopt a clear and definite attitude and must leave no stone unturned to put an end to the aggression and to preserve the commonwealth of nations from a terrible catastrophe.

Some Powers are making a further effort to remedy a situation which becomes more disquieting every day; I feel it my duty, therefore, to tell you in a few words how my Government views this problem.

Everyone is aware of the attitude of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics towards the Spanish question. My Government has never regarded aid to the legal Government of the Spanish Republic against the rebels as interference in the internal affairs of the country, or as a breach of the Covenant of the League of Nations. We have always regarded the prohibition of the sale of arms to a legal Government which is the victim of an aggression—particularly when these arms are supplied in virtue of contracts previously concluded—as an arbitrary and unfair measure, a measure contrary to international law.

Nevertheless, bearing in mind certain exceptional circumstances and being anxious to do its utmost

to safeguard peace, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics felt bound to accede to the international agreement concerning non-intervention; and it has faithfully fulfilled its undertakings. The fact that the Government of the Soviet Union deliberately agreed to reinforce and extend these undertakings is an indisputable proof of this. Thus, on December 4th, the delegate of the Soviet Union was instructed to propose to the London Committee that non-intervention should be extended to the despatch of volunteers to Spain. It is, of course, understood, however, that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will only agree to measures of this kind provided they are strictly executed by all parties who have assumed the same undertakings. That is why it is thought necessary to introduce strict and effective supervision over their application.

In this connection, the delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics urged in the London Committee that the persons responsible for supervision should have the widest powers. The Government of the Soviet Union still maintains the same firm attitude as regards the need for effective supervision.

To strengthen the system of control and to ensure that it is completely effective may bring nearer the end of the rising in Spain. When the Government has restored order, it will no longer be possible for foreign Powers to intervene in the internal affairs of Spain, and the danger of international complications will be averted. If this hope were disappointed, it would be for the Council to seek other and more effective means of preventing a general conflagration.

As to the joint action by the United Kingdom and France with a view to terminating the hostilities in Spain as soon as possible, the Government of the

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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to agree in principle to such action and, for this purpose, to consult with the Governments of the other countries as to its form.

Without anticipating the results of this endeavour, we must try this and any other means to put an end to the aggression which is causing such terrible suffering to the Spanish people and gravely jeopardizing the whole international community.

The Council of the League of Nations, which must do everything to safeguard world peace, should devote consideration to the Franco-British initiative and should do its utmost to support this initiative with the full force of its moral authority.

Speech by M. Komarnicki, representative of Poland.

The Polish Government, and with it the whole Polish nation, feel deep sympathy for the Spanish people and deplore the tragic events which are occurring on Spanish territory. Consequently, Poland would welcome with relief and joy any action that might put an end to a struggle that is causing so much suffering to the Spanish nation.

The Polish Government and also, I believe, several other Governments were not of the opinion, however, that the convocation of the Council of the League of Nations would relieve the tension in Spain and mitigate the sufferings of the Spanish people. Did not M. Alvarez del Vayo say this morning: "We are not asking the Council to do anything to assist the Spanish people to solve their own problems?"

In these circumstances, the rôle of the Council is limited to an exchange of views, somewhat inadequate moreover, which can do nothing tangible to pacify men's minds. Is not the Council of the League of

Nations, together with the whole of the Geneva organization, in danger of embarking on a question which can only lead to further disappointment, so damaging to the prestige of the League of Nations and perhaps even to the cause of international peace?

We are afraid that this method of procedure cannot but compromise still further the very slender possibilities of an agreement which exist at the moment. The Polish Government's doubt as to the advisability of convening the Council cannot but be confirmed by the fact that, on the very eve of our meeting, new steps was taken by two Governments. In appealing to the four Powers whom they regarded as most directly interested in the internal conflict in Spain, these two Powers have created a *de facto* situation in which it is difficult for the Council to discuss the Spanish problem.

Seeing that no precise request is before the Council and that the prolongation of the discussion cannot but be prejudicial, not only from the point of view of the internal situation in Spain but also from the point of view of the general international situation, I think it would be wiser to close our discussion on this matter.

If the Council felt it should concern itself with questions of an international aspect connected with the Spanish problem, it would undoubtedly do so spontaneously without any pressure from outside, solely with a view to preserving peace, and quite apart from ideological considerations. I am glad to see that the same opinion were expressed in other speeches to-day, particularly in the speech we have just heard from the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Cranborne.

In conclusion, I should like to say, on behalf of my Government, that it intends to co-operate, as far

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as it is able, in any steps calculated to circumscribe the conflict and diminish its intensity, if not to put an end to it at the earliest possible moment.

The attitude adopted by our delegate in the London Committee and the steps my Government is about to take to strengthen the means of control, in so far as it is able, prove unequivocally that the Polish Government is sparing no effort to further the action which led to the non-intervention agreement, an agreement we owe to the fortunate initiative of the French Government. Consequently the Polish Government will give a most favourable reception to any humanitarian proposal as well as to the proposal for the participation of the technical organs of the League of Nations in the attempts to alleviate the unfortunate situation of the civilian population.

No other Member of the Council spoke.

Resolution of the Council

In the session of December 12th, 1936, the President spoke as follows :

During an exchange of views between Members of the Council this morning a draft resolution was drawn up. I now place this draft before the Council:

The Council.

After hearing the observations made before it;

I

Noting that it has been requested to examine a situation which, in the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant, is such as to affect international relations and to threaten to disturb international

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peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends;

Considering that that good understanding ought to be maintained irrespective of the internal régimes of States;

Bearing in mind that it is the duty of every State to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States, a duty which, for Members of the League of Nations, has been recognized in the Covenant:

Affirms that every State is under an obligation to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of another State;

II

Considering that the setting-up of a Committee of non-intervention and the undertakings entered into in that connection arise out of the principles stated above;

Having been informed that new attempts are being made in the Committee to make its action more effective, in particular by instituting measures of supervision, the necessity for which is becoming increasingly urgent:

Recommends the Members of the League represented on the London Committee to spare no pains to render the non-intervention undertakings as stringent as possible, and to take appropriate measures to ensure forthwith that the fulfilment of the said undertakings is effectively supervised;

III

Views with sympathy the action which has just been taken on the international plane by the United Kingdom and France with a view to avoiding the dangers which the prolongation of the

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present state of affairs in Spain is causing to peace and to good understanding between nations;

IV

Notes that there are problems of a humanitarian character in connection with the present situation, in regard to which co-ordinated action of an international and humanitarian character is desirable as soon as possible;

Recognizes, further, that, for the reconstruction which Spain may have to undertake, international assistance may also be desirable;

And authorizes the Secretary-General to make available the assistance of the technical services of the League of Nations should a suitable opportunity occur.

The Spanish Government Reserves the Right to Bring the Question again Before the League

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO.—This morning I agreed to the present working of the last paragraph of the resolution. I was the more ready to do so in that the exchange of views between the Members of the Council showed clearly that, in accordance with the Council's invariable practice in the matter of technical co-operation, international action on Spanish territory could only be undertaken at the request of the Spanish Government.

In conclusion, I should like to add that, as the step taken by the Council does not exhaust the question that has been raised, the Spanish Government reserves the right, should circumstances render it necessary, to ask the Council to proceed with the examination of the question.

Manoeuvring of the Representative of Chile, Señor Edwards

The Council will, I hope, allow me for a moment to divest myself of my presidential functions in order to say a few words in my capacity as the representative of Chile.

The sanguinary civil war now raging in Spain, which is responsible for the summoning of this extraordinary session of the Council, is a source of deep sorrow to the people and Government of Chile. We earnestly desire to see an end to this conflict at the earliest possible moment, so that peace and prosperity may return to a country with which we feel ourselves bound by the closest links of friendship and by an affectionate regard, the origins of which date back to the most remote periods of history.

I need not therefore say that my country noted with the utmost satisfaction, and will follow with the liveliest interest, the high-minded initiative taken by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom to arrive at an agreement for mediation whereby an end may be put to the Spanish tragedy. I have received personal instructions, not only from my Government but also from the President of the Republic, M. Arturo Alessandri, to inform the Council that Chile wholeheartedly supports this initiative, thanks the Governments of France and the United Kingdom for the line they have taken and earnestly desires to see their efforts crowned with the fullest success. If the proposed mediation were to result in the restoration of internal peace in Spain—which seems to us possible, with a Government that can count on the freely expressed wishes and support of the majority of the Spanish people—and the elimination of all danger to the peace of Europe, my country and, in fact, the whole Chilean people, which

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is proud of its Spanish blood and which speaks the Spanish language, will feel that France and the United Kingdom, by the service they will have rendered to Europe and to the whole world, will have well deserved the gratitude of Chile.

We have also followed with the utmost sympathy and the keenest interest the policy of non-intervention and the work of the London Committee with a view to preventing this unhappy internal struggle from giving rise to more extensive complications; and my Government hopes and desires that the Committee will be able to render its action increasingly effective.

The United Kingdom representative touched yesterday on another aspect of the Spanish civil war, on which my Government's attitude is identical with his own—namely, the problem of humanizing the conflict. My Government, which is in complete agreement with everything that was said yesterday by the United Kingdom representative, desires me to draw the Council's attention to a particular feature of the work of relief which is not without international bearings. From the outset of the conflict and as hostilities developed, the Chilean Ambassador, called by special circumstances to act as doyen of the diplomatic corps, has been concerned, with the close and enthusiastic collaboration of his diplomatic colleagues and in consonance with the policy of the Chilean Government, to leave no stone unturned to humanise this tragic and irremediable struggle with all the attendant horrors of modern war, and to save the civilian population of Madrid from appalling sufferings.

With the same object in view, my Government recently approached the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva and supported the high-minded action of M. Motta in urging the Red Cross to continue

its humanitarian efforts, which cannot but meet with general approval.

I am anxious, in this connection, to express my Government's great appreciation of the magnificent work done by the International Red Cross Committee, for which the civilized world is assuredly grateful.

In his capacity as doyen of the diplomatic corps at Madrid, and as the representative of Chile, our Ambassador has done all he could to lessen the suffering of so many unhappy persons, the innocent victims of political and social passions. With this object, in the exercise of powers which have always been recognized in international law and international practice, he has given refuge to a large number of non-combatants who have sought the protection of the Chilean flag. There are at present something like one thousand men, women and children to whom he has extended the right of asylum. Very many persons have also found asylum in other embassies and legations at Madrid. As Madrid is no longer, for the moment, the seat of the Government, and the city and neighbourhood are the scene of appalling battles, it is easy to imagine the suffering of these unfortunate people and the dangers to which they are at present exposed. Compelled to remain shut up in narrow quarters, without shelter, without heating and almost without food, their situation has become impossible.

In view of these truly exceptional circumstances and the urgent need for relief of all these unhappy persons, my Government has considered it to be its duty to draw the Council's attention to a situation which ought not to continue. All persons who have been granted the right of asylum must be evacuated from Madrid.

But it is not possible for our Ambassador and his staff to leave the battlefield to which Madrid is now reduced without fulfilling the sacred duty of protecting

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those who have found refuge in what, by a fiction of international law, may be described as "Chilian territory." This it is which prevents our Ambassador from following the example of the Government and withdrawing from the battlefield of Madrid to the new seat of Government. He cannot take such a step without having received a guarantee from the responsible authorities that the right of asylum will be scrupulously respected—that is to say, that the persons concerned will be given the assurance that they will be able to leave Spain without interference from any quarter.

In the case of men capable of bearing arms, I understand the difficulty which the Spanish authorities feel in letting them leave without an assurance that they will not go to swell the ranks of the Spanish Government's adversaries. It should, it seems to me, be easy for the diplomatic corps at Madrid to obtain an assurance of this kind.

If the evacuation of all these refugees is to have any chance of success, my Government considers that it should be placed in the hands of some neutral organization which is beyond suspicion. My Government believes that there is no organization better qualified to undertake this humanitarian work than the International Red Cross Committee, the headquarters of which are in Geneva. The moral authority of the Committee would be immensely strengthened if it could command for the purpose the technical assistance of the League of Nations.

In the light of all these considerations I have the honour, in my capacity as the representative of Chile, to draw the Council's attention to the situation. My Government's only object is to save from cruel suffering individuals entitled to our protection, who are not responsible for current developments in Spain, the

sad results of which we all deplore and should like to see ended as soon as possible.

I commend the position I have described to the consideration of my colleagues and, in particular, to my distinguished friend, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I have had occasion during the last few days to exchange views of a very cordial character, which have given me the assurance that the problem will find a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

I do not consider it necessary to submit a draft resolution on the subject, as I think the situation with which my Government is concerned can be dealt with under the resolution at present before the Council.

Speech by Señor Costa du Rels, the Representative of Bolivia

The President, speaking as the representative of Chile, was good enough, in his interesting remarks, to discuss a humanitarian question which is of the greatest importance to the representatives of the Spanish-American nations on the Council. There exists a right, an American right perpetuated by age-long tradition and confirmed by the Conventions of Montevideo and Havana; I refer to the right of asylum. We do not question this right in the case of civil war; it proceeds from the concept of honour handed on to us, with so many other virtues, by Spain. When we throw open our doors to any who claim shelter, we ask no questions about their political ideas, their religion, or the motives that led them to seek refuge under our roof and ask for our protection.

I am sure that the representative of Spain, whom I saw at work in the Chaco affair, when he displayed deep devotion to the cause of peace, and for whom my country has such admiration, will appreciate

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the various aspects of a principle which sums up the virtues of our race. I am sure he will be willing to consider means of solving this problem to which all the countries of Latin America—perhaps I should say of Spanish America—attach so much importance.

That is the spirit in which, on behalf of the Bolivian Government, I warmly support the humanitarian considerations put before us by the President of the Council.

Señor Alvarez del Vayo

I have listened with great interest to the observations of the representatives of Chile and Bolivia, and I thank the latter for his friendly remarks in regard to myself.

The Spanish Government has defined its position, as regards persons benefiting by the right of asylum in the Embassies, in a note I had the honour to address some weeks ago to the members of the diplomatic corps in Madrid. There is no need for me to say that, in accordance with the attitude adopted in this note, I am quite prepared to examine the problem direct with each of the Governments concerned, bearing in mind all its aspects.

THE PRESIDENT.—It only remains for me briefly to thank the representative of Spain for the declaration he has just made to the Council.

The resolution was adopted unanimously.

How Agreement was Reached on the Text of the Council's Resolution

Commenting on the resolution adopted by the Council, the Manchester Guardian correspondent in Geneva wrote as follows (December 14th, 1936):

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The text of the resolution was agreed on at a secret meeting of the Council yesterday morning after a long discussion. Señor Edwards (Chile) objected to any reference to Article 10 of the Covenant in the first paragraph of the resolution. He even went so far as to say that he would not vote for the resolution if the article were mentioned. Finally it was agreed as a compromise not to mention the article but to quote part of it. The quotation, however, was not exact.

There was also a considerable discussion of that part of the resolution dealing with international assistance. Lord Cranborne and Señor Edwards, supported to some extent by Señor Costa du Relf (Bolivia), wished to give this paragraph a character described by one member of the Council at the secret meeting as "aggressive benevolence." Señor del Vayo insisted that there must be no international action in Spain except at the request of the Spanish Government, and finally the Council agreed to his point of view.

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It is the general opinion in League quarters that, although the result of the Spanish appeal to the League is not brilliant, it might have been much worse. On the whole, the Spanish Government is understood to be satisfied with it. Everybody remarked yesterday the change of tone on the Council in regard to the representative of Spain, who was treated with much more courtesy and consideration than in September. Cynical people attributed this to the change in the military situation.

"The Dignity and Restraint" of the Spanish Representative

The Times correspondent wrote that same day :

The resolution is generally recognized to be the most that could be expected by the Spanish Government in the circumstances. That it went to the length of laying down the principle of non-interference was due to the tenacious insistence of the Spanish Foreign Minister in the face of a very considerable opposition, notably on the part of Poland. While the resolution does not commit the Council to any immediate action, it advocates non-intervention with strict control (which the Spanish Government regard as unfairly discriminatory towards themselves) and gives its approval to the Anglo-French project for mediation (though carefully avoiding the word) at the moment when the bare possibilities of this seem to be receding. In its general tone it is considered to come down, though very lightly, on the side of the Spanish Government, but its main value is that it upholds the principles of the Covenant, supports non-intervention as a principle, and leaves the door open for further steps in both directions should the occasion be more propitious.

The dignity and restraint with which Señor del Vayo presented the Spanish case were greatly appreciated.

"Important Successes for the Spanish Government"

Vernon Bartlett in the News Chronicle of December 14th, 1936, wrote the following interesting commentary :

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The resolution on Spain which was unanimously adopted last night by the League Council conceals some bitter argument which went on behind the scenes and reveals important successes for the Spanish Government.

Of the latter perhaps the most vital is the fact that the League States are now so closely associated with the maintenance of "the territorial integrity and political independence" of Spain, that it will be much more difficult for the British and French to undertake one of those disconcerting attempts at conciliation of which the Hoare-Level plan is so memorable an example.

The resolution as voted emphasizes the obligation of every State "to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of another State," the increasing urgency of more effective supervision of non-intervention, and the need for international co-ordination in humanitarian and reconstruction work.

There is no specific reference to "mediation," to which the Spanish Government is opposed because, frankly, there is no possibility of compromise in Spain for the moment.

Behind the reference to humanitarian work is an interesting example of that profound British conviction that the best way of avoiding a future war is to make friends as soon as possible and at all costs with the successful aggressor in the last war.

There exists an organization called the International Relief Union, which has no experience and a total budget of £350 a year.

The British delegation wants this organization, which is practically an Italian concern and has an Italian director, to undertake relief work rather than

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the technical organizations of the League, which have in the past repatriated half a million prisoners of war, have organized public health services in China and other countries and fought epidemics all over the world.

The reason is apparently that Germany and Italy do not love the League and therefore the League must be pushed into the background.

No specific reference to the International Relief Union appears in yesterday's resolution, but I am convinced that the Spanish Government, when the time comes, will accept League help or none.

The British Government may therefore have the wisdom to remember that its policy is supposed to be based on the League.

But apart from such timidities, the discussions of the last three days have been very valuable inasmuch as they constitute a reaffirmation by all the State members of the League of the rights of the Spanish Government.

Few people had expected so satisfactory a result from discussions on such a dangerous subject.

Telegram from the Spanish Government to the League of Nations Denouncing German Intervention

On January 6th, 1937, Señor Alvarez del Vayo sent the following telegram to the Secretary-General of the League :

I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following. On December 23rd last, the German steamer *Palos*, part of whose cargo contained war-material, was arrested in waters under Spanish jurisdiction. The said war-material was attached by the Spanish authorities and the ship was

then allowed to continue her voyage with all the rest of the cargo, among which were foodstuffs for the rebels, and with the crew, except one Spanish citizen with no papers who was on board. The fact that the arrest of the *Palos* took place within waters under Spanish jurisdiction is evidence that the procedure followed was perfectly legitimate. The Spanish authorities were merely exercising the right of examination within territorial waters, which derives from the right of police and is inherent in every sovereign State. Under the pretext of reprisals for the arrest of the *Palos*, the German fleet has committed acts of direct aggression against Spanish vessels trading between different ports in the Peninsula controlled by the Government. After the seizure of the Spanish ship *Soton*, her second officer was taken on board the *Koenigsberg*, where he was obliged to sign the following declaration: "I have been informed that s.s. *Soton*, commanded by Captain Pedro Lopez, has been captured by the cruiser *Koenigsberg* by way of reprisal for the unlawful detention of part of the cargo and one of the passengers of s.s. *Palos*, captured on December 23rd last. I have been informed that I am to obey the orders of the cruiser *Koenigsberg* and navigate on the course prescribed. I promise for myself and the other officers to carry out strictly the orders given and transmit them to the captain." An order was given to him indicating the form of departure and the course to be followed. On the same day, the trans-Mediterranean ship *Aragon* was captured by the German battleship *Admiral Scheer*, while carrying 1,200 tons of cargo, when leaving the port of Almeria. On January 3rd, the *Koenigsberg* arrested the ship *Marta Junquera* with 600 tons of cargo, bound from Bilbao to Santander and Gijon. It was on the same day that the first telegram was received from the

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German naval command to the Government of the Republic, in the following terms:

The German Admiral in Spanish waters is prepared, after the surrender of the passenger and the rest of the crew attached on board the German steamer *Palos*, to surrender the arrested steamer *Aragon* and to suspend further reprisals. He awaits a reply by radio-telegram to the *Koenigsberg*.

This evening, January 5th, a further radiogram has been received, signed this time, in the following terms:

Following communicated to Valencia Government: The two vessels, *Aragon* and *Marta Junquera*, having been seized by the German naval forces, it is again required that the passenger and the rest of the cargo of the *Palos* be surrendered in return for the release of the two Spanish ships seized. If within the three days ending January 8th at 8 a.m. such surrender does not take place, the seized vessels and their cargoes will, after the relevant settlement of accounts, be handed over and used in agreement with the Spanish Government recognized by us. Should any fresh act of piracy be committed against German ships, the Government of the Reich will be obliged to take further steps.—VON FISCHER, *Rear Admiral*.

The Government of the Republic cannot admit that the exercise of police rights in Spanish territorial waters over German merchant ships trading with the rebels is any justification for firing upon Spanish merchant ships, as in the case of the *Soton*, or capturing them, as in the cases of the *Aragon* and the

Marta Junquera. Furthermore, the Government of the Republic cannot reply to the injunctions of a German Admiral, who calls himself the German Admiral in Spanish waters, without surrendering its rights in their entirety, nor can it bargain with its sovereignty. The aggressive activity of the German fleet is the latest form of the German Government's systematic breach of the Non-Intervention Agreement, in a series of violations beginning with the supply of war material and technicians to the rebels and continuing with the despatch of German military contingents disguised as volunteers, interfering with the freedom of trade.

In the communication I have had the honour to make on behalf of the Government of the Republic to the United Kingdom Government, which had acted as spokesman of the London Non-Intervention Committee to the Government of the Republic in connection with the new plan of control accepted in principle by the Spanish Government in the spirit of international collaboration which inspires all its policy, I draw attention to the fact that this action on the part of the navy is capable of leading to the gravest complications. If the Spanish navy or air force happened to be on the spot when such incidents occurred, they would be obliged to take defensive action so as to prevent the German navy's interference. Should such an eventuality occur, the whole object of the policy of non-intervention, in so far as it aims at localizing the conflict, and as emphasized by the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council at its extraordinary session in December, would be seriously compromised. Generally speaking, the whole cause of European peace is placed in imminent danger by the coincidence between such aggressions and the constant despatch of volunteers by countries which

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manifestly seek to repeat the game of placing other nations in the face of accomplished facts and are sending as many thousands of men as they consider necessary, as they have already done in the case of war-material, hoping to sign a general agreement once their objectives have been attained. This is clearly the purpose of certain delays.

In my speech to the Council on December 11th, I spoke of "the international war on Spanish soil." I should now add: "and on the Spanish seas." The Spanish Government's anxiety which led it to ask for the extraordinary session of the Council owing to the insecurity of peace was fully justified. Subsequent events have unfortunately proved it doubly right.

Requesting you to circulate the present communication to all the States Members of the League, I have the honour to be, etc.—JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO, *Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain.*

Telegram from the Spanish Government to the League of Nations Denouncing Italian Intervention in Spain

On May 13th, 1937, Señor Alvarez del Vayo sent the following telegram to the Secretary of the League :

The statements of the Italian officers and men taken prisoner during the last few days in the Guadalajara sector confirm beyond possibility of denial the presence of regular military units of the Italian army sent to fight on Spanish soil in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 10 of the Covenant, whereby "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." From

these statements made in the presence of the Spanish authorities, it appears that on February 6th and following days numbers of Italian regular troops, equipped, armed and supplied, landed at Cadiz from the Italian steamer, *Sicilia* and other ships. They were concentrated in the Port of Santa Maria and subsequently conveyed to the Guadalajara front to take part in the present offensive. This is being conducted by four regular divisions of the Italian army—the first, second and third divisions of Black-shirts, the last being commanded by General Nuvolini, whose headquarters are at Brihuega and the first Littoria division, commanded by General Bergonzoli, with headquarters at Almadrones. The commander-in-chief of this army corps is General Mangini, whose headquarters are at Algora. The attacking forces are completed by two special brigades, one of German and Italian regular troops, and the other of German regular troops and four motorized companies of “carabinieri.” Each division has two regiments of three battalions of 650 men, composed of four companies—three of rifles and automatic rifles, and one of Fiat machine-guns. Each regiment has one platoon of 45-mm. mortars and one battery of 65.17-mm. guns, one platoon of 75.27-mm. and one of 100.17-mm., each consisting of three batteries having four pieces, the first on lorries and the other on tractors, an anti-aircraft battery of 20-mm. firing 260 shots a minute, a battalion of fifty mixed tanks, some armed with eight Fiat machine-guns and anti-tank machine-guns, others having in addition 47-mm. guns, one gas and flame-projector company with six platoons of the former and two of the latter, and lastly bridge-train, sappers, artificers, hospital orderlies, supply corps and wireless telegraphists. All the divisions are motorized. Each battalion has seventy lorries

and the division has also a reserve park. The battalions in action include Nos. 500, 624, 824, 835 and 840. The air force consists of three German flights and four Italian fighter flights and one bomber flight. The machines are of the Fiat, Savoia and Romeo types. Two more Italian divisions are to come. Headquarters plans to take Madrid while the Italian and German squadrons, under pretext of guarding the coast, attack Barcelona and Valencia. The above is a summary of the statements made by Antonio Luciano, major on the active list of the Italian regular army, commanding the machine-guns of the first Littoria division; Achille Sacchi, lieutenant on the active list of the Italian regular army, of the third Blackshirt division; Giuseppe Moretti, of the first company of battalion 835; Andrea Cappone, of the mortar platoon of battalion 835; Francesco Lodo, rifleman of battalion 835; Giovanni Marotto, of battalion 835; Giuseppe Rossotto, of the second company of battalion 624, etc. These facts, besides constituting an attack upon the "territorial integrity and political independence" of Spain, reproduce under aggravated circumstances the situations incompatible with international law created in recent times by the totalitarian States and amount to a resort to war without previous declaration, a dangerous proceeding denounced by the representative of Spain in the September Assembly. The Government of the Republic, being of opinion that ever since the foundation of the League of Nations there has been on the continent of Europe no more scandalous violation of the obligations imposed by the Covenant, and in the same spirit of loyalty to the great institution to which it belongs that led it in December to ask for the extraordinary meeting of the Council to denounce a situation "affecting international relations which threatens to disturb

international peace," now brings to Your Excellency's notice the facts stated above and requests you to communicate them urgently to all States Members.
—JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO.

The Spanish Government Requests the Sending of a Health Mission from the League of Nations

Letter addressed by Señor Alvarez del Vayo to the Secretary-General of the League, December 15th, 1936:

With reference to point 4 of the Council's resolution of December 11th, 1936, I have the honour on behalf of my Government to submit the following proposal:

In order to cope with the war situation that had been thrust upon it, my Government, confronted with the necessity of improvising the whole of the army services, found itself urgently compelled to organize the military medical services and also to solve the special health problems that had been created by the mobilization and the war, and to do this not only at the front, but in the rear.

Thanks to the exemplary bearing of the Spanish medical personnel, and their enthusiasm, which made up for the lack of resources, and thanks also to the women of all social classes who generously came to the assistance of the ambulances and hospitals, the health position in Spain, despite enormous difficulties, is now better than might have been thought; so far, no epidemic has occurred.

Nevertheless, the continuation of the war and the approach of winter is causing great concern to the Government of the Republic. This is why, in consideration of point 4 of the above-mentioned resolution, I venture, Sir, to propose that a competent delegation

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from the Health Organization be urgently sent to Spain to study the possibilities of rapid action in consultation with the Spanish Minister of Public Health.

It is the earnest desire of my Government that arrangements may be made to start and develop such joint action which, fortunately, at the present time, is required for purely preventive purposes.

TEXT OF THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 12TH, 1936.

The Council . . .

Notes that there are problems of a humanitarian character with the present situation, in regard to which co-ordinated action of an international and humanitarian character is desirable as soon as possible;

Recognizes, further, that, for the reconstruction which Spain may have to undertake, international assistance may also be desirable;

And authorizes the Secretary-General to make available the assistance of the technical services of the League of Nations should a suitable opportunity occur.

OBSERVATIONS MADE AT THE COUNCIL BY THE SPANISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TEXT.

This morning I agreed to the present wording of the last paragraph of the resolution. I was the more ready to do so in that the exchange of views between the Members of the Council showed clearly that, in accordance with the Council's invariable practice in the matter of technical co-operation, international action on Spanish territory could only be undertaken at the request of the Spanish Government.

Reply by the Secretary-General (December 21st, 1936).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 14th, in which, referring to point 4 of the Council resolution of 11th inst., you propose that a competent delegation from the Health Organization be urgently sent to Spain to study the possibilities of rapid action in consultation with the Spanish Minister of Public Health. You add that it is the earnest desire of your Government that arrangements may be made to start and develop such joint action which, fortunately, at the present time, is required for purely preventive purposes.

I could respond to your request as follows:

Representatives of the Health Organization would study, with the Public Health Department of the Spanish Government, the present health situation in Spain, the measures already taken and the measures required, and would present a report.

For this purpose, two representatives of the Health Organization could proceed next week to Valencia for a stay of fifteen days, to be devoted essentially to a consultation with the Minister of Public Health. Your Government would no doubt be prepared to place at their disposal, during their stay on Spanish territory, the necessary means of transport and all needful liaison officers, whether medical or administrative. These two delegates would report to this Minister and myself and, after examination of the report, we could review the position and take such further decisions as might seem appropriate.

COMMUNIQUÉ TO THE PRESS DATED JANUARY 6TH, 1937.

In accordance with arrangements made by the Secretary-General with the League Health Committee, in response to the Spanish Government's request

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founded on the Council resolution of December 12th, 1936, the delegation of the Health Organization, consisting of

Médecin-Général A. LASNET, Member of the French Academy of Medicine, and Member of the League Health Committee—with Dr. LAIGRET, of the Pasteur Institute in Tunis, as assistant—and Dr. C. WROCZYNSKI, former Director-General Public Health and Under-Secretary of State to the Polish Government, one of the Health Organization's experts,

reached Valencia on December 29th, 1936.

The purpose of the delegation's visit is essentially to consult with the Spanish Minister of Public Health, in particular with regard to a study of the possibilities of rapid action for the prevention of epidemics among the civil population. Accordingly, the delegation, in full agreement with the Government and with the assistance of the health authorities, made an enquiry at Valencia and at Alicante into the general epidemiological situation and the living conditions of the civil population. It then considered the special conditions of refugees, and for this purpose undertook a journey by road to Madrid and back. It spent three days in the capital and examined the general health position and the particular situation of the population. During its journey, it visited several refugee transit centres.

The report which the delegation will submit to the Minister of Public Health and to the Secretary-General before the next session of the League Council will be based on consultations and investigation on the spot, and especially on the visits to localities and places where the concentration of large numbers in itself makes a rapid spread of epidemics possible, or may form a focus of infection.

SPANISH WAR AND THE LEAGUE

Ninety-sixth Ordinary Meeting of the Council January 21st-27th, 1937

At the ninety-sixth ordinary meeting of the Council held January 21st—27th, 1937, Spain was represented by Señor Alvarez del Vayo. The Council considered the report of the Health Mission which had visited loyalist Spain, and the question of the persons who had taken refuge in Embassies in Madrid.

Report of the session of January 21st, 1937:

EXAMINATION OF THE REPORT OF THE HEALTH MISSION SENT TO SPAIN:

M. Alvarez del Vayo requested the Council to include in the agenda of the session the examination of the report of the Health Mission sent by the Secretary-General to Spain at the request of the Spanish Government.

The Spanish representative's proposal was adopted.

Letters on Situation of Persons who have taken Asylum in the Embassies and Legations at Madrid

LETTER FROM THE CHILIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Geneva, January 14th, 1937.

At the extraordinary session of the Council held at Geneva from December 10th to 16th last (ninety-fifth session), the representative of my country had occasion to explain to the Council the very critical situation of the persons who had taken refuge in the embassies and legations at Madrid, on account of the civil war which is at present raging in Spain and the battles that are taking place around the capital.

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Since then, the situation has steadily become worse, and is now so untenable that the Diplomatic Corps resident at Madrid has just decided to ask our representative on the Council to approach the latter with a view to obtaining the help of the League of Nations for the evacuation of these persons.

My Government, realising the urgency of this problem and also its duties towards those who have placed themselves under its protection, feels that it must once more draw the Council's attention to this subject.

In consequence, I am instructed by my Government to request you to place on the agenda of the ninety-sixth session of the Council, which is to open at Geneva on the 21st instant, the following question: "Situation of Persons who have taken Asylum in the Embassies and Legations at Madrid."

(Signed) ENRIQUE J. GAJARDO V.,
*Head of the Chilean Permanent Bureau
accredited to the League of Nations.*

LETTER FROM THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Geneva, January 20th, 1937.

I have the honour to inform you that my Government, in agreement with the decision recently arrived at by the Diplomatic Corps resident at Madrid that the representative of Chile to the Council of the League of Nations should be asked again to call the attention of that body to the desirability of securing the support of the League for the evacuation, with all necessary safeguards and with the utmost speed, of the persons who have taken refuge in the embassies and legations at Madrid; having been informed of the contents of the communication addressed to you on the 14th

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inst., by M. Gajardo, permanent representative of Chile at Geneva, asking that the question of the situation of the aforesaid refugees be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming (ninety-sixth) session of the Council; and being deeply interested in the settlement of that question, which is of great humanitarian importance, in view of the frequent fighting which is taking place at Madrid, entirely associates itself with the Chilian Government's request, and is confident that the Council will arrive at a just decision which will put an end to a state of affairs that cannot but be regarded as distressing.

I would ask you to convey the foregoing to the Council and Members of the League of Nations.

(Signed) G. DE BLANCK.

LETTER FROM THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Geneva, January 22nd, 1937.

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Netherlands Government, prompted by humanitarian sentiments, is gratified to note that, when the Council resolution of December 12th last is discussed and the report of the Health Mission is examined, the humanitarian questions connected therewith, such as those mentioned in the Chilian Government's communication will also be considered.

In accordance with the attitude adopted by its representative at Madrid during a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps in that capital, the Netherlands Government is anxious to support any action the object of which is to find in the near future a satisfactory solution for the problem of these persons who have found asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid.

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I should be glad if you would be good enough to communicate the foregoing to the Council and the Members of the League.

(Signed) O. REUCHLIN.

General Discussion

M. Alvarez del Vayo wished to explain his reservation in regard to item 24, which had been placed on the agenda at the instance of the representative of Chile. He would have welcomed the opportunity thus given him of speaking, at a meeting of the Council, on this subject, as to which the public opinion of the world was ill-informed. But two objections of principle had led him to make his recent reservation in the matter. In the first place, under what provisions of the Covenant was this question included in the agenda? Secondly, the Chilean representative had raised the question at the instance of the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid. That created a very serious precedent. If the Council complied with the Chilean representative's request, it would be tantamount to recognizing the Diplomatic Corps as having a personality entitling it to take steps for the inclusion of a question in the Council's agenda. If, on the other hand, the Chilean Government was alone responsible, how could Chile ask for an examination of the situation of those in asylum at the embassies and legations at Madrid? Had Chile been authorized to take such action by all the Powers accredited to Madrid? If so, a decision should have been taken by each Government, instead of this roundabout, dubious and dangerous method of a resolution of the Diplomatic Corps.

The Council would thus appreciate how difficult it was to agree that this question, raised by the Chilean representative in the name of his Government, should be included in the agenda.

As he was always anxious, however, to give proof, in the Council, of the conciliatory and constructive attitude by which the Spanish Government had never ceased to be actuated, M. Alvarez del Vayo would propose a practical solution of the difficulty. He had just asked for the inclusion in the agenda of the examination of the report of the Health Mission sent to Spain at the request of the Spanish Government. The report in question touched on the problem of the evacuation of Madrid. The problem of the persons in asylum, of which everyone recognized the humanitarian aspect, could therefore be discussed when the Council came to consider the Health Mission's report.

M. EDWARDS was very sorry to disagree with a member of the Council, particularly when that member was the Spanish representative—not merely on account of the official relations between Chile and Spain, but also in view of his own personal relations with M. Alvarez del Vayo, which were of many years' standing. But the issue between them was one on which he could not accept the Spanish representative's proposal unreservedly.

There was no question of any initiative by the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid empowering him, as the Spanish representative had suggested, to represent them on the Council of the League of Nations. He had been a diplomat too long not to know that he had no powers to represent the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid. He was only authorized to speak for the Chilean Government, which he represented.

The Council would certainly remember that, at the meeting held on December 12th last, he had raised this question of persons who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid, not on

political or legal grounds, but for humanitarian reasons. He had submitted no resolution to the Council because he had felt, as he had told his colleagues, that the question was covered by section IV of the resolution presented to the Council and approved unanimously—the section which related to questions of a humanitarian character. He had no wish to see the question dealt with from any other point of view. As for the meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid, that was merely a step taken in Madrid by the Diplomatic Corps in support of the proposal put forward at the extraordinary session of the Council.

The inclusion of the question in the agenda needed no legal justification on his part. No objection could possibly be taken to the continuation of the discussion on a subject already raised at the last session of the Council, when a month and more had passed, during which the Spanish representative had been unable to make any progress, and still less arrive at any successful conclusion, in the negotiations he had promised to initiate with individual members of the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid. Not a step forward had been made in five weeks. The persons who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations were in an impossible situation; they were really prisoners on a battlefield.

A solution of this problem must be sought and found, with the co-operation of the Spanish Government and its distinguished representative on the Council, here in the more favourable surroundings of the League, rather than in the somewhat difficult conditions at present prevailing in Spain. They were concerned, not to discuss a legal issue, but to find a practical solution of the problem.

The Spanish representative has asked under what provisions of the Covenant M. Edwards had proposed the inclusion of this question in the agenda. He

replied that he had no desire to invoke any article of the Covenant. He might do so, however; he might invoke Article II, paragraph 2, because there was an element of the situation which might, at some time, give rise to serious trouble. But he would never raise the matter except in a "friendly" spirit in accordance with the terms of the article he had mentioned. The Council could not, however, ignore the situation, since fourteen countries, Members of the League, were interested in the solution of the problem, owing to the presence in their respective embassies or legations of persons who had taken asylum there. All he was doing was to draw the Council's attention to the situation.

The Spanish representative had suggested that the question could be discussed at the same time as the report submitted by the Health Mission. M. Edwards saw no objection, but he could not agree to the elimination from the agenda of the question of the persons who had taken asylum. It rested with the Council, therefore, to decide if it wished to take the two points together.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO laid stress on the fact that he had been at pains to avoid dealing with the question of substance. The Spanish Government had already given substantial proof of conciliation in agreeing to discuss these questions solely from the humanitarian standpoint. He might have approached the matter from another angle. It would have been very easy to prove that, in practice, the question of the right of asylum had, at certain moments, become a political question which was both disquieting and dangerous.

The Chilean representative had asserted that no progress had been made in this matter during the last seven weeks. Since the December session of the

Council, M. Alvarez del Vayo had had conversations with certain heads of missions in Madrid; and, at the instance of the Spanish Government, an agreement had been reached to evacuate all the women and children, together with all persons not directly implicated in conspiracies against the Government of the Republic—conspiracies which did not cease when the conspirators benefited from the right of asylum.

The Spanish Government had agreed to limit the problem, although it had every interest in a solution of the question in all its aspects. Over and above all international aspects of the question, there was the problem of the food supply of Madrid. At a time when the provisioning of the city was rather difficult, it was not very encouraging for those who were fighting in Madrid to see that ample supplies were available for those who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations.

For the time being, he would refrain, though with difficulty, from discussing the question of substance. Never, he imagined, had a sovereign country, a Member of the League, been compelled, on the pretext of the existence of a right of asylum, to accept *de facto* situations such as those which the Spanish Government had accepted at Madrid. It had done so in a spirit of conciliation, in order to avoid conflict with countries other than those which were at war with it.

It was in this spirit that he had proposed that this question—since the main thing was the evacuation of the people in asylum—should be treated as part of the general problem of the evacuation of the Spanish capital. In the same spirit of conciliation, he suggested that the two points of view might be combined by completing as follows the item which it had just been decided to include in the agenda: "Report of the

Health Mission sent to Spain at the Request of the Spanish Government, and Questions connected therewith." The Chilian Government's request would then be covered by the words "questions connected therewith."

M. EDWARDS (Chile) regretted once again that he was unable to accept the Spanish representative's proposal. He repeated that it was not his intention to go into the substance of the questions. It would be out of place to do so at a private meeting concerned solely with the fixing of the agenda of the session. But he reserved the right to raise the question of substance, if necessary, and to lay before the Council information which would enable it to visualize the present situation in Madrid as regards the problem of the persons who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations.

The suggestion which the Spanish representative had made, in a spirit of conciliation to which he was glad to pay tribute, seemed to M. Edwards to restrict the scope of the question raised by the Chilian Government in the Council. That question was a very serious one, which, if no solution could be found, must be raised from the political standpoint. He suggested therefore, in order to meet the views expressed, and since the Spanish representative wanted this problem to be taken in conjunction with the Health Mission's report, that the two points should be included under a single heading (for example, item No. 24) to read as follows:

- (a) Situation of Persons who have taken Asylum in the Embassies and Legations at Madrid;
- (b) Report of the Health Mission sent to Spain at the Request of the Spanish Government.

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That arrangement would show that the first point was not a secondary matter which it was desired more or less to leave on one side.

M. Edwards added that his own position in the matter was a little difficult, since his instructions on the subject were very definite.

M. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) hoped, as he was sure all his colleagues did, that it would prove possible to eliminate altogether the political aspects of this question. The Council would, therefore, consider, from the humanitarian aspect only, the remarks made by the Chilean and Spanish representatives, who, moreover, in that connection, had given proof alike of their eloquence and of their good faith. The difference between them was only apparent, and their respective standpoints were all but identical. What was necessary was to find the form in which to bring the matter before the Council without raising the question of substance—that was to say, the political question—so as to allow of a purely humanitarian solution on the conciliatory lines indicated by the Spanish representative, while taking into consideration the anxieties and distress felt by the Chilean representative, which were shared by all the representatives of Latin America.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO could not help pointing out that the Chilean representative's proposal, if adopted, might seem—with its two independent and equally prominent paragraphs—to place on the same footing the question of the Spanish Government's co-operation with the League and the question of the persons in asylum at the embassies and legations. The Spanish Government attached the utmost importance to close co-operation with the technical organizations of the

League. That was why it had asked the Secretary-General to send a Health Mission to Madrid.

Further, if it were proposed to deal only with the humanitarian aspect of the problem of the persons in asylum, to the exclusion of all political aspects, it followed logically that the only question arising was that of the evacuation of those persons, and that, in consequence, it came within the scope of the general problem of the evacuation of Madrid. The Spanish suggestion therefore covered the whole of the problem from the practical point of view.

M. GASTELÚ (Ecuador) associated himself entirely with the Bolivian representative's remarks.

M. RÜSTÜ ARAS (Turkey) said that, as there was agreement on the humanitarian aspect of the question, the only problem remaining was of a purely technical character. As the Government of Iraq had asked for the withdrawal of item No. 18 of the agenda, why not put in its place the Spanish representative's item ("Report of the Health Mission sent to Spain at the Spanish Government's Request, and Questions connected therewith")? If the discussion on this point led to a solution which satisfied the Chilean representative, the latter's point would be met automatically, and there would be no need to examine either the substance or the form of item No. 24. The Council would only have to note that agreement had been reached.

M. LITVINOFF (Russia) said that the representative of Chile did not base his application on any article of the Covenant, nor (M. Litvinoff presumed) on any international law or practice. To the best of his belief, there was no international law which compelled a Government to allow foreign embassies and

legations to accord the right of asylum. On that point, he understood that European countries were in a different position from Latin-American countries, the latter having signed a special Convention on the matter of the right of asylum. European countries, including Spain, had never accepted that point of view.

It was true that the Chilean representative had added that, if he wanted, he could appeal to Article XI, paragraph 2 of the Covenant. M. Litvinoff would have thought it lay rather with the Spanish Government to invoke that article. There had been many international conflicts on this subject in the past; and in the majority of cases in which Ambassadors or Ministers had given asylum, in the country to which they were accredited, to people who had broken the law of that country, they were recalled by their Governments. Their Governments had been obliged to recall them. There was one case—it was true it was in the eighteenth century—where such action had led to war.

That being so, the mere fact of asylum having been given might perfectly properly have been seized by the Spanish Government as a reason for appealing to Article XI and pointing out the danger of war. But M. Litvinoff personally could not see on what ground the Chilean, or any other, Government could invoke Article XI, since the Spanish Government had not broken any international treaty, or violated any international engagement, or committed any infraction of the Covenant.

Since the question was not political, but purely humanitarian, in character, it was clear that the Council could only discuss it with the consent of the Government concerned—that was to say, with the consent of the Spanish Government. It was not for the Council to

make humanitarian interventions at the expense of a particular Government, when such intervention involved interference with that Government's internal affairs.

The Spanish representative had shown a real spirit of conciliation in agreeing to discuss the question. M. Litvinoff did not think the Council could impose upon the Spanish representative the acceptance of its discussion in the form of a special item on the agenda, as proposed by the Chilean representative.

It seemed to him that the best solution was for the Council to accept the Spanish proposal to deal with the question in connection with the discussion of the report of the Health Mission. If the Chilean representative was not satisfied with the result of that discussion, he was free at any moment again to ask the Council to include a special item on the subject in the agenda. The agenda could be altered at any time and during any session.

M. Litvinoff hoped, however, it would not come to that, and that a solution would be found which would satisfy all parties.

M. EDWARDS replied first to the Turkish representative, who, in his usual conciliatory spirit, had proposed a solution to get over the difficulty. It was a very ingenious solution, but it did not resolve the difficulty because, if item No. 24 on the agenda were dropped, it would not be possible to deal with the situation with which Chile was concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Mr. Wellington Koo, China) observed that the humanitarian character of these questions was clear from the title of the resolution of December 12th; but he saw no objection to the proposed addition.

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Item No. 24 as amended was adopted.

The agenda of the ninety-sixth session of the Council, as amended, was adopted.

EXAMINATION OF THE REPORT OF THE HEALTH MISSION SENT AT THE REQUEST OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT, AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS CONNECTED THEREWITH (EVACUATION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE TAKEN ASYLUM IN THE EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS AT MADRID, ETC.).

Report of the Session of the Council of January 25th, 1937

Dr. Lasnet, representative of the Health Mission to Spain, came to the Council table.

DR. LASNET, representative of the Health Mission to Spain, desired, since the report describing the results of the Health Mission of the League of Nations to Spain (Annex 1644, page 210) was before the Council, together with the letter to the Secretary-General summarizing the conclusions (Annex 1644, page 206), simply to draw attention to the points which seemed to him to be specially important.

1. *State of Health of the Population.*—The state of health of the population was found to be satisfactory everywhere. No epidemic focus was discovered. That satisfactory state of affairs was undoubtedly due to the good health equipment which had existed in Spain, in the provinces and communes, for some years past, and also, to a great extent, to the professional skill and the zeal displayed by the entire Spanish medical profession. During recent months, however, there had been considerable movements of the population, with

over-crowding in some parts and difficulties in obtaining food in others. That did not mean that the situation would always be as good. Very great vigilance would have to be exercised if epidemics were to be prevented. For that reason, the Health Mission had advised the strengthening of the health services and general vaccination of the whole population against smallpox and typhoid.

As to typhus, which was a specially serious disease, and always threatened to appear in countries in a disturbed state, the Mission had recommended, although no cases had been reported, that every precaution should be taken to prevent the disease from spreading should it by any chance break out. It had suggested that protective services should be set up in all the large centres and that a conference of experts should be arranged by the League Health Organization to determine the conditions in which vaccination against typhus should be resorted to and what vaccine should be used.

2. *Evacuation of Refugees.*—Dr. Lasnet stated that the movement of people fleeing from the area of hostilities was considerable and extended behind the whole fighting front from Aragon to the south of Spain.

On January 9th, there were more than a million refugees, representing about 13 per cent. of the population of the other provinces which had given them shelter. In some places, the absorptive capacity was exhausted, but in many others it would still be possible, by careful study, to find accommodation, especially if use, or better use, were made of big buildings for collective purposes which were now vacant, such as convents, barracks (those were almost empty), casinos, and so on. The list of available accommodation before the

Council was not quite accurate; it showed the available accommodation a few weeks ago. Careful study would certainly reveal far more accommodation.

Another necessary study was that of the distribution of foodstuffs. After the arrival of refugees, some districts were liable to a shortage of certain food products, such as milk. It was essential that that question should be studied carefully, and that the distribution of foodstuffs should be proportionate to the new population, including the refugees. The Health Mission had therefore recommended that, for the future, all the necessary steps be taken to see that nothing was left to chance and that the accommodation and feeding of refugees still to be evacuated was carried out in the best conditions.

3. *Population of Madrid*.—In spite of the numbers already evacuated (about 430,000), the population of Madrid still amounted to 1,200,000. That was due to the considerable movement towards the capital which had taken place during the first weeks of the fighting. The city was in a somewhat paradoxical situation. It skirted the battle line; it was exposed to shelling, and each aerial bombardment caused heavy losses. Its supplies were liable to be threatened, at the same time, the position had been satisfactory up to the present. The state of health was good and there were no epidemics. The health services were being carried on efficiently, and, in spite of the absence of certain foodstuffs, particularly meat and milk, there was enough to eat.

The morale of the population was excellent, and the inhabitants had no desire to leave. But, with so dense a population, the dangers of bombardment were very serious, as well as the difficulties

that might be encountered in feeding the population and the risks of epidemics. The Mission had therefore urged that the numbers be reduced and that half the inhabitants be evacuated as soon as possible. The municipal authorities were entirely of the same opinion. Evacuation was impossible, however, with the means at present available. The Mission had therefore proposed that the Spanish Government should be given the fullest support in obtaining 200 or even 250 large motor-coaches, to be used solely for the refugees.

The fourth point to be noted was the *shortage of motor-ambulances*. The Mission had found that there were not enough for the evacuation of the sick and wounded and persons suffering from infectious diseases. It had therefore advised the Spanish Government to take the necessary steps.

Such were the few special points which Dr. Lasnet had thought it desirable to bring to the notice of the members of the Council.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO said that the Spanish Government was particularly glad that speedy action had been possible under the final paragraph of the Council's resolution of December 12th last. It saw in that a further proof of the efficiency of the organs of the League in the field of international co-operation, and it desired to express its gratitude to the Secretary-General and to the Health Organization of the League for their decision to send to Spain the Mission whose report had just been submitted to the Council.

The Spanish Government wished to express to the distinguished members of that Mission its profound gratitude for the devotion and extreme ability with which they had performed their task.

The letter which the members of the Mission had addressed to the Secretary-General on January 18th contained six conclusions, on which M. Alvarez del Vayo wished at once to make some brief observations, in order to assist the Rapporteur in his work.

The first two conclusions concerned health questions. In the report, the delegates of the Health Organization of the League had been good enough to pay a tribute to the efficiency of the Spanish public health services, so devotedly directed by the Minister of Health. He could assure the Council that those services would follow the very authoritative advice given them by the Health Mission. He would further venture to suggest that all that part of the report which related to health questions should be referred to the Health Committee, whose advice the Spanish Government would also be delighted to receive.

Point 2 of the conclusions concerning typhus—of which, happily, there had so far been no epidemic outbreak in Spain—raised the question of the vaccination of the population.

In the second part of its report, dealing with the epidemiological situation, the Mission pointed out that anti-typhus vaccination was now performed in a number of countries—Poland, China and North Africa—by different methods, and that it would be advantageous if these could be discussed among experts at a technical meeting, in order to determine what method was most suitable for use, if required, in Spain. In view of the urgency of this question, M. Alvarez del Vayo suggested that the Health Committee might be asked to arrange for such a technical meeting as soon as possible.

Points 3, 4 and 5 of the Mission's conclusions concerned the evacuation of Madrid, the rehousing of refugees and the distribution of food, allowing for

the presence of refugees. In all those matters, the Spanish Government would pay the fullest attention to the advice of the Mission, which—and the Government was extremely grateful for it—had given an account of the efforts made in Spain to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees. The Mission had described the organization of the Refugees Committee. It observed that the National Refugees Committee “has enjoyed the full confidence of the whole people and is responsible for all the very useful steps which have subsequently been taken.”

M. Alvarez del Vayo was glad that impartial experts had been able to study the question on the spot and to appreciate the spirit of charity, devotion and national solidarity which the Spanish people had displayed in such unhappy circumstances.

The Mission recommended in particular, in conclusion No. 3, that the numbers at present living in Madrid should be reduced by the rapid evacuation of half the inhabitants, and that to that end facilities should be given to the Spanish Government to purchase the necessary motor-coaches.

As soon as that recommendation had been made, the Spanish Government had taken steps to carry it out. The Mission stated that the Madrid Committee had already obtained fifty motor-coaches, which would be sent from Barcelona. According to the Missions' conclusions, another hundred and fifty, or still better two hundred, were required, “so as to have a reserve in case of breakdown and to accelerate the movement still more if necessary.” The Spanish Government was now endeavouring to obtain those motor-coaches from abroad. It hoped to receive them as soon as possible, together with the motor-ambulances referred to in the Mission's conclusion No. 6.

In conclusion, M. Alvarez del Vayo expressed the

hope that Dr. Lasnet, whose high ability the Council had been able to appreciate, and who merited the deepest gratitude, would be able to continue, in collaboration with the Spanish Government, the humanitarian work on which he had embarked.

M. Alvarez del Vayo desired next to put a few general considerations before the Council. Every time he had had the honour to speak, whether in the Assembly or in the Council, he had endeavoured to convince all those who placed peace before everything else that the very Spain which was, at the present time, compelled to shed her best blood in a veritable war of national independence was more than ever resolved to pursue a constructive policy which would allow of her active and effective participation, in the future, in the great work of international co-operation.

Those who had not had an opportunity to see in person the evidence of that resolve might perhaps have attributed to it the attitude of a handful of isolated men who, even in the firing-line, were still wrapped in idealistic dreams. M. Alvarez del Vayo thanked Dr. Lasnet and his assistants for having realized that behind that constructive determination stood the whole of Republican Spain. When they had visited the "House of Culture" at Valencia, they had been able to see how earnestly Spain was endeavouring to give her most distinguished scientists opportunities of continuing their work, despite the war. The Mission had certainly felt that during its enquiry into the health situation, on the day when, in the midst of one of the most violent attacks upon Madrid, during that second great offensive which the arrival of large German and Italian contingents had enabled the rebels to launch against the capital, the population of Madrid had done its utmost to ensure a normal daily life in spite of everything.

Other missions of a different kind—he was thinking for instance, of the all-party mission of British members of Parliament—as soon as they had succeeded in getting into direct touch with loyalist Spain, had reached similar conclusions. But M. Alvarez del Vayo wished to stress the very special value of such a finding on the part of doctors of complete impartiality in the course of their examination of the health situation which was recorded in the report now before the Council.

As against the legend of an extremist Spain where no sort of control existed—a legend spread abroad by certain States which were endeavouring to justify their aggression—there stood the real Spain, more convinced than ever that it was only a régime of democracy, liberty and social justice that she could carry out the mission to which she felt herself called, with all the fervour of a people capable of dying for freedom. The democratic Republic was a parliamentary one, and it was for that republic that loyalist Spain was fighting.

In the speech which he had delivered five days ago at the seat of Parliament, surrounded by the Government and with the enthusiastic approval of all loyal Spain, President Azaña had furnished solemn evidence to the whole world of the nation's attachment to those principles. The same might be said of the Youth Congress held at Valencia two weeks previously; each of the resolutions adopted by that Congress was a declaration in support of a democratic and parliamentary republic.

It might not be without interest to mention that a reference to President Roosevelt's memorable speech in defence of democracy, delivered after his recent victory, had been enthusiastically applauded by the hundreds of young men who had left the trenches to attend the Congress.

President Azaña had spoken as a statesman who realized his responsibility for the future of the nation as a whole. His speech had expressed his profound bitterness at the sight of Spaniards driven by their sectarian outlook to commit the most serious offences against their country and becoming, in their blindness and hatred, the instruments of foreign domination. President Azaña's words were less in the nature of a malediction than an appeal to their consciences as Spaniards. On the previous day, the prisoners captured on the hill of Los Angeles had been greeted with words of brotherhood by deputies of the Popular Front. Republican Spain of to-day was animated, not by hatred but by the profound desire to see Spanish unity re-established on the basis of constitutional legitimacy.

Despite the terrible hardships entailed by the continual bombardment of its capital, Spain mastering her grief, still proclaimed her unshakable devotion to the League of Nations and the cause of peace. But no one could be surprised if the Spanish Government, which, last December, had accepted the control recommended by the Council and which now renewed that acceptance, pointed out that the States which were making war on her had postponed its entry into force for weeks and weeks, in order to be able to continue without hindrance to send the rebels the divisions which they needed to carry on the war—that crime of treason against their country.

M. Alvarez del Vayo did not consider it necessary to apologize for the general reflections he had just made. He fully realized that they were not imperative in a discussion on the report of Dr. Lasnet and his colleagues, which dealt exclusively with the conclusions they had reached during their enquiry into the health situation of Spain. But if he had felt

authorized to do so it was owing to the dramatic situation of which the whole world was aware.

Before concluding, M. Alvarez del Vayo wished to say once more to Dr. Lasnet and his colleagues that they could not have been surprised at the welcome which they had found in Spain and which they had so generously acknowledged in their report. They had carried the surest safe-conduct and the best recommendation—that of being the emissaries of the League of Nations.

M. Edwards recalled that, in the course of the ninety-fifth extraordinary session of the Council, he had had the honour, at the meeting on December 12th last, to draw the Council's attention to a special feature of the relief work intended to mitigate, as far as possible, the sufferings of the civilian population in Spain, and, in particular, the sufferings of the numerous persons who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid.

The great majority—perhaps all—of those persons were not, as one might be inclined to think, fugitives from Spanish justice who had sought to escape prosecution for political offences; still less were they criminals. All of them, or at any rate those in the Latin-American embassies and legations, had been given asylum under the rules laid down in that matter by the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The most serious and most touching aspect of the problem was the fact that the people in question belonged to all social classes and represented every ideology from the Right to the Left, and that their lives were in danger at the hands of groups and bodies over which the Madrid authorities and the Government at Valencia had no control. The refugees even included persons who had been closely associated with the Valencia

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Government, and others who had been received by the embassies and legations at the request of members of the Spanish Government: that was the case, for instance, with the descendants of Christopher Columbus, whose lives were in danger. The Secretary of State of the Spanish Government—the predecessor, M. Edwards believed, of his distinguished colleague—had requested the Chilean ambassador at Madrid in writing to give asylum to those refugees in his embassy, so as to afford them complete protection.

The question which M. Edwards had had the honour to submit to the Council at its extraordinary session, on December 12th last, was primarily and pre-eminently a humanitarian and moral question, and its urgency could not be gainsaid. It was his Government's desire to raise and deal with the question throughout as a humanitarian issue.

Arguments had been put forward in the Council and outside the League disputing the existence and practice of the right of asylum and contending that it was confined to Latin America. M. Edwards would deal with those arguments parenthetically, since parentheses, it would appear, were the fashion, and since it was in virtue of parentheses that the question of the refugees in Madrid appeared on the agenda, and say a few words to prove that the right of asylum had been exercised by European, American and Asiatic States in Europe, in America and in Asia until the present day. He proposed only to mention—very briefly—a few striking cases in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, since it was not disputed that, in the eighteenth century, the right of asylum was freely exercised in Europe. If there were one particular country in Europe where the right of asylum had been exercised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it was Spain; and Spain, in its turn, had exercised the

right repeatedly in various countries, particularly in Latin America.

Unhappily, Spain, in the course of the nineteenth century, had been the scene of sanguinary disturbances—in 1835, in 1848 and between 1865 and 1875—due to causes closely resembling those responsible for the tragic circumstances which were deplored to-day—namely, the impassioned conflict between two extremist ideological systems.

The civil war between the Christinos and the Carlistas had raised the same problems in regard to non-intervention which arose to-day, and the persons taking asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid had been numerous and highly respected.

Spain herself, at the close of the nineteenth century, had exercised the right of asylum at Santiago de Chile in 1891, in the course of the Chilean civil war, together with France, Germany, the United States of America and Brazil, and, if he were correctly informed, at the time of the disturbances in Brazil in 1930, when almost all the embassies and legations at Rio de Janeiro had given asylum to refugees the Spanish Embassy had done the same. On that occasion—and M. Edwards was glad to recall it—the Brazilian Government, giving proof, not only of its respect for the right of asylum, but also of its broadminded and magnanimous attitude had accorded every kind of facility for the evacuation to foreign countries with the least possible delay of all such political refugees without distinction.

Moreover, the evacuation, at the earliest possible moment, of persons who had taken asylum, seemed to be the practice most generally adopted by all countries according and recognizing the right of asylum. The diplomatic missions of Great Britain, France and the United States of America had frequently accorded asylum in Latin America. Great Britain had exercised

that right in Europe and Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At Constantinople, in 1895, the British Embassy had given asylum to the Grand Vizier when his life was in danger. In Iran, the right of asylum (*bast*), which had existed in that country for centuries past and had assumed the strangest forms, had been recognized and practised by the British Legation at Teheran.

But was it even necessary to recall other cases to the Council in view of what was taking place in Spain at the present time? Was it not a fact that, of the fourteen embassies and legations which had given asylum, six were European—namely, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Roumania and Turkey? Latin America, therefore, only accounted for a bare half of the countries concerned with the problem. The right of asylum, which it was endeavoured to dispute on the ground that it was a purely Latin-American theory, was being actually exercised in Spain to-day by almost as many Europeans as Latin-American countries.

To conclude the lengthy parenthesis on the right of asylum, M. Edwards desired to remind the Council that hundreds and even thousands of persons, amongst whom Spaniards were unquestionably included, had found asylum and had been transported on warships flying the British, French, American, Italian, German and other flags. What legal justification could there be for a distinction between the right of asylum exercised on warships in Spanish territorial waters and the right of asylum exercised in the embassies and legations of Madrid? Why should not the refugees in the latter case be evacuated in the same way as the refugees in the former case? Was it not a question of extra-territoriality in either case? M. Edwards would not like to think it possible for the League, which owed

its very existence to the respect for right over might, to attach more weight to the exercise of the right of asylum under the protection of the guns of a warship than to the right of asylum exercised by an embassy or legation, which had no protection other than international law and that inviolability which was established by the custom of centuries.

M. Edwards had been glad, at the December session, to be able to count on the warm and friendly support of the Bolivian representative, who, in eloquent language, had reminded the Council that the right of asylum was an American right embodied not only in a century-old tradition but also in the Conventions of Montevideo and Havana. At the present session, he had been glad to have the support of Ecuador. The unanimous attitude of the American representatives on the Council in regard to the principle was thus apparent. Further, the Cuban Government had also warmly supported the Chilean request. M. Edwards had been particularly gratified to find the Netherlands, the country which might be called the cradle of international law, exercising the right of asylum in Madrid and warmly supporting the Chilean request.

The Spanish representative had told the Council in December that, in accordance with the line taken by his Government in a note addressed to the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid, he was prepared to consider the problem direct with each Government concerned. As the Council would remember, M. Edwards had refrained, in view of that statement, from submitting any draft resolution on the subject, as he had thought that the situation he had explained was covered by the resolution which the Council had then been about to pass, and which it had in fact adopted at the same meeting. Under Section IV of that resolution, the Council had noted that there were problems of a

humanitarian character, in connection with the situation in Spain, in regard to which co-ordinated action of an international and humanitarian character was desirable as soon as possible, and it had authorized the Secretary-General to make available the assistance of the technical services of the League of Nations should a suitable opportunity occur.

More than a month had passed since the Chilean representative had drawn attention to the truly painful situation of the persons who had taken asylum at the embassies and legations in Madrid, the majority of whom were women, old people and children.

Unfortunately, the negotiations between the Spanish Government and the heads of Missions in Madrid had made no progress, still less had any solution been reached. The Spanish representative on the Council had said, at the private meeting held on January 21st, that he had already been in communication with the heads of Missions at Madrid with a view to the evacuation of all those in asylum who were not suspected of having taken part in the military rebellion. Unhappily, the goodwill of the Spanish Secretary of State had not hitherto been translated into effective action; and the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid had wired to M. Edwards on January 16th the summary of a note he had addressed to the Secretary of State on behalf of the heads of Missions, requesting him to settle the problem, and proposing certain bases and conditions for the effective evacuation of the persons in question. M. Edwards was not aware what answer M. Alvarez del Vayo had made to that communication.

The present situation did not concern a small number only of countries Members of the League; fourteen of them had granted asylum in their embassies and legations in Madrid—namely, the Argentine

Republic, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Roumania and Turkey. China, which had also extended the right to a small number of refugees, had been able to evacuate them and close down its legation in Madrid.

On behalf of the embassies and legations of all those countries and with their express approval, the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps had approached the Chilean representative on January 13th, in the latter's capacity at that time of President of the Council, asking him again to draw the Council's attention to the matter, which had already been raised at the extraordinary session in December.

The fate of these persons, at a time when the whole civilian population of Madrid was being compulsorily evacuated, was becoming more painful even than that of the other inhabitants of the city, since the latter could abandon the battlefield which Madrid now was, whereas those in asylum in the embassies could not do so.

The Members of the Council had had an opportunity of seeing from the report of the Health Mission to Spain, which was being discussed simultaneously with the present grave question, how great were the dangers to which the civilian population was exposed, and how earnestly the Mission recommended the evacuation of half the population of the city on the ground that, although no epidemics had as yet broken out among the unhappy inhabitants, there was every reason to fear the ravages of disease at any moment.

The Council would not fail to note that, if that danger existed in the case of persons who were able to move about freely in the open air in Madrid, since they were not in danger of their lives like those who had sought asylum, it was still greater and more

pressing in the case of the latter, obliged as they were to remain shut up in narrow premises which in spite of the precautions taken to maintain certain hygienic standards, were bound, owing to the overcrowding, to constitute veritable centres for the growth of every kind of contagion. If the evacuation of the population of Madrid was urgent, as the Health Mission's report stated, the evacuation of the persons who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations was even more urgent.

The Health Mission had only remained four days in Madrid and had had no time to visit any of those in asylum except at the French Embassy. M. Edwards was sure that, if the Mission had visited the other embassies and legations, it would have been in a position to observe the painful situation of the refugees there, and the extent to which the danger of under-nutrition, which was beginning to make itself felt amongst the inhabitants of Madrid in general, was already serious in the case of these unfortunate persons who had to be content with a single meal a day consisting sometimes of rice, sometimes of lentils or white haricots, cooked without a drop of fat or oil, still less of butter, since not even milk now reached the city.

The Council would wonder why those in asylums, if their situation were so painful, did not seek some less uncomfortable residence elsewhere. The answer was very simple. Their situation, painful as it was, was preferable to death. Those poor people arrived at the embassies and legations a prey to terror, often having seen members of their family killed and their houses sacked. They preferred the wretched life, full of privations, which they led to-day to the death which awaited them in the street. Did they not know that the majority of those in asylum in the German Embassy had met their death in the very vehicles in which the members

of the Diplomatic Corps had been endeavouring to transport them to their embassies and legations?

The Government at Valencia itself had told the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid that it did not regard the departure of those in asylum as prudent. It was because of that statement that the heads of Missions had found themselves under the moral obligation to continue the right of asylum; and it was for that reason that they were unable at present to begin the evacuation, unless they had international guarantees for the security of these people until the moment of their quitting Spanish territory.

The Spanish authorities could not, with the best will in the world—and M. Edwards was glad to recognize that their intentions were of the most generous and most humanitarian character—even give the heads of Missions in Madrid a guarantee that the old men, the women and the children would be respected and allowed to find safety and freedom in foreign countries.

Numerous cases proved that the safe-conducts issued by the authorities counted for very little and were frequently not recognized at all by local committees or syndicalist groups which assumed a right of controlling the decisions of the authorities themselves. One of the documents which M. Edwards had obtained in that connection was a safe-conduct issued by the Director-General of Police in Madrid, which had had to be submitted to a local committee and countersigned by the latter before it was valid.

It was not only persons belonging to a single social class or persons whose ideas differed from those prevailing in the present Spanish Government who were subject to that dual control on the part of the authorities, on the one hand, and the groups which had assumed power of their own initiative, on the other. The same was true of persons whose whole lives showed

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their democratic and republican convictions. M. Edwards need only cite the case of M. Salvador de Madariaga, so well known for his brilliant services to the League of Nations, who had been threatened with death and obliged to leave Spain.

It was not, therefore, without justification that M. Edwards had drawn the Council's attention to the need for providing all possible international safeguards for the evacuation of those in asylum in the embassies and legations.

In serious, and indeed tragic, circumstances, the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid had met under the chairmanship of its Doyen, and had approached the representative of Chile on the Council of the League, requesting him to inform the Council that it earnestly desired the League of Nations to take action, at the earliest possible moment, for the evacuation to foreign countries of the persons in asylum in the embassies and legations in Madrid, and that it would, in particular, be glad if the League would appoint a committee of experts to examine the question and to take the necessary steps to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible, in view of the increasingly imperative need for such action.

The Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid had also asked M. Edwards to inform the Council of the League that he was prepared to co-operate by every means in his power in that humanitarian task. He had communicated to the Chilean representative the bases which the heads of Missions regarded as best suited to secure the evacuation of those in asylum to foreign countries with all the safeguards necessary, not only in their own interest, but also in the interest of the Valencia Government, so as to eliminate the possibility of those evacuated joining the opposing party and engaging in hostile activities of any kind

against the Valencia Government. On those bases M. Edwards had prepared a draft which appeared to him to cover all aspects of the question, and which he would submit to the Council for consideration. The text was as follows:

Memorandum setting forth the Principles applicable to the Evacuation of Persons who have been granted Asylum in the Embassies and Legations at Madrid, on the Basis of the Main Ideas communicated by the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Valencia Government.

1. Guarantees to be given for the safe departure abroad of persons who have been granted asylum.

2. Old men, women and children to be allowed complete freedom of movement outside Spain.

3. All males capable of bearing arms who have been granted asylum must reside, until the end of the civil war, in towns to be designated and in countries not coterminous with Spain. The authorities of the countries in which these persons are to reside would be approached by the League of Nations with a view to obtaining the necessary permission for them to stay there, and officials of the League of Nations would be responsible, in agreement with the authorities of the said countries, for exercising special supervision over these refugees, who would further be required to swear that they would not take part in the Spanish civil war.

4. Evacuation under the supervision of a Commission of the League of Nations and departure from Madrid in motor-coaches, in each of which the persons granted asylum would be accompanied by a League representative.

5. Embarkation in a Spanish port, under the supervision of the League of Nations, on vessels

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which would take them from Spain. The countries that have granted asylum would be called upon to contribute to the cost in proportion to the number of persons to whom they have given asylum.

6. Guarantee that the property of persons evacuated will be respected until they can return to Spain and protect themselves in normal conditions.

7. Guarantee of security for the departure of foreign Missions from Madrid.

It would be seen from the report of the Health Mission, which had gone to Spain at the request of the Valencia Government, that it would be necessary to evacuate half the present population of Madrid.

The Health Mission proposed in its report that assistance should be given to the Spanish Government to secure 200 motor-coaches to be reserved exclusively for the purposes of that evacuation, and it calculated that those 200 motor-coaches should make it possible to carry out evacuation at the rate of 30,000 persons a day.

It appeared to M. Edwards to be out of the question to evacuate half the population of Madrid and to leave to their tragic fate in that city the 3,000 or 4,000 persons who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations, together with the staff of the latter. On the contrary those persons must be included, and they should be given preference for the reasons he had already indicated; in other words, they should be the first to be evacuated.

But, if the operation was to be carried through successfully and with all the requisite safeguards, it was essential that the Council should appoint an International Commission to organize and conduct the evacuation, in agreement and in co-operation with the Government at Valencia, the military authorities

and the Diplomatic Corps at Madrid. As its duties would be of a humanitarian character, and as M. Edwards desired to meet the pre-occupations of his Spanish colleague and to give proof of his spirit of conciliation, he suggested that the Commission should be identical with that which had been appointed at the instance of the Valencia Government and which had just reported on its visit to Spain. In view, however, of the small numbers of the Health Mission—consisting of only three experts—and in view of the fact that evacuation raised other issues besides those of public health, M. Edwards proposed to enlarge the Mission to include military experts, members of the International Red Cross Committee, representatives of the diplomatic missions in Madrid which had given asylum to refugees, and officials of the League of Nations.

Another solution would be that which the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid had proposed in the bases which it had communicated to the Chilean representative: an International Commission might be appointed with the sole duty of evacuating from Madrid those in asylum in the embassies and legations. In either case, he proposed that the project he had submitted to the Council should be referred to whatever Commission was appointed, in order to facilitate the study of the question and the solution of the problem.

As regarded the relative advantages of appointing a special Commission or entrusting the evacuation to the Health Mission, enlarged as M. Edwards had proposed, he would abide by the decision of the Council and the preference of the Spanish representative.

Referring to the question of evacuation to foreign countries, M. Edwards was authorized to state, on

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behalf of his Government, that it was prepared to assume a proportion of the expenditure involved corresponding to the number of refugees evacuated from the Chilian Embassy. Although he had no information on the subject, he imagined that the Governments of other countries which had given asylum to refugees would be likely to take the same lines.

If ever there were a case which called for the sympathy, the assistance and the immediate action of the League of Nations, it was the present one.

In conclusion, M. Edwards was anxious to tell the Council, and his colleague the Spanish representative in particular, that in bringing before the Council all the details he had mentioned he had been actuated by no desire to criticize the Government at Valencia, or to suggest that it lacked the authority or the will to preserve order. His sole object had been to enable the Council to form an opinion as to the extent of the need for action, and rapid action, if the problem of those in asylum was to be solved in a spirit, and by methods, of international co-operation.

Everyone knew very well that, in the event of internal disturbances in any country where they unfortunately occurred, there were moments when, in certain districts, events took control of the situation out of the hands of the Government. In the case of upheavals so alarming as those of which Spain was at present the theatre, it was very difficult, and even impossible, to expect everything to function as in normal circumstances.

Mr. JORDAN said that the remarks he wished to make on the report were laudatory rather than critical. The report deserved more than ordinary consideration by those on the Council who were not immediately

affected—although, if the situation were neglected, the trouble might not be confined to Spain.

The report said: "The state of health in Spain is satisfactory and appears to have been affected neither by the disturbances that have occurred nor by the accompanying movements of population. Nowhere, not even at Madrid, has any epidemic focus been reported; in particular, there have been no cases of typhus. He was sure the Council would wish to take this opportunity to express its appreciation of the fact that the state of health of the people in the affected areas was so far satisfactory, and that all efforts were being made to safeguard health and prevent violent outbreaks of those diseases which were often associated with wars or other disasters.

As mention had been made of the Health Committee, Mr. Jordan was sure he would have the approval of the Director and of the members of the Committee in saying that the services of that Committee would be available to the League for any operations of such importance, and further that the council might well commend the needs of the hospitals and of the women and children to all who could assist them.

The world's thanks were due to the Government of Spain, to local and international organizations and to individuals for their efforts in caring for the health of the people and the welfare of non-combatants. Special mention had been made of Mme. Montseny and her organization, and also of the assistance given by trade unions and other bodies. The Council would note, too, with gratitude, the passage in the report which said: "Medical personnel is available in fairly large numbers, their professional standards are good, they show great devotion to the common weal and appeared to us to be in every way suitable for the special requirements of the present time." In

short, the medical fraternity was standing up well to the traditions of its profession.

Mr. Jordan submitted that the whole world was concerned in this matter, not only on account of the people in Spain but because, in the event of an outbreak of plague there, it would undoubtedly spread over Europe and beyond. He was grateful to those who were working so hard in Spain and for Spain, and also to the Mission of learned doctors who had done such great work on behalf of the League.

In conclusion, Mr. Jordan expressed his appreciation of the very fine report which had been submitted, not only as regards its compilation, but also as regards the very satisfactory information it contained.

M. KOMARNICKI observed that, in referring to the Council the distressing problem of the persons who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid, the Chilean Government had incontestably acted in an individual capacity. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Ambassador of Chile was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps now at Madrid, and that he had the approval of his colleagues. The Polish Government, which had complete confidence in its *Chargé d'Affaires* at Madrid, who had taken part in the discussions of the Diplomatic Corps residing in that city, felt bound to associate itself in the Council with the step taken by the Chilean Government, and declared that it was prepared to consider the arrangements proposed by the Chilean representative. If he rightly understood the Council's intentions, item 24 of the agenda of the ninety-sixth session of the Council was concerned exclusively with humanitarian questions, and it was in that spirit that he had ventured to intervene in the discussion.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO recalled that, when the question had been dealt with at the private meeting of the Council, it had been agreed that it should be examined solely from the humanitarian standpoint. He would make a strenuous effort to confine himself to that aspect in replying to the representative of Chile. Naturally, he could not hope to follow or rival his special erudition on the right of asylum. M. Alvarez del Vayo was familiar with the Convention of Havana and that of Montevideo—Conventions relating to the right of asylum; Spain had no legal obligations under those Conventions, but that had not prevented her from extending some tolerance to the practice of the right of asylum at Madrid. Obviously, he no longer remembered all the articles of those two Conventions; but he did know that the second paragraph of Article II of the Havana Convention bound the Governments—M. Alvarez del Vayo attached special importance to the word “bound”—to communicate, immediately, a list of the persons who had taken asylum to the Government in whose territory the missions were accredited. Up to the present, he had not been favoured with a list of persons who had found asylum with certain diplomatic missions at Madrid, though that did not mean that he was not aware of the activities of the former.

The Spanish Government had recognized the right of asylum in practice, and if it were desired to open discussion on all the aspects of the problem, in particular its political aspect, he would be ready, on behalf of his Government, to agree to such a discussion with all its consequences. M. Alvarez del Vayo would be prepared to consider whether the right of asylum in practice—and the Spanish Government had accepted it in practice, while not being bound juridically—gave the persons concerned the

right to go on plotting against the Government in the very buildings of the diplomatic representatives.

From the legal standpoint, M. Alvarez del Vayo thought the representative of Chile's conception of extra-territoriality was mistaken. With all due respect to his Chilean colleague, he would venture to say that, in his opinion, M. Edwards was confusing the extra-territoriality of a vessel, which was a part of the national territory, with the extra-territoriality of embassies and diplomatic missions. A picture of the position of the Madrid refugees in asylum had been painted before the Council in dramatic colours, and M. Alvarez del Vayo would not go into that point. He had too clear a sense of his responsibility to yield to the temptation to describe in detail certain facts, which, however, he was quite prepared to place before the President, in his capacity as Rapporteur. In point of fact, Madrid felt very keenly that it was the capital of a State Member of the League of Nations, and that, in normal times, it was only twenty-four hours' journey from the seat of the League; yet it had suffered all the trials he had had the misfortune and sorrow to describe to the Council. The inhabitants of Madrid had an idea—though they had no certain knowledge—of the activities of some of those in asylum. They knew quite well from experience that, when food and other supplies had become scarce, the Spanish Government had granted wide diplomatic privileges. They were not unaware that, in all the legations and embassies where the refugees were residing, the means of subsistence were far more abundant than those available to the population.

During the December session, M. Alvarez del Vayo had made the following statement: "The Spanish Government has defined its position, as regards persons benefiting by the right of asylum in the

embassies, in a note I had the honour to address some weeks ago to the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Madrid. There is no need for me to say that, in accordance with the attitude adopted in this note, I am quite prepared to examine the problem direct with each of the Governments concerned."

M. Alvarez del Vayo had done so, and quite recently had had the pleasure of receiving a message of thanks from the very distinguished Chancellor of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, in which he expressed to the Spanish Government his gratitude for the solution of the problem of those who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations. He had done so also with Mexico, and with other countries, with which he was still in negotiation. He was prepared, moreover, while leaving on one side the abuses that had occurred, to handle the problem individually with all the diplomatic representatives, including those of Chile, and to show all the necessary tact in that very delicate task.

When the Government had assumed responsibility for the conveyance of those who had sought asylum, there had been no incidents connected with their transport, and no abuses. M. Alvarez del Vayo had heard at the present meeting that M. de Madariaga had left Spain because he had felt that he was threatened with death, and that information to that effect had been published in *The Times* of London. But a letter from M. de Madariaga had appeared in the same paper stating that he had left Spain—and he made that statement in London and not in the Via de l'Alcala, Madrid—with all the necessary guarantees and in agreement with the Spanish Government.

There had been negotiations with each Government, and those negotiations had given satisfactory results in the case of the Argentine Republic and

Mexico. The Spanish Government was now about to conclude similar agreements with other diplomatic representatives. M. Alvarez del Vayo was entirely at the disposal of the Chilian Embassy at Madrid to deal with the problem of those in asylum there. But he could not agree that anyone should speak on behalf of a Diplomatic Corps, thus giving the impression, thanks to a skilful arrangement of the names, that the whole Diplomatic Corps was behind the step.

He did not want to use facile arguments, or to reproduce communications he had received from other diplomatic representatives, communications which proved that what had taken place in connection with those in asylum in certain embassies was too well known for all the diplomatic representatives at Madrid to take the responsibility of identifying themselves with an attitude which could not even be justified in some cases. He could not agree to an international decision, binding the Spanish Government to do more than it had done, and more than it could do, for those in asylum. The Spanish Government was prepared to reconsider the problem, and M. Alvarez del Vayo hoped that the whole of the problem could be settled satisfactorily. He would ask the representative of Chile very cordially not to insist on certain aspects of the question. They both had confidence in the complete impartiality of the Rapporteur; M. Alvarez del Vayo would therefore suggest, that the various factors in the problem should be placed before him.

M. EDWARDS did not desire to dwell on certain special aspects of the question of the persons who had been granted asylum; the only thing that interested him was that the problem should be solved as soon as

possible. Like the representative of Spain, he had complete confidence in the President, who was also Rapporteur for the question, and he hoped that, in the course of conversations on the subject, a solution would be reached more rapidly than in a public discussion.

THE PRESIDENT wished first to thank Dr. Lasnet for his additional explanations in regard to the report of the Health Mission to Spain. He was also grateful to those of his colleagues who had spoken on the subject.

As Rapporteur, he would endeavour to formulate a proposal in the light of the observations made and in consultation with his colleagues. That proposal he would present to the Council at a later meeting.

Meeting of January 27th, 1937. The Council Continues its Examination of the Question

THE PRESIDENT said that a letter had been received from the permanent delegate of Iran, in which the latter made a reservation on the subject of a statement made by the representative of Chile before the Council at its third meeting. The text of the letter was as follows:

Geneva, January 27th, 1937.

At the meeting on January 25th, 1937, the representative of Chile informed the Council that the right of asylum had existed in Iran for centuries. The allusion was obviously to the practice of that right in remote times, and not to its present existence in Iran. In order, however, to dispel any misunderstanding, I should like to make it clear that the right of asylum has not for a long time past existed in Iran.

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I should be glad if you would kindly bring this explanation to the notice of the Members of the Council.

(Signed) ABDOLLAH BAHRAMY,
*Permanent Delegate of Iran to
the League of Nations.*

Speaking as Rapporteur, the President added that he had had several conversations with the representatives of Spain and Chile, but had not been able to formulate any resolution; his report would therefore be in the nature of an informatory report, conveying the gist of the conversations which had taken place. His inability to present a draft resolution applied, however, only to the question of the evacuation of persons who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid; the conclusion appearing in the first part of his report in regard to the report of the Health Mission to Spain (Annex 1644, page 206) was merely procedural.

M. EDWARDS observed that, according to the President's statement, the adoption of the Health Mission's report would be merely procedural. Nevertheless, that report asked the League to lend its assistance—presumably, its financial assistance—in connection with the purchase of 200 motor-coaches. Could that be considered as a matter of procedure?

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL pointed out that the Health Mission's report contained a number of observations of varying character, including suggestions such as that to which M. Edwards had just referred. But the fact of the Council taking note of the report and thanking its authors did not imply that the Council approved all the suggestions in the

report and proposed to act on them. The only action which the Council was asked to take was a matter of normal procedure—namely, to refer to the Health Committee a certain number of technical points. The consideration by the Council of the Health Mission's suggestion for the purchase of motor-coaches would require the assent of the Spanish representative, that assent had not been given.

M. COSTA DU RELS remarked that he, for his part, had not yet received the text of any resolution on which to form an opinion. The Council was about to go into public session; its members would therefore have very little time to consider the report and the resolution on which they would have to state their views.

THE PRESIDENT wished it had been possible to present his report earlier. He had, however, been unable to do so, because he had had to discuss matters with the representatives of Chile and Spain.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO pointed out that the question of the motor-coaches was already settled, as he had informed the Council, in his speech on January 25th, of the Spanish Government's decision to purchase the requisite number of cars.

M. EDWARDS said that the Council had reached something in the nature of a deadlock in the matter of the question of the evacuation of the refugees in the embassies and legations; he wondered whether it was in the interest of the Council to consider the question at that day's public meeting or whether it would not be better to postpone it to the following day. The Chilean Government took such a serious

view of the question that he would be compelled, in view of the present *impasse*, to ask his Government for new instructions, unless it was possible to reach an agreement of principle with the Spanish representative before the question came up at the public meeting.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO had no wish to influence the decision of the Members of the Council; but it was right that he should tell the Council that the report communicated to him by the President gave complete satisfaction to the Spanish delegation, and that there was no prospect of any change in that delegation's attitude.

M. COSTA DU RELS considered, after hearing the observations of the Chilean and Spanish representatives, that it was indispensable to make a further effort to reconcile their points of view. He proposed, therefore, to postpone consideration of the question to the end of the public meeting, so as to give the President and the Secretary-General time to see whether it was possible to reach an agreement of principle.

M. LITVINOFF had no objection to the proposal made by the representative of Bolivia; but, in the event of the representatives of Spain and Chile not being able to reach agreement, he wondered whether any purpose would be served by postponing consideration of the question until the following day, when so many delegations had made preparations for their departure from Geneva. If it were only a case of unilateral declarations by the representative of Chile, they could as well be made by means of a letter circulated to the Members of the Council.

M. EDWARDS explained that the Chilian Government regarded the question as a very serious one. As an *impasse* had now been reached in the matter, he would have to ask his Government for special instructions; it was for that purpose that he had proposed the postponement of the question until the following day.

He would not wish to suggest anything that interfered with the arrangements his colleagues might have made to leave Geneva. If his suggestion were considered by the other Members of the Council as inconvenient—though it had usually been the custom of the Council to accede to such suggestions—he would be obliged to make a statement on the question at the public meeting, which would, he feared, not be helpful.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO did not want to give the impression that the situation might change as a result of the adjournment of the meeting. The Spanish Government, which had clearly defined its attitude, was prepared to deal separately with each Government. He did not see how the situation could be modified in twenty-four hours.

Mr. EDEN said it was clear that any Member of the Council had the right to ask for a meeting. If, therefore, the representative of Chile wanted a meeting on the following day, whatever inconvenience might be caused thereby, the Council ought to accede to his request. But Mr. Eden had a practical suggestion to make. There was a rather long agenda before the Council. Would it not be well to deal with it in public session, and then discuss again, in private session, the question of a further meeting in regard to this particular item?

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M. EDWARDS said he would gladly accept Mr. Eden's suggestion.

Mr. Eden's proposal was adopted.

Private Meeting of the Council

In a private session on the same day (January 27th) the Council proceeded with its examination of the question:

The PRESIDENT invited his colleagues to take note of the draft report on this subject which he had prepared for submission at the public meeting. He was glad to say that a good deal of progress had been made since the adjournment of the discussion of this question. He hoped it would be possible to reach a complete understanding.

M. EDWARDS agreed with the President of the Council that some progress had been made in the question of persons in asylum in Madrid, although a completely satisfactory result had not yet been achieved. He hoped, however, to arrive at such a result with the goodwill of the representatives of Spain.

The representatives of the two parties had had interviews with the President of the Council during which they had endeavoured to remove difficulties and find solutions for the points on which the representative of Spain had raised objections.

The chief objection of the representative of Spain concerned international intervention, to which he could not agree. M. Edwards only proposed such intervention as a means of giving security to the refugees when they were being evacuated. He was glad to note that the representative of Spain raised no objection as to the

actual evacuation. If some method other than international intervention could be found to safeguard the refugees, M. Edwards would accept it. He had therefore stated that he would be prepared to agree that Spanish forces, as proposed by the representative of Spain, should be responsible for the safety of the refugees and should guard them until they were able to leave Spanish territory.

M. Edwards had, nevertheless, made the following observation. For some time, there had been guards in the embassies and legations at Madrid who gave full guarantees to the heads of missions. But, according to a telegram he had received from the Ambassador of Chile, who was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, the Commissioner of Public Order in Madrid had, two days previously, withdrawn those guards, replacing them by other forces which did not give the same guarantees. If the safety of the refugees were to be ensured, it must be done with the help of Spanish forces who gave every guarantee to the heads of mission and to the refugees themselves. For that purpose, nothing would be easier than for the Spanish Government to reach agreement with the head of each mission at the time of evacuation.

M. Edwards had again suggested that the Chilean Embassy—he could not speak for the other embassies—should be allowed to add to its staff a few military, naval and air attachés and perhaps two or three secretaries of embassy and legation, to accompany the convoys of refugees protected, as he had just said, by Spanish forces.

The Council would realize that he had gone a long way in attempting to reach agreement with the representative of Spain.

He had understood, from what he had been told by the President of the Council, that the representative

of Spain agreed that the evacuation of all the refugees should be facilitated, provided it was not carried out at once and the same time but in stages, and that the old men, women and children were evacuated first. M. Edwards had accepted that point of view on condition that the evacuation of the other refugees was not deferred for too long.

There did not seem to be any great divergence, on this important question, between the views of the representative of Spain and the statement he himself had made to the Council.

The representative of Spain had then objected to the establishment of a kind of collective agreement for the evacuation of the refugees. He had stated that he was prepared to negotiate, and to reach individual agreements, with each Government and the head of each mission. M. Edwards also agreed to that.

He had only one preoccupation, which he would put frankly before the Council. Chile had taken the initiative in raising this question and had been supported by several countries which were in a similar situation. He had asked for a general agreement in order that he should not appear to be acting without the countries which had supported the Chilean initiative. He did not want it to be thought that he would be satisfied if those in asylum in the Chilean Embassy were saved, no matter what happened to the others. However, to avoid a multilateral agreement, which did not meet with the approval of the representative of Spain, he had declared his willingness to agree that, if an agreement concerning the evacuation of the refugees were reached, those of the Chilean Embassy should be evacuated last. As the Chilean Ambassador was the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, he should be in the same position as the captain of a ship, who was the last to leave.

The question of a guarantee in respect of persons who were able to carry arms had then been raised. The Council was aware that, from the outset, he had suggested that steps should be taken to prevent persons who had been evacuated from taking up arms against the Spanish Government. In raising this purely humanitarian question of persons in asylum, the Chilean Government did not want to create the impression that it might extend some kind of support to the forces fighting against the Spanish Government. That would be quite out of keeping with its attitude of complete neutrality in this dispute. Chile had raised the question, not because she was for or against one or other of the parties, but simply because she felt the situation was very grave and very dangerous and might lead one day, if it were not settled, to unpleasant surprises beyond the control of the Spanish Government.

The representative of Spain had then pointed out to him that there had been no written agreement with other countries and had asked why Chile required a written agreement. He had replied that he did not press that point. What he wanted was an agreement, and the word of the Spanish Government would satisfy him. Agreement must be reached on certain principles which would facilitate evacuation, and immediate evacuation, for the problem was urgent. As to the guarantee, it was sufficient for him that all the discussions should take place in the Council, that the latter should have taken note of them, and that the President of the Council, with his usual understanding and friendliness, should have been good enough to interest himself in the question. It would also suffice, as a guarantee, that the agreement should be carried out in practice. M. Edwards felt bound, however, to remind the Council that if he had some doubt as to

whether effect would be given to the agreement at once, it was because, during the December session of the Council, the representative of Spain had stated that the question would be taken up immediately with the head of each mission. Six weeks had passed: no progress had been made, and some of the notes of the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps had even remained unanswered. It was very natural that he should desire to prevent a repetition of that state of affairs.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO said that the official position of the representative of Spain was clearly described in the report of the President of the Council: he had not a comma to add to or withdraw from that report. That was why he would refrain from entering into a discussion on supplementary interpretations.

He desired, however, to say a few words as to the question just referred to by the representative of Chile in connection with the embassy guards. The Spanish Government was responsible for guarding the embassies and legations. Up to the present, it had carried out that obligation. The choice of guards for one embassy or another was within the competence of the Minister for the Interior, who was responsible for maintaining public order in Spain.

He could assure the representative of Chile that the Spanish Government had no desire to exclude Chile. He was prepared to negotiate with the Chilean Government as with the other Governments. He would be very glad if the representative of Chile would state that he accepted that agreement to negotiate, without entering there and then into the details of the negotiations.

M. EDWARDS agreed with the representative of Spain that the report of the President of the Council

was quite correct and that no change was called for. But it was confined to taking note of what had occurred.

Since it had been drawn up, the representative of Spain had been good enough to state before the Council that he was prepared to negotiate with Chile, as with the other countries, for the evacuation of the refugees. When the report was read in public, could not the Spanish representative's statement be mentioned? That would give the impression, not that nothing had been done, but, on the contrary, that they were on the way to a solution.

In a very friendly spirit, he would ask the representative of Spain to reassure the Chilean Government as to the scope of the statement he had just made. He would ask him to say whether the Spanish Government was prepared to negotiate at once with a view to the rapid evacuation of all the refugees by stages, as the representative of Spain had indicated. M. Edwards would also be glad to know whether his colleague agreed in principle—in principle only—with the general bases he had just laid down, which were very similar to the suggestions made by M. Alvarez del Vayo, since M. Edwards had agreed to a bilateral agreement, and M. Alvarez del Vayo, for his part, had agreed that all the refugees should be evacuated.

The only point on which there might still be a slight divergence of opinion was the method of providing for the security of the refugees awaiting evacuation. It was obvious that the force to be placed at the disposal of the heads of embassies must be chosen by the Spanish Government, since it was responsible for public order, but the choice might be communicated to the heads of missions in order that they might have full assurances.

Furthermore, there would not seem to be any objection to increasing the staff of the Chilean Embassy.

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In the first place, he would propose to send there the Military Attaché who was at present in Paris, but was at the same time Military Attaché at Madrid. Thus, the Military Attaché would simply be returning to his post. M. Edwards would also propose to attach to him two other persons; that was a right exercised by all sovereign States in the capitals in which they had embassies or legations.

He did not think there was any disagreement on other points. Those, then, were the questions he ventured, in a friendly spirit, to put to his colleague.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO observed that, if the report were read carefully, it would be seen that there was a very definite passage to the effect that the Spanish Government was prepared to negotiate with any Government which so desired. The Chilean Government was consequently not excluded, and he saw no need to add a paragraph to the report.

What he was really not prepared to do was to enter there and then into negotiations. The conversation suggested by the Chilean representative would in fact be the beginning of negotiations. Those negotiations must, however, be undertaken in the same way as with other Governments, without unnecessary delay, and with the guarantee that the Spanish Government desired to arrive at an agreement.

Mr. EDEN was reluctant to add anything to the discussion, but it seemed to him that the difference between the representatives of Chile and Spain was nothing like so great as the speeches led one to believe. The concluding paragraph of the report, both representatives are actuated by the same humanitarian motives, and I believe that direct negotiations, which I hope will be begun at the earliest possible moment,

should make it possible to settle the problem of the evacuation of the refugees in the Chilian Embassy to the satisfaction of both Governments, seemed to represent the position of both parties, as well as of the other Members at the Council table.

The Spanish Government was prepared to negotiate, and the Chilian Government was agreeable; the only outstanding difference, therefore, was when the negotiations should begin. The representative of Spain had just said—very reasonably—that he would not negotiate there and then, but was prepared to do so in the near future, either at Valencia or Madrid, or at some other place to be agreed upon. Would it not be possible, if that were actually the only divergence, to bridge that rather small gap?

M. EDWARDS said that if the date and place of the negotiations could be fixed, a definite result would have been achieved. But the whole question would be left in suspense if it were merely stated that the parties were prepared to negotiate. He added that he was in possession of full powers from his Government to negotiate an agreement. He was therefore ready to begin conversations at once.

M. LITVINOFF suggested that, if a stage had been reached at which a settlement on the substance of the question could be left to direct negotiations between the representatives of Chile and Spain, they might also be left to settle the lesser question of the date of the negotiations.

M. EDWARDS saw no reason why the date and place of the negotiations should not be agreed upon with the representative of Spain at once, since it was clear that the representatives of the two countries were prepared to negotiate.

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M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO said he was prepared to reach an understanding and to negotiate with the representative of Chile. He would agree to any proposal M. Edwards cared to make as to the place for the negotiations. But it would be difficult for him to fix the date at once.

M. EDWARDS thanked the representative of Spain for leaving the choice of place to him. The date was more important than the place, however. The problem was an urgent one. The refugees were in permanent danger. Madrid was bombed and shelled daily; there were disturbances. The question of the date could not be left unsettled. Naturally, the representative of Spain could not fix a definite day for the opening of negotiations. But could he not say that they would begin, for instance, in the coming week? That would not seem to be asking too much.

As to the place, seeing that he had full powers from his Government, he would suggest London, if that were agreeable to the representative of Spain. There he would be able to get into touch with the Ambassador of Spain, with whom he entertained the most friendly relations.

M. Edwards did not press for a statement on that point at the public meeting. He merely asked the representative of Spain to give him an assurance that the negotiations would begin in London in the coming week.

The PRESIDENT said that, after hearing the further observations of the representatives of Chile and Spain, he agreed with the United Kingdom representative that there was really very little difference of opinion between them. A further step forward had now

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been made, since there was agreement, not only to negotiate, but to negotiate at any place suggested by the representative of Chile.

There only remained the question of the date, and he wondered whether the Council could not rely on the goodwill and spirit of conciliation of the two parties to reach agreement on that point also.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO said it was agreed that the negotiations should take place in London. As to the date, he assured the representative of Chile that, as soon as he reached Valencia, he would give the necessary instructions.

M. EDWARDS said he was satisfied with the Spanish representative's statement that, as soon as he reached Valencia, he would give instructions for negotiations on the question of persons in asylum. He could not—must not—ask more. He therefore accepted the suggestion.

He would merely ask whether the President of the Council could not say briefly, at the end of his report, that during the private meeting it had been agreed to negotiate? That would give the impression that something had been achieved.

M. LITVINOFF saw no objection to acceding to the request of the representative of Chile.

The PRESIDENT said he would act accordingly. He was very happy to observe that, thanks to the spirit of conciliation shown by the two parties, agreement had been reached.

(The Council went into public session.)

Conclusions Regarding the Health Mission

The PRESIDENT presented the following report:

I

The Council has examined the report of the Health Mission (Annex 1644, page 206) sent to Spain by the Health Organization in execution of its resolution of December 12th, 1936. It will assuredly desire to pay a tribute to the authors of the report—Dr. Lasnet, Dr. Wroczyński and Dr. Laigret. They have made a very fully documented and valuable study, the utility of which has been emphasized by the representative of Spain and our Rapporteur on health questions, the representative of New Zealand.

The representative of Spain has told us that his Government is taking steps to give effect to the conclusions of the report. In particular, it is anxious to evacuate half the population of Madrid without delay and to procure the transport recommended for that purpose by the Health Mission sent to Spain.

All that the Council need do, I think, is to adopt the procedural resolution that has already been recommended to us by our Rapporteur on health questions—that is to say, to transmit to the Health Committee the chapters of the Health Mission's report dealing with the prevention of epidemics. I may remind you that in one of those chapters the urgency of the typhus question and the necessity of holding a consultation of experts on that subject are emphasized.

As regards the evacuation of persons who have sought asylum in embassies and legations at Madrid,

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the Council has decided to consider this as a humanitarian question connected with the matters dealt with in the Health Mission's report.

Having conversed both with the representative of Spain and with the representative of Chile, who directed the Council's attention to this problem, I am in a position to explain the views of those two representatives. Among the information supplied to me I can, of course, make use only of such as concerns the question of the evacuation of those refugees and the humanitarian aspect of the matter.

The representative of Spain has referred to the statement he made to the Council on December 12th last. He then said that, in accordance with the attitude adopted in the note he had addressed to the members of the diplomatic corps, he was "quite prepared to examine the problem direct with each of the Governments concerned, bearing in mind all its aspects." He added that this method of individual negotiation with the representatives of the Powers concerned had already led to satisfactory results. Agreements had been arrived at with the Argentine and Mexico; further agreements were under discussion, and the Spanish Government was sure that it would also come to agreements with such other Powers as might wish to negotiate with it for the evacuation of persons who had found asylum in their embassies or legations at Madrid.

The representative of Chile stated that he was in entire agreement with the procedure of direct individual negotiations with the Spanish Government. Solely from a humanitarian point of view, however, it seemed to him necessary to obtain certain assurances beforehand. The guarding of the refugees during their transport to the port of embarkation would have to be entrusted to Spanish

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forces in which the embassy or legation concerned would have sufficient confidence; the evacuation of the refugees from the embassy or legation would have to be complete, although it could naturally be carried out by stages; each group of refugees would have to be accompanied by a representative of the embassy concerned and certain embassies might accordingly have to increase their staff on this account. The refugees would have to be evacuated to a country which was not adjacent to Spain, and the representative of Chile, fully appreciating the anxiety that the Spanish Government might feel as regards the future activities of certain of those refugees, proposed that all men capable of bearing arms should be required to reside until the end of the civil war in towns to be specified, in the foreign country to which they had been evacuated. According to the suggestion of the representative of Chile, officials of the League of Nations might be instructed, in agreement with the authorities of the country to which the refugees had been evacuated, to exercise special supervision over them, while they would also be asked to take an oath to take no part in the civil war in Spain.

In the opinion of the representative of Chile, an agreement on those preliminary points would facilitate the separate negotiations of the Spanish Government with his own Government, which, realizing its responsibility towards the other Governments that had supported its *démarche*, would wish them to be treated on an equal footing.

The representative of Spain, on being informed of the point of view of the representative of Chile, said that he was just as desirous as the latter that the separate agreements which he had in view should effectively lead to the evacuation of the

embassies, and legations concerned. In its own territory, the Spanish Government alone was responsible for the safety of the groups of refugees evacuated, and recent experience of the execution of the agreement with the Argentine showed that evacuation could be carried out with all necessary safeguards. But it was precisely because, in agreeing to evacuation, the Spanish Government made itself responsible for the safety of the refugees while evacuation was being carried out that it must be free to decide for itself what were the appropriate measures. The representative of the Spanish Government repeated that he was ready to negotiate an agreement similar to those already concluded with every Government which might so desire.

Both representatives are actuated by the same humanitarian motives, and I believe that direct negotiations, which I hope will be begun at the earliest possible moment, should make it possible to settle the problem of the evacuation of the refugees in the Chilean Embassy to the satisfaction of both Governments.

I will therefore merely ask the Council to take note of this report.

M. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO wished to express his very sincere thanks to the President for the interest he had displayed in the conversations which had taken place. He might have concluded his remarks at once did he not feel obliged to rectify an observation made a few days previously by the representative of Chile.

On that occasion, M. Alvarez del Vayo had carefully avoided taking upon himself the responsibility of complicating the problem or aggravating the situation of the persons who had sought asylum, by

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allowing himself to be drawn into a discussion which might have led to a result just the opposite of what it was desired to achieve. Nor did he propose to adopt that course on the present occasion. He simply wished to rectify a material error in the Chilean representative's conception of the Spanish problem.

M. Edwards had said that the tragic circumstances which were deplored to-day represented an impassioned conflict between two extremist ideological systems. The struggle in Spain was not, as had been represented before the Council, a struggle between two extremist ideologies; it was the criminal act of a handful of madmen, who had taken up arms against a constitutional parliamentary Government representing the sovereign will of the country as expressed in the elections of February 16th, 1936.

M. Alvarez del Vayo was aware that the idea of a red Spain, a chaotic Spain, had been spread abroad in Europe by those to whose interest it was to misrepresent the situation. It might perhaps be discourteous on his part not to accept that opinion and not to be able to show a Spain in which wholesale murder had become the philosophy and practice of the Government, or a Spain in which President Azaña or the leader of the Basque Catholic Party, President Aguirre, had become fierce Communists, or in which Catalonia had declared her independence. He would, however, crave the indulgence of the authors of that myth of a red Spain: the only Spain he had to offer was a democratic parliamentary Spain, the pacifist Spain which he represented on the Council. The rest, the rebel side, had ceased for months past to be Spain and had become only a zone of influence of certain Powers and the instrument, turned against Spain herself, of the forces of aggression and of war.

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M. EDWARDS wished first to express his cordial thanks to the President for the friendly manner in which he had listened to the views of the representative of Spain and his own views on the question of the persons who had taken asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid. He ventured to hope that an agreement might be reached, since it had already been agreed to negotiate without delay. M. Edwards did not think, therefore, that it would serve any useful purpose if he were to deal with the problem in detail again. He hoped that an agreement would be reached which would be satisfactory to both parties.

The representative of Spain had referred to a sentence in M. Edward's speech delivered two days previously. That sentence M. Edwards had uttered incidentally to throw light on a question which was, in his opinion, purely humanitarian in character. He did not propose to follow the Spanish representative in a discussion of the matter on the political plane; that would be incompatible with the spirit in which, as Chilean representative, he had raised the question before the Council. So far as an expression of opinion on the existing situation in Spain was concerned, everyone was free to state his own views.

In conclusion, M. Edwards desired to thank the President again for having set forth so clearly the views of the representative of Spain and his own views.

M. LITVINOFF apologized for intervening at such a late hour, but it was a question of great moment. He wished to refer to the statement made by the representative of Chile at the Council meeting on January 25th. M. Litvinoff had refrained from replying to that statement lest his speech be interpreted as interference in the dispute between the

Spanish and Chilian Governments, in regard to which he was prepared to accept any agreement reached. Now that the settlement of that dispute was well on the way, however, M. Litvinoff ventured to make some remarks concerning the very circumstantial statement made in the Council by the Chilian representative. He was led to do so solely by the apprehension lest the fact that the alleged right of asylum in diplomatic missions had been discussed before the Council should acquire the significance of recognition of that right, as a matter of principle, by organs of the League of Nations.

He therefore thought it necessary once again to confirm what he had already pointed out at a private meeting of the Council as to the absence in international law or practice of any recognition of the right of diplomatic missions to grant asylum to persons seeking refuge from the police or from the judiciary. M. Litvinoff referred, of course, not to the granting of asylum by diplomatic missions, which was occasionally practised, but to any recognition of that right by the State to which the missions were accredited. There had been, in the remote past, cases of such a practice in Europe, but they did not constitute a right, all the more because they had always aroused protests on the part of the interested State, and had even led to calamitous international conflicts. He could quote many instances from international experience in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but would not take up the time of the Council.

M. Litvinoff would refer those interested in the question to the case, for example, of Count Schlieben, who, in 1702, took refuge in the French Embassy at Copenhagen, as a result of which the French Government was obliged to recall its Ambassador, Count Chamilly; and to the case of the Duke of Ripperda,

who took refuge in the house of the British Ambassador at Madrid. The house was surrounded by the Spanish police, and Pipperda was arrested in the embassy building. He would also mention the case of the Russian subject Springer, who took refuge, in 1747, in the British Legation at Stockholm. The Swedish Government requested that Springer be handed over to the Swedish authorities: that was done, and the British Minister was subsequently recalled.

Satow, Pradier-Fodéré and other experts in international law mentioned the aforesaid cases as having laid the foundation of the European practice of non-recognition of the right of asylum. In connection with the case of Nikitchenkov, in 1865, akin to those he had mentioned, the French Court of Cassation laid it down: "*que cette fiction*" (extra-territoriality) "*ne peut être étendue, qu'elle est exorbitante du droit commun, qu'elle se restreint restrictivement à l'ambassadeur et à ceux qui, lui étant subordonnés, sont cependant revêtus du même caractère public.*"

In reality, in modern times no case was known in which the granting of asylum was recognized as a right by the State in which it occurred. Even in Spain, where, as a result of frequent revolutions and civil wars in the nineteenth century, the practice had sometimes varied, there had been such cases as that in which the Spanish Government, in 1848, had searched the house of the Danish Chargé d'Affaires, who had given refuge to insurgents.

Governments of the United States of America had also objected to any right of asylum. Thus, for example, in 1875, Secretary-of-State Fish wrote as follows to the United States Minister in Spain concerning Colonel Borreguero, who had sought refuge in the United States Mission: "It is an annoyance and embarrassment, probably, to the Ministers whose

legations are thus used, but certainly to the Governments of those Ministers, and, as facilitating and encouraging chronic conspiracy and rebellion, it is a wrong to the Government and to the people where it is practised—a wrong to the people, even though the Ministry of the time may not remonstrate looking to the possibility of finding a convenient shelter when their own day of reckoning and of flight may come."

That attitude of the United States of America was summed up by Moore in the following words: "Since the practice of asylum is not sanctioned by international law, it can be defended only on the ground of the consent of the State within whose jurisdiction it is sought to be maintained" (Moore, *Digest*, Vol. ii, § 294).

The same attitude found expression in paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Instructions for diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States (1906).

M. Litvinoff might quote examples of non-recognition of any right of asylum in the practice of Latin-American countries also, including Chile. Thus, in 1891, during a civil war, the Chilean Government, on the plea that refugees and their supporters were abusing the right of asylum, had caused the United States and Spanish Missions to be surrounded. The protest of the American Minister was rejected by the Chilean Foreign Minister. In 1893, during an attempted rising by the supporters of President Balmaceda, the Chilean Government demanded the surrender of the leaders of the insurgents who had taken refuge in the United States Mission. The United States Minister was instructed by his Government to expel the refugees, who were then arrested as they left the Mission.

Naturally, the references of the representative of Chile to some cases in Eastern countries, where the

practice of asylum was intimately connected with the régime of capitulation, could not be accepted as convincing; but, even so, M. Litvinoff felt bound to point out that the granting of asylum by the Russian Legation at Teheran in 1829 had led to the storming of the Legation and the murder of the Russian Minister, the famous writer Griboyedov. But there, too, such cases were a thing of the past, and he was sure that, at the present time, the countries of the East also refused to admit any right of asylum.

The position of this question in international law was definitely set forth in the following words of Professor Strupp: "Limited in the eighteenth century to the building of the Mission, and then subject to dispute, the right of diplomatic asylum has disappeared from the international law of the European States, so that a criminal taking refuge in the building of a legation must be surrendered to the local authorities without any process of extradition."

The majority of European authors severely condemned the practice. Phillimore called it a "monstrous and unnecessary abuse of what is called the right of asylum." The same view was expressed by such authorities on international law as Martens, Klüber, Heffter, Blüntschi, Wheaton, Fradier-Fodéré and Satow.

Summing up his remarks, M. Litvinoff affirmed that, while the granting of asylum had sometimes been practised by diplomatic representatives, often even without the knowledge of their Government, that could not in any way create a principle of international law, the more so because the practice was always, or in the overwhelming majority of cases, accompanied by protests and objections from the Governments on the spot.

He therefore held it to be quite obvious that to raise in the League of Nations, the question of recognizing a right of asylum would not, under any circumstances, be justified, either by international law or by international practice: and therefore that such a practice could be tolerated only by the goodwill and free consent of the interested Government.

M. COSTA DU RELS recalled that at the Council's session in December last, he had supported, in the name of his Government, the action taken by the Chilean Government. That action had been determined by strictly humanitarian reasons, and it was from that point of view that M. Costa du Rels had given his cordial and complete co-operation. In perusing the document now before the Council, he desired, therefore, to bear in mind only the strictly humanitarian aspect, for, as he had already said in private session—and he thought his colleagues shared that view—the question now under consideration must be stripped of all political significance in order to eliminate dangerous and delicate considerations.

The Bolivian Government's attitude towards the question of those who had sought asylum in the embassies and legations at Madrid was determined, as M. Costa du Rels had already told the Council, by one principle, which, for Bolivia, was a direct heritage from Spain: the principle of honour. Bolivia could not be found lacking in that sentiment—the word honour still had some meaning and practical significance in that country—by closing its doors to those who knocked.

M. Costa du Rels added that he had viewed with much sympathy and satisfaction the way in which the President had conducted negotiations between the representative of Chile and the representative of

Spain, whose goodwill had been evident at the private meeting of the Council. He therefore noted with great satisfaction the penultimate paragraph of the report, which provided for future negotiations with the Spanish Government with a view to a rapid evacuation of those unfortunate persons who had found refuge in the embassies and legations accredited to the Spanish Government. It was on those lines that the Bolivian Government also hoped very shortly to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the question in co-operation with the Spanish Government, for M. Costa du Rels had had every reason, up to the present, to appreciate the cordial promises made through the intermediary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. GASTELÚ said that the Government of Ecuador, which had supported the representative of Chile as regards the humanitarian aspect of the question of persons who had sought asylum, noted with pleasure that it had been possible to arrive at an agreement of principle, and he trusted that the substance of the problem might be favourably settled at an early date.

M. EDWARDS desired to say just a few words in reply to the representative of Soviet Russia, as he believed it would be discourteous not to do so.

M. Edwards had not raised in the League the question of the recognition by the League of the right of asylum. That, of course, was not a question to be brought before the League, and in that sense he quite agreed with the representative of Soviet Russia, since the question was one to be decided by each Government individually. But he desired to call the attention of the representative of Soviet Russia to the fact that the right of asylum existed and was exercised, and he might say what Galileo had said when he was con-

demned to death for maintaining that the earth went round the sun. He said, "E pur si muove." At the moment when the Soviet representative was condemning to death the right of asylum, M. Edwards could only say that it was being exercised.

M. Edwards would be very glad indeed to examine carefully the cases which the Soviet representative had been good enough to bring to the notice of the Council. He was quite sure he would learn a great deal by reading M. Litvinoff's statement; but he must add that there were certain facts on which the representative of Soviet Russia had been misinformed. He referred particularly to the cases of asylum in the United States Embassy in 1891 in Chile, for it just happened that one of the persons who had taken refuge in that Embassy had been M. Edward's own father, and M. Edwards had been very near to him. He could assure M. Litvinoff that there was no such thing as the right of asylum not being recognized by President Balmacédo at that time—far from it. The right of asylum in that particular case had been most striking. It had been so much respected that his father had been taken from the United States Embassy under the protection of the United States Ambassador, in a train on which the American flag had been hoisted, so that the right of asylum had been extended to the railroad until they reached the port where they had embarked.

M. Edwards wished merely to add that, as in the above case, there might be other cases in which the Soviet representative had been misinformed. He had quoted a great number of authors who considered that the right of asylum was non-existent and was even a monstrosity. Of course, it was well known that authors of international law usually disagreed among themselves, and M. Edwards thought he could

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quote (though not at the moment, for it would take time) a great many other authors who thought the opposite; for that reason, it had never been possible to arrive at a codification of international law.

In conclusion, M. Edwards thanked the Council for its patience in listening to him, and M. Litvinoff for the trouble he had taken in studying the point raised by the Chilean representative.

M. LITVINOFF wished only to say that the cases he had cited from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had not been taken from his personal experience, nor had he been a witness of the case that had occurred in Chile. He knew there had been a fugitive named Edwards, but he had not been the only one: there had been others who had met with a different fate. The Council would probably be very thankful to M. Edwards for his correction on those points. The representative of Chile had spoken of the practice of the right of asylum. But not everything which was being done was legal. Some time previously one of the embassies had attempted to send out a woman in the diplomatic mail. It did not follow that embassies had the right to send out human beings in that way.

M. UNDÉN desired to express his satisfaction at the preliminary agreement which had just been reached, and to pay a tribute to the representative of Spain, who had not confined himself to the strictly legal aspect of the question, but had agreed to negotiate with various Governments in a spirit of goodwill and on practical lines.

The PRESIDENT, speaking as Rapporteur, thanked the representatives of Spain and Chile for their kind words in his behalf. He desired also to express his appreciation of the spirit of conciliation which

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had animated them both and of their confidence in him during all the conversations which he had had with them. His gratitude was due also to his colleagues who had assisted him in bringing about an agreement.

As appeared very clearly in the report, the question before the Council was purely humanitarian in character, and it was only on humanitarian grounds that he had dealt with it in his report. The President was therefore the more glad that his report had been approved by the representatives of Spain and Chile, who were both inspired by the same humanitarian sentiments.

The conclusions of the report were adopted.

Communications from the Representatives of Spain and Chile on the Council, following upon the Reference made by the Representative of Chile in his Speech to the Departure from Spain of M. de Madariaga

LETTER FROM THE SPANISH REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Geneva, January 26th, 1937.

In a speech which he made yesterday in the Council on the question of persons who have been given asylum, the Chilean representative stated that Don Salvador de Madariaga had been "threatened with death and obliged to leave Spain."

In my reply, I have already drawn attention to the inaccuracy of this statement, referring to a letter published by M. de Madariaga himself in *The Times*, of London, but having been taken unawares by so unexpected an allegation, I was unable to give the Council chapter and verse regarding this letter.

I am now able to forward to you its text, which abundantly proves the complete inaccuracy of the

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statement made by the Chilian representative on the Council—an inaccuracy which is, unfortunately, not the only one which might be noted in his speech.

The following is the text of M. de Madariaga's letter sent to the Editor of *The Times*, of London, on August 7th, 1936, from Geneva, and published by that journal on the 11th.

[*Original text.*]

Geneva, August 7th, 1936.

SIR,

If only out of fairness to the Spanish Government, I hope you will allow me to correct a reference to me in your admirable leader of August 5th.

I have not "felt obliged to escape." Having first fully ascertained at the proper quarters that my stay in Spain—where I had gone from Geneva for a brief holiday—could serve no useful purpose, I asked and obtained from the Government the necessary facilities for returning to Geneva, where pressing international work was awaiting me.

Yours truly,

(*Signed*) S. DE MADARIAGA.

As this is a question which closely concerns my Government, I would request you to communicate the present letter to all States Members of the League of Nations.

(*Signed*) JULIO ALVAREZ DEL VAYO.

LETTER FROM THE CHILIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

London, January 30th, 1937.

I have read with interest the communication dated the 26th instant addressed to you by His Excellency

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M. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, concerning a passage in my speech in which I referred to M. de Madariaga.

Although it is true that M. de Madariaga sent the letter quoted by the representative of Spain to *The Times*, and that M. de Madariaga stated that he had not been obliged to take refuge abroad, I have been informed of the reasons which compelled him to leave his country.

Briefly, the information I have received is as follows. A few days before July 18th, M. de Madariaga published in the newspaper *Ahora* an article surveying the points of resemblance and of difference between Fascism and Communism: whereupon another newspaper, *Claridad*, which was in very close touch with certain members of the Spanish Government and was at that time edited by M. Araquistain, published a series of articles, beginning on July 22nd, in which M. de Madariaga was accused of being a Fascist and the people were recommended to proceed against him as he deserved. M. de Madariaga asked for Government protection, but the Government merely recommended him to go abroad and gave him the necessary safe-conduct from the Revolutionary Workers' Associations, without which his diplomatic passport was valueless.

Furthermore, it appears from M. de Madariaga's letter that his statements refer to the Madrid Government, whereas my remarks were confined to groups and authorities over which the Government has no control, as is made very clear by the text of my speech.

Apart, however, from M. de Madariaga's case, which I quoted merely to illustrate the situation existing in Madrid and certain other parts of Spain, there are other equally striking cases. The day I left Geneva, I received a letter from Dr. Gregorio

Marañon, who is well known as one of the most distinguished men in Spain and has been a republican and a democrat all his life. I enclose an extract from Dr. Marañon's letter and a translation of the paragraphs dealing with the question of the refugees in the embassies and legations at Madrid; for it affords the most conclusive evidence of the truth of all the statements that I had the honour to make to the Council at its meeting on January 25th.

I would ask you to be good enough to circulate my communication and the annex thereto to the Members of the Council. The letter from His Excellency M. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, was circulated on the very evening on which the ninety-sixth session of the Council ended, but it is only to-day that I have seen that letter and can send you my reply.

(Signed) AGUSTIN EDWARDS.

Paragraphs from the Letter Addressed by Dr. Gregorio Marañon to the Representative of Chile on the Council of the League of Nations on January 26th, 1937, Dealing with the Question of the Refugees in the Embassies and Legations at Madrid

In speaking to you, I am uninfluenced by any political considerations. As a doctor, however, I have been continually visiting nearly all the embassies in Madrid to see the sick refugees, and I know precisely what I am talking about. I left Madrid only a month ago. Moreover, what I am saying to you, I said personally to one of the Ministers of the Popular Front Government before it left for Valencia.

It is absolutely true—although the Government, doubtless in all good faith, believes otherwise—that very few of the refugees can be regarded as belonging

to the Right. The majority of them are persons appalled by the daily spectacle of persecutions extending to lifelong liberal and even republican circles. To conceal this would be a crime against the truth, and against a truth that constitutes the essential fact in the Spanish revolution. I cannot give you the names of the persons of the Left, and absolute neutrals, who have had to go into hiding in the reasonable fear of losing their lives, either because they have been personally persecuted or because they have witnessed at first hand the persecution of their relatives; but I know that I have only to tell you the facts and you will believe me. It is quite possible that I may never return to Spain, precisely because I might find it difficult to live there, even if I wished, without daily surrendering the right to tell the truth. Wherever I may be, I shall tell it as long as I live. I tell you now that, except for a small number, the refugees in the foreign embassies are there under the most elementary right of asylum; and, in my view, those few others are likewise entitled to it, because only an inhuman mentality can hold that those who think differently from ourselves deserve to be condemned to death. Since this tolerance was the fundamental ideal of many of us, we feel it as a tragedy that the denial of that ideal is now regarded as natural. For that reason, nearly all those Spaniards of the Left, whose left-wing views did not stretch to witnessing crime with folded arms, are now refugees or voluntary exiles.

I do not know the exact facts of the Madariaga case, but you have plenty of choice among the dozens and dozens of professors of the Spanish universities—nearly 80%—most of them liberals and republicans, who are now living in France or elsewhere abroad, and even more among the republican ex-Ministers and the ex-Ministers of the Popular Front itself,

who, on various pretexts, are absent from the democratic and parliamentary Republic, and do not wish to return. It is absolutely certain that many of those refugees and absentees have had to seek foreign aid on account of denunciations in the official newspapers.

Remember that I am not speaking as one who has abandoned his lifelong ideas, but, being faithful to them now as ever, I cannot convert them to the service of violence, arbitrary rule and fanaticism—that is to say, of all that I have always fought and shall fight to my dying day.

Whatever you can do to help the refugees in Madrid will be a work worthy of that which the representatives of foreign countries are doing—nearly all of them, at any rate, and more especially those of the American republics, which Spaniards have now learnt to love because they have not forgotten that the respect for human life is so sacred that, without it, all our ideas would serve only, as our friend Galdos (who also would be in hiding to-day) put it, “to manure the fields.”

(Signed) GREGORIO MARAÑON.

Report on the Health Mission in Spain

(DECEMBER 28TH, 1936, TO JANUARY 15TH, 1937)

LETTER FROM DR. A. LASNET (AND HIS ASSISTANT, DR. LAIGRET) AND DR. C. WROCZYNSKI, MEMBERS OF THE HEALTH MISSION TO SPAIN, TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Geneva, January 18th, 1937.

We have the honour to present herewith our report on the health mission which you instructed us to undertake in Spain and which we carried out from December 29th, 1936, the date of our arrival at

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Valencia, to January 13th, 1937, the date of our departure from Barcelona; the chronological record of our proceedings has been set forth in an addendum annexed hereto (Addendum No. 1, page 207).

Owing to the shortness of our stay, we were unable to make an exhaustive investigation and to submit findings as detailed as we would have wished concerning the situation in the matter of health and the effect that the movement of refugees may have upon this in all the provinces that remain under the authority of the Government. At the same time, we have been able to gain a sufficiently clear idea of that situation and its requirements; it is these impressions that we beg to lay before you, supported by such evidence as we have been able to collect.

The *state of health* is satisfactory and appears to have been affected neither by the disturbances that have occurred nor by the accompanying movements of the population; nowhere, not even at Madrid, has any epidemic focus been reported; in particular, there have been no cases of typhus. It may be well to add that the health equipment of Spain is already fairly complete and that, in the provinces, public health supervision is efficiently conducted; moreover, medical personnel are available in fairly large numbers, their professional standards are good, they show great devotion to the common weal and appeared to us to be in every way suitable for the special requirements of the present time.

The *public health services*, under the energetic guidance of Mme. Montseny, are at present in process of reorganization, considerable attention being given to hygiene, social medicine and health education. Political trade-union influences are of course not left out of account, but—and this appears to us

essential—it may be definitely asserted that the whole system is based upon the work of specialists; it is they who, at the Ministry, draw up the plans the execution of which depends for the most part, in the provinces, upon the co-operation of the medical profession.

The *evacuation of refugees*, a matter of great importance to public health, engaged our earnest attention. This is one of the most difficult problems that the Spanish Government has been called upon to solve; it has succeeded in doing so by precarious means, thanks to the work of the special all-party Committees and thanks to the spirit of solidarity of the population. The total number of refugees already distributed exceeds one million, a figure which reflects the severe character of the struggle. The refugees are either received in families or housed in buildings intended for collective purposes.

This total represents 10% of the population. It would seem that numbers up to 15% could be accommodated with no great difficulty; above this level, absorption will become difficult.

The *position of Madrid* is wholly paradoxical: this great city which skirts the battle-line and is exposed to shelling and air bombing continues to live a highly active life with a population of 1,200,000 inhabitants that is unprotected against the fire and has already suffered severely.

This population is in good health, and, despite the absence of meat, is adequately nourished; its morale remains excellent and it has no desire to leave. But the danger is serious and may swiftly increase, and we have emphasized the need for easing the situation by evacuating half of this population.

Such an undertaking calls for the provision of means of evacuation, and, in our report, we draw

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attention to the need for helping the Spanish Government to procure 200 motor-coaches to be allocated exclusively to the refugee evacuation services.

The conclusions to be drawn from our mission may be summed up as follows:

(1) Reinforcement of the organization of public health services and development of vaccinations of the most essential kinds (smallpox and typhoid fever);

(2) Careful preparation of the organization required to prevent the development of typhus fever and the drawing-up of plans for the vaccination of the population in the event of an epidemic outbreak;

(3) Reduction of the numbers at present living in Madrid by the rapid evacuation of half of the inhabitants and, to that end, facilities for the Spanish Government to purchase the necessary motor-coaches;

(4) With a view to continuing the rehousing of refugees, the preparation in all areas of a detailed inventory of available accommodation, and the equipment of collective establishments (in particular barracks and convents) in order to turn them to the best possible advantage;

(5) Arrangements for the distribution of food, allowing for the presence of refugees, and the procuring from outside of foodstuffs of which there is, or will be, a shortage;

(6) In view of the dearth of means of transport for the wounded, facilities for the Spanish Government to purchase the motor-ambulances which its medical service requires.

The day before leaving Valencia, we handed to M. del Vayo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the letter,

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of which a copy is appended (Addendum No. 2, page 209), in which we set forth the measures most urgently required for the safeguarding of public health, the prevention of typhus and evacuation from Madrid. The Spanish Government has thus already been able to proceed without delay to various decisions concerning:

The partial evacuation of Madrid;
The organization of delousing services;
The sending of a Spanish doctor to one of the institutes that prepare anti-typhus vaccine.

In conclusion we feel it our duty to pay a tribute to the courtesy and consideration that we received at the hands of all concerned. M. del Vayo, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mme. Montseny, Minister of Public Health, were particularly helpful to us, and the whole medical profession met us in a spirit of friendship. The President of the Republic himself expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which M. del Vayo's request for humanitarian assistance had been received by the League of Nations; finally, in the various Committees with which we had dealings, we found the same feelings of confidence and even of gratitude.

(Signed) LASNET,
WROCZYNSKI,
LAIGRET.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF THE MISSION

The Mission, consisting of:

Medical Inspector-General LASNET, Member of the Academy of Medicine;

Dr. WROCZYNSKI, former Director-General of Public Health in Poland;

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Dr. LAIGRET, Head of Laboratory at the Tunis Pasteur Institute,

left Paris on December 28th at 7.55 p.m. by the Toulouse express.

December 29th: Departure from Toulouse by Air-France; arrival at midday at ALICANTE, where the members of the Mission were received by M. HERRERO of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and Professor CUATRECASAS, representative of the Ministry of Public Health.

M. Herrero and Professor Cuatrecasas were attached to the Mission throughout its stay in Spain.

Visit to the Governor of the Province of Alicante.

Departure by motor for VALENCIA, where the Mission arrived at 7 p.m.

December 30th: Visit to M. DEL VAYO, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who gave the Mission a warm welcome and introduced it to the Minister of Public Health, Mme. Federica MONTSENY. In the most cordial manner, Mme. Montseny explained the work of reorganization she is pursuing; she introduced her principal collaborators and placed their services at the Mission's disposal for any information it might require. Work began immediately with a lecture describing the principles of social progress, health education and preventive defence on which the new public health organization is based as well as the practical means that are brought to bear in co-operation with all the syndicalist, political and educational circles capable of exercising any influence.

In the afternoon, there was a long talk with the National Refugees Committee, whose Vice-Chairman, M. LUELMO Y LUELMO, described the machinery set up to collect, evacuate and shelter the populations fleeing from the firing line.

Visit, under the guidance of the Director, Dr. PEZET, to the Valencia Provincial Health Institute and to the Institute's departments dealing with social medicine, the testing of drinking-water and the production of vaccines and sera.

At 7 p.m., reception at the Institute of Culture, recently created to provide a meeting-place for intellectual workers in premises providing all facilities for consulting documentation and for work. The Mission was welcomed by the Professors of the Faculty of Madrid who had sought refuge at Valencia, by those of Valencia and by numerous hospital doctors, engineers, etc. Speeches of welcome by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Education, and the representatives of the medical profession; reply by M. Lasnet.

December 31st: Continuation of the lecture on the public health organization and on the health equipment of the country. At the end of the morning, visit to a marine sanatorium transformed by the International Red Relief organization into a people's hospital, one floor of which is fitted out for the wounded and another for tuberculous children evacuated from Madrid.

At 2 p.m., luncheon given by the Foreign Minister, M. del Vayo, Mme. Montseny and the Ministers of Finance, Propaganda and Agriculture also being present. Speech by M. del Vayo; reply by M. Lasnet.

Afternoon spent in visiting refugee services at Valencia; reception and sorting service at the station; conveyance of refugees to the former Children's Home, Refugees Hospital at the Sanchis Bergon Charity Home; others moved on to the Home for the Aged.

January 1st: Interview at the War Ministry with the Chief of the Military Medical Service, Colonel

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CERRADA, who made a statement to the members of the Mission on the reorganization of the health equipment of the troops. At the end of the morning, visit to the Valencia Military Hospital.

January 2nd: Departure from Valencia by motor. Arrival at MADRID at nightfall. The Mission was accompanied during this journey by the representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Public Health, M. Herrero and M. Cuatrecasas. A delegation on the National Refugees Committee also joined the Mission at Madrid.

On arrival, visit to General MIAJA's headquarters; conversation on the evacuation of the civil population of Madrid.

January 3rd: Discussion on the subject of evacuation, attended by the delegates of the National and Local Committees.

Visit to several provision stores and to the principal market.

Afternoon, at the town hall, interview with the Alcalde, M. REDONDO.

At the end of the day, in company with the Councillor of the French Embassy, visit to accommodation provided for persons who had taken refuge in that Embassy.

January 4th: Visit to the Hospital for Infectious Diseases and the Tuberculosis Hospital of Madrid. The Mission then had a conference at the Hospital for Infectious Diseases, with the Medical officers responsible for detecting, isolating and treating contagious cases.

Just as this conference was coming to an end, the town was bombed by aircraft. The Mission proceeded to the points hit by projectiles, watched the work of the relief sections and visited the wounded in the hospitals where they had been taken. This oppor-

tunity was taken to make a detailed visit of the Obrero Hospital in the working-class quarter of Tetuan, where the bombing had made the greatest number of victims.

In the afternoon, conference with Dr. LUENGO and Dr. TORRES, regarding requirements in sera and vaccines and the production facilities available in the country. Visit to the premises in which the central epidemiological services will be installed. Visit to the Institute of Applied Therapeutics, to which the National Institute of Hygiene has just been transferred.

January 5th: Conference on the Madrid food supplies with the members of the Committee responsible for these supplies.

Visit to a transit shelter established in an old convent. Inspection of a lorry full of refugees about to start.

Visit to the military delousing station transferred from Carabanchel to Madrid, and of the public baths converted into delousing stations by the Municipality.

Visit to the Gas-gangrene Hospital.

General visit of the town to inspect the sanitary conditions, the protection provided against bombardments and the food stocks of the shops.

In the evening, M. Lasnet had an interview with the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps.

January 6th: Visit to the prison described as prison No. 1 of Madrid; inspection of the conditions of hygiene and nutrition of the prisoners.

The Mission left Madrid at 10 a.m. by the Alcázar Road.

At ALCÁZAR, visit to the transit shelter and to the provincial hospital.

Arrival in the evening at ALBACETE, where the Mission spent the night in the same premises in which

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the refugees are sheltered, and was thus able to witness arrivals and departures and to study the operation of the service at close quarters.

January 7th: Visit at ALBACETE to the transit shelter, the town dispensary and the provincial hospital.

Visit to the Provincial Governor.

Mission returned to VALENCIA.

January 8th: Collection of supplementary information necessary for the Mission.

Farewell luncheon given by Mme. Montseny, Minister of Public Health, the Ministers of Industry and Labour and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs being also present.

Visit to two villages in the neighbourhood of Valencia, where the Mission studied the conditions of rehousing of refugees.

January 9th-11th: Continuation of the work of documentation. Interviews with the Directorates of the Spanish Red Cross and of the International Red Relief organization.

January 12th: Departure from Valencia.

The Mission proceeded to BARCELONA by car.

Audience granted by His Excellency the President of the Republic at the Parliament Palace of the Generalitat.

January 13th: At Barcelona, visit to two establishments for refugee children from Madrid. Visit to the hospital for infectious diseases and to the Olympic Stadium, converted into a central station for the distribution of refugees.

Departure by air for Toulouse.

January 15th: Meeting of the three members of the Mission at Geneva.

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LETTER HANDED TO M. DEL VAYO, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS HEALTH
MISSION ON ITS DEPARTURE FROM VALENCIA

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Valencia, January 11th, 1937

*Dr. Lasnet, Dr. Wroczynski and Dr. Laigret, Members
of the League of Nations Health Mission, to the
Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Valencia.*

SIR,

We have now almost completed the work of surveying the health situation with which we were entrusted by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations at the request of your Government; there still remain a few particulars for us to obtain in Catalonia, after which we shall return to Geneva.

For the moment, we are unable to communicate our report to you, since it will not be finally drafted until after our return, and we imagine that it will then be sent to you by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

We can, however, say at once how happy we have been to note the great effort that has been made to provide your country with a sound public health machinery. The work of organization that is at present being performed by the Minister of Public Health, Mme. Montseny, with the assistance of the whole medical profession, marks a great step forward in this direction.

As a body, the Spanish doctors show a devotion and a vigilance which impressed us greatly; it is they who, to a large extent, deserve the credit for the maintenance of the satisfactory standard of health

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which has been observed everywhere, even at Madrid, since the outbreak of hostilities.

We have felt it necessary, however, to make certain recommendations for the maintenance of this situation and for the avoidance of the risk of epidemics that might be entailed by the prolongation of hostilities. The following are the main points which we intend to stress:

(1) Reinforcement of the organization of public health services in the provinces, and the increase of vaccinations of the most important kinds;

(2) Since typhus remains the disease most to be dreaded in countries which are in a state of war, careful preparation of all the equipment that might become necessary to combat it, bearing in mind that all anti-typhus work must be based upon louse control and that plans for vaccination should be put in hand as soon as the first cases occur;

(3) In view of the serious menace overhanging Madrid, emergency action to reduce the numbers at present living there, recourse being had for preference to motor-coaches for purposes of evacuation.

In conclusion we would ask you, Sir, as well as the Minister for Public Health, to accept the assurances of our deep gratitude for all the facilities you have extended to us, and for the attentions you have shown us.

(Signed) Dr. LASNET,
Dr. WROCZYNSKI,
Dr. LAIGRET.

Full Report on the Health Mission to Spain —

FIRST PART.—PUBLIC HEALTH ORGANIZATION IN SPAIN.

The first general impression which the mission gained at the outset of its enquiries and which it was able to confirm in the course of its visits to numerous hospitals and institutions of all kinds is that the Spanish health services constitute an organization which has, for some considerable time past, been very complete in point both of extension and of detailed elaboration.

Long before the war, every one of the fifty Spanish provinces was provided with a *provincial medical organization* comprising a provincial hospital and a provincial institute of hygiene. Associated with this central nucleus in the chief town of each province, there were bacteriological and chemical laboratories, a polyvalent dispensary, a statistical department, and institutions for the aged, the insane and abandoned children.

Below the level of provincial organization, there was a system of *communal health equipment*. In principle, each Spanish commune should have a hospital and a doctor, and this principle has been adhered to everywhere except in the very small centres.

Under direct Government control, there were large *hospitals* (National Hospital for Infectious Diseases, Trachoma Hospital, Cancer Hospital, Madrid Tuberculosis Hospital), a leprosarium (at Alicante), sanatoria and *national scientific institutions* (National Institute of Hygiene, Institute of Applied Therapeutics).

The staff available comprised about 20,000 doctors, doctors of medicine of the faculties of Madrid, Valla-

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dolid, Valencia, Salamanca, Santiago, Seville, Cadiz, Granada, Saragossa and Barcelona; assistant doctors, the *practicantes*, who are similar to the *officiers de santé* and are trained in the faculties of medicine; and numerous hospital and visiting nurses.

On the outbreak of the revolution, the Republic was abruptly deprived of a large proportion of its medical resources. It lost almost the whole of its army medical service, which had to be built up entirely afresh. There remained some 10,000 civilian practitioners, and it is they who have carried out, under the most difficult conditions, the scheme of reorganization and adaptation which we propose to describe below. Before proceeding to do so, we should like to remark that they do the greatest credit to the Spanish medical profession, and justify every confidence in the future of the nation's health.

A. Health Machinery at present available for the Needs of the Civilian Population.

Throughout the interior of the Government zone, the provincial and communal health organizations continue to operate. The staff is adequate. Enough buildings have been requisitioned for new hospitals to be set up if required, and there is no lack of bedding.

In Madrid, the following hospitals are working under normal conditions for the civilian population: Chamartin de la Rosa Popular Hospital, Railway Hospital, Antonio Coll, C.N.T. Catering Trades Union Hospital, Ritz Hotel Hospital, Infectious Diseases Hospital, Tuberculosis Hospital, Venereal Disease Hospital, Trachoma Hospital, Children's Hospital, Psychiatric Hospital.

The total number of beds available in these hospitals is about 6,000.

We visited the National Infectious Diseases Hospital and the Tuberculosis Hospital at Madrid.

The *National Infectious Diseases Hospital* is a fine building erected in 1925, a little outside the city. Though less than three kilometres from the lines, it has not, as yet, suffered from bombardment. It consists of a number of separate blocks, fitted up on entirely modern lines. The first of these is an isolation and observation block, in which patients are placed before their complaint has been diagnosed; each room contains three beds. In a second block, the patients, after diagnosis, are grouped eight in a room—*e.g.*, eight diphtheria or eight typhoid cases together. Unfortunately, owing to circumstances, it is now sometimes necessary to depart from this excellent practice. The hospital was built for 600 patients, but held as many as 1,200 in September, and is still filled beyond its normal capacity. This is not due to any recrudescence of infectious diseases, but to the fact that cases of all kinds, and even wounded men during a certain period, have been admitted. This resulted in a definite, though by no means alarming, degree of overcrowding, which still continues.

Near this hospital is the *Tuberculosis Hospital*, another fine building. It serves as a sanatorium, and, despite the state of war, it still holds 200 cases of tuberculosis. The bedrooms and dining-rooms are cheerfully, even luxuriously, decorated. The open-air wards in which the patients take their treatment, to the sound of gunfire in the immediate neighbourhood, are freely exposed to the sun. The surgical and radiological equipment is magnificent. There is an annex in the form of a pavilion which serves as a sanatorium for sixty children.¹

¹ It would be desirable for the children to be removed to some institution in the interior as soon as possible.

In view of the present importance of the question of epidemics, we devoted special attention to the *laboratories*, principally those of Madrid and Valencia, from the standpoint both of the *detection of infectious cases* and of the *production of vaccines and sera*.

In ordinary times—before the outbreak of hostilities—the detection of infectious cases was carried out in the city of Madrid and the surrounding province by medical practitioners and municipal medical officers. Madrid was divided into ten districts, each of which was under the supervision of municipal medical officers of health. As soon as a suspected case of infectious disease was noted, the alarm was given either to the Municipal Laboratory or to the Provincial Inspectorate of Health; these two institutions worked hand in hand and reported to each other daily on their investigations. Samples taken by the medical inspectors of the Municipal Laboratory were analysed there, and, if necessary, the patients were at once taken to the Infectious Diseases Hospital.

At the beginning of November, the Municipal Laboratory came under the fire of the besieging army, and had to be evacuated. The Provincial Laboratory had to be abandoned for the same reason, and almost at the same time. The National Institute of Hygiene in turn was closed, and its material remained in the fighting-line. The service was completely disorganized and remained so until quite recently.

The National Institute of Hygiene has lately been re-established in the premises of the Technical Institute of Experimental Therapeutics, which are in Madrid itself, at some distance from the lines, and have so far suffered little from bombardment.

Further, the Junta (the Madrid Defence Committee) recently gave orders for the establishment of a *Central Epidemiological Service*, with its headquarters

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in selected premises, in the zone of protection; its material will be that of the Provincial Institute of Hygiene, part of which has been recovered. This service will be divided into four branches:

(1) A Health Police Section, under Dr. MORETE, Provincial Inspector of Health;

(2) A Diagnostic Service (clinical and bacteriological) for infectious diseases, with Dr. BLANCO in charge of the clinical side and Dr. LUENGO directing laboratory research (the services of other bacteriologists in Madrid will also be enlisted);

(3) A Section for the organization of epidemic disease control under Dr. FALCO;

(4) A Delousing Section, under two doctors—Dr. DELGARDO for the troops and Dr. HERNANDEZ PACICCO for civilians.

This organization will be entirely ready for service by January 20th. In the opinion of technicians, it will be fully adequate for the urgent biological diagnoses and anti-epidemic work necessary in Madrid. Moreover, all the institutions in the capital, both official and private, especially private laboratories, have been placed under the control of the Defence Committee, to work and, if necessary, reinforce the new system.

Its activities will be directed chiefly against the four diseases which are arousing most apprehension in Spain at the moment—smallpox, typhus, typhoid and paratyphoid fevers and the various forms of dysentery. It was already feared at the outbreak of the war that epidemics of intestinal infections would develop during the summer, and accordingly a special service was set up for the epidemiological confirmation of dysenteric diseases. This service, which was housed

in the National Institute of Hygiene, dealt with the city of Madrid and the front until the Institute had to move. It is now being reorganized, the intention being to incorporate it in the Defence Committee's central epidemiological service.

This new organization will thus protect the capital entirely from epidemics, and will endow it with a satisfactory system of detection and diagnosis.

As regards vaccines and sera: these were produced, in peace-time, by the National Institute of Hygiene. There was also an Institute of Military Hygiene, which prepared sera and vaccines for the army. In addition, anti-typhoid vaccine was made at Madrid by the Municipal Laboratory. Finally, several private laboratories were authorized to prepare and sell vaccines and therapeutic sera tested by the Technical Institute of Experimental Therapeutics.

On the outbreak of hostilities, the two Institutes of Hygiene, civil and military, increased their production of vaccines and sera so as to form large reserves.

When Madrid was besieged, all the official centres of production—the National Institute, the Municipal Laboratory and the Institute of Military Hygiene—had to be evacuated at the same time. The horses at the last-named institution which provided the diphtheria, tetanus and gas-gangrene antitoxins were saved, but only a few of the National Institute's horses were rescued.

A private laboratory, the Ibis Institute, continued work for some time, though situated in a bombarded area. It prepared vaccines for the army and the civilian population, but its work had to be carried on under increasingly difficult conditions, and eventually it had to be abandoned.

Throughout this period of disorganization, the reserves of vaccines and sera which had happily been

formed at the beginning of the war were drawn upon. An adequate supply of tetanus and gas-gangrene antitoxins sera was available for the military hospitals. For several weeks, there was a shortage of diphtheria antitoxin.

The Institute of Military Hygiene has now been re-established in new premises and has been given charge of all the horses recovered from the various serotherapeutic centres. All sera are now prepared at this Institute.

Vaccines are prepared both by the Institute of Military Hygiene and by the National Institute of Hygiene.

Outside of Madrid, there are two centres for the preparation of vaccines and sera, one at the Valencia Provincial Institute of Hygiene, and the other at Barcelona. The Mission visited the Valencia Institute, which is admirably managed and equipped. In addition to meeting the needs of the province, it could, if Madrid had to be completely evacuated, supply, in conjunction with the Catalonian Institute, enough sera and vaccines for all the provinces under Governmental control.

B. *Military Medical Equipment*

The Spanish Army Medical Corps now has a strength of 600 medical officers. Forty of these are regular army doctors who were serving when hostilities broke out. Sixty are retired army doctors who have been recalled. The remaining 500 are civilian doctors attached to the troops. The Ministry of War is satisfied that the present establishment of physicians, surgeons and medical orderlies is adequate.

At the front, the personnel is allotted as follows: One medical officer and one *practicante* to each

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battalion; two medical orderlies to each company. The *dressing stations* are placed as near the firing-line as possible. They receive the wounded and the sick, if any, and send them on stretchers to a *brigade medical post*, which acts as an advanced *field ambulance*, where urgent surgical operations are performed. Each of these brigade medical posts has a chief medical officer, three assistant medical officers, eight orderlies and sixteen stretcher-bearers.

Further to the rear is the *front medical headquarters*, which are responsible for organizing the transfer of the wounded and sick to hospitals in the interior.

Medical stores were almost completely lacking at first. The Government troops retained only a negligible proportion of the medical stores in the army depots. There is now an adequate supply of material for dressings—cotton-wool, gauze and bandages. Little use has been made of "first field dressing," as their utility is disputed and the men are too apt to waste them. The available materials are used for larger and more practical dressings, with which the medical officers and orderlies are amply provided. Should the war be prolonged, however, a shortage of materials, especially cotton-wool, is feared.

There is a great dearth of transport for evacuation. We were told at the Madrid front medical headquarters that they had only sixty motor-ambulances. Open cars and light lorries have been pressed into service as ambulances, but there is a great shortage of these also.

There were six hospital trains, but one is immobilized on the northern front and another at Madrid.

There are no medical aircraft.

Behind the front there are seventy hospitals specially reserved for wounded soldiers. They are known as *hospitales de sangre*. Twenty of them are directly

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controlled by the Ministry of War, while the others are administered either by the provincial authorities, or by the Workers' Committees, or by the Red Cross or the International Red Relief.

A great deal has been done in establishing new medical formations, convents and private houses being requisitioned for the purpose. It is now realized that it was a mistake to set up so many small hospitals, and the intention is to reduce the number in the interests of efficiency. Be that as it may, the total number of beds available for the wounded in all hospitals is 25,000, a large number of which are vacant. According to the information given to us, the existing organization is adequate.

In the city of Madrid itself, the wounded are treated in the following hospitals:

	number of beds.
Madrid Provincial Hospital	1,700
Madrid Military Hospital	1,100
Nuñez de Balboa Hospital for urgent cases .	700
Obrero Hospital	350
Central Red Cross Hospital	350
Social Assistance Hospital	300
Ophthalmological Institute (maxillo-facial surgery)	300
Lina Odena Hospital (gas-gangrene)	300
San Carlos Clinic (re-education of cripples) .	350
Inclusa de Madrid (cases of self-inflicted wounds, and prisoners)	500
Total	<hr/> 5,950

Special mention should be made of the *Gas-gangrene Hospital*.

Though not unduly frequent, gas-gangrene has been, since the outbreak of hostilities, the commonest

complication in cases of wounds. It was therefore decided to establish a special hospital for the treatment of gangrenous infections. This hospital was at first housed in the Cancer Hospital, but in November the Cancer Hospital found itself in the danger-zone of Madrid, not far from the firing-line. It was moved to the vacant buildings of a former convent, at Principe de Vergara, 53, and took the name of the Lina Odena Hospital.

We paid a visit to this establishment, which has received 250 patients with gangrenous wounds since its organization. The method of treatment is to strip the wounds and open them up extensively. Serotherapeutic treatment is also given, in the form of the daily injection of 80-100 c.c. of polyvalent serum. The serum injections are sometimes carried out intravenously, but generally subcutaneously. The average duration of the serotherapeutic treatment is six days, so that every patient receives about half a litre of serum in all. The results have been remarkably good, 75% of cases having been cured. Death has occurred only in cases removed too late from the front. We saw in this hospital some cases of gangrene under treatment, and a large number whose gangrene had been cured, but who were detained for further treatment of their fractures or other affections due to their wounds. Three more large wards were being fitted up to increase the capacity of the hospital. Here, in a besieged and bombarded city, work of the highest scientific value is being done on gas-gangrene; we can only mention it in this report, and leave our Spanish colleagues to publish the details of their observations when they think fit to do so.

To sum up, long before the war, Spain already possessed excellent medical equipment. This was

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disorganized at the beginning of hostilities, especially at Madrid, where important hospitals and large laboratories had to be abandoned and the staff rehoused in new premises. The medical equipment of the troops had to be completely improvised. The Mission was able to convince itself that the work of reorganization has now reached a very advanced stage. Certain new creations, such as the Gas-gangrene Hospital and the Madrid Central Epidemiological Service, constitute highly interesting innovations and show how successfully the Spanish medical profession has been able to adapt itself to circumstances, despite great difficulties. At the front, as in the rear, the health equipment is adequate on all points except one—namely, the evacuation facilities. The Spanish Government is short of vehicles for the transport of the sick and wounded. The Mission draws attention to this deficiency, which threatens to jeopardize the operation of the medical services of the country at the time when their work may be most useful.

SECOND PART—EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SITUATION

The epidemiological situation in Spain is good. Though epidemics might have been feared, there has been none since the beginning of hostilities, nor, indeed, any change whatever in the health conditions of the provinces under Government control. Yet none of the causes usually productive of epidemic outbreaks has been lacking: congestion, the intermingling of populations, the disorganization of medical services, and cold, the effects of which might have been further aggravated by the practically complete absence of fuel. As we shall mention in another chapter, the stream of refugees has, in some regions, been intense and has, up till quite recently, been proceeding

without any order or supervision. There has been no lack of food among the stable population. But there can be no doubt that food privation must have been frequent among the fugitives, especially at the beginning, before their transfer was organized and supervised as it is to-day. To this it may be added that the combatants are infested with lice and that these are to be found, though to a lesser degree, in the civil population as well. It is a matter for surprise that, in such circumstances, the Spanish people should have kept its health unimpaired. And yet this is undeniably the case.

In our investigations, we were not able to rely exclusively on the statistics; for they are incomplete. In most places, and especially at Madrid, the epidemiological intelligence services had been working but incompletely up till their recent reorganization. But we questioned the doctors, the representatives of the administration and the heads of military medical services who are unanimous in their views. Whilst visiting the hospitals, we were able without difficulty to form an opinion of our own, which is in keeping with the statements made to us.

We may now turn to the four contagious diseases especially to be feared in Spain under conditions of war: typhoid fever, typhus fever, smallpox and bacillary dysentery.

The frequency of *typhoid infections* in the peninsula is well known. The maximum number of cases is always recorded in October and November. Year by year, between 150 and 190 cases are reported in Madrid alone. The general annual morbidity for the whole of Spain fluctuated between 3,000 and 4,000 cases before the war.

This year, the only definite information is supplied by the return of admissions to the National Infectious

Diseases Hospital. As we have already said, this institution has continued its work without interruption: it has taken in all contagious cases detected at Madrid itself and along the defence front of the capital. During the last six months, cases of typhoid fever totalled 358, including forty-two with a fatal issue.

Though the greatest caution may be justifiable, there is no evidence to show that the Spanish population has suffered from typhoid infections more severely than in ordinary times. Now the season in which these are most to be feared is over. The health services are reorganised, the bacteriological testing of drinking-water is everywhere working with efficiency. In these circumstances, it would not appear that a typhoid epidemic need be feared for the moment.

None the less, the Mission holds it desirable to advise the intensification of anti-typhoid vaccination.

Louse-borne *typhus fever* was fairly frequent in Spain during 1919 and 1920. It still occurs sporadically. The annual number of deaths has been less than ten during the years following 1929. In 1935, there were three fatal cases (in the provinces of Cuenca, Jaen and Madrid).

In 1936, one case was recorded in Catalonia at the beginning of July. In the second half of the year, three cases notified as typhus were admitted to the National Infectious Diseases Hospital at Madrid. These were found to be in fact cases of "boutonneuse" fever, and the mild course of the disease confirmed these findings. Since then, no case has been reported among civilian and military population on the territory under Government control.

At the moment, then, there is no typhus in Spain. It may reappear. We reached agreement with the Spanish hygienists concerning the rapid organization

of *delousing* services and, in the event of a typhus epidemic occurring despite this precaution, the application of *anti-typhus vaccination*. This is nowadays performed in a number of countries—Poland, China and North Africa—by different methods. It would be advantageous if these could be discussed among experts at a technical meeting, in order to determine what method is most suitable for use, if required, in Spain.

The *smallpox* death-rate in Spain is practically nil. Since the beginning of hostilities, Jennerian vaccination has been systematically performed on the enrolled militiamen; it has also been carried out extensively among the civilian population. The medical profession has not reported a single case of smallpox. We saw none in the hospitals.

According to official pre-war statistics, *bacillary dysentery* caused sixty-four deaths in 1934 and 105 in 1935. The disease is always observed to occur during the summer season. Its appearance was greatly dreaded during the first months of the war and, as we have said elsewhere, a special service of coprological examinations was set up at the National Institute of Hygiene, in contemplation of such an epidemic. This service worked up to the beginning of November—that is to say, throughout the period when bacillary dysentery was most likely to occur. There were only eight authenticated cases at Madrid, with a single death. In the Asturias, the number of cases—as to which no precise figures were available,—is said to have been greater, but there has been no epidemic in the strict sense of the term. At present, no recrudescence is to be anticipated. Moreover, the medical services are organized in such a way as to ensure the most rapid detection of cases: even at the dressing-stations along the front, arrangements

have been made for the despatch to the laboratories of samples taken from all suspected cases.

Malaria in Spain causes an average of 300 deaths per annum, which occur mostly in the provinces of Estremadura and Andalusia. Despite troop movements, there has been no increase in the mortality or morbidity rates from malaria.

Scarlet fever was less frequent in 1936, probably owing to the great epidemic outbreak that occurred in 1935 and which produced a death-roll ten times as great as the average for the ten preceding years. In regard to "*boutonneuse*" fever, *undulant fever* and *recurrent fever*, there is nothing special to report.

In a word, our epidemiological survey has led us only to negative conclusions. The Mission has been able to convince itself that there have been no epidemics in the Government area of Spain since the beginning of the war. It satisfied itself that the hospitals have, at present, only a few cases of typhoid fever, and none at all of smallpox, dysentery or typhus. Nowhere, in the course of its investigations, did it find any evidence that the general state of health has been in any way affected.

The Public Health Services have completed their reorganization. Vaccines and sera are now being prepared in Spain as in peace time. Should there be an epidemic outbreak, all the most effective means of control could be brought into operation by a staff whose bearing under severely trying conditions affords ample proof of its competence and devotion.

The measures already taken by the Government and by the health authorities may be summarised as follows:

1. Utilization for the Health Service of all existing medical personnel.

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2. Co-ordination of the action of the civilian and military medical authorities.

3. In the area of the front, the adoption of special measures to ensure the efficient working of the services. Thus, at Madrid, by Ordinance dated November 10th, the Defence Committee has set up a special commission for infectious disease control.

4. Preventive Vaccination: Preventive vaccination against the typhoid and paratyphoid fevers is fairly widespread in the army, according to the statements made to us by the authorities concerned. At the same time, a certain number of volunteers who were sent to the front as an emergency measure could not be vaccinated before departure.

Vaccination against typhoid fever seems also to be fairly widespread among the civilian population. We were informed that a large part of the town populations has been vaccinated; in view, however, of the intermingling of these populations owing to constant arrivals and departures, it can hardly be hoped that the measures taken will have removed all danger. It may be added that T.A.B. vaccination is not compulsory.

Smallpox vaccination is regularly carried out in the army and in the civilian population; it is compulsory.

Anti-diphtheritic vaccination has been discontinued at the moment; in any case, it was never very extensively practised.

No other type of vaccination is being carried out at present.

In particular, anti-tetanus vaccination is not in use in the Spanish army.

Conclusions.

The following would seem to be the conclusions that may be drawn from the facts cited above:

1. The state of health of the population is satisfactory.

2. The infections to be feared at the present time are:

(a) *Typhoid Fever*: Though the dangerous period is over, we believe that the risk still subsists owing to the extensive population movements, the congestion of town and country by the refugees, and the weakening of the resistance of the population owing to the privations which the war has brought in its train. We question whether the vaccinations so far carried out against this disease can suffice. The usual measures should be taken. The compulsory vaccination of the population in the congested areas and especially in those places which are typhoid foci (Southern Spain and Coast) is advisable. Finally, the testing of drinking-water and of foodstuffs should be continued.

(b) *Typhus Fever*: Though no case has been notified up to the present, we believe that the danger of epidemic typhus subsists unabated.

According to our information, the trenches are infected with lice, a fact which cannot cause any surprise. Consequently, action should be taken without delay to meet any emergency. To that end, the following is required:

The provision of delousing stations in all large centres.

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The organization of mobile delousing squads, equipped with mobile plant and with all necessary appliances—such squads to be attached to the departmental public health services and to be ready for duty at all times. The staff concerned should be immediately instructed and trained.

Immunization against typhus of the whole of the medical and nursing staff. Provision of supplies of vaccine, to be renewed as required and to be held ready for use at all times in case of need.

Equipment of the municipal and the provincial services with motor-ambulances exclusively intended for the transport of contagious cases (some fifty ambulances would be required).

Equipment of the health services with mobile disinfection plants in which steam, dry heat or gaseous disinfectants (sulphurous anhydride, formalin or hydrocyanic acid) can be used at will. The number of disinfection plants at present available does not seem to be adequate. (Requirements: about fifty). Provision to be made also for the supplies of disinfectant chemicals.

The arrangements for the isolation of contagious cases are, generally speaking, fairly adequate in the large towns. Madrid is well provided for, with its modern infectious diseases hospitals (three hundred beds, which could be increased to six hundred after evacuation of tuberculosis cases). The Barcelona hospital has three hundred beds and is equipped for the isolation and observation of patients (three hundred rooms). In the secondary centres, the room available for contagious cases might prove inadequate in the event of an epidemic. But other premises and even existing hospital establishments can quite well be fitted up for this purpose.

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As regards the detection of infectious diseases, the necessity for compulsory notification should be impressed upon the medical profession and the whole of the health and medical staff. Cases of typhus, typhoid fever, smallpox, suspicious intestinal infections and dysentery should be reported, by telephone or telegraph, to the provincial inspectors. The inadequacies observed in the matter of notification are doubtless due to the events of the war, but it is highly desirable, for the adequate safeguarding of public health, that such notifications should be sent in as regularly as in the past.

Finally, it would be well that the epidemic service personnel should be strengthened at once by the appointment of *epidemic disease medical officers*, who would be concerned exclusively with the prevention and control of contagious infections. These doctors would accordingly be called upon to supervise asylums, homes and prisons and generally all collective establishments. It appeared quite clearly that, at Madrid in particular, the municipal medical officers of health are over-burdened with work, since they are obliged to take part in various medical functions and are consequently unable to devote to their public health work all the time that would be needful.

THIRD PART.—EVACUATION OF REFUGEES.

I.—Organization of Evacuations.

II.—General Movement of Evacuation.

III.—General Action required and Special Measures for Madrid.

IV.—Conclusions.

I. Organization of Evacuations.

First Evacuation.—At the beginning of the rising, the Government, taken by surprise and thrown off

its guard, was unable to organize any evacuation, and the populations fleeing from the battle zone flowed back of their own accord into the neighbouring regions, where they were given shelter by the local families and the municipalities.

The first exodus of population occurred as follows:

The population of Estremadura sought refuge in the provinces of Jaen, Ciudad Real and Toledo. About 250,000 persons, including 70,000 who had sheltered at Toledo, went on a few weeks later to Madrid and the others dispersed throughout this area and were for the most part absorbed by the local families.

The inhabitants of Aragon proceeded towards the Catalan provinces, producing an influx of refugees of about the same relative volume. Barcelona, owing to its large resources, received a high percentage.

Formation and Functions of Refugee Committees.—At the beginning of October, a "National War Refugees Committee" was formed at Madrid as a controlling, executive and supervisory body, to make general arrangements for the evacuation, distribution and accommodation of refugees. This Committee, which consists of representatives of the various political parties and syndicalist groups with M. Giral, former Prime Minister, as Chairman, and M. Luelmo y Luelmo, Director-General of the Local Administration, as Vice-Chairman, has enjoyed the full confidence of the whole people and is responsible for all the very useful steps which have subsequently been taken.

Its first act was to arrange for the creation in every province of a Provincial Committee (at the capital) and of Local Committees (in the various despatching and receiving centres), all constituted on the same model as the National Committee, with representa-

tives of the various parties and groups. Moreover, in the districts where the stream of refugees was greatest, the National Committee appointed delegates to represent it permanently in the Provincial Committees, give them its fullest support, and, at the same time, supervise and inspect the housing conditions of the refugees.

The rôle of these Committees is to arrange in detail for the organization of evacuation, the distribution of refugees and, in agreement with the municipalities, their housing.

Transit shelters.—In the first place, in the principal centres of collection and distribution, the Provincial Committees had to undertake the creation of special organizations known as “transit shelters.”

These shelters represent the standard unit of the refugee service and play a similar part to that of the casualty clearing stations in the great war, which received the masses of wounded and arranged for their evacuation.

The efficiency of the whole system depends on the functions of these shelters, which are numerous. They are required:

To register the refugees and keep card-indexes of them, so that they may be readily traced at any time (double card-index by surnames and places of origin);

To feed and shelter them on their way through;

To clean and delouse them;

To provide them with the necessary medical attention (infirmary organization for slight cases working in close liaison with the hospitals for serious cases);

To sort out the refugees, giving preference to children, women and the aged, leaving adults

between 17 and 45 at the disposal¹ of the Government;

To form and despatch convoys, and see that they arrive safely at their destination.

These shelters, some of which have received several thousands of refugees per day (4,800 at Madrid), must have plenty of space; they need large waiting rooms, dining-rooms, dormitories, sick-rooms, lavatories and delousing premises, offices, kitchens, a food-store, a clothing-store, etc. Use has therefore been made of large buildings used for collective purposes, often convents, sometimes casinos (Albacete) and provincial children's homes (Valencia), and we found that they have been turned to account in excellent fashion.

Numerous volunteers of all categories have offered their services in the most disinterested way to co-operate in the work of these shelters; the members of the Committee have themselves collaborated very actively and the evacuation of the refugees has proceeded smoothly whatever the hour at which the convoys set out. Thus, when passing through Albacete one night, we were able to see for ourselves the efficient operation of evacuation arrangements, including the despatch of several successive trains, leaving at intervals between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m. under the very vigilant direction of members of the Committee.

Despatch and Destination of the Convoys.—Evacuation takes place by rail or motor; military needs make it impossible to obtain all the lorries and motor-coaches which would be necessary, and as often as possible the regular railway trains are used, since

¹ According to their wishes and according to requirements, they are enrolled in the national defence services or engaged in public work.

their fixed time-table facilitates the despatch of the convoys.

Each refugee is given a railway travel voucher, the chief of the convoy receives a list of the refugees, stating their places of origin and their final destination, together with the safe conducts necessary *en route*. Good is provided for them *en route* either in the form of hot meals served at the principal stops or of cold food served out before departure. At Valencia, the railway service is very well organized, with a waiting-room, sick-room, dining-hall, shower-baths, food-store, etc.

Each convoy is accompanied to its destination by a member of the Committee of the place where it was formed, and this member, with the help of the municipality and of the receiving Committee, sees that the refugees are properly housed.

As a rule, care is taken not to place the refugees in large towns where the risks of bombardment (*e.g.*, Alicante, Valencia, Albacete) and the overcrowding are greatest; an exception has, however, been made in the case of Barcelona, which has received nearly 100,000 refugees, a large proportion of whom come from Aragon.

Refugees are preferably placed in families and, as far as we have been able to ascertain, households which are able to do so willingly offer to take them in. When placing in families cannot be arranged, recourse is had to the collective establishments which may be available and which are organized by the Local Committees with the help of the municipalities; the National Committee assists by allocating funds to the local Committees to enable them to help the families; if necessary, the Local Committees also apply to well-to-do persons for assistance, and it is not refused.

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Special Measures for Women and Children.—Children and mothers are included in the general stream of evacuated refugees, but they go ahead of the others. In the transit shelters, special rooms are reserved for them wherever possible, and a supply of tinned milk and children's clothing is available.

Statistics are being compiled to determine the exact number of children evacuated; they are included in the general movement of refugees, and all that can be said at the moment is that the proportion is high. In the first place, there are the children who already constituted groups (children from relief institutions, orphans, children undergoing institutional treatment, children from boarding-schools and even from day-schools), and then there are the children whose mothers are ready to entrust them to the refugee service in order that they may themselves stay with their husbands who are either mobilized and in the firing-line or employed on defence or general utility works.

Experience has shown that collective transfers carried out together with the whole of the teaching or service staff to which the children are accustomed represent by far the most satisfactory method, which causes the least amount of confusion and affords the best safeguards.

Thus, at Barcelona, we visited, in the former "Santa Teresa" Convent, a group of 600 children who had been boarders at the "Palona" children's relief home at Madrid; they were moved together with the whole establishment staff, comprising seventy-five persons in all; they were presented to us by their own teachers, and lessons had already been resumed; premises were being fitted up to increase the number to 2,500, who can easily be accommodated in this fine building. In a large villa, standing in beautiful

grounds, another group of 100 children had just been very nicely installed. These children, who came from the working-class families of a Madrid brewery, were also grouped together with an attendant staff, and the leader of the convoy was the son of the brewery manager.

Another 3,000 children were expected to arrive during the next few days; there will be no difficulty in taking them in at Barcelona. The only source of anxiety is the food supply; unlike the southern provinces and even Madrid, Barcelona is short of flour and potatoes are scarce; as for meat and even fish, it is available only in scanty quantities, and even the milk supply is extremely limited. It would seem that the distribution of foodstuffs is somewhat of a problem, because of transport difficulties; this is a serious matter which might fairly quickly affect the general condition of the population, and upon which we feel it desirable to lay stress.

The good organization of the transit shelter in the Exhibition Olympic Stadium is another noteworthy feature at Barcelona. It has been fitted up with dormitories, dining-rooms and a well appointed sick-room. It is provided with shower-baths, baths, etc. On the occasion of our visit, there was a group of 400 children awaiting distribution; we noticed the scantiness of the diet provided—one large plate of lentils and one orange for a midday meal.

In the interior of the provinces, the method of collective groups is also preferred. In the course of the visit we paid to him when passing through Barcelona, President Azaña told us that, the day before, he had been to see a settlement of 400 Madrid refugee children at Gerona. Unfortunately, we had not the time to pay a visit to some of these establishments ourselves.

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Convoys of children are sent, like others, by rail; this means a long and tiring journey in trains, which, under present circumstances, are but irregularly heated. No other method is possible, owing to the lack of motor transport.

Sick children are under the care of the public health organization, which evacuates them and sends them to hospital. At Valencia, in a sea-side sanatorium converted into a people's hospital by the International Red Relief, we found a special section for tuberculous children on an isolated floor giving on to the sea-front; 400 places had been provided, sixty of which have already been allotted to refugee children from Madrid who are suffering from tuberculosis of the bones.

Pregnant women are also sent to hospitals for delivery; they are accommodated for preference in the maternity wards of the provincial hospitals.

The despatch of children to France and Belgium has been contemplated.

In France, an association for assistance to the war victims has been set up under the international Co-ordination Committee presided by M. Basch and M. Langevin. This organization has offered to receive 50,000 children, an offer which has been accepted for 30,000; the first group of 180 will be leaving shortly for Port Vendres, from which centre it will be distributed.

In Belgium, 3,000 places have been offered; seventy children have been sent, most of whom are boarded out in families.

Spontaneous Evacuation.—Apart from organized evacuation as described above, it should also be remembered that a certain number of persons endeavour to escape by their own resources. These are limited in numbers, for all the motor-cars have

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been requisitioned, and the means of transport most frequently used is the railway.

The Administration encourages these voluntary departures as much as possible, but endeavours to supervise them, and, in most cases, attaches these refugees to the convoys formed in the shelters, so as to ensure that they shall have somewhere to go if they have no relatives or friends awaiting them.

The population of Madrid has supplied the largest figures in this category: 1,000 to 1,200 during the most critical days and after that some hundreds.

Defraying of Costs.—The general expenditure connected with the evacuation of refugees and their maintenance is borne by private individuals and the State.

It is reduced to a minimum, owing to the astonishing public spirit shown by all sections of the population in assisting the refugees. Generally speaking, except for the posts already filled by professionals, all the workers are voluntary. Food is bought on very cheap terms and the refugees' three meals never cost more than 1 peseta 50. Warm clothing for children is obtained by gifts. As regards lodging costs, these are usually borne by the families, and the local Refugee Committees constitute the regulating machinery which appeals, where necessary, for the assistance of those who have sufficient means to help forward this work of solidarity.

The heaviest costs are those for transport by rail, as the railway is a private company. As for motor transport, since it is for the moment all working on Government service, no payment need be made.

Accordingly, when the National Committee was

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created, it was given a credit of 3 million pesetas for the special purpose of defraying costs of transport and food; a fresh credit of 5 millions will shortly be provided.

Subsidies will probably have to be increased in future, since the voluntary charity of the population is very nearly exhausted with the present total of refugees, which already represents 10% of the population of the occupied provinces.

II. *General Movement of Evacuation*

The exodus of the population has been general behind the whole battle-front from Aragon to the Province of Granada. After the first wave from Estremadura and Aragon, the largest numbers came especially from the Toledo and, later, the Madrid sectors.

When the fighting round Toledo was taking place, a stream of refugees flowed back to Madrid, which comprised, first of all, the 70,000 fugitives from the Estremadura and then a large proportion of the inhabitants of Toledo. As the tide of battle approached Madrid, large daily arrivals of refugees still further increased the burden thus laid upon the city population, which, as we were informed by the Alcalde, M. Redondo, rose to over 1½ millions. And so, despite all the work of evacuation that has been proceeding since October, the capital still has a population figure which approximates to the normal—*i.e.*, on January 5th, 1,200,000, including a large proportion of women and children.


The Madrid evacuation service has been working very actively since the Refugee Committee was set up in October, and the Local Committee of the city has displayed great vigilance. At the beginning

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of November, when the town was most seriously threatened, the daily evacuations reached a maximum of 12,000. Then, when the strain was eased, they slowed down and fell to 7,000 at the beginning of December; at the time of our visit, they fluctuated between 3,000 and 3,500 (beginning of January).

The following graph shows the variations during December; they were influenced by two factors—the frequency of bombardment and the available means of transport. The November statistics have not yet been established with sufficient accuracy to enable us to draw the graph.

GRAPH OF DAILY EVACUATIONS FROM MADRID DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER



The general movement of refugees is shown in the following table that was compiled as on January 9th by the National Refugee Committee from information telegraphed from the provinces; it yields a total of 1,004,000. These figures do not, of course, include

the refugees who fled from the other fronts in the Basque Provinces, Santander and the Asturias, nor those of the Malaga sector.

The number of these refugees stands in the proportion of roughly 10% to the population that has taken them in. The number of places given as available is only 156,000.

There can be no doubt that, in certain places, the point of saturation has been practically reached, and that it would not be possible for any more to be absorbed. In many others, however, it will be possible, by means of a careful survey, to find more room. In particular, many buildings used for collective purposes (monasteries, barracks, casinos, etc.) remain available and can have their capacity increased by suitable equipment. For these reasons, a systematic study of all resources should be made in all areas. The study of food resources should be carried out, currently with this and all necessary suggestions should be made before the despatch of the refugees in order that the supply of essential foodstuffs may be ensured.

On the other hand, the question of funds should not be neglected, and, in the future, Government assistance will become more and more essential. The National Committee should therefore be kept properly informed and ought to know what expenditure it will be called upon to meet in respect either of the fitting-up of premises or of the purchase and transport of food.

So far as the evacuation of half of the population of Madrid is concerned, this does not seem to cause any apprehension, and, indeed, we believe that the distribution could be effected without undue difficulty, provided, however, all necessary measures are prepared at once.

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Provinces	Number of inhabitants	Refugees received	Places available
Barcelona .	. 1,349,282	350,000	70,000
Tarragona .	. 355,148		
Lérida .	. 354,674		
Gerona .	. 325,619		
Valencia .	. 926,443	160,000	20,000
Ciudad Real .	. 427,365	112,000	12,000
Murcia .	. 638,639	81,000	14,000
Alicante .	. 512,186	60,000	7,000
Almería .	. 358,149	57,000	10,000
Jaen .	. 592,297	53,000	5,000
Cuenca .	. 281,628	43,000	10,000
Albacete .	. 219,833	40,000	3,000
Castellón .	. 306,886	32,000	5,000
Guadalajara .	. 201,444	16,000	
Total .	.	1,004,000	156,000

III. *General Action required and Special Measures for Madrid.*

General Measures.—Since the onslaught on Madrid in November, no major strategical movement having occurred, the average rate of evacuation has fallen, and is now fluctuating in the neighbourhood of 5,000 per day, of whom 3,000 come from the Madrid front.

If operations become stabilized behind the line of trenches, the flow of refugees will probably diminish still further until there is a revival of activity. Such a revival must be allowed for, as the lessons of the Great War show (the Departments of North-Eastern France were twice invaded). For this reason it is essential that the authorities should not be taken by surprise and should be ready to evacuate the threatened population.

Consequently it would be desirable:

(1) That a schedule of the places available in each Province should be kept strictly up to date, and that the possibility of increasing their number should be urgently studied so as to have a reserve in case of emergency;

(2) That the National Committee, thus having accurate information, should be in a position to fulfil its duties as a regulating organ and to inform the Provincial Committees at the first alarm of the points of destination of their various convoys;

(3) That sufficient means of transport should be available when required.

The means of transport are the railway and the motor-car. Trains cannot meet all requirements and do not always run to the requisite points of departure and arrival;¹ moreover, when there is a very heavy traffic, they are not always able to cope with it. Motor coaches of great capacity, able to convey sixty or even seventy-five persons with children, are necessary, and the provision of such cars must be given first attention.

To provide for this service properly, each Provincial Committee should always have two or three motor-coaches at its exclusive disposal and the National Committee should have a reserve under its immediate control which would enable it to meet emergencies immediately. The Albacete Committee possesses a motor-coach of its own (which is an exception), and when we visited this place we were able to form an idea of the immense services which

¹ Thus, evacuation from Madrid involves a journey in four stages, viz.: Madrid to Chinchon by narrow-gauge railway; Chinchon to Tembleque by motor-car; Tembleque to Alcázar de San Juan by train; from Alcázar de San Juan onwards by ordinary train.

it renders and of the comfort which it ensures for the refugees.

Special Measures for Madrid.—The situation of Madrid is truly extraordinary, and only an eyewitness can appreciate the paradox of a great city, which is still swarming with people and the life of which continues unabated, under the dreadful menace of shell-fire: to the north-west the boundary of the University City is lined with trenches, the town is in the field of fire of the artillery, and aircraft make frequent bombing raids without the possibility of the alarm being given. Protection is practically nonexistent and very little attempt is made to use what there is. The underground railway, which had been used at the time of the first attacks, has been abandoned and has now resumed its normal service; it did not, in any case, provide much protection, for we saw an arch that had been broken through by a bomb that was probably of medium calibre. As regards the cellars, they are reputed to be insecure and have not been utilized.

Owing to the large stream of refugees which flowed into Madrid, and also to the returns which took place as soon as there was a lull, the population, despite the fact that 400,000 persons have already been evacuated, still remains at its usual figure of 1,200,000. Its morale, is, moreover, remarkable. Everyone goes about his ordinary occupation, all over the town trams are running in large numbers and crowded with passengers, there is a dense stream of motor traffic, people are seen hurrying about the streets, or even strolling along, the market gardeners come to market as usual with their barrows, and the general impression is one of exceptional activity.

There has hitherto been little shortage of food-stuffs except as regards meat and milk; housing

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accommodation, thanks to the utilization of abandoned dwellings, has not been lacking; the only shortage which is felt is that of coal.

As regards the health situation, it has remained excellent, and there has not been the slightest sign of an epidemic; it should be added that all the sanitation services are working, the town is regularly cleaned, the drinking-water is abundant and of excellent quality, and all the technical health services are at their posts and functioning regularly. True, the Institute of Hygiene in the neighbourhood of the University City was destroyed, but its various laboratories have already been transferred to the Institute of Experimental Therapeutics in town, where we witnessed the resumption of work.

In short, the administrative and health activities of the capital continue; the population, which is care-free and deeply attached to its city, does not wish to leave. This does not prevent the danger from being very grave, and it may become still more so and be rapidly complicated by famine if the roads of access should be threatened. For this reason, we consider that *it has already become necessary to remove half the population as soon as possible*. This is also the opinion of the City Alcalde.

To organize this evacuation efficiently, no reliance can be placed on existing resources, particularly on the lorries whose use is subject at all times to the exigencies of the fighting. What is required is motor-coaches exclusively reserved for this service and providing for an average accommodation of sixty places. Two hundred motor-coaches would thus be necessary; they would have a carrying capacity of 12,000 or, at the rate of two journeys a day, 24,000. In this way, a daily total of 30,000 could easily be reached by the simultaneous employment of the

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other means now available (railway and available lorries). Thus the evacuation of Madrid could be carried out rapidly and satisfactorily.

The Madrid Committee sent its Chairman to Barcelona to negotiate for 100 motor-coaches; we saw him on his return to Madrid and he told us that he had obtained fifty. Another 150, or still better 200, are required, so as to have a reserve in case of breakdown and to accelerate the movement still more if necessary.

We propose that all possible support should be given to the Spanish Government, so that any order given for this purpose should be filled on the understanding that throughout the duration of hostilities these cars shall in no case be used for any purpose other than the transport of refugees.

After the evacuation of half the Madrid population, part of the motor-coaches might be distributed between the different Provincial Committees for the service of their convoys; the remainder would be kept in reserve at the National Committee's disposal for urgent requirements which might arise, among which might be that of having to evacuate the remainder of the population of Madrid.

IV. *Conclusions.*

I. The *evacuation* of the refugees, which is being entrusted to special all-party committees, has gradually been organized, and is now being operated in a regular, careful and methodical manner; but the results are limited owing to the shortage of transport facilities.

The Mission was able to judge of the great efforts being made by all the members of the committees, irrespective of their views; with the limited resources available, nothing better could be achieved.

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On January 9th, the number of refugees was 1,004,000, excluding those of the Basque Provinces and the Asturias.

II. *Rehousing* is provided for in all cases out of the ordinary resources of the country, by the utilization of collective buildings and by placing in families. The number thus accommodated in the areas under Government control represents about 10% of the population taking them in, and in certain places saturation level has been reached.

The Mission recommends that, in order to avoid any hitch in the future, a thorough inventory be made of all resources that remain available, and that the collective establishments should be fitted up so that they may be used to the utmost of their capacity.

III. The *feeding* of the refugees should receive attention; it would seem that the supply of food to certain areas, more especially in the Catalan provinces, presents some difficulties. It would no doubt be necessary for the Government to examine this matter and consider what measures should be taken to provide for the distribution of foodstuffs produced by Spain and to import from outside such foods as are lacking, and, in particular, milk and meat.

IV. The *town of Madrid*, in the middle of the battle zone, despite the evacuations and owing to the considerable influx of refugees from the neighbourhood, still has a numerous population (1,200,000) which it is almost impossible to protect against bombardment, which it might at some future time become difficult to feed, and which is thus seriously exposed to danger.

Although health conditions and morale are excellent, it is a matter of urgency to evacuate half this population without prejudice to subsequent measures that might be required by circumstances.

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V. The *rapid evacuation of Madrid* seems impossible with the resources at present available to the Government. Two hundred motor-coaches, with fifty seats each, are necessary; fifty being expected from Barcelona, we propose that the Spanish Government should be given every possible assistance in obtaining the delivery of another 150 (or preferably 200) motor-coaches, on the understanding that these vehicles will be exclusively reserved for the transport of refugees.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE SPANISH HEALTH MACHINERY

Provincial and Communal Organization

At the head of each province is a Government-appointed medical inspector, who is in charge of a Provincial Institute of Hygiene, and also supervises the technical work of all the health units in the province, though he is not responsible for their administration.

The Provincial Institute of Hygiene consists of:

- (a) A bacteriological laboratory;
- (b) A chemical laboratory;
- (c) A polyvalent dispensary;
- (d) A statistical department.

These various sections are more or less developed according to the size and needs of the province. In Valencia and Barcelona, for instance, the provincial bacteriological laboratories are fully equipped institutes, capable, not only of performing all ordinary analyses, including water analyses, but also of preparing vaccines and therapeutic sera. (In the present circumstances, this decentralization is highly advantageous to Spain.)

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As a general rule, a provincial hospital contains medical wards, surgical wards, an ophthalmological ward, a venereal ward, a maternity ward, and an isolation block for infectious cases. It has attached to it a provincial mental hospital, a home for the aged, and a foundling hospital (*Inclusa*). The whole organization is administered by a delegation of the provincial Deputation.

Every commune has a medical officer of health, who is in charge of a small communal hospital. In rural communities of moderate size, the Mission saw well-equipped communal health units with radiological plant.

Auxiliary Staff

The *practicantes* are auxiliary medical staff, who are required to have a standard of general education roughly equal to the French elementary teacher's certificate, and undergo a two-years' practical course in a faculty of medicine. The institution is an old and obsolescent one. There are still a large number of *practicantes* attached to doctors in the country districts and in the big urban hospitals. The rest are being used as medical auxiliaries in the army.

Nurses are trained in special schools attached to the principal hospitals, chiefly in Madrid. On the completion of their training, they become certificated hospital nurses. Some hospital nurses undergo an advanced course in a Government school, in which they qualify as visiting nurses. Spanish visiting nurses are polyvalent.

Central Public Health Organization

Until last year, public health in Spain was controlled by a directorate under the Ministry of Labour.

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The present Government includes a Ministry of Health, which is in the charge of Mme. Federica Montseny, Minister of Health.

This Ministry is still in process of organization. It is divided into two main branches—public health and social assistance—each of which is further subdivided into five sections:

Public Health:

Chief

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Hygiene and preventive medicine . | Dr. MAS |
| 2. Hospitals and sanatoria | Dr. TRIAS |
| 3. Pharmacies . . . | Dr. AZCON |
| 4. Medical personnel and professions . . . | Professor CUATRECASAS |
| 5. General secretariat . | Dr. MORATA |

Social Assistance:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Physical and mental infirmities . . . | Dr. RAMÓN RAMIA |
| 2. Maternity and infant welfare . . . | Dr. LUIZ VALENCIA |
| 3. Child welfare . . . | Dr. AMPARO POCH |
| 4. Social work against prostitution . . . | Dr. FRANCISCO AUMATELL
(barrister) |
| 5. General secretariat . | Professor JOSÉ REDONDO |

Work of Relief Institutions

International Red Cross.—For all particulars of the work of this organization in Spain, reference should be made to the circulars entitled “Work of the Red Cross in Spain,” sent out by the International Committee to the Central Committees.

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Spanish Red Cross.—This institution has assisted in organizing three dressing-stations on the Madrid front, seven dressing-stations in the city of Madrid (with two mobile first-aid squads), a hospital with 250 beds in Madrid, a hospital with 200 beds at the Escorial, and five small hospitals (twenty beds each) at Cambrera, Somosierra, Cercedilla, Collado and Median, near the firing-line. It is now co-operating with the Madrid city authorities to form ten delousing teams. It arranges in Madrid for the transport of persons wounded by bombardments. Its president told us that it had not enough ambulances for this work.

International Red Relief.—This organization has its headquarters at Valencia, and Local Committees in all the towns and many of the villages in the Governmental zone. It has made itself responsible for the operation of several hospitals previously in existence, and has also established new hospitals, including a considerable number of small ones (twenty-five to thirty beds), which it is now proposed to reduce by amalgamation. The largest hospital under the management of the Red International Relief is the Pasionaria Hospital at Valencia (150 beds).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SITUATION

1. *List of Compulsorily Notifiable Diseases in Spain*

Encephalitis lethargica	Infantile paralysis
Influenza	Whooping-cough
Epidemic cerebro-spinal meningitis	Measles
Scarlet-fever	Diphtheria
Chicken-pox	Varioloid
Smallpox	Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers

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Puerperal septicæmia	Bubonic plague
Asiatic cholera	Yellow fever
Dengue	Typhus fever
Dysentery	Rabies
Trachoma	Leprosy
Pulmonary tuberculosis	Undulant fever

2. Method of Notification

The communal medical officers send the monthly returns of notified cases to the departmental inspectors. These returns also contain all relevant demographic particulars: number of inhabitants, number of births, number of dead births, number of deaths (special mention of deaths of infants below one year). The departmental inspectors draw up weekly returns for each department and send them to the medical statistical service at the Directorate of Public Health, at present at the Ministry. This service ceased to operate for the whole country at the beginning of July, 1936. The evacuation of Madrid has been another reason why the machinery for the comparison of vital statistics has ceased to function. According to the information collected on the spot from the civil and military authorities since the beginning of hostilities, there have been no epidemics of any sort; on the contrary, the health conditions appear to be particularly favourable in this respect.

3. Return of Infectious Diseases Recorded at Madrid during July

The Ministry possesses only incomplete returns. At Madrid, the most definite information was supplied by the National Infectious Diseases Hospital, which is alone authorized to receive the infectious cases coming from the front, from the civilian population

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of Madrid and the province of Madrid, and from among refugees. The hospital has gone on working uninterruptedly. From July 19th, 1936, to January 1st, 1937, the total number of patients treated at the hospital was:

	Cases	Deaths	Case mortality rate %
Typhoid fever . . .	358	42	11.7
Paratyphoid fevers . . .	6	0	0
Pneumonia	88	9	10.2
Dysentery	8	1	12.5
Puerperal septicæmia . . .	10	6	60.0
Tetanus	5	2	40.0
Whooping-cough	83	3	3.6
Poliomyelitis	1	0	0
Malaria	46	0	0
Diphtheria	3	0	0
"Boutonneuse" fever . . .	15	0	0
Tuberculous meningitis . .	14	14	100.0
Undulant fever	20	2	10.0
Scarlet fever	80	8	0
Erysipelas	71	4	5.6
Cerebro-spinal meningitis .	4	2	50.0
Measles	99	10	10.0
Mumps	7	0	0
Pulmonary tuberculosis . .	456	58	12.3
Anthrax	8	0	0
Endocarditis	26	8	30.0
Encephalitis	1	1	100.0
Influenza	41	2	1.8
Chicken-pox.	11	0	0
Septic sore throats. . . .	30	0	0
Miscellaneous	287	40	0
Total	1,778	212	11.9

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Cases of infectious diseases at Madrid notified to the municipal public health service (Head, Dr. ORTEGA) were as follows:

During November:

Typhoid fever	21
Diphtheria	2
Chicken-pox	1
Infantile paralysis	1

During December:

Chicken-pox.	3
Typhoid fever	3
Tuberculosis	22
Measles	2
Scarlet fever	5
Diphtheria	4
Puerperal fever	1

We were able to obtain data for the whole of the Spanish territory under the control of the Valencia Government for the weeks ending November 28th, and December 5th, 12th, and 19th. The total number of notified cases in these four weeks was:

	Cases	Deaths
Typhoid fever	258	42
Chicken-pox	109	—
Diphtheria	80	14
Scarlet fever	62	2
Measles	1,027	4
Whooping-cough	458	5
Influenza	4,070	27

A comparison with figures for the corresponding period in 1935 (four weeks ending December 28th,

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1935) for the whole of Spain shows much higher figures—even when they are reduced by 50% in consideration of the fact that the territory of the Valencia Government comprises about half of the population.

No case of smallpox was notified in 1936 during the period in question. Eighteen cases of smallpox were reported in 1935 at the same period. No typhus was notified in 1936 or 1935 (four weeks).

THE FOOD SITUATION IN MADRID

From the outset, the siege of Madrid raised the problem of supplying food to its population of 1,200,000 inhabitants, which had been further increased by the addition of some 300,000 refugees from the Province of Toledo and from Estremadura.

The war-front stretches from the north-east to the south-west, cutting Spain into two parts: to the east, in the hands of the Government, lie the regions which produce large quantities of wheat, rice, vegetables, fruit and wine; to the west, in the hands of the insurgents, lie the pasturelands and hence the stock-breeding areas. At first sight, it seemed that the Madrid population would run short of meat and milk; whereas provided transport facilities did not fail, regular supplies of flour, olive-oil, vegetables and fruit of all kinds could be expected to continue.

These forecasts proved correct; supplies of meat and of fresh milk have shrunk appreciably, but so far there has been no lack of other foodstuffs, and it may be asserted that, for some time yet, the Madrid population is assured of an adequate if not normally abundant supply of food.

Arrivals are irregular, and long queues of purchasers can be seen outside food-shops; but these

crowds are in excellent health. A market we visited displayed a scene of great activity and we noticed large quantities of potatoes, vegetables and oranges. Thus, the comforting impression which the visitor gains as soon as he arrives is that the Spanish capital is in no way suffering from famine.

Until quite recently, the sale of food was not controlled and, as commonly happens in such circumstances, there was a certain amount of waste. In order to remedy this, the municipal authorities decided upon a system of restriction, which came into operation on January 5th. It is to be extended to the majority of foodstuffs within ten days. We shall show that this system has been planned on very generous lines. Naturally, it will be applied by means of ration-cards, of which several types have been provided: family cards, personal cards for people eating in restaurants, and special cards for the sick.

The ordinary ration will comprise:

(1) Fresh or tinned meat: 150 grammes, for which 100 grammes of ham, 200 grammes of fresh fish, 100 grammes of tinned fish, or 80 grammes of cod may be substituted;

(2) Milk products: half a litre of fresh milk, 130 grammes of condensed milk, 200 grammes of concentrated milk, or 75 grammes of cheese;

(3) Fats: a quarter of a litre of olive-oil, 200 grammes of lard, or 100 grammes of bacon;

(4) Potatoes: 250 grammes, or 100 grammes of lentils, 150 grammes of dried beans, 180 grammes of rice, 150 grammes of broad beans or 100 grammes of dried chick-peas;

(5) 150 grammes of fresh vegetables, or 500 grammes of fruit, or 500 grammes of tinned vegetables (tomatoes, etc.);

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- (6) 25 grammes of coffee or tea, or 30 grammes of chocolate, or 50 grammes of cocoa;
- (7) Sugar: 50 grammes, for which 80 grammes of honey may be substituted;
- (8) Bread: Half a kilogramme.

Salt and spices will not be rationed.

It has been calculated, on the basis of the above rations, that the total food supplies required for the population (civil and military) of Madrid will amount to the following quantities monthly:

	Kg.
Oil	1,644,000
Rice	205,500
Sugar	2,465,700
Cod	822,000
Coffee	120,000
Meat	3,000,000
Dried peas	123,300
Dried French beans	164,000
Lentils	123,300
Potatoes	6,000,000
Eggs (number)	24,000,000

(No estimates have been made for tinned milk, since the amount consumed will depend upon the available supplies of fresh milk.)

We give below various comments made to us by municipal officials in Madrid, concerning the chief products required:

Potatoes.—Requirements can be almost completely met by supplies from the country immediately surrounding the capital—*i.e.*, the provinces of Madrid and Toledo. From these sources alone, a total quantity of 6,000,000 kilogrammes per month

can be obtained in the course of the next three months. Normal consumption before the imposition of restrictions was slightly higher than this figure—*i.e.*, 250 tons a day. It is hoped to make good the deficiency by importing 100 twenty-ton truck-loads from the Netherlands. It is feared, however, that insufficient motor transport may be available to bring this complementary supply to Madrid.

Fresh Vegetables and Fruit.—Plentiful supplies have always been provided by the suburbs of Madrid, and also to some extent by Valencia and Murcia. The suburban supplies will be sufficient to cover the rations provided for, and no transport difficulties will arise.

Meat.—As we have already indicated, this is one of the most difficult problems. Until last November, meat supplies came to Madrid from the neighbouring countryside in quantities almost sufficient for normal consumption needs. To-day, arrivals are hardly sufficient to cover the needs of the army, and this means that, for the last month, there has, for all practical purposes, been no meat for the civilian population. The lack of meat has, however, been offset in part by supplies of fish, and, in particular, of sardines. The Government is endeavouring to import frozen or chilled meat from Yugoslavia and the Argentine; but here again it will be confronted with the problem of the transport needed to bring these supplies to Madrid.

Sugar.—The Madrid district produces large quantities of beet, which is also grown in the other provinces. The year's crop might yield 45 to 50 million kilogrammes of sugar, which would suffice under the rationing system. There is in Madrid itself a sugar factory capable of manufacturing this sugar. The Alcalde informed me that

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coal was being held in reserve, so that the refinery could start work as soon as the sugar-beets had been lifted and brought in.

Milk.—As fresh milk supplies have dwindled, they have been replaced by condensed milk. Hitherto, children have suffered no shortage. There is a large condensed-milk factory in Santander, from which town it is hoped to send in supplies by sea. Swiss and Russian supplies have already reached Spain.

Bread.—Since before the war, bread production in Madrid has been in the hands of a syndicate, the Consorcio de Panderia. This form of organization proved effective in peace-time and even more so since the conflict began, and there has at no time been a shortage of bread.¹ It has therefore been decided to leave the regulation of the bakery trade in the hands of the Consorcio. The sale of bread will remain free, and the municipal authorities have no fears of any sort on this subject.

Coal.—In normal times, Madrid consumes 25 million kilogrammes of coal a month. Monthly consumption has been brought down to 11 million kilogrammes by suspending the production of lighting-gas, by forbidding the heating of dwellings and by reducing the use of electric-light. But in spite of these restrictions, the whole coal-reserves of the town have been used up. There are large supplies of coal in the province of Ciudad Real, but, so long as the transport problem is not solved, the shortage at Madrid will continue.

The situation can be summed up in a few simple words:

¹ There is a shortage of bread in other parts of Spain; Barcelona in particular.

Up to the present, the Madrid population has been able to feed itself fairly adequately. Whilst there has been a shortage of meat, sufficient supplies of fish have been provided. Bread, rice, vegetables, oil and fruit have been available in almost normal quantities. There has been milk for the children. But certain products of primary necessity are beginning to fail; above all there is almost no coal left.

Now railway communications between Madrid and the rest of the country have been completely suspended. To keep up supplies over the roads still communicating with the capital, the number of motor-lorries available is quite inadequate.

The position, although not critical, is serious. If we think of the hundreds of thousands of women and children living in Madrid, we cannot but conclude that it will be necessary to evacuate, as rapidly as possible, the greater part of this civilian population, which is already suffering from the bombardment and which, if the war continues, might find itself threatened by a food shortage. The problem of evacuation has engaged the earnest attention of the mission, and is the subject of one of the main sections of our report.

TECHNICAL NOTE

Should there be an outbreak of typhus fever, the Mission is of opinion that it would be desirable to resort to preventive vaccination. Three methods may be recommended:

1. *The Weigl Method.*—Weight vaccine is prepared at the Lwow Institute in Poland.

It is a killed vaccine, consisting of a formalized suspension of rickettsias. Its preparation is difficult and requires a large and specialized staff; there

could be no question of producing this vaccine in Spain. The Polish Institute can be asked to supply it. It travels well and keeps well. It is supplied only in small quantities, owing to the difficulties attendant upon its preparation. It is given in three injections at intervals of one week.

2. *The Georges Blanc Vaccine* (Casablanca Pasteur Institute).—This is a live vaccine prepared from a typhus virus isolated from rats and attenuated by bile. Supplies of this vaccine are prepared as and when required with the *tunica vaginalis* of guinea-pigs killed on the spot. The preparation does not keep. It is given in one injection. Reactions are rare and usually mild. More than 20,000 inoculations have already been made in Morocco.

3. *The Vaccine of the Tunis Pasteur Institute*.—This is a live vaccine, prepared, like the previous one, with a virus of murine origin. The virus is embodied in a double "coating" excipient consisting of yolk of egg and oil. It is supplied in the form of a dry vaccine, either in powder or in 20-dose tablets. The latter form of presentation is very convenient. For use, the powder or tablets are ground up in sterile olive-oil. Immunisation is effected by a single injection. Reactions are rare and negligible, less marked than those which follow anti-typhoid vaccination.

The vaccine retains its activity for several months when kept in cold storage at -10° C. At ordinary temperatures, it can stand a quick journey, but it is preferable to keep it constantly at a low temperature. Transport in refrigerated thermos flasks is recommended.

The Tunis Pasteur Institute would readily accept a Spanish bacteriologist who could familiarize himself, in two or three weeks, with the technique

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of the preparation and applications of the vaccine, which is, at present, in current use in North Africa. In this way, a producing centre, ready to operate in the event of any epidemic menace, could be organized in Spain itself.¹

¹ By telegram, dated January 16th, the Valencia Government informed us that it had decided to act upon this proposal.

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